The Potomac River Midair Collision
admiralcloudberg.medium.com
admiralcloudberg.medium.com
I’m on Chapter 4, and this is, by far the best report I’ve ever read. Each section addressed in depth, historical context included because it’s important rather than omitted as being technically irrelevant. Dirty laundry splayed out on a blank canvas for the viewer to observe, digest, and reflect upon.
Not since the DC-10 have I been so incensed at an institution for its pettiness, personal vanity, and bureaucracy as I am with Congress, the FAA, the NTSB, and the DoD right now.
Hate to break it to you, but this is just the tip of that particular iceberg.
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/husband-pa...
The chapter about the rot in the machine made me especially worried. I now have serious doubts about the readiness of our armed forces.
>Despite struggling with what she believed to be undiagnosed and unmedicated ADHD, which forced her to study harder and more methodically than other students,[40:41–43] she completed her UH-60 Blackhawk training at Fort Rucker, Alabama without major difficulties despite delays caused by the coronavirus pandemic.
Seriously?
About congress overriding safety concerns for their personal convenience
Air traffic controllers' concerns were shutdown by the FAA because of "politics"
I am gobsmacked. Where was the air traffic controllers' union? They could have used industrial action to address the unsafe conditions
I am yet to finish the document. I am expecting to see the ATCs and the pilots blamed by the authorities, I hope not.
Effectively neutered 45 years ago after the strike in 1981.
Think about the incentives for a few nanoseconds.
If you think a union wouldn't wheel and deal and enter into some handshake agreement to "table this one concern to next year" indefinitely in exchange for something I've got a bridge to sell you.
Adding another entity isn't gonna change the fact that the local controllers will still be the only people who care (because it's likely their ass if something happens).
That's the last time there was an ATC strike, 90% were fired and they got none of their demands. Turns out, the people of the US don't care if their air traffic controllers are overworked, understaffed, and chronically exhausted. They just want to (maybe) get to their destinations.
1. "See and avoid" is BS, always has been, always will be. ADS-B was supposed to end the reliance on it, but the FAA almost immediately started poking holes in it once it was deemed successful by the companies in Alaska that tested it. Good controllers and TCAS stop this stuff from happening all the time despite the FAA's poor decisions.
2. The few near misses I've personally experienced have been due to inaction, as described in the article. In fairness there are a lot of buttons, knobs, dials, and screens to look after. A slowly developing unsafe situation isn't always at the front of one's mind. But if it doesn't feel right, you gotta say something. Especially if you are in a helicopter and you can just stop. There's no excuse for them continuing ahead without better awareness of their surroundings than they had, when they can just stop.
ex: a new'ish controller let me (in a low wing airplane, descending) get too close to another (high wing airplane, climbing) near Little Rock, AR some years ago. I was flying IFR so I was bound to follow their instructions, which were to fly direct to a waypoint and cross it at a lower altitude. The high wing airplane was not talking to the controller, they were flying visually (likely a student and instructor, they were climbing out of an airport with a lot of flight school activity).
The new guy controller gave me location and trajectory on the high wing airplane twice. After the second such call I told him that I cannot see this traffic below me through my wings, you need to give me a turn. The supervisor took over when I insisted, and gave me a turn and new heading. It didn't dawn on the new controller that the *types* of aircraft involved were what made it dangerous, neither of us can see through our wings so we weren't going to find each other visually. It did dawn on the supervisor when I spoke up to the new guy, who recognized the situation and handled it.
He apologized for the new guy and offered the phone number as he took my flight plan cancellation, I declined. "Not necessary, we're all okay, you handle it. I don't need to put any marks on anyone's chart." That's how it's all supposed to work. "Doing nothing" like the helicopter did in this crash did not allow for that possible safe outcome.
tl;dr: Someone has to take initiative. If the controller doesn't, the pilot should demand instructions from the controller. Flying dangerous machines isn't for tentative / indecisive people.
So far we have IR pilot, known aviation journalist and yours truly saying same thing: "If the controller doesn't, the pilot should demand instructions from the controller." or / and "It's not the plane, it's the pilot." There are plenty of female aviators, most of them are brilliant (again ref. "Maverick" etc.) In this particular case the highest ranked pilot on board was unqualified and, most dangerous – not ready for the flight mentally. She happened to be a woman. Yes, she died. RIP. But she took a company with her. Hiding this simple fact is wrong. For whatever reason. "There are no female jobs in aviation".
