Passkeys were invented by engineers with zero understanding of consumer brain | Hacker News Reader

Passkeys were invented by engineers with zero understanding of consumer brain

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https://xcancel.com/nikitabier/status/2079787406300266743

I do not know how to use a Passkey in a way that won’t impede how I log in to systems. I’ve been in tech for 26 years, and I understand the Public/private key behind what a Passkey is. Here’s what I don’t understand:

I access a website through at least four different devices (my iPad, iPhone, Windows Desktop computer, and MacBook Pro) and three different browsers on each device (Brave, Firefox, Safari) , and I use LastPass. If I accidentally set up a passkey on my phone (let’s say I use Safari one day instead of my go-to, Brave), can I still log in without that passkey on other devices? Is there a way to ensure that passkey can be used on other devices? Can I add another passkey on another device? How many passkeys can I set up for a particular site/app? I have at least 6 different combination of browser/devices in use.

I don’t want to use Passkeys because I don’t the answers to those questions, and I don’t know whether each website/app that has set up Passkeys has decided the answers to those questions in the same way as the others. For now, I’m going to stick with LastPass and use Passwords; because no matter whether I lose my device or not or whether I’m on my own devices or not, I can be sure I’ll be able to get into a site/app.

Edit: One final consideration, my spouse and I share user/name passwords for some things (notably Pandora and our Amazon Prime account) since they don’t handle things like family logins well; how do both my wife and I use amazon or Pandora with passkeys? Do we each set up passkeys? How do I get her Pass if that’s not an option?

This is the main reason I've avoided passkeys. I have these exact questions and there's no a clear explanation given for these. I don't want to lose access to important accounts.

Agreed, it's the exact same as me, I haven't seen someone put it into such succint words before, so bravo.

I think the reason is because I've anchored passkeys into my understanding of how 2FA works, and the pain of migrating 2FA from one phone to another.

So, I don't want to bother with it.

use an app where you can backup the 2FA DB.

https://f-droid.org/en/packages/org.liberty.android.freeotpp...

oh my god, so not the point.

> there's no a clear explanation

there's. it depends on how the site implemented passkeys.

I'm using multiple devices and passkeys via keepassXC. I haven't lost access or even got locked out of any accounts.

but it's like 2FA, and almost all sites have a clean fallback (backup codes) for 2FA.

> there's. it depends on how the site implemented passkeys.

so. no clear explanation.

the same is true of passwords. some sites provide password reset some don't. how is that not clear?

> some sites provide password reset some don't

I'm yet to see a site that doesn't provide a password reset (excluding websites without passwords). What inane webdev though that'd be a good idea?

How do you sync the KeePassXC file?

I use KeePassXC, just not for passkeys. I used to use Dropbox but now I use Syncthing. I use a strong password and a key file that IS NOT synced.

This is the #1 most common misconception I see about passkeys. They do not make it more likely that you will lose access to your accounts. They actually have nothing to do with account recovery. They are just a stronger primary factor than a password.

Most providers continue to offer email-based recovery in the case that the end-user loses access to their primary factor, regardless of whether the primary factor is a password or a passkey.

And email based account recovery does not make the security advantages of passkeys disappear, which are:

- credential that's guaranteed to be unique

- credential that's guaranteed to be strong

- credential that cannot be phished (due to cryptographic binding to the domain at the time of credential creation)

- changes the incentives for compromising servers (there's nothing worth stealing from the server -- only public keys)

- if/when an app/website transitions to retiring password-based authN, then it will entirely eliminates credential stuffing attacks

And if the account recovery scenario in question is your Gmail or Apple account, then you would need to go through their account recovery flows regardless of whether you were using a password or a passkey:

https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/7682439?hl=en https://support.apple.com/en-us/118574

If you use something like 1Password it's very easy. It stores your Passkey and it syncs cross device. It's another thing but once it's set up it's less of a pain than using authenticator apps or having to find some random iPad that Google popped up an approval prompt on.

This is how I use them but you have to admit that this assumes 3-4 things about a user just to save them the hassle of supplying two factors at login time. It's also unclear to users if passkeys can be migrated from one password manager to another

I'm using bitwarden, but it's possible to use passkeys from multiple devices and if it's not available for whatever reason, you can just login with username/password/token/biological probe/whatever you used before. As an example: GitLab gives you both options right from the start, so you can use whatever you fancy in that particular moment.

Did [someone from the Working Group] ever back down from their implied threat to blacklist Bitwarden for allowing for the sharing/export of passkeys?

That really rubbed me the wrong way, and smacked very heavily of "the big players (MSFT, AAPL, GOOG) can do this - you can't".

I know KeePassXC faced the same threat. I don't know whatever became of it.

It’s really not that hard.

Most of your devices are in the Apple ecosystem and when you are prompted to create a passphrase it will ask you to put it in your iCloud Keychain. Boom, now it is available across all of those

This is how it will work for most people who don’t care about security and just casually use their devices. My boomer mom does this. It’s better than the notebook full of handwritten passwords she was using.

You have chosen lastpass and a multi-ecosystem environment with windows and multiple browsers on each. You have chosen complexity and this is not a limitation of passsphrases as they have been designed for a more common use case.

I use Linux and apple. I have chosen protonpass for my vault. I just tell my OS to save the passkey there and everything works pretty well. If not, my password is right there as fallback. It’s really not that hard.

What if I lose all my apple devices? House break-in and they steal my mac and my phone?

You're basically fucked even if you buy a new one because you need one of the other two to log in.

No technology in the world can protect you against every threat model and unlikely scenario.

What if the robber hits you in the head and you get brain damage and forget your password?

Master password to password vault stored on metal, buried in my backyard and I tell a family member where it is in case I ever get brain damage

Family member gossips "that crazy [deejaaymac] always burying secrets in the backyard..."

Or straight up betrays you (you slighted them at some family event)

If you marry someone you don’t trust, you’re going to have a lot more problems than password compromise.

That is not a rare threat model. Many people use iPhones and Windows computers. Fortunately, Apple has released iCloud Passwords which lets you access passwords and passkeys from a Windows computer.

Did not know that - how well does it work?

That's the point: passkeys, and even 2FA, address rare and unlikely threat scenarios, while defeating most common use cases (delegation by sharing credentials), and making people vulnerable to most common threats (like, losing or breaking your phone).

A password has the best recovery process. Period. Write it down somewhere. It's up to me, no third party.

I had more trouble with a failed 2FA than with a password.

Then you'll login to your Apple iCloud account using your password.

Passkeys are just passwords that require a password manager; you can't login to a password manager without something outside the password manager, usually a password. (That's why they call it "LassPass" and "1Password"; there's one last password you'll still have to maintain.)

No password manager tries to get you to login with a passkey without setting a password, for precisely that reason. Apple, Google, and Microsoft do invite you to login to their password managers via passkey, because it's convenient and unphishable, but they always also allow you to login via password (or "backup codes", which are just backup passwords).

Proton Pass is on the official Passkey client naughty list[1]. I hope the services you log in to don't choose to ban it because of those big, scary X's.

[1] https://passkeys.dev/docs/reference/known-issues/

The fact that services can ban passkey providers is a major red flag in the protocol and the real issue that nobody talks about

well, people are talking about it but it's not making a difference https://lucumr.pocoo.org/2025/9/2/passkeys/

This is why I am so concerned about passkeys. They could be a good improvement, but in practice I already see how it's going to result in Google/Apple/Microsoft/whoever seizing even more control.

The document there is laughable too, because KeepassXC is listed as "not performing User Verification" when it demands manual authorization per request. But this isn't good enough for the passkey people. Ultimately, I see any FOSS option being effectively banned from most services and all important ones. It's a parallel to how you must now be on Cloudflare's nice list or be banned from the majority of the internet.

Yeah they're really trying to solve problems that should be solved at a technical level with soft solutions in porcelain. See also this issue asking keepassxc to disable plaintext exports, which is completely technically feasible

https://github.com/keepassxreboot/keepassxc/issues/10407

The author of this ticket seems to come across as an arrogant know-it-all that thinks "the threats i thought of (or personally face) are the only threats that are significant, fuck anyone in a different situation."

I proudly print my entire KDBX file including passkey private keys and I encourage my elderly parents to do so too.

Lightning strikes (and assisting people with cleanup and repair from them) have taught me that there are definitely a class of threats that will leave me with paper but possibly no technology until I can go buy a cheap laptop to restart my digital life, SO BEING ABLE TO BACK EVERYTHING UP IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL.

His website says he's in Boston, so I seriously doubt he's ever seen what lightning can do or dealt with a hurricane or tornado.

In general, if you're in the FIDO Alliance and had anything to do with the kind of micromanagement that passkeys can allow, FUCK YOU. Go get a job at Walmart as a greeter. We'll all be better off.

>I proudly print my entire KDBX file including passkey private keys and I encourage my elderly parents to do so too.

Do you mean you print the raw values to paper or some encoding that would let you reconstitute the file (some giant QR code or something?)?

I print a nice HTML document - each entry has each field/value in a HTML table and each group gets its own header.

On macOS I use Strongbox's Print Database capability. On Windows, I'm testing a KeePass plugin I created that does the same thing and more (not quite ready for public release).

If I'm still around and coherent, I can re-type it into a KDBX-supporting app by hand (or maybe if I'm lucky only enough entries to get to a backup in cloud storage).

If the worst happens and I'm no longer capable of using a computer, it's an obviously-important document for whoever is cleaning up after me (I bet most people would understand the importance of a document with a bunch of usernames and passwords). They won't have to somehow break into my computer first to be able to figure out what online/digital matters of mine need to be dealt with.

EDIT: My current printout is 46 pages long.

>EDIT: My current printout is 46 pages long.

Wow. Roughly how many entries do you have and how do you handle updates? I'm often being asked to change passwords and of course create new login entries.

57 groups, 307 entries. I try to reprint whenever I get an oil change (so a few times a year).

I don't reprint for every password change. I will for major accounts. I will also immediately print for certain new accounts but not all (e.g. I didn't reprint for my HN account).

The Strongbox printout has the last printed date on it and my KeePass plugin even includes the SHA256 of the KDBX file just to be sure.

That issue was exactly why I took up my "Never use, under any circumstances" stance on passkeys. It is an indictment of the entire passkey project. I now routinely tell the less technical folks in my life, when asked about those weird passkey options, that they are the mark of the beast, and should be avoided at all costs.

See this comment as well:

>I've already heard rumblings that KeepassXC is likely to be featured in a few industry presentations that highlight security challenges with passkey providers, the need for functional and security certification, and the lack of identifying passkey provider attestation (which would allow RPs to block you, and something that I have previously rallied against but rethinking as of late because of these situations).

https://github.com/keepassxreboot/keepassxc/issues/10407#iss...

They 100% will lock it down to "secure" options you cannot control. I suppose if there's any hope, it would maybe be the official keepass submitting to their demands, while keeping them easy to bypass with a recompile.

(I might be wrong, please correct me if I am) What I'm gathering from this page is that the Passkey spec can specify whether the app handling the passkey should prompt the user for biometric scan, PIN code, etc. but some apps simply ignore that flag. This makes sense though. I've already logged into my password manager and it hasn't timed out yet, so why would my password manager prompt me again? I'm glad that they don't prompt me again when I'm already logged in. I don't see this as a problem.

Your understanding is correct and I agree with you. The Passkey spec authors, however, think services should be allowed to ban your client for behaving this way:

> [When UV is required, KeePassXC must request user verification or not handle the request]

> This implementation is not spec compliant and has the potential to be blocked by relying parties.

https://github.com/keepassxreboot/keepassxc/issues/10406

> > This implementation is not spec compliant and has the potential to be blocked by relying parties.

The only conclusion I can come to when it comes to this and the earlier kerfuffle regarding being able to export the plain text of passkeys is 'the spec is bad and you should feel bad'.

Yeah, it sucks. It could've been a cool technology but they're so locked in to "my way or nothing" and won't consider other usecases or security trade-offs other than the ones they decided on. It's just a complete non-starter with that attitude.

Right, not only are you authorized, but you are also prompted to manually complete the request, which will fail if you do not accept. However, this isn't considered sufficient by the passkey people, who do in fact want you to retype your password at each prompt.

If they do, oh well.

Passkeys are a convenience and as I stated above I always have a password as a fallback

Same here, also what if I lose the device?

I can safely write down a password on a piece of paper and keep it somewhere phyisically safe.

Passkeys and 2FA are a usability nightmare if you need to recover, or all the security vanishes if you put usable recovery mechanisms for the passkey or the second factor.

Sounds like something security services would love people to use. Instead of using wrench to extract the password - and distressed person may lose memory, they can just locate the passkey.

Nobody is safe from a nation-state "attack" they'll just go threaten your providers to give up your data. Passwords written on paper are probably safer than a centralized password manager for almost every circumstance other than a government coming after you.

Papers: Safe - yes. Easy to lose/misplace: also yes.

Humanity having millennia of experience securing them: also yes.

I’d like to see them threaten Apple or Bank of America.

You do the same as you do when you lose your SSH key. Restore from backup and move on with your life.

Why is there so much misinformation nonsense around passkeys?

How do you use a restored passkey from backup? Aren't they locked to the device?

That's all I want to know. How do I restore from a backup? Specifically, a backup that I make to a medium I control, like a piece of paper or a burned CD-R in a safe deposit box. If I could get a good answer to that, I could be onboard. But from the conversations that I am getting here, it looks like only certain managers allow it, and with device attestation, they could be banned at any moment by any website with no recourse.

> * and with device attestation, they could be banned at any moment by any website with no recourse.*

Isn't this true of any authentication method? It doesn't seem unique to Passkeys.

Now that I think about it, you are right. But if they could ban my use of written passwords as easily as banning my use of a particular passkey device, why go through all the extra hoops to just be as vulnerable as before? This seems like a whole lot of extra work to do that gains me nothing.

I think it is important to explain why I and others are so reluctant to this.

In security, you identify reasonable threats. You can't protect against all of them, and some may even be contradictory.

When I get a call on my phone that says "Potential Spam", I have never even once in my life decided to run over to my list of passwords and hand them over to the President of the Spanish National Lottery. Not even once.

But on many, many occasions I have dealt with a simple system that was replaced by a more complicated one and something in that Rube Goldberg machine broke down and deprived me of access to money, email, even a parking permit to my office.

Passkeys seem to protect against the former case that has never happened to me, while increasing the chances of the latter that has happened way too often.

It should go without saying that, while you've never given your passwords over to the President of the Spanish National Lottery, there people who do get duped into doing exactly that all the time.

I don't like the default option being to treat everyone like they are a moron. I don't like being treated like a moron.

You aren't considering all the advantages of passkeys.

Passkeys only work on the domain they were created for. Password managers usually default to providing the password of the current website, but nothing stops you from pasting that in at any site.

There is no danger to the credential db being stolen. The website only has your public key.

A website using passkeys can support cross device authentication which allows you to login to on a computer without it ever seeing your credentials.

I'm sure that isn't a complete list. My last point, despite all the comments here, there is no vendor lock in. Bitwarden provides an open source self hostable option. On both Android and Windows 11, you can change your passkey provider to Bitwarden. A proper passkey implementation, should allow multiple passkeys to provide access. My bank does exactly that.

> Passkeys only work on the domain they were created for. Password managers usually default to providing the password of the current website, but nothing stops you from pasting that in at any site.

Considering how my bank has changed the sign-in domain three times (as well as some other sites), I consider this a feature, not a shortcoming.

I don't think the goal of passkeys was ever about making it easier to back them up or protecting you from websites that could ban you. I think (correct me if I'm wrong) the goal was always to make it nigh impossible for attackers to phish your credentials.

If you use Safari, they're locked to all of the devices on your iCloud account, not to a single device.

I login to 1Password on another device and all passkeys are there, and usable.

The OSes I use where that works fine:

- Android - Windows - Linux - macOS - iOS

How? Where are they stored? Which password protects them? How do I back them up? How do you move them to another device? Can I print them out on paper as a last resort measure?

Nobody fucking knows.

it depends on which password manager you are using. if you use Google's then it gets backed up to your Google account.

BitWarden, KeePassXC, and probably a bunch of other password managers have very thorough support for import-export, automatic/periodic backup, sync/merge, etc.

And that's a HUGE issue. SSH keys are easy to manage in comparison to PassKeys.

Are they easier to manage if you have a few hundred SSH keys?

Why are you making stuff up? Of course people know where they're stored in password managers and how they're synced.

password managers do the backup for you based on how you set them up (eg. to your google drive, or to a simple SFTP/FTPS/S3 URI)

those that don't have this built-in (eg. KeePassXC) recommend using Dropbox or some external sync mechanism

but the keys are stored in a file, which you can back up.

> all the security vanishes if you put usable recovery mechanisms for the passkey or the second factor

no, not at all. it still gives you better UX, because when you use the passkey you know it's the site you want to log in to. (because there's mutual authentication.)

2FA secrets can be backed up, and everyone should do that, for the same reason you'd want to do it with passwords.

Passkeys can too, but there it's even more obfuscated than with 2FA.

>Passkeys and 2FA are a usability nightmare if you need to recover, or all the security vanishes if you put usable recovery mechanisms for the passkey or the second factor.

Most providers continue to offer email-based recovery in the case that the end-user loses access to their primary factor, regardless of whether the primary factor is a password or a passkey.

And email based account recovery does not make the security advantages of passkeys disappear, which are:

- credential that's guaranteed to be unique

- credential that's guaranteed to be strong

- credential that cannot be phished (due to cryptographic binding to the domain at the time of credential creation)

- changes the incentives for compromising servers (they're nothing worth stealing from the server -- only public keys)

- if/when an app/website transitions to retiring password-based authN, then it will entirely eliminates credential stuffing attacks

That doesn't really explain if I can use said website on my phone with a password if I login with a passkey on my computer

Hopefully your e-mail is not tied to the passkey that you just lost.

Why not use passkeys in LastPass? Then the passkey travels with you to your devices/apps.

You can store your passkeys in Bitwarden or Keepass vault. Then you can use them through Bitwarden or Keepass apps on any other device. Been using passkeys like this for several years, and it works pretty seamlessly. With Keepass vault, I even have an offline copy as backup.

If you store the key in Bitwarden or Keepass, what makes it different from a password?

The difference is you can't just copy and paste the private key into a phishing website. The login process validates your private key and logs you in.

Also since the service does not store your private key, it is more resistant to data-breaches as that is one less potential breach source.

But most password programs do this too, if you install the plugin (which you pretty much need if you want those same programs to do the passkey thing, anyways)

They are bigger. Not as easy to guess. More like pretty impossible. It's like not letting the user choose the password. That way they can't have a bad password.

But these same services are the reason why my passwords are as short as they are. They made me use 'short passwords' by putting upper limits on them.

It is relatively easy to pick a password length/composition that's pretty much impossible to guess, too. So the benefit you're list is for the company (that has to deal with people picking bad passwords), not the person using their site.

Heck, the company could easily say that your password needs to be 128 characters long and use multiple types of characters - and tell you to use a password manager (that both generates and fills in that information for yet).

Main difference is that my banking website doesn't make me use SMS 2FA if I use a passkey to log in.

Answer to almost all of your questions is that it entirely depends on the service what kind of auth implementation they offer. I personally have completely adopted passkeys and use them with every service that allows it.

I use ProtonPass and have made it the default password store on every device and browser. This way all passkeys get stored in proton and I can login from any other personal device with proton setup.

> ...it entirely depends on the service what kind of auth implementation they offer.

I think that's exactly the problem. These are all answerable questions, but getting those answers is confusing for most people.

Also from experience, most sites will implement it in every wrong way possible.

For example, all the major sites that allow the total of 1 active TotP authenticator app - trying to add one forces to delete the other. Which is fine while you have only one phone and aren't in the process of switching to another one.

With foresight you can get around this since you can reuse the TOTP seed values.

The annoying thing is so many services don't even support TOTP. They either want their own proprietary app, still insist on SMS, some of them even try to get you to use voice prints!

> These are all answerable questions, but getting those answers is confusing for most people.

It's the same answer when someone asks 'how am I supposed to have a different password for every site' and 'how am I supposed to remember a password of X+ characters.' Use a password manager. Pretty sure every major one supports passkeys by now.

Password managers are themselves cross-device footguns and I could easily write the same headline for them myself. I've been working in tech for 20 years now, and I don't use them.

ETA: Well I do use auto-fill in browsers/mobile, but funny thing about this, I have three running on my phone[0], they all activate at the same time, and they contain mostly non-overlapping set of credentials, and I got tired of trying to sync them together, so I just look up passwords manually one by one in each and use clipboard to transfer the credential once I find it.

And I had to stop using passkeys because they interact with this split-brain system in unpredictable ways.

[0] - Specifically: Google Password Manager / Google Autofill / whatever they call it, Samsung Pass / Samsung Wallet (they're sort of but not the same?), and auto-fill built into Firefox.

So passkeys achieve nothing if you can already use strong, secure, random passwords stored in a password manager?

Write it down on a sheet of paper and put the paper in a safe place. As a bonus, I can have multiple copies in multiple places. It is simple, easy, and I have been doing it all my life. I see no reason why it has to be more complicated than that.

Password managers for passkeys have a huge problem when dealing with any kind of remote support or working on someone else's hardware - you can't just copy/paste or type in the passkey so you're forced to install the password manager on a family member's/stranger's/employer's PC or do what? I'm not even sure. At least SSH keys have forwarding when you ssh to a remote machine, how do you "forward" a passkey?

With Apple's Passwords app, you can create "groups" for passwords and passkeys and share them with people. Once shared, the passkey/password automatically fills as if it was that person's own.

I have a "Family" group in my Passwords app where I share passwords and passkeys with family members for exactly this purpose.

Don't think it's any more confusing than e.g. logging in with an email address and password, or logging in with email + code, etc. A website's auth is usually a black box that they don't explain, and the only reason people find passkeys confusing is because they've been conditioned to enter passwords instead.

Passkeys basically MITM the 2FA process so that they can track and deplatform you with a single click across all your accounts.

The biometric verification also allows to confirm that a certain person is holding the device, and they can easily be matched to existing passport/travel databases.

Great system if the good guys have it, a bit problematic if it's abused by nepo kids to hide their crimes.

> Passkeys basically MITM the 2FA process so that they can track and deplatform you with a single click across all your accounts.

I use passkeys with a physical authenticator. How do "they" track and deplatform me with a single click? Can you explain?

The service can use the use the attestation feature to block passkey providers that are deemed undesirable for whatever reason. Hard not to see eventually only major providers being accepted, even things like Microsoft services requiring Microsoft Passkeys using the Microsoft Passkey App which you're now required to have on your phone. Or worse you now need Symantec Passkeys to login to Symantec services (using that example since I believe Symantec had a ToTP App you needed to reverse engineer to extract the ToTP seed from if you wanted to use a different Authenticator)

If a service wanted to do that they could already do that, you even point to an example with a platform requiring their specific app to use the account. I've had banks which required me to have their own time-based code physical security tokens to log in, isn't that in the end the same?

This thing you're talking about isn't inherently a thing about passkeys. If a service wants to remove your ability to log in to their service they can do it in a million different ways.

Also, the above poster said:

> deplatform you with a single click across all your accounts

"They" could do it across all your accounts with a single click. If service A decides to require attestation, how is that now affecting all my accounts?

Unfortunately the US has willfully destroyed a significant amount of goodwill with citizens of their NATO allies. Due to aggressive rhetoric we are forced to look at the risks differently now.

Further centralization on US services for something that already works fine (like 2FA) is unnecessary risk.

I agree the US has torched a lot of international goodwill.

Once again how does this relate to passkeys? You don't have to use US companies to use passkeys. There are European providers of authenticators. What country is Yubico based out of again? Just picking one example, there are others.

these questions all have easy answers that could be quite easily discovered by simply trying to use passkeys, instead of trying to find reasons not to use them.

You shouldn't be forced to discover what capabilities exist by brute force. Just freaking explain it.

But since there's a potential nonzero risk of permanent account loss, I don't want to experiment, and since I can still log in with email/password I'm going to keep doing that.

If you save it via Passwords app, it'll be iOS / macOS mainly, but you can unlock with any Apple device that supports Passkey / Passwords app (so likely modern + reasonably updated) the easiest. If you want it to work "everywhere" then you CAN use your iOS / MacOS Passkey, it will show you a QR code, some places poorly support this, I believe both devices need bluetooth, and then it will authenticate it.

Linux is the only oddball here, I had issues getting this flow to work.

If the UX for Passkey improves, I will go all-in on it, I'm at the point I'd love to just completely block passwords from accessing my account, unless I explicitly enable it temporarily by logging on via passkey, I wish some sites would let me lock my account to this level, it would be better. Passwords feel like they just wind up all over the web.

Weirdly enough you can store multiple passkeys for a given domain, which can get confusing in some cases if they dont have normal names tied to them.

Edit: Originally I thought Passwords from Apple was iOS / macOS only, but its not! So I have been editing my original message, sorry for the confusion, I had forgotten that I can login on Windows with my Passkeys from Apple's ecosystem.

As another poster noted, you can transfer them out of Apple's ecosystem too!

> Linux is the only oddball here, I had issues getting this flow to work.

Take a guess why.

Passkeys are just a trick for vendor lock-in disguised as a security practice.

Firefox just didn't support it cleanly, I think Chrome did, I don't remember. Apparently it's just due to Linux not having a native passkey implementation. Dang.

Edit:

Apparently BitWarden should work, but my particular passkey was not on there.

> Apparently it's just due to Linux not having a native passkey implementation.

Excuse me? The infrastructure for "an apps is trying to login with a private/public key pair, and right now it needs the private key to encrypt some part of the transaction" has existed on Linux since it began.

The problem, as best as I can understand it, is that some/all browsers are not treating passkeys as an extension of the key system that began with ssh(1), even though technically speaking, they are.

I use Bitwarden on Linux. There is no option to do anything with a passkey I have stored there except delete it.

They are, however, completely unphishable, which is a big plus IMHO

What are you talking about? I can literally export all that data to another OS or password manager. Takes a whopping single click.

I didn't realize this was supported, I'm kind of favoring Apple's Passwords app since you can lockdown your account and they are very on top of someone accessing anything of yours. Any time I power on an iPad I havent used for months they tell me a new device can read my texts type of thing, which is a nice paper trail.

I wouldn't favor an application that is locked to a big player account (Microsoft, Apple, Google) where a ToS violation for something unrelated may lock you out of all services, passwords/keys included.

Yes me too. And it works great. I do make a backup of it to another provider once in a while though, just in case.

Only to other proprietary systems within the FIDO Alliance that you don't own or control.

Additionally passkeys allow services to detect and ban specific password managers, so have fun when the only approved managers that works consistently across all services are Google/Apple/Microsoft. There is already a list of "bad" clients here https://passkeys.dev/docs/reference/known-issues/

Again, what are you taking about? There are open source implementations available. I can write my own. They do work. This list just shows some which do not actually implement the spec correctly.

Also moving the goalpost. The post I replied to said I couldn’t export it. I absolutely can, and have, with a single click. To another provider. It’s really not a big deal.

> This list just shows some which do not actually implement the spec correctly.

KeepassXC was threatened to be blocked.[1]

[1] https://github.com/keepassxreboot/keepassxc/issues/10407#iss...

Because they were exporting secrets in plain text. And they didn’t threaten, they said relying partners (so the site itself, for example GitHub) might block them.

This is not some conspiracy, and again has nothing to do with the fact that I can export my key passes

I don’t get the activism here

Unpopular opinion but correct the whole thing has been designed to lock you to devices they make and have themselves be the arbiter of your authentication.

