counterargument:
1) let x be a thing
2) I name x "Jeff"
3) all things are nameable (from 1 and 2)
another way to put this is that it's natural to take the paradox as a reductio.
1) let x be a thing
2) I name x "Jeff"
3) all things are nameable (from 1 and 2)
another way to put this is that it's natural to take the paradox as a reductio.
Really, the blurb about "seems impossible to verify this by giving positive instances" contains the tension between constructive math and non-constructive math. Does an unnameable (and undefinable) thing actually exist? If a tree falls in a forest, but no one can hear it, does it make a sound?
I'm not really up on maths so this is possibly a stupid question, but can't any real number be written as an ASCII string, which is basically an integer number, so there is a direct mapping there?
Or is it because the ASCII number wouldn't be in order that makes the difference?
Or is it that you can't write that mapping as a mathematical function perhaps?
But perhaps that's not such a bad thing that I can get answers to my foolish questions!
An unknowable name isn't a very good name, IMHO.
For that matter, the paradox is self-resolving. By labeling the entities it is concerned with as "unnameable things", it has named them. As a collection, entities not otherwise named can be simply referred to as "Bhartrhari's things".