Those are of course just minimum viable proofs of concept for users with the CLI installed because they are succinct. Real malware could of course install the CLIs for the user helpfully or just directly access the database the next time it is unlocked and dump everything just as easily. A malicious browser plugin to dump the master password to bulk decrypt works just as well.

Decrypting -all- passwords any time you decrypt -any- password under the hood is an irresponsible design for a password manager, especially on modern hardware with so so so many other options that enforce rate limiting, hardware anchored encryption, and physical user consent.

Performative 2FA for every secret like 1password does when the binary has direct access to bulk decrypt all secrets in plain text with a key in system memory is a very strange choice given you could just have the hardware doing the individual decryption for a single secret instead of exposing the secrets that can bulk decrypt the whole database.