If that wasn't the intent they could have make the thing work like ssh keys, encrypted at rest, you can take them wherever you want.

It is not Apple's job to implement Passkey into Linux, that is up to the Linux community to build up and figure out, and then for Firefox to implement it on Linux. On the other hand, Chrome just works with it, so maybe Firefox either implements it for Linux in-house, or figures out an existing initiative they could invest resources towards and help to prop up so they can integrate against it on Linux.

My issue is not the lack of Linux support, my issue is the dependence on hardware components, that are distributed by a small group of incumbents, that is pretty much baked into the spec.

What they want is to lock your identity to your android and/or iphone devices.

I don't think that's the unpopular opinion, I think that's the standard opinion, outside of the corporate security cloister.

Windows also has the Apple Password app.

https://support.apple.com/guide/icloud-windows/set-up-icloud...

Also note this from the spec:

> A Public Key Credential Source’s generating authenticator determines at creation time whether the public key credential source is allowed to be backed up. Backup eligibility is signaled in authenticator data’s flags along with the current backup state. Backup eligibility is a credential property and is permanent for a given public key credential source. A backup eligible public key credential source is referred to as a multi-device credential whereas one that is not backup eligible is referred to as a single-device credential. See also § 6.1.3 Credential Backup State.

* https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-3/#backup-eligible

Listening to Yubikey and OnePassword talk about this, they actually say "One Person, One Device". Which really speaks to their failure to understand their users.

I would love to see what you’re referencing, can you provide a link or citation to that quote?

the video requires signing up for Yubikey spam. https://app.livestorm.co/yubico-y/securing-trusted-actions-a...

Because the original FIDO/WebAuthn standard was built for device bound credentials. They imagined unique keypairs tied strictly to a specific piece of hardware. Synced passkeys were a compromise, mostly driven by Apple and Google, because per-device credentials are too much friction for general use. It's not that they failed to understand users, it's that they incorrectly assumed the level of inconvenience people are willing to tolerate to be textbook secure (the answer is almost zero inconvenience).

The device bound model also completely falls apart in the enterprise, fails to address shared devices and shift workers where employees share the same PC under the same OS profile, now you're back to needing good old fashioned SSO w/ physical MFA (Yubikey) to attest who the user is in addition to attesting the device itself.

Before synced passkeys, the actual standard is a unique key pair per device. The key pair on my phone shouldn't be synced to my laptop, my laptop should generate it's own key pair.

That is odd, I regularly use my Yubikey on multiple devices, that was the biggest draw.

The Yubikey is the "one device". But most people don't buy Yubikeys so the "one device" is, in practice, a smartphone.

Even then, unless you use one for work, where work can issue you a new one if you lose it, you're going to need (at least) two Yubikeys if you want to go that route, because not having a backup is a bad idea.

This is much, much simpler than you think it is. Passkeys are just passwords that require a password manager. If you lose your passkey, you'll reset your passkey the same way you reset your password, probably with a "forgot my password" email.

(But you're not going to lose it, because you use a password manager, and the passkey will be stored there and synchronized to all of your other devices.)

The weird part is that password managers provide no way for you to copy and paste your passkeys. To present a passkey, you have to use a password manager. This makes it impossible to copy and paste your passkey to the wrong person (someone trying to trick you).

Major password managers don’t even allow you to export your passkeys to a file that you can read/backup yourself. Instead, the password managers each have their own finicky app-to-app mechanism for transferring passkeys from one password manager to another. (I think all the password managers kinda like that lock in.)

Finally, note that for logging into your password manager itself, you'll always require something outside your password manager to login, probably a password, but possibly a YubiKey; your choice. (It's your one "last password," as they call it.)

https://danfabulich.medium.com/passkeys-are-just-passwords-t...

P.S. It's past time to move off of LastPass. LastPass lost all of your passwords again last month, just like they did in 2022. The most similar service is 1Password. If you like LastPass, you'll like 1Password about the same, but 1Password hasn't had multiple terrible security breaches.

I looked up the June 2026 breach and there is no mention of passwords being stolen. Only some PII (Phone, name, email, address) through a third party.

> Major password managers don’t even allow you to export your passkeys to a file that you can read/backup yourself

That's a red flag to me. It's enough that phone backup systems go out of their way to prevent you from accessing your own data, too, for unexplained "sekhurity" reasons.

> P.S. It's past time to move off of LastPass. LastPass lost all of your passwords again last month, just like they did in 2022. The most similar service is 1Password. If you like LastPass, you'll like 1Password about the same, but 1Password hasn't had multiple terrible security breaches.

That's the most annoying thing about password managers, and a major reason I still don't use them: there exists no password manager that is cross-platform (desktop/mobile in particular), local-first, and isn't sketchy or enshittified or otherwise on HN's current "don't use it, use <whatever> instead" list.

For core security tool class, that doesn't inspire confidence.

Apple, Google, Microsoft, Mozilla, and 1Password don’t let you export passkeys to a file that you can read and backup, but Bitwarden, Proton Pass, and KeepassXC do.

I think Bitwarden is on HN's current happy list. (I just use Apple iCloud myself.)

Allowing passkeys to be exported to a plaintext file undermines the phishing protections, at least somewhat. It’s possible to trick you into exporting your passkeys from Bitwarden and sending the file to an attacker.

The major password managers say that this is the reason they don’t allow exporting passkeys, and it’s not false, but they’re also making it harder to switch password managers, which may be their ulterior motive. (You can’t even import those exported passkey files into any of the major password managers, which they would be incentivized to do, if those smaller players had significant marketshare.)

It’s up to you to decide whether protecting yourself from being tricked into exporting your passkeys is worth sacrificing your ability to read them.

I’ve relied on iCloud as well, but just learned that it allows apps to store persistent data. This data is synced between all devices, and there’s no way for you to view or manage/delete it. Even determining which apps do this requires you to enumerate the apps entitlements, which is nontrivial. And so an app you install on your iPhone can have configuration or credentials persist to each iCloud-connected device, and you have no control over it. This is certainly convenient, if that’s the behavior you want; if not, there’s no visibility or control.

Is this different from the per-app enumeration in Account —> iCloud —> Storage? That provides a means to delete per app

Does it provide a way to edit or at least view it?

> That's the most annoying thing about password managers, and a major reason I still don't use them: there exists no password manager that is cross-platform (desktop/mobile in particular), local-first, and isn't sketchy or enshittified or otherwise on HN's current "don't use it, use <whatever> instead" list.

I've used pwsafe for years now. I think it checks off all your boxes. Works on desktop and mobile. Local-first but allows cloud if you really want to. No ads or enshittification. Bonus: Open Source. Other Bonus: Not owned by BigTech or LittleTechThatValuesMonetizationOverSecurity

I had the same frustration, I ended up with Keepass, the store is a open spec db[0] that has several clients, I use it across windows, android, and Linux without any issue and just sync with your favorite file sync tool.

0 - https://keepass.info/help/kb/kdbx.html

Depends on what qualifies as a password "manager", but I've been using pass (https://www.passwordstore.org/) for years on multiple desktops, and have recently added iOS app sepass to my setup (https://sepass.modiot.com/).

Quite complicated to get it all setup (definitely not for non-technical users), but both are GPL and I now have all my passwords available with hardware protection (yubikey on desktop, secure enclave on iOS) in all locations.

It doesn't even have to be something as bare-bones as pass. You can have a full-fledged password manager that is open-source and local-first. KeepassXC (and the OG Keepass) were always OSS and local-first. The original version of Keepass 1.0 for Windows was released long before Lastpass or 1Password[1], so we had an open-source local-first password manager before we had commercial cloud-based managers.

[1] To be more accurate, although it was always proprietary, 1Password was also local-only at first, with syncing only supported by putting it on something like Dropbox. They only added native cloud syncing later and eventually made it cloud-first.

>This is much, much simpler than you think it is. Passkeys are just passwords that require a password manager.

The issue isn't what passkeys _are_ (e.g. explaining they are like public/private "ssh keys" and hoping that type of explanation ends the confusion).

Instead, it's the workflow around passkeys. The websites show very confusing dialog popups and choices that a lot of normal people will not understand. This is a good article with screenshots showing the confusion: https://arstechnica.com/security/2024/12/passkey-technology-...

I have senior citizens asking me about passkeys because their bank and medical websites keep reminding them about switching to passkeys every time they login into their accounts. My recommendation to them is not to do it unless they have a simplistic single vendor setup such as only Apple iPhone and MacBook with iCloud Passwords app. If instead they have a mixed Windows + Apple setup with 3rd-party password manager, they could accidentally put a new passkey into the os or browser instead of their external password manager and not realize what has happened. This happens because the different parties implementing passkeys all have different agendas that suits their interests and that's what makes the workflow confusing for normal people.

I don't think you're giving those seniors good advice. When the banks ask people to "switch" to passkeys, they're not removing the passwords; they're adding passkeys as an alternate login mechanism.

If you lose your bank passkey, (e.g. if you put it in the wrong password manager and you can't figure out where it is) you can just sign in with your bank password.

In the worst case, banks actually don't make it very hard for seniors to reset your password/passkey; just show up at a branch with photo ID, your bank card, and your PIN, and a teller will help you reset your credentials. They do it all the time.

And, remember, seniors could also put a randomly generated password into the wrong password manager. In that case, they'll either have to reset their password, or they'll have figure out what they did, retrieve their password from the OS password manager, and transfer that password to their preferred password manager.

The exact same story applies to passkeys, except, because passkeys can't be copied and pasted, you'd have to figure out how to use the finicky app-to-app transfer system ("Credential Exchange Protocol"). That's probably too complicated for most seniors, so falling back to a password is almost certainly their best bet.

Uh, if you set up a passkey it becomes the default almost always. Then on another device it'll pop up looking for it and look like login failure and you need to "try another way". That's alarming to anyone, not to mention seniors.

Sure, that's alarming, but if you set up a passkey on the "wrong" password manager, you've (temporarily) lost your passkey. You should probably be kinda alarmed about that.

You can click "try another way" and use your password, and then you'll have access to your bank. But then, you should try to resolve that problem. If you (or a trusted friend/family member) can figure out how to use settings to remove the passkey from your bank's account settings, you can do that, or you can ask a bank teller to help you, instead.

(And, luckily, you won't need a bank teller, because you'll still have access to your account.)

> you can ask a bank teller to help you

At virtually all banks, the bank tellers cannot help you with login problems. You will have to call the bank's tech support and somehow navigate AI-modulated phone menu hell.

Citation needed. Walk in with photo ID, a bank card, and your PIN, and all the major banks will send you a reset-password email.

I went to my bank with all my ID and my bank card, talked to the teller and was told to call a support line. One of my parents went through the same thing.

I don't have a citation for you just recent experience, do you have a citation?

Switch to a better bank.

My credit union has people who can help with any online banking/website login issues. They aren't tellers, but they are there. You just need to ask to speak to a customer service rep.

I help run a non-profit and the only time I have ever been able to get this kind of service is when I visit a bank that has in-person business services. Tellers do not have any ability to do any of this.

Tried this, they weren't even able to verify my ID for KYC reasons. Had to go a second time after they blocked my account with zero warning. I have zero expectation that they will be able to help me with a password reset

Even my primary Credit Union is limiting teller roles in branches. There are still people to help, but then you have to go in person. My nearest branch is a day trip away but I can do most banking tasks at any partner CU location.

> In the worst case, banks actually don't make it very hard for seniors to reset your password/passkey; just show up at a branch with photo ID, your bank card, and your PIN, and a teller will help you reset your credentials. They do it all the time.

Maybe... I just ran into an annoying scenario where the largest bank in Canada made an administrative error where they mislinked an account belonging to me to my wife's profile.

I went to a physical branch to get it fixed and was told that branches don't have that kind of ability so I'd have to call customer support.

I called customer support and failed the verification questions because the expected answers were wrong, based on their own clerical error. After failing the verification questions, I just got a "we have to end this call, no additional information can be provided, please visit a branch."

I was able to get around it by calling back in and providing the incorrect, but expected answers to pass the verification step - I imagine, however, that this could have turned into a real nightmare for seniors, or anyone who wasn't able to deduce what the expected verification answers were.

> I went to a physical branch to get it fixed and was told that branches don't have that kind of ability so I'd have to call customer support.

What are the branches even for if not customer support?

> What are the branches even for if not customer support?

Lots of physical locations make the bank seem big/safe/reputable.

Beyond that, it's sales and a place to have ATMs. I have sometimes been able to get a replacement card issued at a branch instead of waiting for one to show up in the mail.

Some branches will accommodate special requests like "can I withdraw $200... in two dollar bills" / take coin deposits but that's been increasingly rare.

My local branch has had a sign on the front door "our coin counter is broken, sorry for the inconvenience" for the past 6 months. I refuse to believe they don't have a working coin counter in a bank branch; they just don't want customers bringing in a big jars of coins.

I didnt even realize you could do that - I just assumed you still had to roll your own coins or use a service like Coin Star

A meeting space to discuss business services, and a terminal for people who insist on depositing cash. They are definitely not a customer support terminal.

Sales. They are there to talk you into getting the premium mortgage.

Banks don't want to run physical branches anymore, hence why, at least in the UK all local branches are done. And central branches are all that exist.

They want to close even them because the only services they have now is ingesting cash, which is getting less and less anyway.

But yeah, any time I've gone into a branch, which they made me do a few months ago to "validate" my documents for a mortgage. Which was just scanning and uploading to their internet..., they've made me sit on the phone to their call centre.

This is more a statement of how awful Canadian banks are than anything else. For anyone unaware we have an oligopoly of five identical banks all of which treat their customers like shit and effectively extract tax from the Canadian population while providing nothing.

> while providing nothing.

You forgot about the endless frustration and annoyance.

Ironic given the prime minister's former employment

With advent of ai-based impersonation, I wonder why in-person reset is not the priority right now

> just show up at a branch

In the UK at least, there are very few brick & mortar branches anymore - banks expect everything to be done online.

sadly it seems like most of the banks I use still enforce antiquated password rules, no MFA and rely on stupid questions most of which can easily be guessed from public records.

Just the other day I was creating an ID on a government web site, which offered a list of security questions such as "Title of your favorite movie" or "Someone that you admired as a child" and the answer was not allowed to have any spaces.

Just absurd.

Security questions have always been ridiculous, but I'll especially never understand how "favorite [thing]" ever made it to production anywhere. "Favorite movie" can change multiple times in the same conversation.

Still better than the government (!!!) website that a few days ago gave me the option of using "What's the name of the company you first worked at?"

You can also just put any answer into the question as long as you will remember it.

It should work for all people and not depend on these “tricks”.

That might change on the country. At least here in Brazil, all logins require some sorth of MFA.

This changes by banks, some send code to our phone number (thought WhatsApp or SMS), others send SMS+email + face ID. All of them require at least the face ID. Some biggest banks requires you to go to ATM to authorize app access. You insert your card, password and authorize there.

There's Mercado Pago, which supports passkeys and standard MFA too. So you can store on bitwarden even.

No doubt preaching to the Choir here but I just generate a new pass phrase and store it in Bitwarden. If course for the non HN audience, much more confusing and dangerous.

Yet they still work and people generally don't have their accounts stolen. Why? Because security is more than technology. Stealing a bank account is illegal and you will be prosecuted for it.

hahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahahaha

Nobody hacks because that's illegal

The optimum amount of hacks is not zero.

You're agreeing precisely with the parent commenter that passkeys are, from a user's perspective, just passwords that require the use of a password manager. The difficulties many people have understanding or using passkeys are valid to point out and criticize, but they're precisely the same difficulties people have moving from the paradigm of "memorizing or writing down all my passwords" to "using a password manager."

> they're precisely the same difficulties people have moving from the paradigm of "memorizing or writing down all my passwords" to "using a password manager."

Errr, no.

You can transfer a password from one manager to another. Those very same password managers won't let you transfer a passkey they hold.

And if you know the password, you can use it anywhere by just typing it in - no complex technology or protocols involved. But using a passkey involves your secure computer talking to another computer, using a complex protocol that can't go via eyeballs and fingers. If you don't have a way to connect the device holding the passkey to the computer wanting your id - say your USB A Yubikey isn't recognised by your phone, then you are out of luck - you can't use that passkey, even though it's sitting in your hand.

And you can't work around that by copying the passkey to a device that can communicate with the service you're using, because you aren't allowed to copy.

It's an unworkable mess. The mess is not created by passkeys themselves, because, as others have said elsewhere the protocol is pure elegance. The mess is created by vendors choosing lock in over transportability. I'm hoping it's a passing phase.

That’s a fair point. My thinking was that, once you’re using a password manager, you’ll A) use it to generate random passwords that would be unwieldy to memorize and B) have passwords synced to all your devices such that you will never deal with the plain text password directly.

Of course it is conceivable to want to directly access the plain text password for reasons you mention, although that would be exceedingly rare (at least for me). In those cases I agree that passkeys don’t work, although I might argue that if the average user thinks they need to access the plain text password, there’s a significant chance that they’re being phished!

> Of course it is conceivable to want to directly access the plain text password for reasons you mention, although that would be exceedingly rare (at least for me).

It's a daily occurrence for me, because especially because of going through steps A) and B), step C) which is copy-paste is needed to actually transfer the unwieldy, unmemorizable password from the password manager that stores it, into the app that requires it, when the autofill service refuses to communicate between the two.

But that sounds like precisely what standardized passkey integration in the browser and website solves! This is honestly how I think about passkeys: they're a standard API for browsers and websites to integrate with password managers without needing a browser extension to manually look for and fill out text inputs on the page.

> This is honestly how I think about passkeys: they're a standard API for browsers and websites to integrate with password managers without needing a browser extension to manually look for and fill out text inputs on the page.

But it isn't always that simple. I have a work laptop. It has a MDM installed, so I can't trust it. I don't run my personal password manager on it, ever. But occasionally I go to a web site I don't care too much about, whose credentials are stored in my password manager. It's not an issue; I just type that password in. That doesn't work with passkeys.

Then there is backup. If I lost my password store I'd be toast. Which means if the company that manages my passwords took a dislike to me and banned my account, I'm in a world of pain. I deliberately choose a password manager that makes that unlikely, but not everyone knows to do that. Many people use Google, Apple or Microsoft as their passkey manager. These companies have seen fit to ban accounts without warning and no recourse.

My password manager lets me export all my passwords as plain text, so for my passwords this potential for lock-in is a non issue - I just export, encrypt, upload the result to a few places, I'm safe. I can always upload the data to a another password manager. As that doesn't work for passkeys, I don't use them.

Passkeys will become acceptable to me once multiple independent storage providers become available for passkeys, and they allow me to freely choose other certified others as a backup. Until that happens, they only solved half the problem. It looks to be the half that locks their customers into their platform.

PS: this doesn't require much. Just Google/Apple to implement CXS along with government providers, and we are there. But it won't happen any time soon.

The what and why make sense. The how is poorly done. People are generally familiar with passwords but passkeys are different.

So you're saying that if you're inside Apple's walled garden, it works really well! Hmm...

> So you're saying that if you're inside Apple's walled garden, it works really well! Hmm...

Or google. If you use android and chrome then it all just works.

But god help you if you want to use a password manager to keep everything in sync; I haven't yet found a way for a mobile app or web page to explicitly signal to the device that the passkey to be created should live in $password_manager and not whatever built-in/on-device key-store exists.

So I only really use pass keys for desktop/web things because that's the only place the "store/read from $password_manager" flow _works_.

It's probably not something the app or web page should have any visibility or control over. It's more something the browsers and OS should allow a straightforward selection of where you want your passkeys stored (ideally something you can configure the default for globally). But of course the OS and browser vendors are trying to compete to do it, so they're not incentivised to make it obvious or fair.

>I haven't yet found a way for a mobile app or web page to explicitly signal to the device that the passkey to be created should live in $password_manager and not whatever built-in/on-device key-store exists.

On Android 17 (on Pixel) you can select the password service under Settings -> Passwords and passkeys -> Preferred service.

If you have an alternative password manager installed, it will be listed there along with Google's own password manager. iOS has a similar setting but I don't know exactly where off the top of my head.

> On Android 17 (on Pixel) you can select the password service under Settings -> Passwords and passkeys -> Preferred service.

I have this set to my password manager but I still can't _use_ the pass-keys in my password manager to sign in to most apps.

"Most" apps? So it works in some apps, but not others?

Setting your preferred password/passkey manager on Android 17 to 1Password works fine in Chrome and Firefox to log in to any site, presenting passkeys managed in 1Password. It also works in all of Meta's native apps. (I'm pretty sure it works the same in Bitwarden.)

Whatever issue you're having, it's not an inherent limitation of Android passkeys. It might be a bug in your passkey manager…?

> Setting your preferred password/passkey manager on Android 17 to 1Password works fine in Chrome and Firefox to log in to any site, presenting passkeys managed in 1Password

I went to `github.com` in chrome (not my default browser) and firefox and tried to sign in with pass key. I never even got a prompt from 1password to unlock to use the pass key, just a "no pass keys available" message from what looks like the system UI.

When I go to passwords & passkeys, 1password is the only item listed under preferred service. Google shows up under additional services but I have the toggle set to off.

so yeah, I just auto-fill my username and password like it's 2018.

> Setting your preferred password/passkey manager on Android 17

Which approximately no one is using yet. Maybe in two weeks, when the new Samsung flagships roll out, to two months, when they start updating current generation devices...

> to 1Password works fine in Chrome and Firefox to log in to any site, presenting passkeys managed in 1Password.

Perhaps. But does it work with System Web UI, which I imagine is Chrome but have no clue how it's accessed?

https://f-droid.org/packages/de.noisruker.openPasskeyAuth

Use this then totally offline

Works fine on iOS. All my passkeys are in 1Password, and every prompt to use or save a passkey goes through 1P. You can also control which password managers are active on iOS (eg, I disable iCloud passwords, and only allow “autofill from” 1Password.)

So yeah, this is cross platform on iOS, macOS, Windows, and Linux.

No one is convincing you need to use it. If it makes it makes other people's lives easy then ok

>I have senior citizens asking me

>instead they have a mixed Windows + Apple setup with 3rd-party password manager

Why do I feel like this scenario is entirely fabricated.

What fucking "senior citizen" is confused by a passkey, but has multiple devices and password managers?

> This makes it impossible to copy and paste your passkey to the wrong person (someone trying to trick you).

It also, unfortunately, means it's not possible (via most passkey implementations) to back those passkeys up to paper. Which is quite unfortunate: backing up to paper is one of the most stable and human accessible ways of ensuring redundancy and continuity, an inevitable but also oft-ignored part of credential management.

Security folks would like to pretend "solving continuity" isn't a problem, or is a problem that doesn't need to be accessible.

> back those passkeys up to paper

Is writing down passwords something people do? I have countless passwords saved over >20 years and I don’t think I’ve ever recorded one to paper. I even checked a couple of popular password management solutions and they don’t seem to have “print” functionality.

It is absolutely a thing people do. Google even offers a convenient printout as a way to provide account recovery.

Yes, this is extremely common, both as a continuity means and/or as a localized password manager. Know someone who uses a Rolodex for hers, which is funny and yet it works.

Doesn't work well in office environments, but at home the local threat model is largely fine with this.

The passphrase to my bitwarden database is in my will. And a bitlocker decryption key is right beside it.

It is what the vast majority of people do.

I doubt if that’s true since the vast majority of people no longer have printers. Not even the vast majority of online people.

I was not aware writing down a password required printers.

Both pens and pencils exist.

Yes. Old people constantly do it, since they have no hope of remembering 15 passwords. Sometimes, they can barely remember 1 (one).

I've written down one: the master password for my Keepass database, along with instructions on how to get to and open that file. It's in a 'open if I'm no longer alive' envelope.

> Is writing down passwords something people do?

Yes, it's pretty common.

Yes:

  Paranoid password printing with a Raspberry Pi
  https://7402.org/blog/2020/paranoid-password-printing-pi.html

I am an engineer and have some insights on the discussions and developments around it.

ITS NOT SIMPLE AT ALL

1. The idea was to provide a phishing resistant authentication method for enterprise users (companies loose quite a lot of money to phishing).

2. Majority of industry players shared the vision of a credential which is available across the platforms and browsers

3. The vision for collaboration never materialized so everyone went their own way to implement it. Examples would be google rolling out browser (Chrome) managed authentication which led to this situation where even on the same machine you have to remember which browser you used to create the Passkey credential.

4. Interestingly enough the earlier popular name was WebAuthn, Apple started calling it Passkey on fly, given Apple's popularity everyone just caved in.

5. My personal interpretation is that in some sense Apple wanted to be the default password manager on Apple devices.

6. This is when all password manager companies jumped in strongly to save their business and the protocol went into a direction where you can use your existing password manager to store the credential/Passkey as well

Personally its a mess, the phishing resistant aspect has its own benefits though. If you are using it with security in mind then my recommendation would be to use a hardware backed security key with NFC enabled. Everything else is pretty much lipstick on pig, they are worse than passwords in some sense from usage perspective.

It should have never been a cloud password manager play. It should be hardware device only, and tied to the device. One passkey on each hardware device.

That leads to the cross-device usability issues from the original post. Even for an experienced engineer, it's a headache to manage multiple devices across multiple sites.

With the "cloud password manager" angle there is some hope of being user friendly, although we're certainly not there yet for most folks.

Then most of us would never use it. That means either:

- Only one specific device can ever login (bad).

- It doesn't limit login to one specific device, therefore it does nothing.

Linking Passkeys to a physical device was always DoA. At least not without a way to enroll every device you own, and strong recovery strategies. But considering how inconsistent every company's Passkey implementation is (inc. many that only allow ONE TOTAL!), it is DoA.

> Only one specific device can ever login

That's entirely service dependent, and the standard doesn't mandate "Service must not allow multiple passkeys"

> It doesn't limit login to one specific device, therefore it does nothing.

It's not nothing. It provides an attestation that you the user are in physical possession of the device, and have passed the challenge to release the key form the TPM (biometrics, pin, something like a yubikey).

Giving your private key to a cloud password vault makes it phishable again (via an attacker getting acsess to your vault, just like with passwords). The private keys are supposed to be non-exportable, and the cloud password managers defeat that as well.

>> Only one specific device can ever login

> That's entirely service dependent, and the standard doesn't mandate "Service must not allow multiple passkeys"

Unfortunately, given the laziness, incompetence, and cost-consciousness of organizations like traditional financial institutions, telcos, governments, etc., many of them have & will end up with that implementation.

> That's entirely service dependent, and the standard doesn't mandate "Service must not allow multiple passkeys"

In fact WebAuthn is explicit that you should allow multiple tokens. But every time I see an HN thread it has people who insist this doesn't work or at least isn't common. When asked for examples, if they give any answers...

1. Most often these are sites where you can't use this technology at all. They'll have TOTP or something and apparently "I don't know anything about this" == "I know everything there is to know about this topic" in the increasingly LLM-crazy world we inhabit.

2. Usually otherwise it's AWS. Which is pretty annoying, but it's one site. I have like a couple of dozen places where I use WebAuthn and in all of those two (or three, or in a few cases four) tokens are enrolled. I don't have an AWS account, my employer is a Microsoft-only shop in this respect.

Why? The "one device" can be something portable like a Yubikey-like USB key, or for that matter, a smart phone, because people are already forced to use phones to do authentication codes, so it is kind of assumed a phone is always with you. In fact there is an existing workflow for this, where you use the phone to scan a QR code and pass the challenge back.

