Comment by hliyan | Hacker News Reader

Comment by hliyan | Hacker News Reader

Surprised this article didn't explain the categorical imperative before appealing to it. Here's my interpretation of it, although some would say that (4) is a utilitarian interpretation(even though it's globally utilitarian) and therefore it is not truly categorical.

(1) We all know that doing what's best for oneself does not count as doing something "good" or "right". Even the worst psychopath or monster will do what is best for themselves. "What benefits me" is not a principle on which to decide how to act morally.

(2) The most basic moral principle might be "do no harm", i.e. you are free to do whatever you want as long as you do not cause others harm. This is something that most normal human beings instinctively recognize as a valid way to decide between good and bad actions. This is the absolute minimum moral compass you must possess in order to participate in civilized society.

(3) One level up is the golden rule, or "do unto others as you would have them do unto you" or treating others the same way you would want to be treated. This is generally recognized by many religions as the gold standard for what it means to be a good human being.

(4) Kant goes one level further. He says, basically: "before you do something, ask yourself: if everyone else in the world did what you're about to do as a matter of course, will it make the world better or worse? If it makes the world worse, then don't do it". This is a very basic formulation of Kant's Categorical Imperative.

> Kant goes one level further. He says, basically: "before you do something, ask yourself: if everyone else in the world did what you're about to do as a matter of course, will it make the world better or worse? If it makes the world worse, then don't do it".

This is not the Categorical Imperative. What you're describing is more like Rule Utilitarianism. Kantian ethics is deontological, not consequentialist.

Hence my qualification at the start. My problem with deontological ethics is that the justification of it abruptly hits an impenetrable wall, i.e. the rule or the duty, unless you appeal to some benefit or prevention of harm to rational beings. Even in the Metaphysics of Morals, the whole concept of duty would be arbitrary if not in reference to rational beings. But happy to be corrected.

> Even in the Metaphysics of Morals, the whole concept of duty would be arbitrary if not in reference to rational beings.

In what sense? There's a sense in which there's no moral law without rational agents, but Kant himself is explicit about the "good will" being entirely independent of intended or obtained ends. In other words, no rational agent needs to benefit (or be harmed) in Kant's system for individuals to be morally blameworthy or praiseworthy.

(See GMS 4:394 for the "jewel" analogy, which is most popularly cited as evidence for Kant's position on this.)

I understand that this is the common (and perhaps the prevailing) interpretation, but my question has always been: once you subtract action potential and expected ends, what remains of the concept of "good"? We cannot simply end the inquiry by saying "good will" because it still doesn't clarify what it is that one wills. Disclaimer: not a Kantian scholar.

It's been twenty years since I read Kant, but it differs from utilitarianism in that it has no concern for utility of others, rather it's "if I could pick rules for everybody to follow, those are the rules I should follow. Ergo if I never want anybody to lie to me, then it is always immoral for me to lie -- anything else would be a contradiction, since it assumes two rational agents coming to different conclusions.

A good point, but (a) this merely sounds like a modification of the golden rule: do unto all others, without exception, as you would have done unto you, and (b) the rule isn't an end in itself because the end lies behind the "should" (e.g. why should someone not lie to me).

It's not about what you actually want in this case, but what you could want. It's impossible to want people to betray your trust, because if you wanted it then it wouldn't be betraying your trust.

So that type of lying is strictly forbidden. You do not want to be deceived. But if include in "lies" such things as reading fiction aloud, then that can be permissible as you can want that: you aren't really deceived or betrayed.

Yes, Kant's version is strictly about logic: Is it possible to want everyone to follow the proposed rule without making the rule nonsense?

(4) is not actually co-extensive with any of Kant's four formulations of the CI. To break them down:

1. The "universal law" formulation (GMS 4:421) states that an action if permissible if and only if we can will that maxim of our action becomes a universal law. At no point does the FUL actually ask whether the world becomes a better place, it asks strictly whether there's a logical contraction between the maxim of one's actions and their universalization.

2. The "humanity" formulation (GMS 4:429) states that an action is permissible if and only if it treats its rational subjects (including the actor) as ends in themselves, rather than means. But this too is a logical construction without reference to outcomes: a plain reading of Kant suggests that the HF formulation permits actions that make the world a worse place so long as the maxim behind the action is derived from a basic source of respect for humanity as a means.

3. The "autonomy" formulation (GMS 4:432) is similar to the FUL, except that it asks us to imagine ourselves as a legislator of universal law. My interpretation of this formulation (IMO it's Kant's most confusing) is as his attempt to emphasize that we must not merely follow derivations of universal law, but actively legislate and derive it for ourselves. This effectively layers a constraint on the FUL, but preserves its basic logical structure, i.e. does not ask us to perform casuistry when determining whether an action is permissible.

4. The "kingdom of ends" formulation (GMS 4:439) is intended as a unifying formulation of the first three, and essentially challenges us to test the moral permissibility of the maxims our actions not merely through universalization, humanity, or self-legislation, but as acceptable to an abstract community (Kant's "kingdom") of similarly rational, self-legislating actors. This is arguably Kant in his most Rawlsian/Piagetian state, since there's an additional idea that the permissibility of our actions is qualified and constrained by whether our peers would accept them.

Of these, (4) is arguably the closest to us asking whether the world is made better or worse as our moral test. But two problems emerge. First, Kant himself sees his formulations as co-extensive, meaning that (4) cannot imply any consideration for outcomes if (1) through (3) do not (and they do not, as purely logical, non-casuistic constructions of duty). Second, Kant emphasizes acceptance of actions in the KOE formulation, and acceptance in turn is grounded in (1) through (3). If acceptance were not grounded so, the imperatives in question would be hypothetical rather than categorical.

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