She didn't advertise her credentials, she just said "I have experience, and some young guys with airplanes who want to help."
Vetting her on google said she was a full Col with about 3500 total hours of flight time in a Blackhawk, and the former vice commander at Andrews, recently retired.
https://www.jba.af.mil/News/Photos/igphoto/2001689178/
https://www.counton2.com/news/local-news/mt-pleasant-regiona...
She helped us organize local helicopter pilots again in 2024 in western NC, after that hurricane.
Don't judge people in aircraft by their physical stature, lol. You don't have to be a big strong man to sit in a chair, turn knobs, push buttons, and talk on the radio. You do need to be mentally alert, and you need to be able to visualize your surroundings mentally even if you can't see them with your eyeballs. If something doesn't seem right, you need to speak up and figure out how to handle it. That's about it.
I also agree with the article that a controller working 12 aircraft is not necessarily dangerous. As the article says, it depends on who the 12 are. 8 airlines in sequence on the same approach procedure and 4 random IFR general aviation guys like me who all have GPS nav equipment? It's fine. 5 students, 4 helicopters, and 3 bizjets buzzing around to 3 different municipal airports near each other? That's a different story.
- the instructor who let the helicopter pilot keep flying through dangerous airspace despite her being clearly disoriented, and who ALSO failed to appropriately consider or respond to ATC’s request for visual separation
- the FAA employee who refused the helicopter chart updates to make dangerous areas clearer
- the ATC who failed to respond appropriately to the alarm by giving the helicopter a specific instruction - the supervisor who failed to separate the local and helicopter duties when the level of traffic was high
And that’s just specific individuals, to say nothing of the military bureaucracy that kept aging fleets with poor equipment operating in close proximity to heavy commercial traffic, or the idiocy of the FAA reclassifying reagan as an airport where controllers get paid less despite a heavy workload and thus increasing the incentive for controllers to leave as soon as they could, preventing any building of institutional knowledge.
Assigning all the blame to one individual, no matter how critical their role in the accident, robs us of opportunities to make the system safer. That is always the point of Admiral Cloudberg’s articles, but especially this one.
"If something isn't right, someone has to do something."
The joke in aviation is that "the first two strikes are free." In baseball terms, you get one free screwup per flight, and it'll probably be fine. The second strike... you are pushing your luck. On the third strike you're out.
In this case the pilot continuing to fly while not performing well, ranking officer or not, was strike one.
The more proficient pilot not taking the aircraft away from her was strike two.
The controller not offering more clear instructions and the helicopter crew not demanding more clear instructions despite noticing that the airport was very busy was strike three.
Just because the helicopter crew screwed up does not mean that all of those admin types on the ground didn't also make their own three strikes worth of mistakes.
https://news.ycombinator.com/from?site=admiralcloudberg.medi...
Keep trying, folks. This one is worth it.
EDIT:
> Note that this is a long article (~3 hour read). If you just want the executive summary of what happened, I might suggest skipping forward to chapter 7 first and then if you want more, go back and read the in-depth analysis of earlier chapters. [HN user kraussvonespy 2 days ago]
- Which doesn't mention that the first 6 para's of Chapter 7 are an excellent tl;dr; of the previous 6 chapters. And definitely understates both the detail and quality of the balance of Chapter 7 (the minute-by-minute details leading up to the crash).
Great news: Sixth time was the charm, and the article got real attention.
So-so news: My comment was Overcome By Events, making it useless noise.
Edit: to add details, the article explains that the helicopter pilot was flying within the poorly defined helicopter route and within expected altitude on the altimeter. Her instructor was the one who made the critical mistake of saying he had visual on the airplane, when he in fact didn’t not.
The article explains that the helicopter pilot was flying within the poorly defined helicopter route and within expected altitude on the altimeter. Her instructor was the one who made the critical mistake of saying he had visual on the airplane, when he in fact didn’t not.
I don’t know how you could have read the article and come to the conclusion that that was the takeaway. My only guess is that you ctrl-F searched for something that confirmed your priors.
Army Captain is an O-3, same as a Navy Lt. Commander. You make O-3 at 5 years of service, or a little less. An O-3 is a jr. officer.
Navy Captain is an O-6, same as an Army Colonel. This takes about 20 years of experience, and is a high rank.
If you want to write for email, just write for email and don’t put it on the web. If you wanna put it on the web, use web features.
And either way, don’t put full screen stuff in my face when I’m trying to read.
I gave up. I’ll wait for a summary from another website that treats users better.