Then I wouldn't use it, and I would probably stop using services that tried to push me in to it.

I use multiple devices and I want to log in to things using only my master password. I also want to be able to back up my credentials to local encrypted storage so I can restore them if my password manager service provider stops operating or becomes untenable.

Yes, this is exactly the problem.

Multiple pieces of software vying to be your passkey provider, often using dark patterns so you don’t realize you’re making a choice, and not using the term “passkey” so people are using the technology without knowing what it is or how to research it.

Kind of reflects the state of the web today, where every company wants to be your intermediary in every interaction, from making a purchase to transcribing a meeting.

> Multiple pieces of software vying to be your passkey provider,

Which entirely defeats the point of using passkeys. There shouldn't be a passkey provider the "provider" is your device's TPM/secure enclave + your biometric challenge. They are supposed to be mathematically non-exportable, device-bound.

Yeah - and as a user, I don't want my device manufacturer to have that level of influence or control over the authentication that I use for unrelated services.

> They are supposed to be mathematically non-exportable, device-bound.

Which would make the whole scheme unworkable (at least for me).

I pair of hardware keys (Token2, Yubico, etc) has the benefits from both worlds.

Except enrollability. Got a new account? You need physical access to both tokens to enroll it. Got a new token? You'll have to individually enroll every website - provided they even support multiple tokens at all...

Yubikey tried to solve this, for obvious reasons. Their proposal was DOA.

I believe it was DOA because it defeated the main idea of tokens.

"supposed" is doing a lot of heavy-lifting here. According to who? The FIDO2 or Webauthn standards? Or in a perfect world?

FIDO 1.0 started as two different standards: UAF and U2F. U2F was for USB keys used as second factors (so almost always stored in a TPM-like chip and device-bound, but not provided by your platform and there could be multiple of them). UAF were either provided by your platform or by any software and there was no requirement for them to be stored in TPM. Back in the day, very few platform had any FIDO support built-in, so in practice UAF was always done in software (usually based on whatever biometrics/TPM the hardware provided).

So competing options were the default for early FIDO, getting a default platform option is something that came later.

The anti-phising benefits are still very much there even if you sync them to pw manager. Yes it introduces single point of failure (pw manager), but at the same time you no longer need to go reset all your passwords to every service you use if you happen to lose that device. Tradeoffs.

WebAuthn is the standard for token authentication.

(I.e., Yubikeys and other USB sticks.)

It works fine and it a no-brainer to use.

The problems start when vendors start trying to shoehorn their shitty cloud auth services into WebAuthn.

How well does that Yubikey work with an iPhone?

Works just fine, you have to get the one with NFC

You can also plug them in to the USB-C port, works just fine.

Some functionality is not supported via USB-C. Namely HMAC Challenge does not work via usb-c but will work via lighting port.

iPhones are a lost cause.

Passkeys on my iPhone works awesome.

Too bad for Yubikey. I don't need them any more.

Works great, they even have ones with USB on one side and Lightning on the other for older iPhones.

I don’t see hardware tokens (like Yubikey) in the list. Those are the only ones that provide a true second factor, to protect against the theft or compromise of your primary device.

I’m a little afraid that hardware tokens are getting lost in all the passkey marketing BS. At least they continue to work for now.

> I don’t see hardware tokens (like Yubikey) in the list. Those are the only ones that provide a true second factor

passkeys are not meant to be a second factor; they are meant to replace the password as a primary factor.

>to protect against the theft or compromise of your primary device.

I love Yubikeys, but the only additional protection you get by making the passkey hardware-bound is preventing an attacker who has already compromised your operating system from stealing the credential.

But! Unless you are also doing hardware binding of the session (aka cookie) after sign-in, then doing hardware binding of your credential is mostly security theater, because the attacker can just wait for you to sign in and then steal your session.

And there is standards work happening separately for hardening session security, such as DBSC: https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-dbsc/

I have no idea if Yubico is involved with DBSC, but I would hope that they are, because it would help them make Yubikeys live up to the security guarantees that I personally feel are heavily implied by their marketing.

There are some parts of this that are correct and other parts that are incorrect:

>1. The idea was to provide a phishing resistant authentication method for enterprise users (companies loose quite a lot of money to phishing).

This is incorrect. The idea was to provide a phishing resistant primary factor that could compete with the usability of passwords to the point that consumers would actually want to adopt it.

>2. Majority of industry players shared the vision of a credential which is available across the platforms and browsers

This is correct/accurate.

> 3. The vision for collaboration never materialized so everyone went their own way to implement it. Examples would be google rolling out browser (Chrome) managed authentication which led to this situation where even on the same machine you have to remember which browser you used to create the Passkey credential.

IIRC at least Chrome's default on Apple platforms is to save to the Passwords app by default. There are then multiple fallback options in the case that the user isn't using the default credential provider -- ultimately falling back all the way to cross-device passkey sign-in (the QR-code initiated sign in) or Security Key.

The security engineering behind the QR-code cross-device sign-in stuff is interesting: https://www.corbado.com/blog/webauthn-passkey-qr-code#4-pass...

That said, I strongly agree that fragmentation of where passkeys get saved is super confusing and I wish there:

(a) was stronger guidance from the FIDO alliance on both educating users that it's totally fine to have multiple passkeys across different ecosystems (e.g. one in Apple, one in Google), and;

(b) that all the credential managers could figure out a better way to place nice together and make it super clear to the end-user where a passkey is getting stored, what context it's for (e.g. personal vs. work), and actively help them store it in the right place (which might be different credential manager app for personal vs. work!).

> 4. Interestingly enough the earlier popular name was WebAuthn, Apple started calling it Passkey on fly, given Apple's popularity everyone just caved in.

This is incorrect -- passkeys are not just another name for WebAuthn. If you go back and look at the original definition Apple gave for the word passkey, you'll find that it was meant to be a discoverable WebAuthn credential that syncs across a user's devices with end-to-end encryption. There was a bunch of industry thrash around the definition, but it seems like the original Apple definition has largely stuck/settled now, and when passkeys don't sync they're typically called "device-bound passkeys" rather than just "passkeys".

>5. My personal interpretation is that in some sense Apple wanted to be the default password manager on Apple devices.

If you go back and watch the original passkeys announcement from Apple, their stated goal was to create something that is both a better user experience and more secure than passwords. By "better user experience", they meant the act of creating credentials and then repeatedly using those credentials (logging in).

Part of actually achieving that goal means there needs to be something that "just works automatically out of the box" which means there needs to be a built-in credential manager. That said, Apple credential manager had already existed for many many years by the time passkeys came around. The only thing that changed was instead of being solely accessible from inside System Settings (which was hard for the average user to find), the functionality moved into a standalone Passwords app.

>6. This is when all password manager companies jumped in strongly to save their business and the protocol went into a direction where you can use your existing password manager to store the credential/Passkey as well

I think it's a huge positive that all the password managers jumped on board, and that they could jump on board (since WebAuthn is an open standard). I think this is a good thing for consumer choice and for overall adoption and perception of passkeys. A lot of folks (including on this thread) have big tech lock-in conspiracy theories about passkeys, and the conspiracy theories would be even more prevalent without a wide spectrum of consumer choice for credential managers.

>If you are using it with security in mind then my recommendation would be to use a hardware backed security key with NFC enabled. Everything else is pretty much lipstick on pig, they are worse than passwords in some sense from usage perspective.

Passkeys protect against phishing attacks, and you get that protection regardless of whether the credential is hardware-bound or not. That protection comes from the cryptographic binding of the credential to the domain at the time of credential creation.

The only additional protection you get by making the passkey hardware-bound is preventing an attacker who has already compromised your operating system from stealing the credential. But! Unless you are also doing hardware binding of the session (aka cookie) after sign-in, then doing hardware binding of your credential is mostly security theater, because the attacker can just wait for you to sign in and then steal your session.

And there is standards work happening separately for hardening session security, such as DBSC: https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-dbsc/

I try to be accurate when sharing information like this. Some things are fact and some things are opinions, I already tried to annotate the opinions as interpretation. Most of the information is first hand, I was a member of FIDO alliance in past, have been watching these discussions.

1. This can be subjective, Unfortunately Customer identity is not on the highest priority from security perspective, its all about ease of product use when it comes to customer identity. For customer identity, most account recovery methods still fall back to email or SMS even if you have 2FA configured. The real money lost with phishing is with enterprise identity, when some one poses as an employee. The recovery of these accounts can be managed. If a customer account gets hacked then the business is not really on the hook to make it even.

> Usability of passwords

This is the biggest point of contention as per my interpretation. The industry did a very poor job of securing their infrastructure leading the massive leaks of password databases. Instead of fixing that goal post changed, with the by introduction of PASSWORDLESS. The passwordless works just fine for enterprise identities, not the customer identity. Even for enterprises, you cannot get rid of passwords if you get into AAL concepts (guidelines provided by NIST for authenticator assurance levels)

4. I was working on WebAuthn when the term passkey was not there, I was there when the term was introduced, I saw how every one was trying to map their existing definition/understnading with the new terminology specially the part where Apple just announced them to be syncable. Enterprise companies had to actually disable the Apple Passkeys for this reason to begin with. I found it interesting to see how Yubico changed their documentation overnight, they switched every instance of WebAuthn keyword with Passkey. It took some time to settle on how to categorize discoverable credentials (where meta information about user is on the device in addition to credential) and non-discoverable credentials (hardware keys, they are limited in space so they did not store user meta information in earlier versions). Eventually google took the lead in calling the credential where private key cannot be synched as Security key and everything else as Passkey. Resident key, syncable, synched are all different bits of the WebAuthn assertion

5. Thats an interpretation of how I read things based on the overall play going on.

> Passkeys protect against phishing attacks, and you get that protection regardless of whether the credential is hardware-bound or not. That protection comes from the cryptographic binding of the credential to the domain at the time of credential creation.

The security aspect is tightly coupled with the authenticator implementation. The phishing aspect is the only default good in here, it just means that the credential is strictly tied to a particular domain, the one on which it was set, that too is highly dependent on the client (browser) doing the right thing. Additionally you have to count on the server to not get compromised as well (There is a a feature to support multiple domains).

Most importantly, when you make something this hard and complex to understand then be advised that people are going to make mistakes in implementation and leave gaps in security.

> The idea was to provide a phishing resistant authentication method for enterprise users (companies loose quite a lot of money to phishing).

Honest question: If the main issue is phishing, why wasn't something like Yubikey adopted more widely - or dongles, or the venerable chip cards we have since the 80s?

Everyone knows what a key is - I mean the thing you open doors with. Most people know the basic security implications as well as what to do if you lose one.

The simplest way to translate that to "electronic keys" would be a dongle or chip card - that lets a device use its identity as long as its plugged in, but is not physically locked to that device. A user can unplug it, take it home with them or plug it into a different device. What a user can't do is copy them, so the same phishing protections as with passkeys are provided.

But for some reason, this never caught on except for niche solutions. Instead, the industry is increasingly moving to systems where the keys are fused with the devices themselves, using TPMs or similar technologies that can't be removed from the device. Which gives you all the well-kniwn hassles if keys have to be moved or devices get lost or stolen.

But I don't understand why this is done.

Having to rely on a possibly proprietary password manager app to use a passkey sounds like a nightmare. A lot could go wrong with the password manager like becoming incompatible, becoming subscription based, lack of updates for bugs, etc. I don’t passkeys for the same reason as the original commenter.

So to login using a public PC, you need either USB access (and carry around your password manager) or you need to install the password manager on the PC to log into a website?

There’s a process to scan a QR code with your phone and your phone then authenticates with the passkey.

Discord has an option to login with qr code. And it's very often used maliciously to steal accounts.

The passkey method uses Bluetooth to ensure proximity.

Wait a sec. My understanding is that passkeys are public/private keypairs. Public is in server, so even breaking into a server does not reveal the private key.

The big risk with passkeys is storing the passkey where it will be held hostage. Don't store it in most single-ecosystem devices like Apple. Bitwarden can export, and I think 1Password can as well.

That's where the attestation feature comes in. It allows them to force you into a hostage situations by restricting passkey implementation. There's a reason that was part of the spec from the get go but a passkey transfer system wasn't.

This is not much simpler than they think it is.

> But you're not going to lose it, because you use a password manager, and the passkey will be stored there and synchronized to all of your other devices

That's just wrong. I use android, my partner uses ios. If he creates the passkey in safari, it's not going to get synced over to my phone. And that's just the first of the family sharing passwords issues. Same person issue is also present if somebody uses an iphone and a windows laptop, or chromebook.

It doesn't help that all modern browsers eagerly try to step in and offer their implementation of passkeys for logins, and they're not featured enough to support the type of shared access or synced access many people would expect from a password manager. How useful is your firefox passwords on an iphone? Or Mac OS's keychain I use as a daily driver on my windows gaming desktop?

> Major password managers don’t even allow you to export your passkeys to a file that you can read/backup yourself

This is wrong. Every single major password manager supports export. Lastpass, 1password and bitwarden all do that.

> It's past time to move off of LastPass. LastPass lost all of your passwords again last month

That just isn't true. Last month, their third party customer support portal was breached. That did not involve passwords.

> Every single major password manager supports export.

They all support exporting passwords, but, check your CSV; you won't find any passkeys in the CSV export for Apple, Google, Microsoft, Mozilla, 1Password, or LastPass.

(Bitwarden, Proton Pass, and KeepassXC do support exporting passkeys to CSV, which undermines the phishing protections, at least somewhat. It’s possible to trick you into exporting your passkeys from Bitwarden and sending the file to an attacker. It’s up to you to decide whether protecting yourself from being tricked into exporting your passkeys is worth sacrificing your ability to read them.)

> How useful is your firefox passwords on an iphone?

Did you try it? That's the primary feature of the Firefox app for iPhone.

(Especially since the Firefox app for iPhone is just Safari's WebKit wearing a Firefox disguise.)

> Or Mac OS's keychain I use as a daily driver on my windows gaming desktop?

https://apps.microsoft.com/detail/9pktq5699m62?hl=en-US&gl=U...

> With the iCloud for Windows app, you can access photos, files, passwords, and other important information from your iPhone or other Apple devices on your Windows PC.

When Apple's your password manager, you use Apple's password manager app to synchronize passwords and passkeys.

> That's just wrong. I use android, my partner uses ios. If he creates the passkey in safari, it's not going to get synced over to my phone

It would, if the people implementing it weren't all so obsessed with pushing their own platform-specific solutions over enabling open standards. LastPass works fine on Android, iOS, Mac, and Windows, but each one of those platforms defaults to saving passkeys in their own platform-specific store unless you jump through hoops to specifically save them somewhere else.

But this is well established behaviour in the real world. That the passkey design doesn't take this into account only proves even more that it was designed in a vacuum.

The passkey design does take this into account, it's only the implementations that don't.

>That's just wrong. I use android, my partner uses ios. If he creates the passkey in safari,

There. You just violated the premise of his point, that you use a password manager that syncs to all your devices.

> That's just wrong. I use android, my partner uses ios. If he creates the passkey in safari, it's not going to get synced over to my phone. And that's just the first of the family sharing passwords issues. Same person issue is also present if somebody uses an iphone and a windows laptop, or chromebook.

The passkeys sync just fine between iOS and Android on our devices using 1Password.

> Instead, the password managers each have their own finicky app-to-app mechanism for transferring passkeys from one password manager to another. (I think all the password managers kinda like that lock in.)

It's a nice simplifying step to talk about password managers here, but in the majority of the cases this won't be handled by a password manager, but rather by the device operating system, and the device manufacturers really like that lock in.

They're also in an especially good position to abuse it, because they now know every service that you authenticate and the webauthn "attestation object" field lets them set up a side channel with those services such that they can sell additional information about you.

Some people will tell you that the attestation object is not used in the consumer passkey system, so there's no way for this abuse to occur, but since it's usually going to be the device manufacturer who controls the password-manager-like component here, and they're the ones who stand to profit most from this kind of abuse, I think we need stronger guarantees than "the spec says you shouldn't do this unless the user is your employee and you paid for their device".

Until they fix this, I'm sticking with my mess of TOTP authenticators and yubikeys.

All of the major operating systems and all of the major browsers are password managers. Apple, Google, Microsoft, and Mozilla are all password managers. They all have apps that let you access their password managers on other operating systems.

You're right that all of the major password managers like their lock in. The Credential Exchange Protocol is just barely good enough that OS vendors can say they "support" it, but tricky enough to find that ordinary users probably will never try it. (Not to mention that it doesn't even work yet on Windows or Android.)

As for attestation, the good news is that Apple always returns 0s for the attestation ID (because Apple, like you, opposes it as a side channel), and so any public site/app that insists on attestation would reject all Apple devices. This gives smaller password managers like Bitwarden sufficient cover to 0-out their attestation as well.

> As for attestation, the good news is that Apple always returns 0s for the attestation ID (because Apple, like you, opposes it as a side channel), and so any public site/app that insists on attestation would reject all Apple devices.

The bad news is this could change.

The risk is not that the site would insist on attestation, it's that Apple would volunteer it. They could pass an ID through that channel, use it to strike up a separate conversation which makes them some money, informs Palantir about what protests you've been to, and the service in the middle gets a finder's fee.

If we want this to be usable by consumers we need to prevent this kind of thing, not thank Apple for their restraint.

I love that you wrote 6 paragraphs and linked to a medium post all without actually answering the question posed by the comment you replied to.

Yes, I did. When you set up a passkey on your phone in your password manager, you'll transfer it to your other device using your password manager.

Either your password manager will automatically synchronize for you, or you can transfer your passkey to another password manager that will do the synchronization, via the finicky app-to-app transfer system (Credential Exchange Protocol). You can transfer from Apple to Bitwarden and vice versa.

The family sharing question was added later, but the answer is: all of the major password managers have finicky family-sharing features for passwords and passkeys.

For passwords, most people don't bother with formal family-sharing features, and just share passwords via copy and paste. For passkeys, you have to use the family-sharing features, which means you and your family member have to use the same password-manager vendor to share those passkeys.

It’s up to you to decide whether protecting yourself from being tricked into exporting your passkeys is worth sacrificing your ability to read them.

> It’s up to you to decide whether protecting yourself from being tricked into exporting your passkeys is worth sacrificing your ability to read them.

Until a relying party uses attestation to decide this for you.

> The weird part is that password managers provide no way for you to copy and paste your passkeys.

The main feature of passkeys is that they can't be pasted into a website they shouldn't be pasted in to. That means you can't copy them, by design.

They're just text behind the scenes, so you can copy them if you really want to. KeepassX lets you do it, and got into a kerfuffle about it.[1]

It's an impossible design. It's all just obfuscation, most of which is confusing to users.

[1] https://github.com/keepassxreboot/keepassxc/issues/10407

> They're just text behind the scenes, so you can copy them if you really want to. KeepassX lets you do it, and got into a kerfuffle about it.[1]

Yes - the kerfuffle is broadly I think the fact that it negates the main advantage of passkeys: people can't be tricked into pasting them into a fake login screen.

> It's an impossible design. It's all just obfuscation, most of which is confusing to users.

I agree - they're explained in a really odd way, and I think that's because they're a technology with multiple interaction patterns, rather than a single thing like a password. E.g. your fingerprint on your Mac is implemented as a passkey, or clicking on a browser passkey is also a passkey, or using a password manager via a different UI is also a passkey, or touching a Yubikey is also a passkey. The underlying mechanism (passkey) probably has been surfaced more than it should've been.

This seems like a consolidation of risk to rely on a password manager, especially software defined, especially if it relies on a password. I like the hardware token idea (yubikey). But even that seems cumbersome because you should be making a copy for safe keeping. And how do you securely do password recovery if most security questions can be obtained via osint or the reset links are sent to a site you are similarly locked out of is compromised?

> This is much, much simpler than you think it is. Passkeys are just passwords that require a password manager.

This is not true. There are device bound passkeys where the private key is stored in a HSM (TPM2.0, Android SE, or apple SE) instead of a hosted service (iCloud, Bitwarden.com). You can just add multiple Passkeys to a single site to have another backup device should your other one be unavailable.

Speaking about hardware tokens:

If I have to go get the backup out of "secure" storage each time I want to add a new Passkey it's not really a backup.

The design should have allowed, even if it was just within only the purview of a single manufacturer, a method for the device to export an encrypted dump that could be reloaded onto a factory-new device. Heck, make it a value-added service that the manufacturer has to initiate and tie it to some real-world identity verification.

The idea of having to put backup devices in-hand regularly is a bad design.

Phone apps. get around this idiocy by backing-up the encrypted Passkeys to a hosted service.

> If I have to go get the backup out of "secure" storage each time I want to add a new Passkey it's not really a backup.

Yes.

> even if it was just within only the purview of a single manufacturer

> Heck, make it a value-added service that the manufacturer has to initiate and tie it to some real-world identity verification.

No.

Just have the 2nd device when you create any account. But have it away from the 1st device always. Just update 10s or 100s of accounts for every new device. Just never use sites which allows 1 Passkey.

Oldschool KeePass ftw

> This is much, much simpler than you think it is. Passkeys are just passwords that require a password manager

Cool. So can I write down my passkey on a piece of paper and put it in a safe?

> you'll reset your passkey the same way you reset your password, probably with a "forgot my password" email

Cool. But what if I lose the passkey to my email account?

> and the passkey will be stored there and synchronized to all of your other devices

Cool. Surely backups and synchronization never fails.

> The weird part is that password managers provide no way for you to copy and paste your passkeys

Uh oh. So you are saying passkeys are not like passwords? Last time I checked, every password manager lets me copy and paste my passwords just in case.

> To present a passkey, you have to use a password manager

Uh oh. So you are saying passkeys are not like passwords, like at all? Last time I checked, I can just type in my password using a keyboard on all websites I visit.

> This makes it impossible to copy and paste your passkey to the wrong person

Uh oh. So it means I can't just give my password to a family member sitting in the opposite side of the room? Sorry mom, corporate has decided that you are trying to trick me.

> Major password managers don’t even allow you to export your passkeys to a file that you can read/backup yourself

Uh oh. So is there a registry of Major League Password Managers that are guaranteed to implement Corporate Strength Cybersecurity Measurements? Will I be blocked by services if I happen to have landed on a minor password manager?

> This is much, much simpler than you think it is. Passkeys are just passwords that require a password manager. If you lose your passkey, you'll reset your passkey the same way you reset your password, probably with a "forgot my password" email.

This is why I don't bother with these if they have a weaker workaround, which will be open to remote hacking.

> Passkeys are just passwords that require a password manager.

Passkeys are passwords which allow a relying party to control what password manager you can use.[1]

[1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46305566

I am not happy about a trade-off which involves me having to cede control of my digital identity to 'providers' who will not give me access to it, in exchange for maybe not getting phished. If passwords continue to exist for a long time then this entire exercise is pointless as they can still get phished. If passwords go away and we can only use passkeys then you're only entry point to any kind of digital account is through one of the designated providers. If you don't have a provider that spans all of your platforms then you're screwed or have to manage multiple pass keys which is also stupid. Even the current crop of online providers as you illustrated in your post are unsecure and unreliable. No thanks.

> Passkeys are just passwords that require a password manager.

How come I log into my corporate Windows laptop by typing a passkey instead of a user/pass combo?

> If I accidentally set up a passkey on my phone (let’s say I use Safari one day instead of my go-to, Brave), can I still log in without that passkey on other devices?

N=1 and I'm sure I'm holding it wrong, but I can only log in to ADP to request PTO from my personal laptop because I set up an iCloud passkey, work laptop does not allow access to iCloud keychain, and you can't request PTO from mobile.

Although that's more a failure of your workplace's security policy than of the Passkey itself. It makes sense that the passkey doesn't work if you can't access the place the passkey is stored.

yeah but my problem is that I can't fall back to logging in to ADP with a password. Maybe there's some way to fix this? IDK.

I think the intended workflow is you login with your phone and that device is now the authority that allows other devices to issue their own passkeys.

In my opinion it's a bad plan, because it elevates certain devices to privileged status, if you lose your phone you are hosed.

Passkeys should be allowed to be synced between devices and stored on password managers in the cloud. I am making my own password manager for my personal use, but have not delved into passkeys.

  > Passkeys should be allowed to be synced between devices and stored on password managers in the cloud. I am making my own password manager for my personal use, but have not delved into passkeys.

They are, that’s exactly how I use all my passkeys with Bitwarden. They sync to any device I have Bitwarden installed on when added on one device.

Yeah that's all hackery I think, if you read at the specs there is always a device involved, bitwarden and company just pretend to be a device or have an extension that just ignores the spec.

I use ProtonPass and afaiu it just syncs the passkeys private part everywhere you need it. So it “just works”. This is better than just old fashioned credentials because the passkey only “triggers” on the correct domain, so they can’t be phished by other domains… Right?

I recognize the point of your post is more about the lack of clarity and details around passkeys. That's real, and I don't really have an answer for that - other than, I think maybe the quest for making them simple and "just work" has maybe made them nebulous enough that we've wound up in the current situation where a lot of even technically savvy people don't really understand them. But I feel like answering your questions might sort of help explain why that's the case, so I'm going to take a stab at it:

> If I accidentally set up a passkey on my phone (let’s say I use Safari one day instead of my go-to, Brave), can I still log in without that passkey on other devices?

Assuming you have LastPass set up to be an iOS password manager, and it fully supports iOS' passkey implementation: when you create a passkey in Safari, it will ask you if you want to store it in LastPass or in the iOS Passwords app (previously known as iCloud Keychain). If you say LastPass, then it's up to them, but I assume it'll sync to all your devices - it's how 1Password works. If you were to accidentally say Apple Passwords, it'll sync to all your Apple devices automatically, and you can either use Apple's password browser extension on Windows, or you can use the "another device flow" I'm about to detail.

> Is there a way to ensure that passkey can be used on other devices?

As mentioned above, passkeys are intended to sync via your password manager of choice as the primary use case. If for any reason you don't have that passkey synced to that device, _and that passkey is on a mobile device with a camera_, most browsers will give you the option to scan a QR code with your phone. This kicks off a flow that will authenticate you via your phone's biometrics or passkey, then use Bluetooth to first ensure device proximity and then handle the authentication exchange. In the case of iOS, this includes any passkey-supporting password manager, so the passkey itself can be in 1Password; it doesn't have to be in the iOS password system for this to work.

When I first read the above, my hackles were raised given how well Bluetooth operates at times; but every time I've used it so far, it's been fast and flawless. Still, I can see a lot of scenarios where this might not work - e.g., the first one I thought of was a public computer at a library where Bluetooth might be locked down; corporate computers or remote servers could also be troublesome. As far as I know, passkeys don't yet have answers to those scenarios; other than to just use your password + 2FA as you would without a passkey.

As far as I know, both of the above apply to every passkey-consuming site.

> Can I add another passkey on another device? How many passkeys can I set up for a particular site/app?

This touches on your last paragraph, where it indeed could change based on the website. In my experience, every website where passkeys are fully supported - e.g., not ones that are using passkeys as a substitute for FIDO/U2F keys - has let me add multiple passkeys and have not _appeared_ to have a limit. I typically will create a passkey in both 1Password and Apple Passwords just to have a backup, and I can't recall any cases where that's been a problem. Still, I can't say for sure that isn't a problem on any website.

I went all in on trying passkeys when they started to be an option, and I don't have any notable regrets. For me, passkeys have generally worked well when the site is designed to use them well; and at no point have they been a _major_ hindrance. That isn't to say there are _no_ annoyances, though:

- Most websites that support passkeys tend to use them as a replacement for both the password _and_ 2FA, which makes them more convenient. However, a few - Amazon being the most notable I can recall - only use them as a second factor, which just makes them feel a little useless.

