Authorization terminology is a mess: Let's fix it
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I’m sure someone thought it all made perfect sense.
Probably someone who never confuses “empathy” and “sympathy” while also carefully distinguishing between “should” and “ought”.
What do you mean by this?
"You should drink more water"
"You ought to help your sick mother"
But there is significant overlap.
Also fun: yesn’t. Yes, but really no.
You'll also need RFC 6919[1] for "OUGHT TO":
> The phrase "OUGHT TO" conveys an optimistic assertion of an implementation behavior that is clearly morally right, and thus does not require substantiation.
And the up-threads gut feel that "ought to" is slightly stronger comes across there, I think: ought to conveys that moral stance, where as "should" is more "there's a decision here, possibly".
[1]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6919.html; n.b., this is an April 1st RFC. I like it, though, and it isn't uncommon to see a stray "ought to" lacking a citation in a non-April-1st RFC.
Hence OUGHT leads to SHOULD and the latter is meaningless without the former.
E.g.: You OUGHT to secure systems that handle sensitive customer data, so you SHOULD regularly patch your software.
Just telling someone they should do something without an initial moral motivation to do the “right thing” can fall on deaf ears.
I’ve seen an official patch management strategy in a government organisation that was simply: “Don’t”.
Their moral argument was that they OUGHT to save taxpayer money and so they SHOULD save time, money, and effort by not applying updates (which they felt weren’t necessary for security).
In other words: OUGHTs are like axioms that you can choose, and then the SHOULDs derive from them automatically.
> they all elide to the same thing
I see what you did there: https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/elide#Usage_notes
Current article title: Authorization terminology is a mess: Let's fix it
That being said, GP mentions OIDC Connect, which is indeed a standard using jargon, just like the IETF uses jargon, and when a standard uses or invents jargon, it makes an effort to define that terminology, and also delineate when it's being used.
https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#Termin...
If someone believes that standards and specifications are written by pedantic people who are precious about the definitions of words, they may also be likely to fire their attorney during a court case, because that attorney just refuses to use plain English in the courtroom.
IMHO, the most elegant method to answer this question is capability based access control. If the subject can utter the action, then it can perform it. And then delegation is the transfer of nouns and verbs to perform the utterances.
This sounds like another layer of weird terminology that doesn't mean anything for someone who is not familiar with whatever capability system you're thinking of.
Say I am a user who can see a particular directory on a shared setup. I try to upload a file in this directory, using the same method that worked on another directory. The question of AuthZ is: will I be allowed to do it or not? In the plain sense of the words, I can absolutely "utter the action", I have all of the "verbs" (upload) and "nouns" (the file, the destination path). Still, I should not be allowed to perform the action if I was only given read-only access here.
Now sure, you can say that "upload to dirA" is a different verb than "upload to dirB". But this is just confusing terminology, it doesn't enlighten anything.
Your accessor, dirB, should not contain the “upload files” verb, while your dirA accessor (noun) should.
My favorite example is the home directory and the file picker. Why should a program have access to all your files by default then politely ask you which file it should read/write to? It would make more sense if the file picker was something the operating system ran when a program wants to edit a file, and what came back to the program after you selected was the accessor for that file (with read and/or write verbs).
So the program only have access to those files you have it access to. It cannot even ask the question to open another file, because it only has opaque accessors to those files it has been given.
If you use this API (via a simple widget library) then the user simply picks a file in their dropbox and the app gets access to that one file. Vs OAuth where you grant the app broad access to the whole dropbox (or maybe some sub-folder).
Instead of an authorisation system trying to find a reason to give you permission, you have to carry the proof in the form of a “verb”. Which you use when you perform the action.
Do you mean that the directory should not be responsible for making this decision and there should be a central authorization authority?
A central authority is not a requirement. What is required is some way making sure capabilities are unforgeable.
This can be a central authority, which then has a completely mechanical task of registering capabilities and their ownership. But it can also be ensured “cryptographically” with a key.
The OS already has a capability system called “file descriptors”. Which works quite well, within its limited scope. This could be expanded out to more areas.
