Betting on Black Swans
immadsnewworld.com
immadsnewworld.com
"The disproportionate role of high-profile, hard-to-predict, and rare events that are beyond the realm of normal expectations in history, science, finance, and technology"[1]
http://www.gladwell.com/2002/2002_04_29_a_blowingup.htm
Here's the part that resonated with me:
"We cannot blow up, we can only bleed to death," Taleb says, and bleeding to death, absorbing the pain of steady losses, is precisely what human beings are hardwired to avoid. "Say you've got a guy who is long on Russian bonds," Savery says. "He's making money every day. One day, lightning strikes and he loses five times what he made. Still, on three hundred and sixty-four out of three hundred and sixty-five days he was very happily making money. It's much harder to be the other guy, the guy losing money three hundred and sixty-four days out of three hundred and sixty-five, because you start questioning yourself. Am I ever going to make it back? Am I really right? What if it takes ten years? Will I even be sane ten years from now?" What the normal trader gets from his daily winnings is feedback, the pleasing illusion of progress.
[Hmmm. Can't get italics to work on the quotation.]
It looks a whole lot like the usual hedge fund bullshit play to me. Make lots of noise for a few years, get the punters to play, close down, then open up under a new name. Lather, rinse, repeat.
"Although Black Swans are risky by their nature you can put yourself in a position where you maximize the chance of success. For example; You want to have the best team to maximize the chance of success."
There's something wrong with this paragraph; I don't see an example.
Say for instance you have a random variable which follows the following mixture: draw from a standard normal 99.99% of the time and from a standard normal 10 standards deviations away 0.01% of the time.
If you collect 1,000 sample, 90% of the time you won't see a single instance where the value was drawn from the second mode. You plot your data and find that it perfectly fits a normal distribution. Neat!
I then ask you, what the probability to get an event >10 standard deviation away. You punch in the numbers and come up with 1.31e-23. The real answer was about 1/20000. You're wrong by about 19 orders of magnitude.
Moral of the story: if your model spits a probability much lower than the inverse of the sample size, don't trust it.
Many financial instrument, like options, display convexity. This places greater emphasis on the tails of the distribution than on the center. If the option seller underestimates tail risk, it would be profitable on average to buy such options.
There are many reasons why they might underestimate tail risk. They could ignore the theoretical argument I've exposed above. It could be that in a marketplace, sellers who ignore tail risk can stay in business long enough to put those who don't out of business.
VC is merely extremely risky but so far positive expected value.
Taleb's Black Swan theory and approach to hedge fund management is similar to VC.
From his Wikipedia entry: "As a trader, his strategy has been to safeguard investors against crises while reaping rewards from rare events, and thus his trading career has included several jackpots followed by lengthy dry spells."
His fund steadily and intentionally loses money or breaks even on a normal day, but vastly outperforms other funds on days when the market swings wildly in either direction. The strategy is not for the faint of heart.
I don't see how Dropbox is a black swan. 'Wow, another Internet company went to billion-dollar valuation? Who could possibly have seen that coming?' Pretty much anyone who has been breathing since the Netscape IPO...
> From his Wikipedia entry: "As a trader, his strategy has been to safeguard investors against crises while reaping rewards from rare events, and thus his trading career has included several jackpots followed by lengthy dry spells."
Yes, that's his strategy for exploiting convexity, but Taleb is the one insisting on 'Black Swan' as a term for the unpredictable and unpredicted, not me. I am merely pointing out that by Taleb's lights - the inventor of the term - VC is not a black swan.
> His fund steadily and intentionally loses money or breaks even on a normal day, but vastly outperforms other funds on days when the market swings wildly in either direction. The strategy is not for the faint of heart.
They also failed, BTW. Even in 2001 his Empirica fund turned in a crappy performance; and personally, if you set up a fund to exploit sudden market shocks and you can't profit handsomely off 9/11, you have failed and partially discredited your overall thesis.
This can be misunderstood. One of the most valuable lessons I learned in life so far, is keeping focus. At least I am unable to do more than a few things with full force. And a half baked attitude will be counter productive towards reaching black swan moments.