- A passkey can _also_ be used as the proof of identity, meaning you can log in in one fell swoop and don't need to enter a username or email address, which is IMO the best showcase for passkeys. Like above, this makes websites that ask you to enter an email address before letting you use a passkey also feel annoying.

- Most web browsers I've used support the QR + Bluetooth flow I mentioned above (otherwise known as Hybrid Transport or caBLE) without issue; Linux has been the odd duck out. Firefox doesn't seem to support it at all on Linux, and Chrome-based browsers do but sometimes are missing what they need and in that case don't show it as an option. Since I sync just about every passkey with 1Password this typically isn't a problem; the exception is the passkey for Apple Accounts, which Apple creates automatically, and (AFAIK) doesn't allow you to enroll your own. Apple Accounts are the only service I've found that does this, though.

- Some websites seem to only offer passkeys as an option if you're on a mobile device, or at least did so at the time of enrolling. eBay and PayPal I think are the two that jump out at me as having done this. Why they did it this way instead of simply detecting if the browser supported passkeys, I have no idea.

All of the above issues have gone down over time, so it's generally been a net decrease in friction over time. And, at least as far as I can recall, passwords themselves continue to be an option in every instance I've enrolled a passkey. So if you like your passwords, generally speaking, you can keep them :P

> passkeys are intended to sync via your password manager of choice as the primary use case.

The sync was actually a compromise to the standard. The idea was unique, device-bound credentials. One person, one device. The private key/passkey on your phone should not be the same one on your laptop, or your tablet, etc. Each device was supposed to have it' own unique credential.

Allowing sync is a security downgrade to the standard, in terms of threat-model guarantees. Pure WebAuthn credentials should be sealed in hardware (TPM or Secure Enclave or equivalent) and be mathematically non-exportable which guarantees zero remote blast radius, an attacker must physically posses the device.

Allowing sync and storing passkeys in a password manager reintroduces cloud account compromise risk and recovery flow hijacks. You lose non-repudiation.

Still more secure than passphrase + TOTP, but doesn't eliminate account takeover attacks against your cloud credential vault, which purely hardware based, per-device credentials do.

I don't get it. How does every device combo having a unique key pair help with security? They can all log in, right? So all you need is to compromise their session and you're in, whether they share the same passkey or not.

And if you're compromised in such a way that an attacker could steal your password then wouldn't they be able to just hijack your session instead?

Passkeys protect against credential theft, not session hijacking, two different parts of the stack. Passkey's only concern is initial authentication, it was never meant to provide any sort of protection against session theft. RFC 9449 Proof of Possession is how you prevent session hijacking, or session binding with a client-side TLS certificate.

Device-bound passkeys take care of non-repudiation. With synced keys (e.g., 1password), an account compromise of your vault hands the attacker all your credentials, the private keys are in the vault.

Device-bound keeps the private key sealed in the TPM (or secure enclave), the key cannot be exported, so it cannot be extracted remotely. Even malware on the machine, can hijack your session, but it cannot exfiltrate your private key, TPM won't release it to the service without user verification via biometrics, yubikey, or a PIN. There's also an attestation chain that breaks with synced passkeys. The attacker has no way to get your private key, so the only way to compromise the account is, yes, session hijacking, or physical access to the device with the user present to pass the biometrics check.

Ooh, thanks for the insight, I didn’t realize that - though that makes sense given how they work. My initial reaction is, I like the idea of the pure hardware-locked passkey as you describe it, but I feel like the syncing is a reasonable-ish nod towards making them more usable in the real world since it does let you have more flexibility.

I haven’t ever looked at the APIs for passkeys; is there any semblance of those types of keys being an option, or did opening the door to syncing basically let anything happen with the APIs and lose those guarantees?

> Still, I can see a lot of scenarios where this might not work - e.g., the first one I thought of was a public computer at a library where Bluetooth might be locked down; corporate computers or remote servers could also be troublesome.

None of my desktop computers support Bluetooth. Neither do my wife’s.

Yes, I mean, that’s also a possibility - or someone didn’t know they needed to screw on the antenna, or it’s otherwise borked. Every PC motherboard (sample size of four, three for me and one for a nephew) I’ve bought in the last five years has had on-board WiFi and Bluetooth though, so I’m curious to know, was that a deliberate choice?

(In thinking about it, it’s possible that the motherboards I bought did have non-wireless alternatives that weren’t stocked at my local Micro Center - lot of digging required to figure that out, though :) )

Wifi is becoming more common on desktop motherboards, but it's still not a guarantee, especially on the lower end. On the higher end they can throw in wifi to make the feature list bigger without cutting into their margins. Out of my sample size of 4 over the past 5 years, only two had wifi. And honestly, I'd opt out of having that if I could trade that for a lower price or some other feature I'm missing, since I haven't used the wifi on those boards at all.

My issue is that they're touted to the consumer as secure, and they're not really doing much more than a complex password.

How do you generate a new key if you need one? Same process as a password reset. Does it prevent session stealers? Not at all.

Its "benefit" is grandma can't read it to an attacker. OK, well can grandma click a link and have a session stealer bork her life instead? Yeah, and attackers know that and just shift methods. Session stealing isn't a sophisticated attack, and so all that's being done is shaving a cost on PW resets in the interest of shareholder value, at the cost of security theater and locking up your keys in a single domain that holds control over our access to everything.

There is security value. A passkey will not work anywhere except the actual website. Fake look a like sites can't get the credentials. Evidently they can trick you into authorizing their device.

Sure? MitM isn't a new kind of attack, and I'd be surprised if the ball-of-wax-and-javascript that is WebAuthn isn't vulnerable to that...

This is one of the key security features of passkeys. I did a little searching and the work around is to do a standard fake website that prompts for your standard credentials. That should be a fairly simple fix. Require access from a new device to be authorized from another source with an explanation that they will never request this info.

That's also how any good password manager works. You'd have to manually copy-paste the password to get around the same-site fill restriction (whether it's autofill or manual fill).

Passkeys have an advantage in that the server doesn't have your password and every passkey should be unique.

I think the point is that Passkeys are not supposed to be as precious as passwords. You're supposed to have a brand new one for every device/application combination. So they are just login cookies at this point, and haven't even come close to replacing passwords because you need to know your password to get a new passkey every time you log in.

Now, is that the official stance? I don't know; but it's _absolutely_ what every current implementation suggests the companies deploying this stuff want.

You can make passkeys better. Like me, you can install a well-funded password manager (well-funded, because it needs the engineering effort behind it to keep up with the ever-changing passkey apis on every platform in the world; screw up and oos, can't log in today!). Then you have one passkey per remote service, and just have to make sure 1password is _always_ installed and perfectly integrated. Easy!

There are a couple of problems I have with that. 1) Many websites limit the number of passkeys I can link to my account. Some only allow 2 or 3. I have more devices than that. 2) If I am supposed to create a new passkey for every device, how do I login in the first place? Most websites currently fallback to password login which defeats the security benefit of using passkeys in the first place.

I currently only use passkeys for a few websites that have awkward password login workflows or do not autofill properly from my password manager. I just have a single passkey for each that is synced via Bitwarden. Currently, I see passkeys as using an electronic biometric lock on the front door while passwords are still regular locks on the backdoor. The biometric lock on the front door does not do much for security when the backdoor still exists and I have come across very few websites that support only allowing passkeys. And those that do still run into problem 2 listed above.

Yeah, I agree. My policy is much the same as yours: set a passkey only when a site makes logging in with a password such a PITA that the PITA of a passkey becomes the easier option. Google comes to mind. They seem to actively not want anyone to log in. At some point sites will start to 2FA you even with a passkey, but we don't seem to be there yet.

Copying / syncing passkeys between password managers is still work in progress, but you can usually work around it by making multiple keys. For important websites, I recommend saving additional passkeys to Keychain, etc, as backup, assuming the website allows that. (It should, but some websites might not have a good implementation.)

Also, nothing says you have to delete passwords (or alternate means of logging in) if you already have them set up. Having multiple ways in will help prevent lockout.

Unfortunately probably implementation specific, but you don't always need to have multiple passkeys. There is cross device passkey login. I had this occur in the last couple weeks. Evidently I had created a passkey on my phone. Logging into that site on my PC, it identified that I had a passkey and allowed me to authenticate using my phone.

You can add as many passkeys as you want and you can still have password logins too.

I have come across many websites that limit how many passkeys I can add. Some have only allowed one or two.

Yeah, it's bad implementation on the websites but the protocol doesn't have a limit.

1 of gortok's points was I don’t know whether each website/app that has set up Passkeys has decided the answers to those questions in the same way as the others.

I can't speak to all of your browser combinations, but most desktop browsers can present a QR code when logging in with a passkey. I keep my passkeys in a password manager synced between my phone and personal computers. On my work computer, where the password manager is not installed, I can still use passkeys by scanning the QR code with my iPhone's camera app.

(small parenthesis, please consider to _not_ use lastpass given they have had so many security incidents https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LastPass#Security_incidents )

For me, it is "how many passkeys can I have for the same site?", and "how do I revoke them?"

Worse, I'm still using LastPass -- but migrating over to Chrome password storage as it syncs between phone and laptop. LastPass doesn't give you the option to not use it for passkeys. It might be the thing that causes me to finish the migration away from it.

A potentially good idea got corrupted by vendors, password managers, browsers, etc trying to assert control. I'm also an engineer and I find the UI around passkeys entirely unclear, but it doesn't have to be that way. It seems like everyone wants to be _the_ password manager for all your passkeys. They don't want to make it easy to understand that is what they are doing though, they just happily offer to "handle it for you".

My non-technical friends are extremely confused by passkeys and if they should use them and how to use them and I honestly don't have very good answers. It is a mess. I don't believe an inherit mess, but one created by the companies and projects trying to take advantage of the new system.

> It seems like everyone wants to be _the_ password manager for all your passkeys.

Which defeats part of the point of passkeys in the first place in that they are supposed to be device-bound, the private key held in the TPM or secure enclave or whatever other security chip, mathematically non-exportable. Storing all your private keys in a cloud vault still leaves you exposed to potential credential theft if your vault gets compromised.

Every device is supposed to have its own unique private key, stored in TPM, released only when passing the user challenge (biometrics or pin, or a yubikey).

Right; but THAT idea is consumer hostile by design.

So your account is now tied to a physical device; great, but the device is dead, or you own a dozen devices, now what? Each vendor has their own idea about what THIS means. Heck I have a couple that allow, max, a single Passkey at a time.

> Right; but THAT idea is consumer hostile by design.

No argument from me there, just stating what the design actually calls for.

It was never meant to be consumer friendly in the first place, it's an enterprise standard. It was just shoehorned onto consumers with the synced credential compromise to make it easier, instead of coming up with something better, and then just calling it a "Passkey" which now has dual meaning.

But the real solve is difficult. If a system requires a consumer user to manage, remember, or safely store something extra, it will fail.

The FIDO set of standards (UAF, U2F which predated passwords and passkeys) haven't even started as enterprise standards. There are multiple origins for what became FIDO, but the main ones I know are:

1. PayPal was looking for a physical authentication solution for their users, Michael Barrett was their CISO at that point and he became the president of FIDO.

2. Google developed Gnubby (which was internal, and therefore enterprise) and they wanted to push a similar authentication to their end-users, supported directly on Chrome. They wanted this to become a standards, so donated the underpinnings of the Gnubby technology which became FIDO U2F.

I might be wrong but at least these are the two parts I know.

And while the original FIDO could be called dual-use, Webauthn and especially Passkeys were developed to be first and foremost a customer-facing standard.

It doesn't mean they are not confusing, but they are clearly designed with end users in mind.

Eh, PassKeys are consumer friendly by virtue of allowing the keys to be synced across multiple devices. That actually breaks some of the security of it for the benefit of the end user.

No end user wants to export and store a keychain. So they hand that off to somewhere else.

This is exactly all the stuff normal people don't care about.

If your system requires any basic intelligence or interest scrap it and go back to the drawing board because you just lost your customers.

I mean, no one ever said it was a good design.

But the original FIDO2 standard wasn't made with consumers in mind in the first place, it was driven by enterprises that wanted high-assurance security. It works in that environment because, well, a big IT department controls it, can support the employees, and you can mandate and control its use.

It was just sort of haphazardly shoehorned onto general users/consumers, prematurely IMO, via synced credentials as a compromise instead of coming up with something better.

Stronger than "don't care about" (at least if I and some friends I've discussed this with count as normal people): this is actively what I don't want! I want control over my authentication and I don't want it bound to device, browser, OS, etc.

> Which defeats part of the point of passkeys in the first place in that they are supposed to be device-bound

If you watch the original Apple WWDC talk presenting passkeys, you will find that they were always intended to sync, at least for the consumer use-case.

What you are describing is how the WebAuthn standard had been implemented by Yubico and Google up until the point of the introduction of “passkeys” by Apple.

The reason passkeys have their own name and definition is because they are meant to be a phishing-resistant primary factor that competes with the UX of passwords. And a great usability trait of passwords is that they’re convenient to use across all your devices. With a technology involving public/private keypairs, the only possible way to compete with that UX is to sync the private key across the user’s devices.

> the only possible way to compete with that UX is to sync the private key across the user’s devices

This is my issue with passkeys. Either we lessen security to improve UX (syncing across devices implies extracting private keys from secure enclaves, at which point it’s no different to password syncing), or we have a proliferation of different keys per website across devices (assuming the website supports multiple passkeys).

Perhaps this trade off is not resolvable in a way that happily satisfies both the security constraint and the UX requirement.

"A better version of password syncing" is exactly what Passkeys are and ought to be. Just like passwords, but unphishable, unguessable, not reusable across sites, not vulnerable to data breaches, and with better UX.

Stranding private keys in clone resistant secure enclaves has unacceptably bad UX for the average user, which is why very few implementations try to do that.

So just a password manager?

Passwords are still significantly less secure than passkeys even when using a password manager.

Why?

Passkeys cannot be stolen. Yes, don't say that what if someone steals my iPhone, PIN, and adds their fingerprint.

Let's say eBay asks user to login. With passkey. Press and hold fingerprint etc. login done. Even with laptop.

And average Joe doesn't want to maintain a keepassdatabse sync it. Yes, you can always use your own server etc but others have life.

how do I back it up and transfer it to a new device? This is relevant because an attacker can also do that.

Buy a new iPhone. Sign into it. Everything is now available.

That is the reason: for the average Joe not having exportable passkeys is good.

Average Joe doesn't have to do backup. It is all automatic.

So I just have to get the victim to sign into my iPhone?

Yes. If you are such a person then do it.

Hiding the underlying exchange of data from the user does not mean the data is unstealable

With your logic nothing is unstealable. Go and watch film inception.

The main point is the average Joe it works seamless. And average Joe won't have to remember things.

Yes, it does. Not everyone wants to maintain password database.

Because as I just outlined, passwords, even when stored in a password manager, can be misused. (Phished, set to something weak/guessable, reused on multiple sites, leaked in a database breach, etc.)

Password managers make it easier to avoid those pitfalls, but passkeys make it nearly impossible to fall into them.

> at which point it’s no different to password syncing

You still get the phishing resistance, though!

Password managers prevent phishing as they check for the domain name before inputing the password.

Password managers do not architecturally, cryptographically make phishing impossible. Ultimately a user can still be tricked to copy/paste their passwords into fake websites, even when using a password manager. You could blame end-users for this behavior, but attackers don't care about blame. Ultimately, it doesn't matter who's at fault when there are massive phishing attacks happening at scale every single hour of every day. The only real solution to solve this problem for the entire internet is to make credentials architecturally, cryptographically unphishable by design. That's what passkeys give you.

Is the "phishing resistance" just inability to view and manage your own data? That's a bug, not a feature then.

Downloading and keeping safe local data is a bug for others

It's still ignoring one of the main features of passwords for regular people, which is authority delegation via password sharing, aka. "could you please log in to my ${service} and do ${something}, my password is ${password}...".

Yes, that is a feature and a normal use case that has equivalents in meat space, that security aficionados refuse to recognize even exists, much less support.

Not only that, they don’t need to worry if they lose their phone they’re locked out of their accounts too!

> The reason passkeys have their own name and definition is because they are meant to be a phishing-resistant primary factor that competes with the UX of passwords. And a great usability trait of passwords is that they’re convenient to use across all your devices. With a technology involving public/private keypairs, the only possible way to compete with that UX is to sync the private key across the user’s devices.

Another way would be auto-enrolling passkeys from other devices you own through a standard API. Enroll your trusted Apple device in your Google Account's settings, or your Bitwarden/KeePass, and vice-versa. When your iPhone creates a passkey at a site, iCloud notifies Google, which issues a new passkey and sends the public key to iCloud, which auto-enrolls it at the site alongside the iCloud passkey. BitWarden gets the same treatment. When you open your KeePass vault it checks Google and iCloud and picks up any pending offers for passkey enrollment and completes them.

Simple, secure, opt-in, and users control their devices and passkey vaults with minimal hassle. If a device is lost, the other services can help you automatically delete the compromised passkeys and set up your new replacement device.

Matter does something very similar with cross-compatibility between Apple and Google (and the rest of the ecosystem) when new devices get enrolled with the user's choice of PAA; the only thing missing is roughly cross-PAA enrollment but that would be just one additional trivial trust relationship in both ecosystems.

I like it.

The high level UX of this idea feels very compelling to me as a "yes and" -- aka a world where vendors continue to offer end-to-end encrypted syncing within an ecosystem, but then this idea gets layered on to solve the cross-ecosystem problem. I think the trickiest part would be how to do it in a privacy-preserving way, but that's solvable.

  > Every device is supposed to have its own unique private key, stored in TPM, released only when passing the user challenge (biometrics or pin, or a yubikey).

I have just shy of 2000 site credentials in Keepass. Let's assume that they were all Passkeys.

1) When I buy a new device, how do I create 2000 new Passkeys for that device?

2) Can I still do that if I don't have access to the old device? Maybe it was destroyed, stolen, or lost.

3) How about if the new device is from a different vendor than the original device? E.g. switching from Apple to Android?

Apple's keychain or google password manager - can hold 2000 passkeys easily.

Did you not read the comment thread you're responding to?

Nothing in the post you're replying to is about "is 2000 passkeys storable", it's about "if I have 2000 passkeys and I need to move between an Apple device and an Android device, do I need to establish a second set of 2000 passkeys"?

No you don't. I use the same passkeys for all my devices sync'd with bitwarden.

Exactly. Bitwarden, not the Apple/Google/Microsoft keychain. That's the problem.

Not at the moment. But if you sign into google account in iPhone then you can use Google's passkeys in iPhone.

At the end, passkeys are built not for the tin-foil, (I hate Google Apple fellows), I want to keep every single locally, RMS fans. No.

A majority will benefit. End of matter.

A majority don't change platforms (I have not seen them do it).

And lets be honest - even if they were portable are you privacy person that is going to do it? No.

No, the majority will not. If through some miracles, passkeys gain sudden and wide adoption, there will be a day of reckoning come around the next mobile refreshment cycle, maybe earlier.

People break their phones. That is normal experience. Entirely unsupported by passkeys as they are today.

I'm actually surprised we didn't have more pushback for ubiquitous 2FA, as they have similar threat profile - i.e. addressing the tin-foil threats of cybersecurity aficionados, while entirely ignoring the common threats to real people, in particular the one of broken or lost mobile device.

Incorrect. They break but they fix it.

People break their phones less often compared to telling them keep their keepassdatabase in sync across devices.

Even recently my friend fixed his iPhone XR (10 year old) 3rd party. Everything including passkeys work fine.

Dunno why the downvotes, if you're willing to trust Apple or Google this is a good method for passkey usage. because your touchID/faceid/opticalid auth gate the keyring's on either of these vendors your passkey works without having to migrate them. EDIT: Also ANY device that you add to your iCloud has access to the passkeys you've made... it's a dream for secure access.

The downvotes are because the commenter did not read or at least did not fully comprehend the meaning of the post they were responding to.

What happens when the user decides to move to an Android device, or even is suspended from Apple for a suspected breach of the terms of service, or Apple decides to not support their country anymore? There are countless reasons to prefer to manage one's own access.

True... Theoretically correct but in practical sense?

All these doom mongering of suspension happens so rarely that majority don't care.

There are countless reason to DIY. Agree. But passkeys will help the majority.

Also note that the kind of people - like journalists etc - that need to use DIY/local are the ones that are likely to use passkey. Reality.

Downvotes does not matter. People here that are privacy inclined always find ways to argue about Google or Apple (any major companies). But if you look at their private lives - they adopt tech ASAP. A majority have Apple Pay or Google Pay. Paypal. At the same time use bitwarden also. (And that is fine)

These privacy zealots fail to realise that majority of population does not have time to setup bitwarden server or lineageos or zfs storage etc.

Passkey comprises of public key that the website you created it on holds, and the private key you store on your pw manager or in the TPM/secure element. As long as you can copy the private key to the new device, you don't need to recreate the whole passkey. In your case, you would just need access to a backup of the Keepass database in case you lose the device.

The biggest point of confusion in my opinion comes from Windows especially having lacked a way (and kind of still does) to save the private key of a passkey to your password manager, defaulting to saving it to Windows Hello, which saves the private key to your PC's TPM. In this scenario you can no longer easily copy the private key to other devices, and if you lose that Windows PC, you also lose the private key and the whole passkey as a result.

People who say users should not be able to export keys are not confused. They believe users should not be able to export keys.

I was referring to confusion experienced by people new to the passkeys creating passkeys for the first time ("Where am I saving this to?", "How do I store this in my password manager?").

dotancohen would not be allowed to store Passkeys private keys in a Keepass database in the case thewebguyd specified. Relying parties would block password managers which allowed this.

You don’t. You don’t store anything at all.

On registration, a keypair is generated, then the private key is encrypted with the long-term key burned into your security key fob or hardware. The encrypted blob is sent to the server and stored there.

On authentication, after you enter your login, the server sends the encrypted blob and your security key tries to decrypt it with the long-term key it has. If it succeeds, it then request a challenge from the servers, signs it along with the server name and timestamp and sends back to the server. Server validates the signature and if it’s good, log you in.

Expanded: As long you as the user has the security key fob, you can login. You should have 2.

> You don’t. You don’t store anything at all.

Yes, you do.

Whenever a website offers to create a passkey, it could end up in any of these:

- Samsung's Password Manager (if using a Samsung phone)

- Apple's Keychain (if using an iPhone)

- Google Password Manager

- Your operating system's keychain

- A bespoke password manager (e.g., Bitwarden or LastPass)

- Your hardware key

Most users do not have a security key fob. Instead, the proposal being mostly pushed is the idea that users can store keys on their own smartphones, making use of the modern TPM and chip security. Most of the discussion here revolves around that idea: "What if I lose my phone? What if I switch phones?" and that's why the problems seem so obvious to you.

I absolutely agree the best solution is to use hardware keys, but I'll admit it's cumbersome if I need them for hundreds of accounts (which I do have), having to register both for every website and praying that I never lose both at the same time in the case there's no viable recovery flow for some of the accounts. Also, most of these hardware keys are limited to 25 or 100 resident keys, which again makes them unable to substitute passwords. Observe the usage of the term resident keys: passkeys do rely on the private key being stored on the hardware key, as that allows discovery.

I was talking about the non-resident FIDO keys. “Passkey” term is meaningless unfortunately because FIDO Alliance did not define it initially, it was a marketing term invented by Apple and then re-introduced (or shoved down the throat) by the FIDO alliance.

In non-resident keys scenario you don’t store anything and from what I see there is no security downside of using non-resident keys.

Loosing both (or multiple) security keys is like loosing all your car or home keys. Very inconvenient, agreed.

Anyway, I think we can agree that FIDO authentication protocol implementation is a mess. Apple and Google made it messy because they wanted to lock down users to their platforms and then password managers followed. As a result, the current implementation is not more secure than “login with Apple” or “login with Google”.

I agree!

Indeed, the only advantage to Resident Keys (i.e., Passkeys) is the discoverabillity of them, so you can login without even using a username. It's a shame all of the terminology around WebAuthn/FIDO2 and Passkeys is so loose and badly defined.

Honestly, I think OAuth logins are still an ok option for the average user, unfortunately, as I would never recommend someone I love to use Passkeys and put them through the burden of having to understand and deal with all of this mess.

I have deployed FIDO authenticators at a ~2000 employees organization as the second factor. It was great for a while - when early versions of macOS and iOS respected the “platform” claim and created non-exportable private keys backed by Secure Enclave. Windows was never a problem, keys were created in TPM. We mandated 2 FIDO credentials - typically the laptop and either a phone or Yubikey (or both). People were encouraged to use the later but as soon as the keys were not exportable, phones were acceptable.

Then, Chrome got an update and started hijacking the enrolment process from the operating system and created keys synced to Google Account. This resulted worse UX because authentication now required pulling the Android phone (for those unlucky ones who have it) and confirming the login there instead of doing it right on the computer, uninterrupted.

Then, Apple followed with cloud-only key pairs and then so did the password managers (including Bitwarden Enterprise we were using) and everything become a mess.

The only solution would be to use the key attestation and to only allow specific security keys. Both Chrome and Apple have config knobs to simplify enterprise attestation (a strong assurance, which FIDO authenticator has been used), but neither Windows nor macOS support key attestation for hardware-backed keys (and macOS ignores “platform” claim altogether).

It sucks.

I have to think people aren't doing any research. Both Android and Apple sync your passkeys to your account. You can toss all your devices in a wood chipper, buy a replacement and still have access to all your passkeys.

Yeah, they do. But what if you want to move from Android to iPhone or vice versa? That's the big problem regarding these keychains/password managers. Some of them didn't even allow you to export your Passkeys until a few months ago, meaning you were literally locked into their platform.

Remember that your average user has no idea what a passkey is, doesn't remember half of their passwords and has no idea what a password manager is.

If you want to change it maybe tough. It doesn't have to be. Bitwarden has an open source self hosted option(you can also use their service), that can be set as provider in Android and Windows 11. KeepassXC is an option everything is in your kdbx file. Passkeys are so much more convenient and secure. If you do get stuck having to migrate, you can use your password (I would actually prefer just using multiple passkeys.) You don't need to do them all at once. Your average user is probably using whatever their device offers or nothing at all. I'd argue anyone that is tech savvy shouldn't be using either Google or Apple. If your account is disabled, you probably just lost anyway to retrieve your account unless you use a separate email address. I recently discovered cross device auth when a device I had a passkey was able to open my account on my pc that didn't have a passkey. TLDR ther are simple solutions that solve the 'lock in' issue.

So the use of Passkeys is contingent on allowing a major tech firm to spy on you?

I actually do have a Google account, but do not link my (Android) phone to it. I don't have WhatsApp or any other spyware on the device. I do use Telegram, Ankidroid, and a few other apps that I trust. I'm not a fanatic, but I won't enable and abet anybody to follow me around and report all that I do. How my position is considered an extreme position today eludes me, and frightens me as well.

The original U2F tokens didn't suffer from this problem that much. It contained one secret, it relied on the website to store and return an opaque website-and-account-specific blob, which was decrypted by the token and used to sign the login request. It would be reasonably easy to expand this in a way where the server also stores a backup credential for use by your second/third/whatever hardware token, encrypted with an asymmetric key during the enrollment of the primary token.

But this went out of the window when some genius decided that usernames were too complicated, so Passkeys had to be discoverable, which means they have to be fully stored token-side. Which of course has the nice side benefit of essentially killing hardware tokens and forcing people into using their Android/iOS/Windows device for it.

