Now, maybe consciousness is produced exclusively through the electrical action of neurons, in which case computers have the necessary machinery to simulate it. But if neurotransmitters, or other things that we haven't even discovered yet, are vital parts of the process that produces consciousness (and I'm not the only one to strongly suspect they are), then computer hardware, lacking anything that even remotely resembles the action of neurotransmitter chemicals, will be unable to produce consciousness.
When I ask people, "When did you first remember feeling conscious?" and receive nonsense replies - mostly people respond with their first memories and make no reference to the feeling of consciousness.
Consciousness, like God, is often explained via gaps. Quantum effects, holography, emergency, any number of hard-to-understand ideas from science.
All of these don't paint a great picture for the idea of consciousness. There's no way to measure it. At least with other sense we can set up discriminative tests - I can use my feeling of the qualia of color to distinguish objects. I can use the qualia of smell to distinguish chemicals. It honestly doesn't feel like it exists at times, it's so elusive.
This is turning into a rant, but make it make sense.
This is why it's The Hard Problem. We can neither ignore it nor make headway against it. It's no surprise that most attempts at talking about it are, as you've noticed, a disaster.
At the risk of making absurd claims about your interiority: you might be overthinking it. It's conceivable that you're an honest philosophical zombie in a world of conscious humans, but more likely whatever you do experience is the same thing everyone else is talking about, and you just don't resonate with their overly grandiose descriptions.
Part of me wonders if, like alexithymia[1], aphantasia, anauralia[2] and anendophasia[3], there exists the inability to recognize one's own conscious experience. We would never know.
1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexithymia
Certainly when I talked about consciousness and the brain, I was going by the most basic, simple definition: awareness. Are you awake and perceiving the world? Then you're conscious. Are you asleep or knocked out? Then you're unconscious.
Now, self-awareness (the ability to reason about one's own consciousness) is one meta step beyond being conscious. Animals have awareness, experience the world through their senses, and so on. But to date, there is no evidence that I'm aware of that animals can reason about their own experience of the world. Learn from it, yes: many animals are capable of remembering past experiences and learning from them (if I push this lever I receive food, and so on). But reasoning about it, thinking about the process of thinking and so on? So far it appears that that ability is unique to human beings. (And contra the paper's authors, I don't believe that the LLMs are doing that. The reasons why would be complex and this comment is long enough already, so I'll defer the long explanation unless anyone actually cares to hear it).
EDIT to add this P.S.: I realized on re-reading my first comment that I wasn't entirely consistent in how I used the term "consciousness". Specifically, when I said that we're not entirely sure how the brain produces consciousness, I was thinking more of self-awareness than of awareness. Sure, we also don't fully understand the mechanics of how the brain takes nerve signals from our retinas and turns that into "sight", but we understand quite a bit of the process. But how the brain produces the sense of self, the sense that "I" exist as a separate being from "you" and all that goes along with that? That's still a deep mystery, and we have (if anything) only the most surface-level understanding of that process. In the rest of my comment I was using the most simple definition of consciousness, as I mentioned... but in that one sentence I slipped into the more meta definition.
Which goes to illustrate how hard these things can be to talk about: any time there's more than one definition for a single word, confusion can arise. I was trying to stick to one definition and I failed; imagine how confusing it can be to have a group discussion where multiple people are mentally thinking of different definitions of the word? There's a good reason why most philosophy texts I read (I took a philosophy minor in college, though I haven't kept up on it) spend the first few chapters carefully defining their terms, only launching into their actual argument once the terms have been defined.
Mm. My answer would be:
The first time I remember feeling conscious, was the first time I, while conscious, noticed the absence of the feeling.
I've been told this is "dissociation"? The sense that I was no longer present in the moment, that I was watching myself as if a homunculus sitting in a cinema? It was brought on by tiredness, I think.
Depends on what you mean, of course. This is the *feeling* of consciousness I refer to, and in the absence of that feeling I still had qualia, it's just that the qualia failed to include the sense of "being there". For a lot of people, qualia is the important thing; I think for most people asking them "When did you first remember feeling conscious?" is like asking a (non-flying) fish "When did you first remember feeling wet?"
> There's no way to measure it. At least with other sense we can set up discriminative tests - I can use my feeling of the qualia of color to distinguish objects.
Indeed, the capacity to have qualia is not measurable from the outside. This is why I am skeptical of all claims, pro and con, about if any given AI has, or lacks, qualia.
However, I do know from experience that I can have altered states of consciousness.
I'm not saying we _should_, just putting the idea out into the aether...
Somehow this sentence is self-contradictory, but I can't quite lay my finger on the exact spot.
I think what they're actually trying to say is that the physical reality of LLMs doesn't leave any metaphysical space for dualism, which is required in their view for "mind". Ed: or maybe not, based on their other comments.