Do you get a huge list of capability keys when you log into the system, one for each path? Do you ask a service for a capability when you want to perform the action?
Furthermore, even here, this doesn't cover another case: what if I am allowed to add files to destPath, but I'm not allowed to modify a specific file? This API still has to fail if `destPath/file.Name` already exists and I'm not allowed to modify it (or it at least has to do something different than when `destPath/file.Name` doesn't already exist).
And even if we accept that we can only ever write things in this way, this still leaves the problem of terminology intact. Depending on the technology, it's simply not true that I can't "utter this phrase" if I don't have the capability. For example, if this is an HTTP API, then I can always do a `POST /dest-path/upload-file` with the file I want, regardless of whether I have the authorization to access that or not. Sure, if it's a HATEOAS-style API, the `GET /dest-path` might not return a link to `./upload-file` at all, but that doesn't mean that I can't utter that sentence - i.e. issue that HTTP request.
So, “utter” there means make a valid request with a key. On both the client side and the server side the keys and validations were invisible to the business logic, they just carried objects as usual.
You created capabilities by registering a handler for the operation, and got back a token object you could hand out and even send over the api to those who were meant to use them. And the clients got these objects which they could just manipulate and keep around for making API requests.
The cool part was that you could never forget to do an authorisation check. The keys were automatically checked when the request came in. An API request handler would have no privilege itself, it would only call the key-validated handlers created when the capability was minted.
All I take issue with is the claim that this is a way to make the unauthorized actions "impossible to utter". The reality is that, at least at some level, you always have to evaluate a request and, based on some cryptography related to user identity, decide if you'll honor it or refuse it. That may be checking a cookie to look up the user and then checking a separate place to see if the user is authorized to perform the action (perhaps with an extra step of finding a role, etc), or it can be checking a "pre-approval" signature obtained at some earlier point as you're describing here, but it's ultimately the same concept, and isn't "implicitly handled" in one case anymore than the other.
The keys were there to stop an attacker, the type-checker helps the good guys stay in line.
I don't think I can imagine what you mean here. How would my compilation success depend on whether an Admin has given me the right to read or write to a certain path?
But the point is, you would not grant access to a “path” or some such. You gain access to a collection of actions, described by types. It can be simple “get/set property” or more complicated actions, maybe involving capabilities to several things at once.
To mint such an access token the “admin” will have say how the actions are performed, and then pass the token to you. The client code then will have a typed set of actions it can perform using the token.
This does not mean that we compile in the specific rights of each user or anything, it only means that we must ensure a valid flow of rights in order for the whole program to compile. You can get a capability in two ways: you mint a capability for something you already can do (you are the admin and own the data base, say), or you receive it (via an API call, say).
There is definitely a knack to design the system with this kind of flow. But once in place it feels very natural, you get the right to do something just in time for your need to do it. Very much principle of least privilege taken to an extreme.
> It would make more sense if the file picker was something the operating system ran when a program wants to edit a file, and what came back to the program after you selected was the accessor for that file (with read and/or write verbs).
I'll make an educated guess that you mean "objects and methods" instead of "subject and action" or "noun and verb" respectively. But it's really the "utter" and "transfer" terminology that I have no idea what it might mean
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Capability-based_security
> Capabilities achieve their objective of improving system security by being used in place of forgeable references. A forgeable reference (for example, a path name) identifies an object, but does not specify which access rights are appropriate for that object and the user program which holds that reference. Consequently, any attempt to access the referenced object must be validated by the operating system, based on the ambient authority of the requesting program, typically via the use of an access-control list (ACL).
> Instead, in a system with capabilities, the mere fact that a user program possesses that capability entitles it to use the referenced object in accordance with the rights that are specified by that capability. In theory, a system with capabilities removes the need for any access control list or similar mechanism by giving all entities all and only the capabilities they will actually need.
https://capnproto.org (used by Cloudflare)
https://spritely.institute/goblins (with wasm support via Hoot)
https://ocapn.org (where things come together in a future open standard)
(shameless plug)
Just in the past year I have wasted several months pulling my hair out due to incorrectly named projects.