This. I would have loved if this original u2f existed. Google has even removed this from their accounts.

> But this went out of the window when some genius decided that usernames were too complicated, so Passkeys had to be discoverable, which means they have to be fully stored token-side. Which of course has the nice side benefit of essentially killing hardware tokens and forcing people into using their Android/iOS/Windows device for it.

This part of your comment is incorrect. Discoverable Webauthn absolutely can be used with hardware tokens like Yubikeys.

> Let's assume that they were all Passkeys.

Lets assume I put all the effort to explain.

I will give you a better example.

- Lets say you have a google account with pixel phone

- You are using it and added 1000 passkeys

- All are synced to your Google account

- Destroy and Get a new phone. Login to your google account with recovery code.

- All your passkeys are in your phone again.

There are plans in fidoalliance.org to make it portable. Pretty sure you are still not going to move to it.

It works fine until Google suddenly decides that your new device is not you and asks you to confirm login from previous device...

See.. the sad thing for doomsayers like you is that if even 1% of users were affected then there would be mass exodus from Gmail. It does not.

Yes, you don't use Gmail so it does not matter. You may be don't know. And often even average Joe some how has a oldphone or iPad that has oldgmail account there or logged into wife's phone or phone based SMS whatever.

it is ok to hate passkeys or google or love only self-hosted but let others do what they want.

I have been user of solokeys (since the first one) - only opensource hardware keys. works for me...

But if you go to the local highstreet then there are tons of people doing this screenrepair etc just to recover the account. Average Joe doesnot mind paying for that. Even will give the repair guy full password to transfer all data from old to new phone.

Or until Google decides that you did a wrongthink and bans your account, including locking you out of your old phone.

1) Install a keepass client and use it for passkeys.

2) See #1

3) See #1

KeepassXC supports passkeys. They suggest a couple mobile apps that also do.

How easy is it to switch off keepass? And how easy is it to export off whatever you imported to? Passwords are simple, just remember the text. Passkeys have alot of uncertainty around this

To switch off, just stop using Keepass. If you want want delete the entry on the site. You don't need to, since your Keepass file should be secure and passkeys are designed allow multiple for a site. Passwords are not equal to passkeys and not difficult to add. Everyone seems to think you need to create new passkeys for all your websites. You don't, add them as you go. The hassle of adding it should be less than using a password to login.

> Every device is supposed to have its own unique private key, stored in TPM, released only when passing the user challenge (biometrics or pin, or a yubikey).

This is a misconception. A particular service can choose to enforce those class of passkeys, but most don't need that and shouldn't.

Passkeys are primarily meant to replace passwords and be hard (but not necessarily impossible) to exfiltrate.

The key difference is during normal usage you don't have to type the secret in anywhere, it's strictly asymmetric, so a unwitting user is far less likely to get fooled into accidentally leaking the actual credential.

Passkeys is basically a brand name for "discoverable credentials" (a Webauthn term). They do a little more than that technically, but in practice their purpose is what you said. Replace passwords. Or more accurately usernames and password pairs. This is in contrast from 2FA, but even before Apple started marketing Passkeys the FIDO standard supported the concept of Passwordless authentication, alongside 2FA.

Passkeys came together with multi-device syncing when Apple introduced them and IIRC it was pushed as their killer feature by Apple back then, but passkeys can also be completely device-bound. The marketing around this was all quite confusing, but it's a bit too late to fix now.

What we got, as far as the average consumer should be concerned, is that "passkey" is any authentication mechanism (not the actual credential) that can replace a password. And it's still confusing.

I think in Apple stack they cannot be made hardware bound anymore. Platform claim is ignored on creation and the keypair is always in Keychain and syncable unless iCloud sync is disabled.

Lest we forget that enterprises have had passwordless auth long before any of this

> Passkeys are primarily meant to replace passwords

Unfortunately, the designers of passkeys decided they should replace passwords and usernames and second factors.

Also they decided they should be cloud-synchronised, so the something-you-have second factor doesn't impose the burdensome requirement for you to have something, which was apparently a big usability problem.

> Unfortunately, the designers of passkeys decided they should replace passwords and usernames and second factors.

They obviate the need for a user identifier as the key is itself unique, but removing the 2nd factor is a choice of the service, not the designers of the Webauthn standard.

> Also they decided they should be cloud-synchronised

The earlier versions of the spec required that the keys be resident in hardware, but it was updated to allow "roaming" keys. The important part is it's up to the service to decide on whether they want to require hardware resident keys (which cannot be synced via the cloud). Most do not.

The usability problems are actually larger than that, see sibling comments for why. Passkeys, even when cloud synced, are still better than cloud synced passwords and still give the option of hardware backed keys for those whose threat model warrants it.

> The important part is it's up to the service to decide on whether they want to require hardware resident keys (which cannot be synced via the cloud).

From what I know, Apple ignores `platform` and `ResidentKeyRequirement` claims and always creates cloud-synced key pairs.

Moreover, the strongest claim value allowed for the `ResidentKeyRequirement` is “discouraged”, which per spec is treated as SHOULD in RFC 2119 since. In other words, browsers are free to ignore it when “they know better”, which Apple always does.

The service may require attestation and verify the actual authenticator metadata.

If the passkey is not accepted by the service, it can use the signaling API to indicate that the passkey was not registered validly.

Sure, but you can still use a Titan T3 or recent Yubikey model on an iPhone. If I had the threat model to justify it, I would not set up the passkey in Apple's infrastructure.

It is too bad they ignore that though. That's really disappointing.

> A particular service can choose to enforce those class of passkeys

And that's exactly why the technology should be rejected while we can. It's no business of a particular service how I use my devices.

Device-bound would be a nightmare. I don’t want to have to think about different credential for phone vs. laptop, etc.

Easy: it's the token on your physical keyring, right next to your house key and car key.

I have 7 house keys and 2 car keys. Getting a new house key is a breeze and cheap, and even if I lose them all, a lock smith can make me whole again. Getting a new car key is a bit more expensive, but also largely not a hassle.

Having spare Yubikeys is more of a hassle than both of those (and more expensive!), and the worst case scenario of losing them all is much more catastrophic. If I have no house key, I still get into my house. If I have no car key, I still get into my car (after a fair bit of hassle). If I have no Yubikey, I have permanently lost access to the accounts it was tied to.

If physical hardware tokens were as cheap as house keys and not much more difficult to set up and copy, then it would be kind of reasonable. As it is, it's unworkable. Even password managers manage to make this work. You can throw your database on every storage device you have and write the master password down on paper, and the chances of you not being able to have access to it are pretty darn close to zero.

No one is forcing you. You can continue to use passwordmanager.

We are talking about the rest the people that want convenience.

In a way that is the reason passkeys synced with Google or Apple just work. No need of hardware keys.

It's not a nightmare, in fact different sessions of the same user could be used to grant different capability levels across sessions depending on the trust level.

Seems like the flow should be:

1. All passwords stored in password manager. 2. Login with password manager when logging in for the first time on a device. 3. Combination of OS and site/app notice that no passkey has been created for this account and offers to create one. This is presented to the user as “setting up the current device for password-less log ins.” 4. OS negotiates with site/app to install the passkey and use it for future log ins on the device.

It’s presented to the user as a convenience clearly tied to this device.

…but you still have your text password stored in the password manager’s servers…

By still having the password the user can still be attacked via phishing

The user can always be attacked via phishing so long as account recovery methods exist (and they need to exist for obvious reasons). Use passkeys, but so long as you can also log in via password, or SMS code, etc., it's phishable, you can get sim swapped.

Your master password to your cloud PW manager's vault is also phishable (hence why passkeys were ideally device specific, non-exportable).

Its phishing resistant not phishing proof

> hence why passkeys were ideally device specific, non-exportable

Not true. The original concept was always for them to be cloud synced.

This has nothing to do with their anti-phishing capabilities. The anti-phishing capabilities come from the fact that the password manager authenticates the application before handing out the passkey. It doesn’t matter if they are synced across devices or not.

You are correct that other login methods might be weaker than passkeys. I’m not sure how that’s related to passkeys though. In real security sensitive applications the recovery process is “go to the bank’s branch and show them your driver’s license”.

> Your master password to your cloud PW manager's vault is also phishable

No, it’s not. You would need to steal my yubikey to get access.

> Not true. The original concept was always for them to be cloud synced.

It was not. The original U2F spec was created before that idea was around and it talked about hardware security keys as means to store the primary key pair.

Yeah, but it's an order-of-magnitude more complicated. It's no longer "click a link and fill in your creds on a legit-looking website", it turns into "hack someone's email, request a password reset, wait the mandatory 24 hours, do a social attack on the provider to pull off a sim swap, and fill in the 2FA code".

> Your master password to your cloud PW manager's vault is also phishable

... which is why all sensible cloud vaults have a separate enrollment key, requiring an explicit action to grant a new device access.

I do not want my identity to be device-bound. I want it to be me-bound.

That's self sovereign identity. But you still need someones that can issue those verifiable credentials, and we (as a global society) can't decide who that should be in the web of trust? Our banks? Governments? Schools? Doctors at time of birth?

Arguably, that's the only way forward. SSI is also nice because you get to fully control what you share and don't share (e.g., age verification, you get to only share "I am over 21" and no other information).

Passkeys were (are?) supposed to be just a password replacement though. That services are using them to replace a username AND a password AND 2FA is a problem that's turning the device into your identity, instead of keeping the identity as three parts (What you know, what you have, who you are (biometrics)). Now we've just turned the "something you have" into the entire identity stack.

Put yourself in the role of a consumer for a second.

As a consumer, I don't give a shit. I use my driver's license to apply to jobs, my passport to fly, and a password (with 2FA depending on how much I / my employer cares) for everything else. I prefer whatever I use for 2FA to not be device-bound, because that's obnoxious, error-prone and constraining.

As a consumer, I don't see any reason for my auth to be more complicated than that.

> we (as a global society) can't decide who that should be in the web of trust? Our banks? Governments? Schools? Doctors at time of birth?

Yes? I mean, that's what literally is there by default in every country. They're not either/or either, they're part of a chain.

Most importantly, none of that is device-bound. Or even person-bound. Which allows for delegation, which is a feature that cybersecurity people keep insisting is not real.

How do we verify that you are you? It can't be linked to fingerprints, iris scans, or DNA, as those are trivially leaked, impossible to change, and a privacy nightmare.

Until we find a way to securely implant a Yubikey in people's brains, it isn't going to happen.

In the Apple ecosystem, passkeys are stored in your iCloud, and access to the passkeys is device bound. So if I generate a passkey on a MacBook, I can then use it from my iPhone as well, because it's encrypted to all my hardware devices.

Replace the word passkey with password in your comment. What’s the benefit of passkeys again?

If you’re not storing the actual private key in the Secure Enclave but only the “access to it” what’s changed from how Apple’s keychain already manages password syncing to iCloud?

The only benefit (and it’s still a decent one) is that some random website breach can’t disclose your private key.

A random website breach can't disclose your password either, assuming you use random high-entropy passwords and the website only stores a hash of it. I haven't really seen the benefit to passkeys over passwords. Pretty much everyone is using a password management service that securely syncs both passwords and passkeys across devices. In that context I don't see the difference.

> Pretty much everyone is using a password management service

In the US, only about 34 to 36% of adults use a password manager. Of the ~64% that don't, an alarming 20% reuse the same password across almost every service, and a ton just rely on browser autofill.

If you use a password manager, you are in the minority. Hell, even if you don't use a PW manager and you at least use a different password for different services, you are ahead of most people.

The general population is largely computer illiterate, and have a staggering lack of basic security hygiene.

FWIW, browser autofill is a basic password manager.

Chrome password manager and Apple Passwords count, in this context.

The far bigger benefit is phishing resistance (with hardware-contained keys themselves being phishing-proof on a non-compromised system).

It moves to the account recovery flows, but that can be much more difficult to phish.

Why would a key need to be "hardware-contained" to be difficult to phish? My SSH private key is unphishable and it's right there in a file. It's unphishable because I know there's never ever a reason to send it to someone - in a scenario where that would be needed, I'd generate a new key just for that situation.

Desktop operating systems don't have very good separation between programs. If some malware gets access, it will be looking for e.g. ssh keys and using a keylogger to get the passphrase if you encrypted your ssh keys. Tpm protected passkeys are much better protected

That attack isn't phishing

A random app cannot eat your passkey. Platform authentication ensures more safety. I am not an expert but definitely it does use secure enclave in some ways(maybe decryption).

UX usability is far better. With password and 2FA you have at least 2 steps. Here

Open the app: device like phone or laptop just asks your fingerprint or facial and done.

That is a great benefit for average Joe. Some one trying to scam remotely cannot access the account. The 89 year old grandma will say - I just give fingerprint. Done.

Yes, it won't cover all situations. Like if there is sim swap or bank employee does fraud.

Wouldn’t it be better to use envelope encryption and sync the passkeys? I mean with envelope encryption somebody would probably be able to create a rfc that would support cross browser/password manager sync a passkey by using a encrypted envelope that would be able to be deceptively wither via tpm or by using credentials so when syncing it would ask for upn/password of the original device or something so it can even be e2e encrypted, so some kind of federation protocol for password managers that you own

I don't want my computer to be able to decide I'm not allowed to access something. I'll never use these.

Good. Device bound keys are a mistake.

> supposed to be device-bound

Device bound is horribly broken idea. Credentials must be me-bound, so I and only me fully own and control the credential. I want to access the site from wherever I want to access it.

Device bound is a bad idea especially if in the future sites is designed to be fail secure, you might be able to recover your account but not your data. The provider will then have to take a negative PR risk for something they cannot do

People lose their device all the time, there's tons of horror story where people got locked out because they lost their sole method of 2FA and if there is a method to bypass that then it is inherently insecure

For the layman yeah it is probably enough

> they are supposed to be device-bound

Which in and of itself should already be a super obvious total no-go. Every device will eventually go out of service or will be decommissioned, for a multitude of reasons. Then what, I lose all access, because I went from an iPhone to Android? WTF?

Except I literally never want to have auth tied to a device. That’s ridiculous.

If a good idea falls apart when confronted with reality, it's a bad idea.

What I find particularly annoying on Windows is that it tries to take over the Passkey workflow with Windows Hello. I wish I could just tell it to not handle Passkeys at all, and let me deal with it through my Password Manager (KeePassXC) and my hardware tokens (2 YubiKeys).

How is it corrupted by vendors and password manager? Why is password manager being passkey so bad or do you believe password manager should have no role there?

How would it look if it wasn't corrupted?

I’ve just been operating under the assumption passkeys are gonna lock me out unrecoverably in some way at some point, and have been avoiding them for anything important while allowing them for low-value accounts so they’ll stop nagging me.

I hate that I can’t just put a value in a plain text file somewhere (encrypted, let’s say, to preempt the inevitable and low-value response) and rely on that to work when I need it on any device and interface that can accept keyboard input.

I avoid using them altogether for the same reason. I won't use them for low value accounts because it signals that I think they might be acceptable to eventually require for high value ones. And of course low value accounts have no value so I don't even care about phishing on most of those.

Haha, this thread has prompted me to follow some of the discussion about stupid bullshit like requiring "user is present" attestation and banning passkey programs (LOL wut?) if they lie about it, or resistance to allowing exports and portability.

I'm now on team "I am outright anti-passkeys and hope they fail and everyone pushing them cries a whole lot about it and never gets over it".

It makes sense for a work device that is off network/domain, but then it is your primary/only means of interfacing with services. Then you can consolidate under a Windows Hello passkey or something else.

The second you have a second device to log in from they are useless. The second you want or need to share a credential (smart or not) they are more work than a password.

The passkey trend seems lead by platforms that want to make it easier to get or stay logged in, Netflix type companies that want to prevent account sharing, and those that value convenience (if one device) over security.

I’m 90% certain most of the push for passkeys is to prevent paid account sharing.

Totally in the same boat, passkeys seem to massively increase the risk that I will lose access to my data.

I've taken up the strategy of telling any less-technical person who asks me about passkeys that they are the mark of the beast, intrinsically evil, and should be avoided at all costs, and I encourage all y'all to do the same.

Maybe, at some distant point in the past, there was a plan for a whole system of intercommunicating implementations of passkeys. That is no longer the case. The moment that they decided to include the information necessary to only allow the use of certain passkey vaults in the protocol, and then use that capability to threaten to lock out certain vaults that dared to let users actually be in control of THEIR OWN DAMN CREDENTIALS, it invalidated the entire project in my eyes. Passkeys cannot be trusted, they are designed to let entrenched powers hold your authentication hostage, and should under no circumstances be allowed to take root in the computing ecosystem.

>...they are the mark of the beast, intrinsically evil, and should be avoided at all costs

That's basically my recommendations to people.

1. Avoid using them if possible.

2. If you have to use them, make sure you have a password login to fall back on.

3. If the site forces you to use them, make sure you don't use it for any thing you rely on.

I use bitwarden[0]. It covers all cases and devices in question.

As a bonus, I self host using the open source vaultwarden[1] server implementation, which is packaged in alpine linux.

[0] https://bitwarden.com/ [1] https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden

The thing I find burdensome is managing all the keys in a secure way. I think I would want a hardware token to store the keys on, have separate keys for every site, need to back up my keys onto a second token in case the first one is lost, etc. It gets burdensome. At least with passwords you can store them in various ways that are not hardware or software dependent.

In practice, because site owners know users are going to mess up having their passkeys on all devices, I've not seen any insist that a passkey _must_ be used, and you can always log in with your password (or worst case, email magic links) as a fallback.

However, this negates the primary stated objective of passkeys, removing the possibility of users being phished, so I'm not sure how long that will remain the case everywhere.

I've also encountered sites that have a login with passkey prompt that then turns around and asks for TOTP 2FA or email confirmation anyway, which to me seems to negate the primary customer benefit of passkeys...

> I've not seen any insist that a passkey _must_ be used, and you can always log in with your password (or worst case, email magic links) as a fallback.

With the exception of Github, and banks.

Porkbun too

Did you try it? That’s not correct. I just logged into GitHub with a password (+ 2FA), on an account that also has a passkey.

No major bank revokes your password when you setup a passkey, either.

Is "passkey" only supposed to mean devices that implement specifically U2F, WebAuthn, etc.? I would have thought TOTP and challenge-response hardware tokens to count, including cellphones with apps that implement such.

As to

> No major bank revokes your password when you setup a passkey, either.

If we're talking about requiring 2FA via TOTP or challenge-response hardware tokens or banking apps implementing such, that depends on the country. It's the status-quo in some places. Some banks even put the input field for the token output as a third input in the login form on their website because all customers have them. The rest separate their login form in multiple steps, but they likely require it of all customers too.

"Passkey" refers to a very specific authentication method. TOTP, etc., don't count.

> I would have thought TOTP and challenge-response hardware tokens to count

Those are absolutely not passkeys. Passkeys are just WebAuthn (from what i can tell).

Such a generic word. I imagine there are tons of CLI utilities out there with a --passkey option that refer to simply files with a key inside. Kind of crazy that it's being used to mean specifically devices that implement a specific protocol.

Kind of feels like "crypto is a type of currency and not all cryptography", or "SQL Server is a specific product of Microsoft".

Wonder if how it happened this time was people read the specs and explanations of WebAuthn, saw "passkey", never seen that word before and assumed it's only ever been used in the super narrow context of WebAuthn so it can only mean that. Maybe "header" can only ever mean "HTTP header".

Thinking about it like that, it may be more like how "latte" is specifically espresso with milk (it's really just milk), or "queso" is specifically cheese dip (it's really just cheese of any kind), or "masa" is specifically made of corn (it's really just dough of any kind, or it's mass like atomic mass is masa atómica).

Isn't the standard term for what you're referring to a "keyfile"? Google Trends also indicates nobody was caring about "passkey" before 2022.

> Edit: One final consideration, my spouse and I share user/name passwords for some things (notably Pandora and our Amazon Prime account) since they don’t handle things like family logins well; how do both my wife and I use amazon or Pandora with passkeys? Do we each set up passkeys? How do I get her Pass if that’s not an option?

Lets say it is a android phone. Open amazon app. login in the usual user/password + 2FA (like with QRcode or phone). create passkey. done. This passkey would have been now synced to your google account.

Take next spouse phone. Open amazon website or app. try login it will try for passkey but cannot find it. so

- login in the usual user/password + 2FA (like with QRcode or phone). create passkey. done - Now this passkey would have synced to spouse google account.

In future, assuming you have apple or windows laptop. assume you have signed into Google (chrome). Now go to amazon. It will ask - shall I sign in with passkey. Yes, give your macos fingerprint or windows hello or password of that laptop. login Done magically. You dont even need to remember username or password.

Assuming you both have iPhones. You can sync the passkey to icloud account. And for every new iDevice it will be available.

The main bottleneck of passkey would be that all 3rd party sites will have another non-passkey way as backup to login. I have never seen a website that would say - remove all other methods and keep only passkey.

In a way passkey is 99% convenience. If a hacker would some how get your sms and password they can by-pass.

Thanks. One glaring issue I see is that right now police can’t ask you for your password in the USA (a violation of the right against self-incrimination). They can however get a search warrant for your device and your biometrics, and wouldn’t need your password if they can gain access through your pass key.

If you have it enabled, and you're in custody or at a border or similar, and have biometric auth enabled on your phone/computer, they can hold it up to your face or force you to put your finger on it to unlock it. Search warrant be damned.

According to Google,

> Approximately 90% people never go out of their country...

I am sure > 90% will happily love to have the convenience.

Yes, people like you can setup bitwarden etc. Nothing wrong. Passkey works for majority of people.

BTW, passkey can also be used without biometrics. It needs only the authentication of the device.

> wouldn’t need your password if t

Once you talk about privacy/security then - I am not even sure you should do it here in HN - a bastion for encouraging Silicon valley practices.

In principle, you can remove biometrics and still use passkey (by using phone password only).

If you see my text, I wrote clearly - passkeys are great convenience + security - For the majority. People don't need to waste time in searching login names.

TBH, I was in a few Free Software Foundation Europe and linux conferences in the last year - in my view - at least half of them were using - passkey with iPhone or Android (including Playservices). So people have accepted the reality.

> I see is that right now police can’t ask you for your password in the USA (a violation of the right against self-incrimination).

Hope they don't see your HN post. It is visible even without login.

oh good I thought it was just me who didn't understand them

I find it abjectly terrifying. Like if I log into your site with a Passkey what happens if my device breaks? What if some big tech company decides to nuke my account for no good reason?

>If I accidentally set up a passkey on my phone (let’s say I use Safari one day instead of my go-to, Brave), can I still log in without that passkey on other devices?

Yes, but you can also add the passkey to your password manager so it's available on all your devices.

>Can I add another passkey on another device?

Yes.

>How many passkeys can I set up for a particular site/app?

I haven't really seen a specified limit on any sites, but also if you're using a password manager it's only 1 passkey for all your devices anyways.

> For now, I’m going to stick with LastPass and use Passwords; because no matter whether I lose my device or not or whether I’m on my own devices or not, I can be sure I’ll be able to get into a site/app.

Your passkeys would be in LastPass as well like your passwords, so arguably the same result regardless of which you use.

>Edit: One final consideration, my spouse and I share user/name passwords for some things (notably Pandora and our Amazon Prime account) since they don’t handle things like family logins well; how do both my wife and I use amazon or Pandora with passkeys? Do we each set up passkeys? How do I get her Pass if that’s not an option?

If it was me I'd add a second passkey to my password manager for your wife under a new entry, and share that entry to her lastpass account.

Or if she's not on lastpass, you could just copy the data from the passkey over to whatever she does use.

I get your problem, i don't really accept it as valid. Passkeys were always supposed to be fungible. You have one in your iPhone, a different one on your desktop. A third in your significant other's phone. All stored in the hardware tpm equivalent.

You can have 7 passkeys. You can have 14.

The real failure of passkeys (emphasis on the s!) is that people think they must only have one.

Again, is this true for all major sites that support passkeys? And how do you set it up? My passwords are automatically synced between my devices, how to I achieve the same thing if I set up an account with a passkey?

Why would you take one passkey and move it between devices? Generate a new one. They're fungible. You set it ask to the exact same way you do today. It's not a problem.

This assumes all services let you generate new passkeys with no hassle, which is not true.

Again, do all major sites allow you to register 6-10 passkeys? Not asking if they could in principle, but do they in practice do it? And how easy is it to log in with a new device to generate that passkey? Do I have to jump through hoops on my laptop, second phone, secondary browser, and so on?

Finally, if it is easy to register a new device, how does the anti-phishing still work? Can't an attacker just convince me to use whatever means I would normally use to register a new device, instead of an existing secure passkey?

> [...] people think they must only have one.

That's the real failure? I think the real failure is that people must have _more than one_. I thought so hard to add all my credentials to 1Password. Now people tell me I should use a Yubikey (or better two or three of them). What do you think, I'm going to register a couple of hundred accounts times three for something I already have (my password manager)?

The real advante in passkeys is in allowing me to log in into a service on a foreign device without typing [my password], which is (honestly) something now sane person should ever do.

Again, I'm attracting people who fundamentally fail to grok passkeys . That's cool, but doesn't entitle you to anything

I don't think that would work either.

Let's say I have a new account and a single Passkey in the TPM of PC1. I want to log in from PC2, too. How can I do that? (I know there is some trickery with Bluetooth, but I haven't seen anything supporting it, and desktop PCs usually doesn't have Bluetooth connectivity.)

AFAIK some browsers can do some magic to use a Passkey from your smartphone on a PC, but you need to log in to the same browser-sync account from both device (which brings back us to the same issue).

Also the whole thing becomes a mess when you change devices. You need to log into all the services you have ever used to delete the Passkeys from devices you no longer have, and you need to add a new passkey from a new device you bought to all the services you use.

You generate another passkey is your answer. How do you do that? The exact same way you do today. Why would you need to delete invalid passkeys? You wouldn't.

> You generate another passkey is your answer. How do you do that? The exact same way you do today.

How can I do that, if Passkeys are the only option to log in?

If I can just use a password to log into a website without Passkeys, then Passkey is useless and doesn't add any security benefit.

> Why would you need to delete invalid passkeys? You wouldn't.

I sell my old (and no longer updated) phone or PC and don't want someone to get access to my account by getting access to the secret keys.

An non-revocable authentication mechanism is just stupid.

> How can I do that, if Passkeys are the only option to log in?

It is not feasible to remove password login or some other recovery login method.

> If I can just use a password to log into a website without Passkeys, then Passkey is useless and doesn't add any security benefit.

It isn’t useless, point is you don’t get to type in your password on a device that has passkey generated already, or get phished on a fake web address for example.

> I sell my old (and no longer updated) phone or PC and don't want someone to get access to my account by getting access to the secret keys.

Passkeys are meant to be protected by either PIN or biometrics, however they are also meant to be revocable on the web, at least they are for services i’ve been using with passkeys.

> It is not feasible to remove password login or some other recovery login method.

Then passkeys doesn't provide any real value if you have other less secure recovery option.

Let's say I have a bank account, going to the branch and doing an in person ID check is a valid recovery option, but nobody would want to do that just to log in from a new device.

> It isn’t useless, point is you don’t get to type in your password on a device that has passkey generated already, or get phished on a fake web address for example.

That's solved by letting the browser to remember the passwords.

> Passkeys are meant to be protected by either PIN or biometrics, however they are also meant to be revocable on the web, at least they are for services i’ve been using with passkeys.

