Comment by scoofy | Hacker News Reader

Comment by scoofy | Hacker News Reader

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>The cogito argument is about thinking, not qualia.

I generally agree with the thrust of your argument -- the article is a mess and borderline unintelligible to this former philosophy postgraduate -- but I might nitpick this. Two points: (1) I do not think there is a substantial difference between whether the cogito is about thinking or perceiving. And (2) I'm not entirely sure the sensation that is thinking is independent from qualia.

I'm in less disagreement, but I'm not entirely sure what you mean by:

>Whether or not something is a moral patient (an entity worthy of consideration by moral agents) is independent of both human care and consciousness.

Moral frameworks are exactly deductive frameworks with arbitrary axioms. Like mathematics, they don't actually exist outside of a mind. Thus, I'm not entirely sure what "human care" means here, but absent humanity (or at least some conscious entity), I'm not sure any conception of morality is sensible.

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An unrelated comment, but I just don't want to double post:

To me the most interesting thing to fall out of starting to understanding intelligence -- and we're definitely not there yet -- is that it is entirely possible that the 'consciousness is an illusion' argument ends up as significantly more serious. Ultimately, solipsism means it sort of doesn't matter, but it could be a kind of Darwin-style "we aren't special" result in thinking going forward.

The cogito argument is about cognitive processes (doubt, deception) which in my view don't depend on phenomenal consciousness. You may be right that the distinction isn't that important, since there's a parallel argument that goes "I experience, I am". It just felt like the article was name-dropping Descartes to support an argument about qualia that had little to do with what Descartes was talking about.

I don't think I worded the part about moral patienthood very clearly. The article presents two possible views as "if something is conscious, then humans should care about it" and "if humans care about something, then it's conscious". I'm saying that we need to keep three things separate: consciousness, moral patienthood, and what humans care about. Consider a being that perceives the redness of red, but has no preferences or positively or negatively valenced experiences; the moral obligation to keep a promise you made to someone who has died; the fact that for most of history, humans didn't care about slaves or non-human animals.

>Thus, I'm not entirely sure what "human care" means here, but absent humanity (or at least some conscious entity), I'm not sure any conception of morality is sensible.

It's the author's phrase, but I take it to mean that consciousness is socially constructed by "what humans care about" in the same way that music is constructed by "what humans like to listen to". There's no single definition because it's inherently a subjective concept.

I believe that making the human species fundamental to a theory of consciousness or a theory of ethics is doomed from the start. We just need to imagine other intelligent beings somewhere in the universe with the same kinds of beliefs, desires, and experiences as we have. It's not that I would say ethics is mind-independent, but it can't arbitrarily privilege one species above all others.

Not much to add except that The Economist pontificating about morality is like a vampire complaining blood tastes funny.

I don't think this kind of comment is helpful at all. We should treat these arguments on their merits, rather than with some ad hominum prejudice. If your (I presume anti-liberal) views are compelling, you wouldn't need to trot them out in as a flippant quip.

I would hope I didn't have to regurgitate that kind of basic intro to logic copy in a forum named after a combinatory logic.

I hate ad hominems leveled (especially against me), but the information about the Economist and this author is relevant. It suggests bad faith (to readers who have noticed a pattern by those sources). Which is not necessarily an ad hominem. Specifically it turns out I already read a problematic piece by this author last year, so the heads up saves me time, attention, and energy.

>The Economist pontificating about morality is like a vampire complaining blood tastes funny

This statement is no where close to a statement that matches your concerns. It implies “we all know the Economist is an inherently unserious rag… which it is obviously not.

The statement, written by someone else, matches what I happen to generally believe about the Economist.

Do not presume to understand other people's concerns based on one or two sentences. I don't know how to explain that in an online conversation, this is more a learn to interact with real life people kind of thing. I would assume older generations still behave that way, because they are more authoritarian.

I could talk about why the 'implication' is not necessarily problem and about why what is 'obvious' to yourself should not be taken for granted when talking through disagreements with other people. But that would take more time and I think a well-rounded college education is supposed teach people these basic humanities skills, not something that can be sorted out online especially these days.

>Do not presume to understand other people's concerns based on one or two sentences.

Expecting to be taken seriously in a good-faith conversation while walking in throwing entirely unargued bombs like OP's comment is asinine. The idea that you should be able to skip the "arguing" part of an intellectual discussion because "I mean come on..." is the sentiment you hold is sophomoric bullshit. It doesn't care about truth, much less considering the person such a claim might actually be wrong.

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