It really does turn out naming is important!
Function: a mapping from inputs to outputs, vs "a chink of code that runs and does arbitrary things with global state." Some languages resolve it by using the word procedure (and keyword proc).
(For an amusing read on this subject, see Chapter 5 of Let Over Lambda, which argues that Lisp is actually the least functional language!)
Deserve: can refer to unconditional rights, as well as conditional privileges. (e.g. "every child deserves a safe home", vs. "this person deserves to be punished.")
Positive/Negative have at least 3 separate meanings depending on context (good, present, self-amplifying). e.g. positive feedback can means the system is about to explode, positive symptom can mean "CIA replaced my Shasta again".
Normal can mean "happens all the time" or "is acceptable". Often those two are not in agreement. (People often fuse this one. If it's unusual then it must be bad! If it's common then it must be okay!)
Meaningful: something "means" something if it points beyond itself (as a symbol), or if it doesn't (direct experience).
Example: enjoying a sunset
The experience itself can be deeply satisfying. Or you can project ideas onto it like "I'm blessed", "I earned it", so the experience "points beyond" itself.
(Alan Watts has an excellent video on purpose and meaning, considering our approach to them a uniquely western neurosis.)
Serious: committed, vs overly heavy. People often confuse the two attitudes, which creates a lot of inner resistance. (And ironically produces childishness due to resistance to maturity.)
Selfish: prone to neglect others (bad), vs taking care of yourself (good and natural to every organism, yet often vilified in our culture). You can do both of course but they're kind of independent axes.
Several authors have written in defense of selfishness, but were so abrasive that they did the idea more harm than good!
Meditation can mean 10,000 different things, many of which are opposites (e.g. intentionally directing the attention, vs allowing it to wander freely). (Enlightenment is similarly open to interpretation, even within the same school of thought!)
The team using Salesforce, the data warehouse team, the application development teams, all with different mental models of what "we added 5,000 users today" actually meant in concrete terms.
Source: my own years on data warehouse and application development teams.
Nice work and all regardless
I'd like to fix the prior abstract. Auth and auth upsets me greatly cos we have:
Authentication & Authorization
and we call both/either auth. Hence please help me make this a thing:
AuthENTIcation & AuthORIzation : ENTI & ORI
ENTI- can you enter, ORI (or ORIZ) what can you do?
words dont really matter all that much. people use them because it makes them sound like they know what it is, and if its important and complex, usually have no clue.
ive seen enough "abac" where the attribute is "your login name"
Never change programming/maths in holding onto terrible naming conventions and making really hard stuff even harder to understand (CQRS anyone?)
I don't mean to quarrel about it, but I understood Authentication to be closer to identification. To provide "adequate proof that you are actually who you claim to be".
Even the "can you enter" question falls under authorization; "does the user have appropriate permissions?" Entering is just one of perhaps many subsequent levels of permissions.
But not all systems work this way. There are some systems where you can log in successfully, but then are immediately escorted out because the "can you enter" question has secondary considerations or is decided once identity has been established based on a larger criteria. Expired accounts in some systems work exactly like this.
The distinction between authentication and authorization allows modeling of many different kind of systems, including the degenerate case where identification is treated as a proxy for authorization.
Btw, the kind of thinking behind that degenerate case is what leads to IDOR security bugs - "this person is logged in, so they can access whatever the URL says... even if it's another customer's data!" It turns out that thinking clearly about security helps be more secure, and unfortunately, vice versa.
Not long ago I designed an authentication system which had to be disconnected from authorization pretty fully. The authentication was global in a multi-tenanted system, but access to any tenant was authorized at the tenant level (as well as all other authorization concerns). To be fair, there was some global authorization concerns, but the vast majority of authorizing actions, including tenant access was governed at the tenant level after authentication.
or 4entic5 and 4oriz5, inverting the k8s, i18n pattern...
pronounced "forentics" and "forizes"...
somebody stop me!
It's funny how a graph underlies absolutely everything but no one seems to use them.