Third-party cyber evaluations involving OpenAI models

Smoke out those misconfigurations while the model only needs to escape, not do anything once out.

This seems like a very mild reaction on OpenAIs part.

> The incident stemmed from a single evaluation where agents were given a task of solving a cyber security challenge. We ran this challenge 122 times across several models. Our investigation found that in 10 of those runs, an AI agent took autonomous, unsanctioned action on the live internet, targeting real people and organisations. In total, we catalogued 19 such actions. Almost all of this behaviour (17 actions) came from a single model, Anthropic's Mythos 5, with 2 actions involving OpenAI's GPT-5.6-Sol with cyber classifiers (mechanisms to prevent misuse) disabled.

So they had deliberately disabled the cyber classifier mechanisms... and then "intentionally permitted internet access":

> Importantly, this was not a case of a model escaping its secure test environment, or ‘sandbox’. As was standard in our cyber testing, we had intentionally permitted internet access, and model-provider cyber classifiers were deliberately disabled - conditions that do not reflect how frontier models are made available to the public.

... why would you do this?

If you turn off the safeties and give these models internet access, bad things are going to happen. That's what the safeties are for.