PIN and biometrics doesn't have any inherent security. They rely on some hardware (or software separated from main system) feature, and even those can have vulnerabilities.

Using strong password as you suggested is a solved problem for your use case, but that is not universal. Passkeys provide universal security for all.

Also PIN or biometrics verification to access passkey from device bound TPM or security enclave solved the problem you implied might happen, such as losing your device. How do you protect your password manager, if any?

> even those can have vulnerabilities.

We shouldn’t just give up because everything is inherently insecure.

> We shouldn’t just give up because everything is inherently insecure.

True, but no sane way to mass revoke Passkeys from stolen / lost device is just bad design.

Can these services not use the same fallback mechanism that already exists for non-passkey logins? i.e. an email with a 1-time code or similar. Yes that somewhat defeats the purpose of passkeys but that option is going to exist for a long time regardless of passkey adoption.

If you don't want to downgrade security, how about requiring confirmation from another session that is already logged in using a passkey? e.g. You try to log in on PC2. A prompt appears with something like "confirm this login from [PC1, etc.]". You log in on PC1 using your passkey. The service recognizes that the login id definitely you, or at least someone in possession of your physical device and login method for that device. Therefore, it then allows PC2 to register a new passkey. Kinda similar to how google confirms new logins by sending a notification to your phone.

That could work, but then the service needs to implement complex non standardized authentication mechanism outside of Passkeys. You will have 14 different services with 15 different options. I don't think that's really user-friendly.

Also it could be vulnerable to MFA fatigue attack, if people would constantly get new "confirm this login" popups, they would press anything to make it go away.

So you would need something that is explicitly initialized from a trusted session, then you need something to connect the trusted session to the new login. If you want that to be user friendly you need some short codes and can't rely on QR code / Bluetooth, or two-way interaction. And that brings up the phishing / MitM attacks again.

I save all my passkeys in Bitwarden and they sync across devices.

Same. I'm a tech professional, and I don't set up passkeys for similar reasons. I log in to online services from a lot of different devices and browsers. I use a password manager but the keys to the kingdom (my email password) exists only in my head.

I don't know the exact tech behind it, but for a phone passkey I get a QR code on my laptop screen to scan with my phone, I accept it, and it logs me in.

Not sure about lastpass, but you can save passkeys to 1password. Works just fine.

Notwithstanding the danger of having everything on a single platform, the Apple passkey works great. Sign into one and you’re signed in everywhere and you can share passwords with others.

Wife and I use bitwarden. For shared accounts we put them in a shared folder, and the passkey is attached in there, in bitwarden, meaning it survives device resets.

I store my passkeys in Bitwarden. Can you not do the same in LastPass?

> and I use LastPass

Oh! No. Please switch to something else. Last pass has had so many breaches, at this point it’s just not worth it.

One time, before passkeys, I tried SMS 2FA since everyone was saying 2FA was the future, if you didn't have it you'd be hacked, so I set it up. Next day, phone is bootlooping. Had the recovery codes of course. This sort of thing happened to me three times before I said never again 2FA. It seems to be a device to lock you out of your accounts.

You know how many of my passworded accounts got hacked in my lifetime? Zero.

At least with an SMS 2FA, you can get the SIM card out and put it in another device. If you happen lose the SIM card, your phone operator will probably get you another with the same number once you identify yourself. With authenticator apps or yubikeys, if you lose them (or get a bootloop, or wipe your phone forgetting to back up everything first), there's no path of recovery at all.

Not if it's a prepaid eSIM

I didn't know the answer to any of these either and don't have a hardware key (I thought this was required for a long time) but one day I just clicked add a passkey on a site and the Bitwarden extension picked up the flow and everything was ridiculously easy. Now I also do get how it works, having used it on a few sites. Highly recommend.

Everything you ask is nothing to do with PassKeys, but to do with whatever platform you use authentication flow...

The first time I got asked by a site if I wanted to use a passkey I immediately googled what they were and... never really found the answer, not in the 5mins I devoted to being distracting from my task at hand anyway.

"magic fairy dust to login to apps." is the most accurate description I've seen.

Unlike a password or a TOTP token, I know how those work, I know its my responsibility to keep track of them. If my passkey is on my phone what happens if I lose my phone? Do I need a unique passkey per device? How do I rotate them? What if a device gets stolen?

I'm so glad I'm not alone in thinking these are so poorly explained.

You can use both hardware bound passkeys (where you may not even be able to read the secret so you probably would want to add multiple device passkeys to a site)

or shared passkeys (where the private key can be synced through something like a cloud service across your devices, see Bitwarden, iCloud)

> hardware based

Sounds good until you realise theres no way to transfer/back them up and you are limited to 100 [1] (previously 25?).

Personally my password manager has almost 4x the entries so hardware passkey solutions are a joke leaving users with single option - upload their keychains to ms/apple/etc clouds where they can be requested by any gov under the sun for x reasons.

[1] https://support.yubico.com/s/article/How-many-accounts-can-I...

That limit is only for a certain Yubikey model, not for all hardware-based fido2 authenticators.

> upload their keychains to ms/apple/etc clouds where they can be requested by any gov under the sun for x reasons.

If a HSM module (TPM, Apple/Android Secure Enclave) is used the private key is impossible to extract (and upload to a cloud) anyways

> That limit is only for a certain Yubikey model, not for all hardware-based fido2 authenticators.

Do you know who offers more? I deliberately chose Yubikey as example as their limit was the highest. Others like Nitrokey etc. support even less.

Even if there are keys that offer more, the number 1 brand in hardware keys having that limit is not a good look if the idea is to transfer 'everything' to it.

Think of it like SSH authorized keys but automated for the web. Instead of storing the keys in a file; it stores them in a hardware security module (yubikey, or TPM).

Registration generates an asymmetric key pair between your passkey, and the website. Login is the usual challenge/response process. The biggest step forward is phishing resistance. A fake login page can relay a TOTP code, but not the passkey challenge/response.

Yes, those are the easy parts - but none if that answers GP's questions:

> If my passkey is on my phone what happens if I lose my phone? Do I need a unique passkey per device? How do I rotate them? What if a device gets stolen?

I'd also add: How do I login on a device or browser that I've never logged in before? If I'm on a public computer that I trust enough for quickly logging into my emails but (say, the local library or university PC pool), do I have to install my password manager first and then login with my master password? This seems backwards.

Answering respectively: it's lost; no; same way you reset passwords; depends what you mean "what if" - if your passwors manager is already authenticated and doesn't require reauthentication, then yes, it could be used to login.

And to answer your additional question, yes, I suppose you would either need to install your password manager or use whatever alternative 2FA login you have.

There isn't one correct answer because all those things are implementation dependent. Passkeys just define how a website, browser and OS communicate logging you in between eachother. If someone in charge of making a website designs a bad login system on top of that you will get a bad experience.

> Do I need a unique passkey per device?

If you store it in the device itself (passkey isn't moveable) and not a password manager (you can move the passkey around) then yes.

> If my passkey is on my phone what happens if I lose my phone?

Delete the passkey using another device. If your phone is the only trusted device/only device that had a passkey, begin account recovery (e.g. via email).

> How do I rotate them? What if a device gets stolen?

You shouldn't need to, if they are properly stored in the device (in hardware) and not a password manager they should not be extractable. But if you lost your device/it got stolen and you have no lockscreen password you would need another device that also has a passkey that you would use to invalidate the other one from the account settings page similarly to how you would change your password (you are logged in with another passkey, that is your "existing password" in the password model and you don't set a new password but instead delete the other passkey and create a new one). If instead you use a password manager and it gets breached, either rush in to create a new passkey (e.g. on device temporarily) and then delete the old one, or if they got ahead of you begin account recovery, similarly to if your password got extracted from your password manager.

> How do I login on a device or browser that I've never logged in before?

Similar to steam and discord's Qr code login system if you've ever used that. Ideally when you visit the website would generate a login session and you could then login from a personal device you have on you by scanning a qr code or manually entering a code (for devices without a camera). Probably also tick a checkbox that you are logging in on a public device and that you only want a short lived session, but such a feature doesn't generally exist in login systems that use passwords either, even though it would be convenient to have.

---

All these answers above depend on the login system being well designed. If the people writing the website don't let you register multiple passkeys or don't make it convenient to register a new one whenever you login on a new device, or don't offer the aforementioned Qr code login system or don't offer good account recovery - you will have a bad experience.

> All these answers above depend on the login system being well designed. If the people writing the website don't let you register multiple passkeys or don't make it convenient to register a new one whenever you login on a new device, or don't offer the aforementioned Qr code login system or don't offer good account recovery - you will have a bad experience.

But this is one of the points being discussed here. All of depends on a large number of choices that each site owner will have to get right. You could always argue "well, it's the site's fault for not doing it better", but the matter is that the site owner has to decide those things at all - and if course they will make their own tradeoffs or simply don't bother with certain features.

So you will always have a wildly inconsistent mix of different functionalities and constraints depending on the preferences of the individual services.

Whereas with passwords, implementers don't have to do any of those choices, the basic implementation already supports all those usage scenarios.

The QR code login flow is one such example. I probably have some bias that I don't like the thought of making my phone the sole authority for all my accounts, but even if you accept that, it's an exotic technically complicated flow for the exclusive usecase of "login on untrusted device". There are probably few sites that weigh that usecase high enough to implement the flow - whereas with passwords, there is nothing you have to implement, because the functionality is just a natural consequence of how passwords work.

> Whereas with passwords, implementers don't have to do any of those choices, the basic implementation already supports all those usage scenarios.

Sure, in that sense the usability is better, but now we are dependent on the website makers to make choices on security (offer good 2fa, don't limit passwords to 8 characters and store it on an ancient mainframe, etc.) and even then the usability can take a hit if the website is ignorant of or actively hostile to password managers (breaking autofill and such). Neither system guarantees a good experience.

With my example I tried to paint what a good passkey system would look like for OP, I am aware that leaving the usability part up to the website will result in such a mix.

Enrolling with/registering several devices. Webauthn is pretty cool if not a bit complicated.

For example, passkey on iPhone and on the same account register a second key such as a yubikey.

That’s how my github is configd, for example: my phone and MacBook can auth w OS passkeys. If I need to login on another host, like my windows host or in your example at the library, the yubikey is another registered hardware authenticator.

Worth adopting/looking into imo

100% had said something to the tune of this months ago in another thread on passkeys

> Passkeys need a marketing campaign and UX overhaul. I’m a technical guy, but I really don’t understand what the fuck is going on when I use a passkey. All I know is one day it appeared as an option and it let me login to things. I don’t really understand where it lives, what device it’s tied to, how scanning a QR code on Google Chrome on my phone magically logs me in, etc etc.

The user was not educated on this. Hacker News is the top 1% of computer power users. You gotta understand to someone’s grandma or mom or brother who works in real estate none of this makes any sense nor will they educate themselves on what it is.

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=46301585#46303892

It’s quite the opposite. Passkeys are phenomenal for a lot of consumers. Based on this thread, it’s the engineers who understand authentication in the first place and have their own system (eg password manager) that are confused.

Consider a user in the Apple ecosystem: you are already conditioned to just do Touch ID or Face ID when asked. I was on Amazon the other day, it prompted randomly for “want to set up a passkey to sign in easier”? I set it up and now I can easily sign in to Amazon on my mac or iphone with zero friction.

For the normal consumer this is not a replacement for “dig out my password manager and copy-paste/autofill my password”, it’s a replacement for “oh it’s prompting for my password again” -> proceed to type your shared password for all sites.

A password manager let's me use my service specific credential from any device, securely and decentralized.

Passkeys lock into a specific device and seem easy until you need to use another device.

But instead of being a credential you own and control, across what could even be a local password manager, it's one password to everything. Maybe it is more secure than a regular password in some cases but it largely seems like a worse fix than existing tools for a problem that has better solutions.

Passkeys do *not* do that. I use 1Password to manage my passkeys and they are all synced across all my authenticated devices where I installed 1Password.

You can choose either if your password manager supporte Passkeys

Of course. I was just pointing out that their claim about the lack of portability across devices was untrue.

Perhaps they should’ve said platforms. Because if you wanted to migrate those passkeys off your password manager and into a different platform like Apple Pass or Google how is that accomplished?

https://mobileidworld.com/apple-introduces-cross-platform-pa...

https://support.google.com/chrome/answer/13068232?hl=en&co=G...

https://1password.com/blog/import-autofill-organize-whats-ne...

There's a protocol, FIDO Credential Exchange Protocol (CXP) which is currently at proposed standard status. It is supported by Apple and Google and some third party password managers (1Password, Bitwarden, and Dashlane). (1Password is kind of annoying though as its CXP export only supports exporting everything. There is no way as far as I can tell to export just a single item yet).

Once 1Password supports proper single export when I make a new passkey I'll store it there and later export it to Apple.

Meanwhile I simply make two passkeys. I've only run into I think two sites that supported passkeys but would not let me make two.

On most sites making a second passkey is as simply as going to your security settings, finding the passkey settings there, hitting the "add another passkey" link, and pointing your phone at the QR code it shows, and then on those phone choosing the password manager that you did not use for the first passkey.

On my PC I don't have a manager set up. The browser has the passkey saved, if I accidentally set one up by mistake, but it's not accessible on my other devices.

How do I log in to my account if I don't have the specific device the account exists on?

How do you move your passkey from Apple's keychain into the password manager?

in the ios password app you can tap on the button to export data to other app. it will show you the list of installed apps that can import them. works with passwords and passkeys.

I moved all of them from my iphone to a selfhosted bitwarden in two minutes.

Ok, good to know that.

I'm surprised selfhosted services would be allowed in that list. Isn't there the "risk" that you can then extract the raw key from your selfhosted instance?

I put my passkeys in my password manager and it works fine.

I keep all my passkeys in 1 password. So magical

1password and KeypassXC both support passkey syncing across devices and operating systems.

Until service providers ban them for being insecure — "if you can send your passkey to any other device, you can also send it to a phisher."

Passkeys have preventive measures for phishing.

https://bitwarden.com/resources/passkeys-are-phishing-resist...

    it's one password to everything

You are entirely mistaken. Passkeys involve a third party storing a public key on their infrastructure, while you hold the private half of the key, somewhere.

Passkeys are never reused. Even for the same person, they are always unique across websites, and across devices.

and to unlock that passkey on my PC uses... my user account password. So now every passkey on my device has a single password.

and I can't use this on any other device by default. My passkey is locked within the browser used to set it up.

You're arguing against a straw man.

All password managers support passkeys.

Both apple and google allow exporting your existing passkeys to third party password managers too.

Also each website gets it's own unique public key with passkeys. It isn't a single credential

You're literally arguing a strawman

I don't have a password manager. All the passkeys I've been asked to set up are locked within this one browser on this one device.

By single credential, all the passkeys on this browser use my windows user password which is effectively a single key.

I refuse to be part of an "ecosystem".

KeepassXC is free, open source, and supports passkeys. You can locally store your encrypted password vault wherever you like, and transport it between devices using physical media if you like (or self host your own personal storage synchronization server and sync your passkeys between devices like that).

No need to be a part of an 'ecosystem' to use a password manager or passkeys.

You can sync your vault between devices, but what's the point if the clients on those devices don't support passkeys? As far as I know, no KeePass app on Android has mature passkey support. That's not even mentioning more niche cases, like what if I want to log into a website in a browser on my TV? The cool thing about passwords is that they work on any device.

Also, remember when one of the maintainers of the passkey standard warned that KeePassXC users would get blocked by relying parties [0]? Would you allow tech companies to determine what password manager you are allowed to use?

0: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=39698502

KeepassDX has pretty good passkey support I think. At least, it works for me.

I'll give it another go, I found it buggy last time I checked, but that was a while ago.

> KeepassXC is free, open source, and supports passkeys.

KeepassXC was threatened to be blocked.[1]

[1] https://github.com/keepassxreboot/keepassxc/issues/10407#iss...

I love KeepassXC, I use it for all my passwords.

However, I won't give it things which are meant to represent devices.

People who designed the 2FA model designed with the intention that a password is something you know and a device is something you have.

By putting storing both together you're breaking the assumptions of the people who design these systems.

So I store all my passwords on KeepassXC, everything else has to be elsewhere.

Too late, you're using web standards, you're part of an ecosystem.

The moment my mom needs my help to login to something because she clicked the button but now it's expired / she got a new phone / raison du jur, I will be totally unable to assist her. It's a horrible concept being foisted on unsuspecting victims.

> Passkeys are phenomenal for a lot of consumers.

It already falls apart for regular interactions like "Can you send me the Netflix password?"

At least on Apple devices you can share passkeys with contacts

> I can easily sign in to Amazon on my mac or iphone with zero friction.

And Windows, you need Bluetooth enabled on both devices, on Linux you need Chrome (and presumably bluetooth enabled). It makes you scan a QR code.

>"Consider a user in the Apple ecosystem"

Already you're off-base. Of course it works when your devices are homogenized, but very little folks work that way. Some people have a Windows computer using Brave, an iPhone using Safari, an Android device using Chrome, and a work computer with its own hardware/software limitations and partitions.

Of course it works when your ecosystems are not diversified. Problem is, most people are.

Even using passwords instead of passkeys is going to be a worse experience when using different platforms like you mentioned - I have a massive number of passwords from recent decades.

A cross-platform password manager like Bitwarden handles passkeys (and passwords) across multiple operating systems, browsers, etc.

I've found passkeys generally simple and easy to use on MacOS and Android.

On Windows, I hate them. They always push me towards using a PIN instead of my Yubikey or password.

Until you want to log in on a non-Apple device.

This is not true. There's a specced QR code and Bluetooth workflow for using a passkey on one device to sign into an account on another. It works cross-platform.

If the service implements it.

Like some folks already commented here, even as someone who has been working in tech for 20+ years, I find Passkey confusing. I understand the key aspect in computer science term, but I don't know how to use it across devices. Another big worry is that if I tie that to a physical key, then I might lose it (because it's physical) and never get it back.

Exactly, I always refuse to add a passkey because I'm afraid I won't be able to easily login again. Also, I don't want to be locked in to a vendor.

You can use a passkey that's tied to a Yubikey.

The problem here is i want to have more than 1 yubikey, so if i lose it, all is not lost... I can't do that with the current implementations unless i present N yubikeys to every new account i make. Which makes an off-site backup yubikey impossible. With my current yubikey usage with password store, my "offline" yubikey can be brought in whenever i want to decrypt the passwords, including ones inserted while the key was in storage.

Also yubikeys have limited passkey slots (100, 25 with old firmware)

Also, where do I store the backup Yubikey, or any other pass key owning device for that matter? It has to be easily accessible to set up the pass keys, but also safe from accidents like house fire.

There's a strange tension where I want to use pass keys because they are easy to use but also they are easy to lose, so I choose a KeePass synced over cloud and deal with a bit of a hassle by having to copy/paste my passwords.

I think technically you can just register the public key of the passkey and only need it on-hand for login

Technically i would think so too, but is that how it's implemented? (I legit don't know, but my feeling was always that you had to add them while they're present, especially as there's different passkeys for different sites, to do it offline do you pregenerate 100 keys for each device to assign later?)

use an open source password manager that supports them.

as others mentioned, there's BitWarden (cross-platform, self-hostable), but if you want something simple there's KeePassXC (and you can put the store file on a dropbox shared folder)

The cabal of evil behind the passkey project actively have KeePassXC on their naughty list fore deigning to allow users to access their keys, and specifically included in the standard the means to discriminate between different passkey vault providers. It is the opposite of an open system, and cannot, under any circumstances, be trusted. Do not use passkeys, tell other people not to use passkeys, and make sure to not let shills astroturf conversations about passkeys unopposed.

This is hard to understand without any references. Can you please share a relevant link or two?

Here's KeePassXC being threatened with blacklisting over granting users control over their own data:

https://github.com/keepassxreboot/keepassxc/issues/10407#iss...

Here's the most readable reference to playing favorites on passkey vaults I could find from the FIDO Alliance (the previously mentioned 'cabal of evil').

See Section 2.2: "Validating FIDO UAF authenticator attestations against the configured authenticator metadata to ensure only trusted authenticators are registered for use. "

And Section 2.3: "Verify attestation assertions made by the FIDO UAF Authenticators to ensure the authenticator is authentic and trusted. Verification occurs using the attestation public key certificates distributed via authenticator metadata. "

https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-uaf-v1.2-ps-20201020/fid...

Basically, Relying Parties (the sites you are logging in to) are expected to allow/disallow certain passkey authenticators (the devices or software that hold your passkeys), based on registration and trusted lists. The FIDO Alliance can use entry into those trusted lists as a cudgel to force compliance with the standard. Effectively, the standard is that users must be locked into to proprietary ecosystems, unable to escape.

I resent that I need a special app to "manage" them. I want to know where this key is on my filesystem so I can back it up and edit it myself, not have to use some app to access it. My ssh authorized_keys is just a text file. I can "manage" it with something as simple as vim. Maybe KeePassXC and BitWarden give you that simplicity, if so great!

KeePassXC "supports passkeys" but the website/app that offers the passkey needs to offer it in the correct way for KeePassXC to ingest it. I've found a fair amount of scenarios where they don't correctly let you drop it into them.

Until I can have all my keys as cleartext in a text file, I won't use passkeys.

KeepassXC gave users this choice. And was threatened to be blocked for it.[1]

[1] https://github.com/keepassxreboot/keepassxc/issues/10407#iss...

Yuck. Look closely at the wording: He is trying to counter a "user choice" feature by saying it doesn't have "protection". "File protection." "Protection of the key." Protection from who? From the user, that's who!

This mentality that the user is an attacker, and the software must protect its data from the user. Isn't a passkey ultimately supposed to be my data?

This is simply the mentality. Everyone who's worth anything (as in money) has it. Everyone who makes anything you own has it. They do everything based on this mentality and will not give it up. Every new specification or policy has provisions to ensure the device is protected from its user. Whether it's age verification (non-California-style), passkeys, or CSAM scanning.

You can register multiple passkeys for a single user, there is no lock in

Even if I have my Yubikey passkey that's with my house keys, it's annoying to go grab it and connect every time I need to access something. Enabling it on GitHub was a mistake...

a big problem with passkeys is that there is a lot of flexibility in how it is rolled out with a given site or app. Some sites ask your browser for a passkey as soon as you hit the login page. Some sites you need to enter your username/email address first before you're prompted. Some sites a passkey satisfies both password + second factor. Some sites you need to enter your password and the passkey is the second factor. Some sites you don't need a password but do need the passkey + a second factor (usually SMS)

This is on top of the confusion around enrolling passkeys in your device and synchronizing them

I am a big passkeys fan, and use them on every service I can, but they leave a lot to be desired in terms of user experience. Not sure all of them are solvable, either. The platform vendor side can be fixed: vendors can better integrate with each other to make your passkeys available on every device. But, the issues with how they work across sites and applications is probably not solvable

i don't think you really understand how it works. most implementations are secondary implementation alongside login+password.

how to use cross-device? either use some password manager that supports it (apple/google/1password/keepass/etc support it), or use device that you have on hand most of the time - phone. when the passkey pops up - point your camera and scan the qrcode - you are done. otherwise use dedicated device like yubikey or similar.

really not sure what is hard about that to understand. i'm using android and chrome, so i can use the password manager in chrome, or my phone to scann the qrcode.

my country is using similar authorization for government "profile" (mobywatel - poland) that has similar to passkey implementation. you download the app on your phone, login via login+password (or other), download the certificates, and from now on you can point your camera on qrcodes to login to government websites; it requires pin/code or biometric confirmation on the phone - same as passkeys.

FWIW: I find passkeys to be a very simple and easy to use concept.

Simple: it's like a password that I don't have to type in

Easy to use: because I use 1Password and just have it installed on everything. On Android, it can be set as the default passkey provider so, even on mobile, I am using passkeys shared across devices.

Is this "less secure" because I'm sharing the keys through 1Password. I suppose, at some level. But before that, I was simply sharing passwords through 1Password in the exact same way. So, I don't think my security posture has changed any.

What has changed is the UX and IMO for the better. Now I don't have to generate/fill/copy-paste text strings for user names or passwords. 1Password knows what site I'm on and usually responds automatically when I'm in a passkey context. If I have more than one passkey available, because I have multiple accounts (for something like Google Workspace), it shows me options and I pick the one I want.

Honestly, it's mostly a "just works" system and I like it a lot better than passwords.

YMMV, of course.

OK now say you're on a work/library/friend's computer and you want to look up an account in 1password on your phone so you can type in the password. Passkeys don't support this very basic and common workflow. Meanwhile there's no real security benefit over password manager generated complex and not reused passwords.

If I'm on someone else's computer and I want to use a passkey on my phone, the computer will display a QR code. I scan the QR code with my phone, the phone signs the login request and posts it to the service's callback. Then I'm logged in on that new device.

If my phone's camera is broken but both devices have bluetooth, it can do the handshake over bluetooth.

If I'm on someone else's computer and I want to use a passkey on my authenticator on my keychain, I'll just plug it in and then tap the button on the authenticator.

Meanwhile, if I logged in with the password and the account only has a password then they have a full copy of my entire authenticator to the account. With the passkey, once the session is invalidated the access is gone.

Does the apple passwords app work this way (log in to a public machine by scanning a QR code?)

Passkey on an iPhone, logging into a public-ish terminal by scanning a QR code? Yes.

In fact, if you have your Apple Passwords app set to sync through iCloud, you can:

- Make a passkey on your Mac for a site in the Passwords app

- Go to a different computer (a friend's or whatever)

- Attempt to log in, choose use another device, it'll show the QR code

- Use your iPhone to scan that QR code and sign in, as the iPhone has the passkey synced through iCloud

Note, the same kind of thing is also possible with other password managers as well.

This is good in theory but in practice doesn't always work. It isn't just a QR code like I would like it to be, its a QR code and you need bluetooth. Maybe there is a hypothetical world where bluetooth drivers actually work on windows machines and can connect to a mobile device seamlessly but that is not my experience. Across multiple windows machines i often have a problem where windows just decides the machine doesn't have bluetooth, and will refuse to display the QR code without any explanation. It doesn't tell you that bluetooth is the problem it just says "insert a hardware token to authenticate".

I would love for this feature to actually work but every time I've needed it to it hasn't. Literally this week I only had a passkey on my phone, but at the time I was in Linux with Firefox, and afaict the qr code workflow basically requires either chrome or windows 10.

I use this feature a bunch across dozens of different Windows and Mac devices from various device vendors with multiple Android phones and seemingly never had an issue.

But I'm also a person who generally never experiences the issues some people have with Bluetooth in general. If I ever have an issue with Bluetooth on a computer, I swap out the wireless chipset with an actually good one. Its almost always just bad hardware. I've only had to do that a few times in the last decade though, more modern WiFi/BT chipsets are generally pretty OK. Its the old ones that are near worthless.

Although I will say most of the time I just plug in my USB authenticator. I normally only fall back to the QR code if I don't have my keys on me.

And as an edit, I wasn't aware fully that the QR code is to help assist the BT handshake, I had assumed it was posting a signed request back to the service. My bad, my above comment isn't completely correct. Thanks for cluing me in to the BT requirement for the QR code path.

From what I understand the Bluetooth is required to ensure proximity. It isn’t actually used to transmit anything of vital importance. The QR is doing most of that. It’s just there to prevent scanning the QR through a video call and logging in from elsewhere.

Which I’m sure is great in theory. But IMO just adds even more complexity to a system that already has several moving parts and is more fragile than it should be.

