You seem to assume that "this is now final, nothing will change after that". Why would you assume this to be the case?
You seem to assume that "this is now final, nothing will change after that". Why would you assume this to be the case?
The danger of a slippery slope comes when one change enables the next change - for example, a law mandating certain kinds of data collection enables a future decision to discriminate or control based on the collected data. But in this case, no data is being collected, there's no step happening here that enables a more dangerous later step.
If anything, I'd argue this makes it harder to implement more invasive measures later, because rather than arguing that some form of age control is necessary, Illinois will specifically need to argue that age verification is necessary over the existing anonymous system. That's harder than saying "there is no protection for children right now, age verification is the only way forward".
> But they could also just implement verification now, which many governments are trying to do.
That itself is a proof: the voluntary age declaration was and is common on all the services that governments are now trying to force to do age verification, and it wasn't enough.
EDIT: in more general terms, and going beyond age verification thing and over many recent developments in information security, the Internet as a culture is missing an on-line equivalent to a key real-life social feature: the ability to answer with a shocked "gross!", followed by slapping the asker in the face.
Moreover, nothing really seems to have changed in the enforcement of that (as far as I understand, specifically focusing on laws like Illinois') — it's still ultimately the responsibility of parents to ensure their own child doesn't access restricted websites. This legislation would essentially provide a mechanism that makes it easier for parents to do that.
So no, I don't think that that is the right take.
I also find your edit somewhat amusing, as the key reason that age verification is such a topic is because of a different missing real-life social feature, which is the ability to look at someone and identify whether they're an adult or a child, alongside the ability to look at someone's ID without recording all their personal details forever. As they used to say, on the internet, no-one knows if you're a dog, which is both a strength and a weakness. Identifying mechanisms like this (ensuring parents have more control over their own computers, but not requiring full verification anywhere) seems like a reasonable approach to fixing some of the weaknesses of internet anonymity, while still preserving the basic strength that identifying yourself is always opt-in.
It's actually pretty hard not to have a change be part of a slippery slope. It requires including blocks for further behavior as any subset implementation is hard to sell as not being a slippery slope path otherwise.