At least verifying a signature is something that does not need complex hardware, so chances are that your trusted hardware can do that.
> Your own trusted hardware AND software, because you're not going to be verifying that signature by hand, and you're not going to load the binary file in memory by hand, so either a kernel or system software (like UEFI) will be handling your trusted binary first. > > But then you're back to needing a clean bootstrap again. (...)
But having solved that bootstrapping problem, you are likewise back to square one with trusting "the payload", only this time the payload isn't the actual payload but the OS kernel, UEFI or whatever that obtains and verifies the actual payload.
You have that OS kernel or UEFI as source code, but you don't know if the source code contains a backdoor unless you either verify it manually, or have it verified and signed in some way by a third party you trust, and there the whole signature thing comes back.
(BTW thanks for the discussion. I'm really enjoying this!)