This is the one Bluetooth feature that has always worked for me out of the box on both Windows and macOS. I haven't tried Linux yet to be honest, no idea if anyone has bothered implementing it yet. Usually open source is a couple years late to this sort of thing (except for maybe distros like Android or ChromeOS).

Now, if only Windows, macOS, and Linux can get together and fix whatever needs fixing to get headsets to connect properly automatically, that'd be grand.

this doesn't sound like the passkey is the issue, is the implementation or the missing implementation issue.

in poland we have similar to passkey implementation for government profile, that is then used to login to most/all government websites or to sign government documents. you point the camera on the qrcode, confirm it on the phone and you are done. this same app has your ID, which can be used in most places (shops, banks, police etc).

and btw im using linux (main box), macos, android and ios - no issues so far with really cross device usage

I use a passkey with discord on my phone. If I want to log in to discord on a computer it shows a QR code on the page/desktop app and I scan it with my phone to log in. I could see this become a pretty common pattern.

I like it because I can use discord on even a pretty untrusted computer without providing it any credentials or access to my passkey, and then later when I'm done I can revoke the session.

Ok but now do a service that doesn't support that, whether or not it might in the future 'become a pretty common pattern'.

On most websites logging in through QR codes works out of the box for passkeys. You usually click "log in with device" or something like that with every desktop OS.

You scan the QR code, click the confirmation button, and you're signed in. It's part of the standard UI of normal operating systems.

Might not work (well) if you're on an old computer without decent Bluetooth but everything has Bluetooth these days.

Why does a passkey need bluetooth? For what? Isn't that another vulnerability?

A "passkey" is a bunch of metadata and a public/private keypair. It doesn't do anything by itself, of course. A physical device, like a Yubikey or a Titan, doesn't have Bluetooth. For phones and tablets these keys do support NFC but that's a whole different story.

The Bluetooth connection is how your phone exchanges the key and authenticates you through the computer. In its most secure phone, the key never leaves the dedicated security hardware/trusted execution environment that protects your key from snooping, the same way you cannot get a physical U2F key to give you the private key bits.

You scan a QR code to set up the pairing/connection process (if you haven't already), then a Bluetooth Low Energy exchange happens. You confirm you want to sign in on your phone (so you don't get tricked into scanning a QR code), then the cryptography happens that authenticates you.

You can find the protocol here: https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-v2.0-ps-20190130/fido-cl...

It should be noted that, at least on Android, any credential manager app will support this exchange. The passkeys in the Bitwarden app on my phone work just like the native Android key store when scanning a QR code, for instance, and other apps will also work. You can switch authenticator apps in the pop-up, or set a dialog in the Android settings if you want to switch the default.

Furthermore, there are also CTAP2 implementations for smartwatches (at least for Android smartwatches) that let you authenticate with a tap on the watch. That flow doesn't use a QR code for obvious reasons, you would need to manually connect your computer to the watch before it works. I believe https://github.com/fmeum/WearAuthn is the prime open source example of this feature.

TIL! Thank you for taking the time explaining this!

I don’t think this ever works with passkeys stored in pw managers though, only Face ID/whatever Android is doing?

It does using 1password.

It works perfectly for passkeys stored in Bitwarden on Android. Don't know what iOS is doing.

so you need to have discord installed in your phone.

now multiply it with every web site you want to access.

That is how discord has chosen to implement it but nothing about the scheme actually requires an app besides a mobile browser and QR code scanner to be involved.

Meanwhile passwords work the same everywhere

This is why you should use physical tokens like Yubikey.

But don’t log in to important accounts on a public computer, like ever, unless it’s a dire emergency.

You can decide what appetite for risk you are comfortable with, but some people don't have any better option than logging in to accounts on a public computer. The industry is pushing this system as the new universal answer for authentication, it NEEDS to work in every scenario passwords do.

(...and I’m pretty sure plugging my yubikey into a locked down public terminal is not going to solve this, either.)

It would let you log in (even though you shouldn’t). Most “locked down” computers still allow things like USB drives and Yubikeys.

My problem with passkeys is that "don't have to" is actually "don't have to, and couldn't if I wanted to".

Everything you said is _also_ true if you use a password manager than can interact with the browser (which you're already doing).

Plus, that doesn't have the negatives/limitations of passkeys.

But you still have all the negatives/limitations of passwords, of which there are tons.

This is a big problem I have with "just works". Everyone is used to services only allowing a single password. I know the answer to this, but it's not clear in the marketing or how it's explained to normie end-users: Won't creating a passkey erase my password? How do you sign in on another device? Won't that change the passkey and lock me out from the first device?

it just a lot of complexity and i don't want to deal with it but i have to because of all these dark patterns. sometimes i enable pass key and don't even notice.

Creating a passkey generally won't erase your password, no. Using a passkey generally requres a password manager or yubikey, so you can set that up on the other device and use the same passkey.

This. Honestly, most of the arguments I read against passkeys just sound like “old man yells at cloud.”

It’s not that difficult. Spend 10 minutes researching the topic and you’re fine. Passkeys are so much more convenient than having to use passwords. When implemented right, it’s literally one click from opening the login page to being signed in. On all of my devices.

It's not difficult. It's undesired. It makes simple things slightly easier and makes difficult things impossible.

Exactly the sort of behavior that will suck in the unsophisticated user, and then leave them with no options when it fails.

I try to use passkeys when possible as I'm also a 1Password user, but this hardly "just works". Firefox on Windows often triggers the Windows password manager for passkeys (some how this is only on some sites), making it impossible to use 1Password.

I've seen the same on Android too, and I think there's a difference in how Chrome and Firefox are handling the requests.

Then you get in to cases like a Microsoft Account. You need to use your account to log in to the device that has the passkeys, so the workflow never works properly and you have to fall back to another method.

Amazon is another one. If an app like Libby redirects to Amazon, I get a different, passkey-less password prompt, so I need to have a password readily available.

It's great when it works, but honestly 1password with straight up username/passwords is probably just a better UX in the end.

With physical U2F key, I could explain to my 78 year-old-parents "this is a physical key needed to access your account. Think of it like the front door key to your house. Don't lose it or lend it to anyone. We should have a couple of backup keys too." And they got completely understood and added it to all of their accounts. This was not hard. People assumed consumers were too stupid to do this without even giving them a chance.

> Don't lose it or lend it to anyone. We should have a couple of backup keys too.

Honestly, this is one of the two things that make me hate passkeys. The key management is a high-friction pain in the ass.

I never found a comfortable way to ensure all of my accounts had more than one U2F key associated with them. I always wished there was a way to have 2 physical U2F keys, one on me, and by adding one to an account, both would work.

As is, I had to either:

- Keep both on me, and add both - I am at risk of losing both at the same time

- Keep one one me, one in a safe - I have to keep track of which device I've added to which service, and periodically take the backup one out of the safe and iterate through the "new" services

I was never satisfied with either approach, so I ended up with an OTP app with backups.

If you're comfortable with OTP with backups, does a password manager like 1password, with backups, fit your needs? Or would you prefer to self-manage your backups on your own storage?

I ask because I'm curious about others' practices and desires here, not with any promise of a better solution!

Yeah, 1password or keepass are both fine solutions for password managers in my mind.

And/or maybe the vendors were annoyed that people would lend the keys anyway, refusing to accept that it is normal because that's how delegation of authority works in real life too. House keys are also things you often lend to a third party that you want/need to access your house in your absence, and in fact making extra duplicated for trusted third parties is normal.

Software vendors continue to refuse to support, or even accept the existence of, this entire class of use cases for regular consumers (they are, however, more than happy to milk enterprises on convoluted implementations of those).

I still can't even get a physical key anywhere in person. You can certainly get phones just about anywhere, but you can't get any FIDO keys at brick and mortar, last I checked.

Until I can tell Grandma to "go down to Walmart and ask the man at the electronics counter for a Yubikey", we still have a few issues.

(No. Ordering online is *not* a valid option in this scenario. If I want to order a Yubikey to this address at this exact moment in time and space, Amazon won't deliver one to me for at least six days at the earliest, based on their rural delivery estimate. Replacing a key is basically impossible.)

> Amazon won't deliver one to me for at least six days at the earliest, based on their rural delivery estimate.

That sounds like an Amazon problem. For 40 USD, yubico.com says that it will deliver a shipment on the next business day to this rather rural house I see in the middle of Foothills Road in Newman Lake, Washington.

Also:

> Replacing a key is basically impossible.

If you know that getting next-day delivery is dreadfully difficult, then order a handful to have as spares. "If you can reasonably afford it, always buy more than one." is solid advice for just about every important thing that you are likely to break or lose.

> Newman Lake, Washington

You're 21 miles from Spokane. I'm over 120+ north from Syracuse, NY. That's not rural, not one iota. Our Walmart isn't even a Supercenter.

> "If you can reasonably afford it"

I mean, at nearly $40 for shipping and something like $40-50 a key, I'm not sure I can reasonably afford to buy more than one on the average blue collar American IT worker's wage of sub-$30 an hour. If you'd like, I can give you my CashApp for donation purposes?

> I mean, at nearly $40 for shipping and something like...

As you noted in your original post, next-day shipping is a shipping method so expensive that Amazon only offers it in select locations. An honest reader notes that three-to-seven day shipping is 4 USD, and the one-to-four day rate is 8 USD.

> You're 21 miles from Spokane.

No, I'm zero miles from San Francisco. But all sorts of places offer effectively-next-day shipping to SF, so I had to find somewhere by dragging around on Google Maps.

> I'm over 120+ north from Syracuse, NY.

Okay, is

  Beaver River Air Field, Eagle Bay, NY 13331

sufficiently rural for you? That's ~200 miles from Syracuse as the crow drives and about 90 as the crow flies. If not, how about

  9340 Long Pond Rd, Croghan, NY 13327

  Forest Lodge Sports Club, Honnedaga Lake Rd, Cold Brook, NY 13324

All of these are still the same price to next-day, one-to-four-day, or three-to-seven-day ship.

I'm glad you've wasted that much time trying to argue the shipping factor and I'm glad you get to brag even more that you can afford to live in San Francisco.

I'll take some of your money now, please. I'm scraping together what I can in what some people called "America's Siberia" and am forced to take care of elderly family and have zero escape plan except for working a horribly underpaid IT job here :)

https://cash.app/$meow

So it is as I said from the outset:

  > Amazon won't deliver one to me for at least six days at the earliest, based on their rural delivery estimate.
  
  That sounds like an Amazon problem.

But perhaps even 4 USD is too much for you to pay for faster shipping than what Amazon can bother to provide you. If that's the case, then I offer my condolences.

I can in fact buy one at a local brick-and-mortar store, but the price is triple/quadruple the amount I'd pay for a copy of my house key. Add in that the whole flow is something grandma is not going to be able to grok, and the whole idea is still-born.

If I were administrating that part of her life too, then maybe, but I'm not really happy with how Yubikey has solved for this problem either. If I could buy them for nearly throwaway amounts of money, and I could make backup copies without issue, then I might even jump on that particular train myself.

Sure, but i would never want a physical key to something important. Physical keys get lost, so the front door spare is under the flower pot.

And now I have another thing I need to carry everywhere.

The website for my HSA required me to set up a passkey last time I logged in. I set it up on my work laptop and my work password manager, which means I can now no longer access my account from my personal computer. This is fantastic, just what I wanted

This is exactly a scenario that worries me. Proponents of passkeys imply you can setup a bunch of passkeys. Evidently that's not always the case.

"But that's just a bad implementation, many other sites do it right!"

And many sites block paste from password managers. Passkeys have so many ways to do them wrong that we're going to see all kinds of new and exciting failure modes that lock you out of your account in the future.

I think the irony here is missed.

And then you call them up, and they allow you in after asking some identity questions, and you learn there's no real security.

Are you also using HealthEquity for your HSA? I'm the same boat, they're forcing passkeys on me. I can still login using my employer's SSO but I've been putting off setting up the passkey until I have to.

yep

I've refused to set up an account. I just call them on the phone if I need something special from them, have them send paper statements, and eat the should-be-totally-illegal-because-of-how-obscenely-large-it-is "mail you a paper statement" fee.

Click the "lost password" button. Passkeys aren't magic, they're just a funky password.

If the website didn't implement a "lost password" button then that says a lot more about the website than it says about passkeys.

It seems to me like those who like passkeys/consider them simple are those who entrust all their credentials to proprietary cloud software vendors that sync them to all their devices.

Those of us who are not comfortable with that and want to keep our credentials offline and sync/backup them ourselves have questions about how the registration/backup/sharing flows work exactly.

I see this as part of a trend together with remote attestation, age verification, CSAM scanning, restricting sideloading, etc that will lead to most interactions over the internet only being allowed if big tech and/or government can verify the participants, the contents, and the hardware and software used.

Even among techies, many support these developments, so it is just a matter of time before we have no choice but to join the former group.

I do love the cloud version of passkeys, but I also have a backup YubiKey. I could do two backup YubiKeys, drop the cloud, and keep one YubiKey in a safe deposit box and one elsewhere, but I haven't had much reason to yet.

A passkey doesn't give up anything compared to a password, and is in fact much much easier to handle, IMHO. I have kept all of my private SSH keys in secure hardware for a decade, so perhaps I'm more used to carrying a physical key than others, but IMHO it's all better, all around.

We should eliminate passwords, and that has nothing to do with remote attestation, age verification, or anything like that.

For 20 years, I've only known two to three passwords at any time, and those are login passwords for separate boxes or corporate/home accounts. Beyond that, hardware access should solve everything, and I shouldn't have to type any passwords anywhere. Every account needs granular credentials, not shared credentials, but no user should have to memorize passwords beyond one per work domain.

> I do love the cloud version of passkeys, but I also have a backup YubiKey

How does this work, exactly? Does you cloud password/key manager allow syncing to the YubiKey?

Or do you register a second passkey that you store on the YubiKey whenever you create a passkey?

If it is the latter, do all services that allow passkey authentication also allow registering multiple passkeys? How many?

> could do two backup YubiKeys [...] keep one YubiKey in a safe deposit box

If you register a new passkey on the primary, do you then have to take the backup YubiKey out of the safe deposit box to put it on it as well?

I haven't seen this kind of question answered when sites prompt me to use passkeys instead of passwords.

I create multiple passkeys for the account: an iCloud passkey and a Yubikey passkey.

Both passkeys are independent of each other and know nothing about each other, only the website knows that both are mapped to the same account.

It's like setting up multiple API keys for a service. Passwords are usually restricted to just one, but passkeys are (generally) allowed to have multiple backups.

When I go to login to Google, for example, it will prompt for a passkey. Currently, in Safari, it will prompt for biometrics on my iCloud passkey. I can either give it my fingerprint/face, or hit the "More options" button, which in the current list allows either 1) insertion of a USB security key, or 2) presenting a QR code that a phone device can scan, allowing use of the passkeys on the phone.

(All very good questions, BTW!)

You can use passkeys with any password manager, including selfhosted ones like keepass.

UX is not the problem with Passkeys. Passkeys were designed to align with the interests of BigTech, who are bent on stopping the abomination that is general computing devices in the hands of consumers and forcing them into their walled gardens. The language that is used for taking away freedoms is the same as always, safety. Where we ended up with Passkeys is an operating model that is suitable for corporate devices, i.e. the user can only do what the owners of the device allow them to. Suboptimal UX is downstream from that problem.

Passkeys work just fine with Bitwarden, LastPass, KeepassXC, physical keys, several software tokens, and TPM storage.

So far only Nintendo has been absolute assholes about requiring specific passkeys, but that's maybe the least assholish thing Nintendo has done.

I think portability is very confusing: they rolled out passkeys with no device portability (device-bound) and only recently added it (CXP). So for anyone with multiple devices it was a relative disaster - why should my Windows PC hold a device-bound passkey to anything? How do I login on Linux or macOS? Picking a password manager to do portability also means another kind of lockin, though maybe you can live with that kind if you really trust the company. Even so, the password managers all seem to be competing to have relaxed security, so that vault and account passwords are the same, or you are asked to type your master password into a webpage - surely we didn't replace per-site passwords with this?

I mostly love passkeys to be honest even though I use multiple browsers across multiple devices and OSes (iOS, Chromebook, Linux, macOS, Xbox, etc). Bitwarden’s support is (finally) pretty good.

My problem is that I manage a lot of accounts for my family which makes passkeys a nightmare. If I’m out and a kid gets chucked into a login flow that happens to require a passkey, I can’t text a password and TOTP code to the adult with them. I know that’s terrible opsec but the reality is people share accounts and passkeys are designed to thwart that.

Throwing my hat in the ring, I think passkeys were also invented by engineers with zero understanding of the average developer: https://etodd.io/2026/04/06/passkeys-are-too-hard/

I think about this a lot when using our corporate SSO tool.

When I hit the button to log into Slack, there are like, 3 popups in succession - the last one ultimately asking for my fingerprint. Then when I give it, there is a flurry of web pages that get loaded and redirects that happen until finally Slack pops up again.

There isn't any realistic world in which I check each window to make sure everything is happening right and I am not being MitM'd.

I'm a fairly technical person, and I would be unable to perceive the difference between a really tight security environment and my computer being hijacked.

The point of passkeys is that you don't need to. Unlike passwords, your session cannot be hijacked because the thing that you give your fingerprint cryptographically verified the requester.

Aren’t passkeys intrinsically resistant to those attacks? With hardware security keys, the private key remains on the device, never crosses the network, and is cryptographically bound to the site being authenticated.

> I run a tech company and I have no idea what a passkey is and at this point I’m too afraid to ask

I thought I was the only one!

lol it seems a good technical writing opportunity someone should take on.

also appreciate your attitude, better than "I work in tech for xx year, i don't understand yy, so yy must be bad."

I find passkeys.. ill say interesting.

I can have the most complex password and create a passkey, but a windows machine could allow a 4 pin digit to access the passkey.

Passkeys are just SSH keys in how they work. We've been doing this since the 90's. The only people that use SSH keys are the Linux savvy users and those who are forced to via an enterprise solution for vaulting.

The average person doesn't know anything about this stuff nor do they care. I also have yet to see a Passkey solution that didn't also have a password on it and a nice little box letting people choose to use the password instead of the passkey. They just added a new layer on top of all the old ones and created confusion. Now people use password and passkey interchangably in conversations and no one knows what they are talking about.

SMS 2FA was also optional everywhere until it wasn't.

It is still optional most places.

Not for Chase, not for Schwab, not for my DOCSIS provider, not for my cellular provider, etc. They don't offer TOTP either, just SMS for 2FA.

It's going to require a law: if you require 2FA, then TOTP or HOTP must be offered as an option.

I can find my ssh keys in `~/.ssh`. No such place exists for passkeys.

It depends on the app you’re using to save passkeys. Use Keepass and it saves the passkeys into kdbx file (similar to SSH keys).

Aren't they effectively locked in the database of whatever password manager is used? I know you can export them, sort of, but that feature may blacklist your password manager and make it useless. Are they portable? I thought passkeys are locked to the device.

I was answering to the storage part. Blacklisting is the attestation part which is definitely a concern. Again, you can use passkeys as a yet another way to login. You can still use passwords. It doesn’t have to be one or other.

> Aren't they effectively locked in the database of whatever password manager is used?

Not in the case of Keepass, since you can export them.

> I know you can export them, sort of, but that feature may blacklist your password manager and make it useless.

Yes, and this is why passkeys are flawed.

> Are they portable? I thought passkeys are locked to the device.

There's nothing preventing you from syncing your passkeys and using them on different devices. This even seems to be the happy path in the locked down eco systems (You can create a passkey on an iPhone, which is then synced to iCloud, and now you can use that same passkey on a Mac).

I can pull up all my passkeys in 1Password or Bitwarden without issue.

I thought your "with issue" typo was quite pertinent to the whole discussion lol

Thats because the people behind passkeys are paternalistic and don't trust users. I had an argument with one of them a few months ago.

https://github.com/keepassxreboot/keepassxc/issues/10407

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47189749#47193048

My read on it all is that FIDO is stuck in some sort of groupthink. They don't feel the boots on the ground confusion around passkeys being opaque. They only care about phishing and being called "insecure" and don't care about anything else. Hence why WebAuthn has additional weird anti features like AAGUID for provider authentication.

Another one of those ridiculous threads is saying you gotta have support for nonsense like user presence verification.

https://github.com/keepassxreboot/keepassxc/issues/10406

> Thats because the people behind passkeys are paternalistic and don't trust users.

To be fair, trusting users with passwords/credentials is how we got into the mess of phishing et al in the first place.

The phishing resistance on fake websites is largely a function of the fact its an ssh key and you can't man in the middle those after first setup because you have known_hosts, which in the case of passkeys gets replaced with the website certificate technology.

The baking in "which authenticator is storing this passkey" and "require user to provide biometrics/pin to verify presence for this passkey" and "don't make it easy or possible to export passkeys" behaviour is more just control.

I guess it sort of helps if the threat model is complete remote code execution inside the victims brain because you got them to export their keys to you, but it seems more useful for websites and governments whitelisting what hardware and software they deem acceptable.

> I guess it sort of helps if the threat model is complete remote code execution inside the victims brain because you got them to export their keys to you, but it seems more useful for websites and governments whitelisting what hardware and software they deem acceptable.

Reminder that Facebook has warnings and prevention mechanisms to avoid users pasting malicious JavaScript into the console on Facebook.com (which would exfiltrate session cookies).

Preventing users from accessing these keys directly makes sense!

I would feel a lot better using SSH keys rather than passkeys. At least those are understandable.

They're literally the same thing, what are you on about?

Apparently not: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49007750

They might be the same thing cryptographically, but passkeys remove your ability to manage, move, or back them up at will. I can trivially move any single SSH key I want between my Mac, my iPhone, my PC, my Raspberry Pi, and my backup media. Can I do that with passkeys? It seems to depend on which storage mechanism I choose, and even then it's often a matter of dumping the entire password database to plaintext first.

Edit:

Oh yeah, I can also share SSH keys with friends and co-workers. I can freely choose which SSH key to use when authenticating and I can have an arbitrary number of SSH keys for a given server on each machine. Some of this stuff is esoteric, but some is not. Most of the stuff I can do with SSH keys I can also do with passwords but not with passkeys (or at least not always). Finally, as many others have mentioned, the attestation stuff is really ugly and takes control away from the user entirely.

this is false equivalency. in poland we have similar to passkey implementation in government issued application - mobywatel [0] that allows to login to government websites. in 2022 according to published data it had almost 9m installations [1] and a lot of them are old ppl, so its not like only neckbeards would know this ancient technology

sure there are some issues sometimes (outages and others), but most of the time they work like charm and solve a lot of issues with login+password issues.

- [0] https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=pl.nask.mobywa...

- [1] https://dane.gov.pl/en/dataset/2919/resource/43845,mobywatel...

I keep seeing people working on Passkeys get real defensive when told they don't make sense to people.

I've worked in tech 12+ years and I _hate_ when a Passkey prompt comes up, its only ever slowed me down.

But the devs who work on them are quite rabid, and keep dismissing real criticism of their implementation.

Yes, a bit of a mess. As the only practical way for most to use is with a password manager. So essentially, all your accounts still have a real password, just you enter that into your password manager app. So if your device is every compromised and someone has your master password then you are screwed.

And of course, passkeys on most all sites don't really improve security since someone can just choose to login with user/pass instead since presumably very few sites allow you to have just passkey.

Also if you use a password manager you may get locked into using that platform. Or ideally using a third party one but then having to pay a subscription, or using an open source option that is not ideal for the average person.

If one uses a passkey as intended and without a password manager and the site truly only supports logging in via your passkey, for all the touted benefits of passkeys, that would be a nightmare if a person loses access to their device, etc.

Passkeys are a nightmare for techies that want to understand and manage their stuff. They were optimized for people who neither can nor want to understand, they just press the button that the screen tells them to press and live inside someone's closed ecosystem.

For that use case, they work fine, and they create enormous lock-in, because now moving out of that ecosystem breaks everything. One might argue that that means they're perfectly engineered for what they are meant to do...

My take: (1) I've had passwords handled pretty well for a long time now: same password manager for something like 15 years; (2) companies are pushing pretty hard to get me to use passkeys instead.

From (2) I assume that the companies see benefits to themselves. I don't care about benefits to them. I don't see much in the way of benefits to me, so I'm not changing anything if I don't have to.

I'll admit to not having looked into passkeys all that much. Someday, I might. But for the time being, I don't see much point. I imagine that eventually I'll be more or less forced to deal with passkeys in at least some contexts. Will leave that for later.

For now, it's all a big "no thanks" from me.

I find it difficult to explain how to use password manager to non-IT person. Whatever I say, they say it is not secure. No amount of explanation will change their mind. They prefer to keep their passwords in their physical note book hidden in the safe (yes, they open the safe etc each time they need to log in somewhere when they get logged out).

As someone with ADHD a passkey is something I can lose easily and I don't want my accounts to be tied to any specific device. What if I have to upgrade my laptop tomorrow because one I use got bricked? Sounds like an absolute nightmare.

Password on the other hand I can remember for dozens of services, each very long.

If the person you describe really is doing that for all their passwords, then they are correct. Their password store is more secure than a password manager by nearly every metric that counts.

The one thing I would ding that approach on is recoverability, though. If a fire burns that down, it's gone.

I mean, they're right. I wouldn't trust any online password manager even if it was iCloud.

They should buy a Yubikey (a physical key) and keep their passkeys resident on that. Then they can truly keep that physical key locked up in their safe. And it is truly safer than their physical notebook because they are safe from being tricked into entering their password in the wrong place.

How do they tell their significant other how to logon to a shared account when they aren’t together? How do they use the Yubikey with their phone, laptop and tablet conveniently?

Their partner can use the same key. or they also register their own yubikey and keep it safe elsewhere.

I use Apple based passkeys to log into everything I can now. I have given it virtually no thought since all my relevant accounts and rolled out support. My non-technical close friends and family (consumer brains) have also done the same. I imagine it is a different case for non-Apple device users, but in the Apple case, passkeys are zero friction and truly life-enhancing for anyone who logs into things

I signed into my Playstation account on a new phone. It told me to make a passkey. Its safe. So i said ok.

Later I tried to sign into my Playstation account on my computer and I couldn't. It said I needed to use my passkey.

I went back on my phone and deleted my passkey.

FWIW, Nintendo seems to have nailed the concept of passkey. I can sign in anywhere. If I'm on a new device, i just use my email password and 2FA.

I dont know why so many vendors find the need to complicate this. A secure solution implemented poorly can potentially be worse than an insecure solution.

One more anecdote on that front — I worked the help desk at a medical school during college. The IT department had their fun password requirements (number, special character, blood of a virgin, change every month, etc). Every single person who came to the help desk had their password written down on a sticky note on their laptops. These were med students , doctors, staff... everyone.

At some point these admins have to ask themselves whether they're actually helping people be more secure or if you're just making them jump through hoops.

Passkeys are a vector for locking your logins to Big Tech ecosystems. They support device attestation, which means the service you are logging in to can require you to only use certain Passkey clients such as those provided by Google, Apple or Microsoft. The Passkey spec authors also maintain a list of "naughty clients"[1], which are clients that allow the user to manage their own data how they want. Services could choose to block those clients for "security reasons," justifying the decision to force you to use one of the Big Tech providers.

Until device attestation is removed or strongly curtailed in the spec, I suggest you do not create any Passkeys. Which sucks, because it's otherwise a pretty cool tech.

[1] https://passkeys.dev/docs/reference/known-issues/

More sources here: https://www.smokingonabike.com/2025/01/04/passkey-marketing-...

Passkeys are a political play aimed at bolstering government support. They’re the privacy sabotaging arm of Digital ID. They go hand in hand with “age” verification. It’s all the same play. Get your identity, get your access credentials, give it to the prying eyes.

This comment section is the best example of all time of the arrogance of Big Tech and its employees. Please try to take a second thinking outside of your bubble before commenting ridiculous stuff.

Yes, as a wealthy American, you "live in the Apple ecosystem". 99% of the world doesn't. And guess what, they're affected by passkeys all the same. They use a Windows laptop, and either an Android phone or iPhone. A lot of people even have an Android phone and an iPad. And no laptop at all. But at work or school they have to use Windows.

It's quite simple. Besides people "living in a single ecosystem" (discussed above, this is almost nobody), passkeys are only viable (i.e. not very painful to use) if you use a dedicated cross-platform password manager. Yet people who use those - which too is a globally negligible percentage - are exactly the people who tend to have near nothing to gain from passkeys, and only to lose. The majority of them is tech-savvy and they use auto-generated unique passwords. In that scenario, the minuscule improvement in security is meaningless and not worth it.

Ironically, this comment section shows exactly why passkeys are a shit show. Half the people here are exactly those who are coming up with this shit in their FAANG jobs, happily part of the global 1% (of which their tech-illiterate grandma too is part of), and they have no idea or care in the world for the remaining 99%. Unless of course this was simply a land grab for lock-in, which is about as likely.

I really don't get passkeys and how they are supposed to be safer.

Currently I save all login tuples to Bitwarden and store OTP secrets onto Aegis. Could have been 1password and authy, it's irrelevant. The thing is, I only get pwned if both are compromised.

Now with ubiquitous passkeys in Bitwarden if someone has access to my vault unencrypted it's already endgame.

Okay, I'm a tech nerd I admit it, but for my personal authentication life I find passkeys to make sense.

All my passwords and SSH key are already in Bitwarden. When a site starts supporting passkeys, I add that to Bitwarden as well. Now, instead of logging in by auto-filling my username and password, I just press the passkey login button (that hopefully exists) and click on the Bitwarden popup to select the account. It's less button presses for me, and I cannot be phished, nor can my passkeys be leaked on the dark web. All thanks to some fancy cryptography.

Okay, sure, if someone steals my Bitwarden vault by snatching my laptop while it's unlocked or something, I end up pretty screwed. That security aspect did not change, so I still use TOTP for all important services.

Also, I've made one invite-only web app where single-use invite codes and passkeys are the only ways to log in. It was not too hard, it was fun, actually. And I get the peace of mind that account sharing is pretty much impossible were a bad actor able to get their hands on an invite, as is hacking other people's accounts.

(Okay, I concede that I've had to help multiple people who find passkeys confusing as a result of this whimsical decision, and that it just might be that nobody is using my web app for real. So I'm just speaking from nerd privilege here... But it works well, trust me!!)

So what do you use for TOTP? Also bitwarden?

Ente Auth. Obviously not Bitwarden, I don't even know why that's an option. Having your 1st and 2nd factors in the same place seems foolish. I used to use Aegis, which might technically be a bit more secure, but Ente is also on the PrivacyGuides recommendations list (https://www.privacyguides.org/en/multi-factor-authentication...), so I opted to use it for more peace of mind in case my phone breaks.

> Also, I've made one invite-only web app where single-use invite codes and passkeys are the only ways to log in. It was not too hard, it was fun, actually. And I get the peace of mind that account sharing is pretty much impossible were a bad actor able to get their hands on an invite, as is hacking other people's accounts.

It also makes access to the app maximally unrecoverable if someone loses access to the passkey...

The userbase is so tiny they can just ask me or another admin for another invite code. No data is tied to the account that would be lost in the process.

My biggest issues with Passkeys is how inconsistently they are implemented and how opaque they attempt to be.

I understand SSH keys, I've been using them for decades, I know where they live, I know how to secure them.

Passkeys are murky as fuck. Is your PW manager supported? Do they sync? Where are they stored? How can I move to another PW manager if I want to in the future? Can I have more than 1 passkey per site? And the list goes on.

I _know_ some of you out there can answer some/all of the questions above but it's mostly on a per-site basis. Passkeys take too much of the control out of my hands and I don't like that.

Even more than that, I hate how they are trying to be pushed on me at every turn. Login -> Want to save a passkey (but they never call it that, they use some other confusing euphemism)? I click "No" and then it proceeds to pop 1Password's UI, then I dismiss that and it opens Chrome's passkey save UI, I dismiss that, and then it opens the OS's passkey UI. It's incredibly disrespectful and unclear.

I never use anything but 1Password but somehow everyone (OS and Browser) try to reach their grubby hands in. This is what scares me, I don't like having to be on high-alert to not accidentally save a passkey in Chrome or Safari and not realize until I'm on a different device and notice it's not in 1Password.

Lastly I trust the developers implementing passkeys... none, I trust them none, zero, zilch. I don't trust them to pick the right defaults, I don't trust their recovery options, and I know they will always pick the configuration that benefits them and not me.

No, for now I'll stick with my as-long-as-you-let-me-make-my-password random passwords which I never copy/paste into random website and be perfectly safe, thank you.

> I _know_ some of you out there can answer some/all of the questions above but it's mostly on a per-site basis.

Yeah, there is a difference between something that is difficult to explain but ultimately explainable, and something where the correct answer is "it depends"...

Passkeys bother me because they depend on the availability of another device. That just won't cut it for a lot of folks, especially people that are prone to losing devices. It's also annoying to have to deal with the 50,000 places that are fighting to keep your passkeys, leading to fragmentation and uncertainty as to where these credentials are stored.

Haphazardly implementing passkeys also has big problems - one vendor I use implemented them rather badly and randomly one day, completely removing the previously-solid password/MFA setup they had, replacing it with a "you are required to confirm on your phone with no other alternative" passkey, which was really annoying. I don't like my logins messed with. Passwords/MFA, while not perfect, work very well for most people, myself included. Passkeys still feel like they are in a very immature state.

I think the problem was that there wasn't a "Best Practices" way of using them when they were launched, which really prevented describing them in a consumer-friendly way.

And web site implementors couldn't follow that golden path, or describe the golden path, so there's fragmentation in usage and meanings and practices, making it far more confusing.

I love passkeys, I want to eliminate any and all password-based logins and switch entirely to passkeys. It's such a better experience, it's a "physical" key that can be backed up to multiple devices, and thinking of it like a key for a physical lock really gets at the core of its capabilities. But locks can be used in many many ways! Maybe you need to open the lock and still tell the guard a password, which is weird, but how most websites still operate.

Reminds me of Yishan Wong's description of OpenID's failure:

https://www.quora.com/What%E2%80%99s-wrong-with-OpenID-Why-h...

I find Google Password Manager makes passkeys pretty easy to use. As long as you don't accidentally create a passkey some other way. Hopefully websites will adapt to the reality of how people use passkeys in practice and some of the UX weirdness around them will disappear over time.

One annoying thing though is that while they recently added password sharing, they don't allow sharing passkeys. Basic passkey sharing would be nice, but it also seems possible to implement fancy sharing features that wouldn't be possible with password sharing. Things like sharing one time use passkeys or time limited passkeys or limited access passkeys or secure revocation of shared passkeys. I hope people are thinking about this.

Considering Google's track record of locking people out of their accounts it'd be very risky to trust them with your password manager.

This is very far from the top of the list of risks I should be concerned about. Basing your security decisions on the frequency with which you hear about something bad happening in the news is not a wise strategy. You have to consider that the user base of Google accounts is in the billions.

> You have to consider that the user base of Google accounts is in the billions.

Basing your security decisions on "it'll never happen to me" because there are billions of other users who will get burnt first is not a wise strategy either.

Why take the chance when there are so many other alternatives that let you own your vault or at least companies that still have some semblance of a support team.

Losing a decade of my Google Maps Timeline data even with backups enabled made me realise I may not be lucky enough to win the lottery but I am lucky enough for Google to pick little old me, hidden in the billions, to lose my data.

> Basing your security decisions on "it'll never happen to me" because there are billions of other users who will get burnt first

That's not my argument. My argument is that your evidence that Google is uniquely bad at locking people out of their accounts is not good evidence. A few stories in the news represents a beyond negligible fraction of billions of user accounts.

> A few stories in the news represents a beyond negligible fraction of billions of user accounts.

https://support.google.com/accounts/threads?thread_filter=(c...

How many times do you have to click "View more" to reach a post from last week? It's a problem.

The repeated advice from the "diamond product experts" says it all:

If you can't recover your account using Google's automated recovery process, the account is lost. [1]

Personally I thought I was OK because I had a recovery email set but what Google doesn't tell you is they outright refuse to even send a recovery email if you don't use a device, browser and same wifi they've seen before. [2]. At the time I was all in on Gmail so it was an especially sobering experience.

I accept it's a hard problem to protect that many accounts, but to dismiss it as a "few stories" is understating the problem and diminishes the terrifying experience all these users are having.

[1]: https://support.google.com/accounts/thread/453660883/locked-...

[2]: https://www.reddit.com/r/GoogleSupport/comments/1ps28fn/coul...

Those complaints aren't Google arbitrarily or maliciously locking accounts. They are mostly people who forgot their password and also simultaneously lost their sim card and phone number and recovery email and backup codes etc etc. Google provides excellent features to prevent this from happening and I have already taken advantage so that I won't simultaneously lose access to all my recovery options. You also have no way of knowing how many of those complaints are from scammers trying to compromise accounts, and if you think that isn't a gigantic problem in support forums you are fooling yourself.

You don't have any accurate data to support your suspicion that Google is worse than others, only anecdotes and vibes. The true source of your fear is a generalized mistrust of big tech relative to other institutions, which while common and popular these days is not a sentiment I share.

I used to think this but once you treat them as another path to get in they become really useful.

Yes, you still have your 2fa and password, but you create a fast path in addition to it when you get in.

It became even more useful once I stopped insisting they have to go into 1password

The cumbersome and poorly designed workflows surrounding passkeys are a significant hindrance to their adoption as well. It surprised me how bad they were when they emerged -- it was as if the UX was intentionally designed to kill passkey adoption.

Passkeys were invented so hacked sites could brush off their leaks with "no credentials were leaked" and minimise any regulatory fines. This is the reason why its being pushed by the big players.

Additionally this puts the same players in control of your logins - want to sync your passkeys? - enable "iCloud Keychain", or some other 'trust me bro' app that will 'securely store/sync your data' - no thank you.

In perfect world users should be able to generate a certificate, upload it to a couple nfc capable ubikey like devices that blow a fuse afterwards preventing from additional writes/reads and use that to login to every app ever. You would buy such devices in packs of 3, upload same cert to all, hide the other, burry the third.

My Health savings account provider is trying to force the use of passkeys. I assumed it was a cynical attempt to force the use of their app, which I never needed or wanted, but now seemingly will be required to use.

I can't believe these comments - passkeys are pretty easy to understand and most platforms allow you to add multiple. Not enough for truly one-passkey-per-device, but if you use a password manager that syncs passkeys, or hardware passkeys it's fine - it's easy, quick, and more secure than any password can ever be (mitm resistant).

I think the confusion with passkeys comes from that fact that everyone wants to own you so you have to be mindful if this passkey is being stored on the OS, the browser, sync'd between devices through google or apple, etc.

I have zero passkeys to my name. It's just not covering any serious attack surface in my life or anyone that I can think of.

If technically-motivated individuals can't be assed to switch away from passwords, then imagine how normies feel. I fully understand why most people choose passwords instead.

Stop thinking of them as alternatives to passwords. That is something they do, incidentally. Really, they are an alternative to normal TOTP 2FA (and shudders SMS 2FA). Those were already dependent on an app on a single device, or a password manager. And now, you can have the security of that, automatically used with biometrics. It is only because they are so secure, due to being a cryptographic key, that they can replace passwords.

They really should come up with a way to transfer them across devices/password managers though.

personally it works well for me as a way to login.

however, lately the anti-bot/spam shenanigans from big tech has ruined any ux work they have spent trillions on.

<rant>

one fine day, i was trying to log into my google account at google's office. for some reason their internal wifi was serving the internet through a corporate vpn, which was based out of the US. this tripped their security system, which then made me jump 3-4 hoops to log in back to my account. i recall sms verification (where you send them a code), some part where i had to scan a qr code and open on my phone (not logged into google btw), and the usual 2fa, among others.

likewise ticketmaster asking for verification for a decently used account over the years out of the blue. this is when booking a new ticket from a residential internet without any shady business. was made to reset my password three times in a row, and still got blocked!!!

</rant>

the false positive rate of these systems have reached a boiling point at some instances. yet they don't seem to stop the spammers and scalpers, but cause great pain to regular folks who don't pass the sieve. passkey-based verification is just a symptom of the larger problem.

PS: don't even bother using a non-normie browser, as it is a sure-shot way to get restricted, even on this website. it is as if we are all using tor browser if it is not the latest chrome.

One of the worst technologies I've had the misfortune of being forced to use honestly. It's always confusing and always breaking or not working as I expect across my devices?

I’ve read all the answers. I still don’t get it. I find it WAY more complicated than copy/paste or a browser extension that does that for me.

I hope it won’t become mandatory. (I honestly doubt).

We've all been through at least a couple rounds now of the security industry pressing us to change how we log in, ostensibly in our best interest: impractical complexity requirements, 2FA, "magic links," ridiculously short session expiry, whatever this bullshit is with the username and password on separate pages that make your password manager less convenient.

The only observable outcome of each of these changes has been making these products less convenient for us to use. At this point I don't think I am alone in being knee-jerk opposed to any further "improvements." I have yet to see a website make a case for a passkey being more convenient than what it is replacing, so I will continue opting out of them as long as I am allowed to.

I kind of get what everyone here is saying, but in my experience i love passkeys and use them for everything as much as possible. I especially love the qr code feature where you can login with a passkey that is only on your phone on another machine without having to do any setup.

Also I find it a bit frustrating when people say password or otp just works. No they absolutely do not work. Even technical people on here get phished all the time even with otp.

I dislike passkeys because they support remote attestation. It's my key -- why does the website care what app I'm using to host it or if I'm allowed to copy it? Or what operating system I'm using, for that matter.

Because of this, I will not use passkeys. It's a slippery slope. Once we're all on passkeys, website devs won't resist enabling the remote attestation bit, locking out linux users.

Passkeys aren't tied to any specific app or operating system.

I always think back to my grandmother in the '90s. When her old black-and-white TV stopped working, we bought her a new color TV with a remote control. A few weeks later I saw that she had taped over the buttons, leaving only the power button exposed so she wouldn't mess anything up accidentally. I've been programming for 40 years, but even I struggle to grasp sometimes what goes where and why - so what is someone with zero coding background supposed to make of it? I sometimes talk about tech stuff - internet, cookies, security - with my hairdresser, and she just listens with wide eyes. I'm convinced most people have no idea what they're actually doing with their devices, and that's on us developers. It's our job to tailor systems to users by serving them with our knowledge, not confusing them with it. I doubt anyone wants to mess with the ECU settings on their car's dashboard - they just want to press the gas pedal, because that actually makes sense.

I don't use passkeys because I can't tell if they're a one-way door. If I use it once, can I still use passwords to log in in the future?

I also don't understand how the system works when things go wrong (someone hacks your account, etc.). I don't even understand all the ways things could go wrong with passkeys.

Seeing the comments here makes me realize I'm not stupid or ignorant for not understanding these things. Some people do understand them much better than me, but there is no universal answer that emerges after sufficient study.

I will continue to stay away from passkeys.

I’m absolutely floored by some of what I am reading here. Six months before passkeys rolled out there were numerous succinct consumer-friendly write-ups. I sent at least one of these to several non-technical people I knew and they had no problem understanding the benefit and moving to using them where available once they started rolling out.

Would be helpful if you provided at least 1 example

https://www.aarp.org/personal-technology/passkeys-future/

I pity the grandpa that has to read all of this and determine if Passkeys are right for them:

> According to Google, you’ll need the following to sign in with a passkey:

> A laptop or desktop that runs Windows 10, macOS Ventura or ChromeOS 109 or later

> A mobile device that runs iOS 16 or Android 9 or later

> A hardware security key that supports the FIDO2 protocol

> Google adds that your computer or mobile device will also need a supported browser, including Chrome 109, Edge 109 or Safari 16 or later.

> [...] Do not create a passkey for a shared device if you don’t want other users to access your account, Google warns.

So much information, so many warnings. I feel nostalgic for passwords just sifting through this stuff.

If you don't understand how an article wasting more words on describing corporate alliances than on how things work, and the latter is needlessly repetitive while also wrong, you are likely to stay on that floor of befuddlement for a long time

The fundamental blind spot engineers have had with every authentication protocol for 30 years is forgetting that trust must be mutual. The lone exception has been phishing prevention with user-selected avatars, and that didn't last long.

Every advancement in "security" has assumed the service needs to more strictly identify the customer, without caring about the customer's trust for the service, or experience with performing the identification ritual.

So when your bank asks you for a code or your mom's maiden name, they never offer anything to verify they are who they say they are. whenever I ask they say "of course we're from chase, we just called you", without realizing how absurd that is.

Now Passkeys suffer an even worse dilemma. Now the customer has 4 dimensions of tools to record & use in order to log in. Did I use email, google, facebook, apple ID to log in? Did I save this code via phone, text, authenticator app (which one, there are multiple incompatible ones)? Did I use a passkey ? where is that passkey located? my phone, my browser storage, my authentication extension.

We started with a single dimension of email + password to log in. Now it's an entire decision tree that has to be recorded. How do you even record this?

  disqus :  credential = email, password = "see bitwarden", 2fa = microsoft authenticator, passkey = "on iphone in icloud"

  viator: credential = google sso, password = same, 2fa = symantec, passkey = "edge on windows 11 laptop in office"

This is absolutely absurd!

I thought engineers were tested for scaling during the interview process. This protocol doesn't even scale to a single site.

Rather: passkeys are great, but the way Microsoft implemented them in their login flow it disastrous.

I store passkeys in a device-independent way, in KeePass using the great actively developed KeePassPasskey extension, because my threat model allows storing password and 2FA for the same site in the same place (or 1st factor when an account is passkey-only, i.e. passwordless). And I sync that between my primary computer and the phone.

I have backups of my KeePass database in a few places (that don't require a passkey to log in) so I am able to regain access to core services in case both my devices fail at the same time. Although it's easy to trap yourself in a circular dependency.

https://github.com/yusei36/KeePassPasskey/

The thing that gets me is that to even use a Passkey I need a browser addon that syncs my entire password vault into browser memory, the same memory that all the adtech JS runs! No thank you! What a ridiculous system. I will continue copying and pasting passwords myself out of KeePassXC.

Passkeys work well when you have password managers with multi-device sync. While it is indeed trivial to get one, consumers don't like password managers in first place. And it is very hard to make person use password manager, instead of his john1988 type of password

For what's worth, I only really started using passkeys after committing to bitwarden/vaultwarden as my password manager. I've been skeptical of Google's/Apple's/Microsoft's passkey implementations forcing you into their password managers and seeing them as yet another power play to lock you in their ecosystem.

Passwords+TOTP have that universality going for them that you can always move away to a different password manager/do without one if you ever want. With vaultwarden and that dependency/liability cut off, passkeys have phenomenal UX, especially coupled to a SSO/identity provider like pocketId.

Passkeys are so, so, so bad. One of the worst things our industry invented. The sooner sites start leaving them on the wayside and just go back to TOTP, SMS, and Email codes/links, the better. These work. We solved auth. Its fine.

I'm probably not the only one to have a deep distrust in passkeys. I've deep-dived in to what they are and how they work and I think I can accept them on their technical merits, but I can't shake the feeling that the adoption has been way faster than we've been used to, for whatever reason. I think it was half a year between the settling down of the specification to being bombarded by a "Get a passkey!" from every goddamn website on this earth. I don't really see what the conspiracy to move the whole world to passkeys would be here, but it certainly feels like there is one.

I think my problem with passkeys is the same as with almost everything today: if I lose my phone, my digital life will be almost as difficult to recover as if I lost my ID and my birth certificate at the same time. Yes, that's why you don't create one passkey (phone), but maybe two or three (browsers), but that's mental load on myself -- I don't even try to explain that stuff to my parents, even something as (somewhat) easy to use as a password manager is out of their scope. Add TOTP and passkeys on top of that and you've got perfect security that no-one in their right minds is using. No idea how to resolve the problem, but it's not by shoving a solution down our throats with a vengeance.

Security people don't care about usability. They genuinely think we are all CIA field agents.

Look I remember my PIN everything else is in Firefox password manager.

> Security people don't care about usability.

I spent a long time working in the network security field, and you speak truth. The perverse thing about it is that security people should care a lot about usability. If the scheme isn't usable enough, people will figure out how to bypass it or aspects of it.

The technically weaker security scheme that everybody accepts is more secure than the technically stronger security scheme that everybody tries to bypass.

I don't need your stinkin' passkeys! I have KeePassXC on Qubes OS and KeePassDX on GrapheneOS. No I will not buy into your proprietary cloud prison, with FISA/NSA/court-order backdoor access to my data! No I will not rely on KeePassXC/DX for storing them, when I can wake up tomorrow and find the paternalistic tyrants who maintain the provider attestation/trust lists have blacklisted my KeePasses! TOTP/HOTP-everywhere is a much better idea than freakin' passkeys! We need a law that forces any service provider that requires (hell, even offers) SMS 2FA to also offer TOTP or HOTP as additional options to substitute for SMS!

Whoever makes these boneheaded decisions (SMS 2FA only, hardware/cloud passkeys only) should not be allowed around engineering authentication for the public!

Yeah, I went there! Back off! Get off your high horses and eat some humble pie!

And when thinking of passkeys, remember that Amazon, who presumably have at least one employed engineer, decided in its infinite stupidity to only allow a single security key to be registered.

So Amazon did not understand FIDO, but J random webmaster is supposed to understand passkeys?

I only use pass keys by storing them in 1password. Then I don't have to worry about the whole "lose/broke/replace a device" thing, which is inevitable. Then just be really good about keeping your backup codes etc with 1pass solid.

If you want a consistent, and seamless authentication experience, then one party has to own that experience. Go federation/SSO. Sign into everything with microsoft, or google as your identity provider, and live with the privacy implications.

Passkeys are great, and they take a significant amount of work away from the user, and make them much less prone to phishing attacks while also not turning their entire online identity into the property of google. I've had much more luck with onboarding non-technical people into a yubikey vs a password manager. Platform authenticators tend to trip people up. However, the process of adding a new key is getting much more consistent, and legible to people over time, and things will settle on platform authenticators rather than external physical keys for most use cases.

I love passkeys.

The only confusion I have with them is around when they are used just as a 2fa (most cases) and when they can replace passwords completely (just one click and you're in)

Unfortunately very few services offer #2 not sure why

It just so happened that Microsoft sent an email today to our M365 tenant administrators that SMS and voice for 2FA is being removed 1-Feb-2027 and that automatic enrollment to passkeys starts 1-Sep-2026. Bring on the passkey overlords. Although, LLMs say that passkeys are superior to passwords since it includes a public/private key setup with the private key saved to a device that requires a PIN or biometric to access the private key.

That's if you're using Authenticator.

Clarification: Microsoft Authenticator.

You can’t use any random password-manager with passkey support.

I use Bitwarden for everything and have to have MS Authenticator installed just for this 1 login.

Super annoying.

I have Duo in our environment. Authenticator not required.

You can use any credential manager you choose for Microsoft Account passkey.

The use of a passkey doesn’t require Authenticator or other OTP app. Gemini said that an OTP app can be used as a vault for the passkey, but it’s not the mechanism that permits the check of the private key. Rather, that’s the PIN or biometric. Now, perhaps I don’t understand your statement and you can clarify if that’s the case.

How is one supposed to let an LLM log in with passkey?

I don't care how it works, but as long as it requires me to physically have some device to log in (and doesn't have a backup, like emailing me or calling me), it puts security in my hands.

This is mostly a complaint about bad copy/explainers in Google's UI. Passkeys, properly implemented, can be perfectly consumer friendly (e.g., Apple Touch ID is delightful).

You’d think a head of product at a tech company would embrace a “it’s literally impossible to have your password stolen if you use this” technology.

You can still get your session cookies stolen. If you have good password hygiene passkeys only protect you in extremely niche scenarios.

if you have good password hygiene is doing a lot of work here. such a large population of the world does not have this, credential stuffing is a huge class of vuln

Obligatory https://fy.blackhats.net.au/blog/2024-04-26-passkeys-a-shatt...

It's a shame, because WebAuthn is really great technology. But tech companies are botching the rollout.

I do have love/hate relationship with passkeys.

Love: I truly have redundancy for most critical accounts, meaning I have 4 separate passkeys assigned, each not tied to one SPoF -- one in 1Password, one in iCloud -- both synced everywhere I logged in and if I'm ever banned/locked out of both of them somehow, I still have two additional USB keys (token2) as a fallback.

Hate: every fucking service seems to have different idea on how to implement them, whether to allow them as the only factor, how many to allow to have in any particular account.

On a separate note, for the hw side of things I'm kinda sad that old yubikey nano approach when the token is just sitting flush on the side of the laptop and I tap it occasionally is just dead, because every vendor moved to mandatory PIN to store passkeys on hardware tokens. I get the rationale but still.

I like the authenticator option. I literally cannot understand if that's the same thing as passkeys.

I'd like to try passkeys out. I actually tried again on Amazon in response to reading the comments here. But it just.... doesn't work?

I'm on a laptop running Ubuntu, I use Firefox as my browser, and I use 1Password as my password manager. I have both the browser extension and native Linux application installed, and they sync/communicate with each other (so if I unlock the native Linux app, the browser extension also unlocks).

When I open my Amazon.com item in 1Password, it has a helpful link to https://passkeys.directory/details/amazon which tells you clearly, step-by-step how to set up a passkey. Great! I love clear directions.

But when I get to the step when I click the "Set Up" passkey, Firefox gives me an address bar pop-up saying "Touch your security to continue with www.amazon.com".

Huh?

I don't have a security key. My laptop does have a fingerprint reader, which I use to unlock my screensaver (and it's integrated with some KDE keyring thing), so I tried putting my finger on that. Nothing. I opened the 1Password extension. Nothing there, just normal view of my login info. I opened the 1Password native application. Nothing there either.

Maybe it's a Firefox issue, or a Linux issue? So I tried setting it up on my phone (running GrapheneOS and their Chromium-based browser), which has the 1Password app installed. I logged in, and this time got far enough that 1Password brought up a prompt asking "Do you want to save this passkey?" I tapped Yes, and it then immediately told me "Unable to save passkey: For security reasons, 1Password did not save this passkey. The associated URL for this passkey does not match the selected app." So... does that mean 1Password is refusing to touch the passkey because it didn't come from the com.google.chrome Android application?

This whole experience has re-affirmed my skepticism of passkeys in practice. I think it would be awesome to have public/private key security on my online accounts. I think it would be great if I could log in without having to copy/paste passwords (when autofill doesn't work, or for TOTP codes). But I have zero confidence that this opaque stream of bytes will actually work to get me logged in to my account. When the 1Password input field detection fails, I sigh, copy/paste my username and password, and then forget about the mild inconvenience after about 30 seconds. I don't even want to think about what would happen to an account if the only way to log in to an account was via passkeys.

Still taking feedback and questions for an upcoming consumer centric "What's a passkey?" site.

https://forms.gle/wmaydkzmUp2eKfJG7

Original post: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47852849

Another noteworthy annoyance is the increasing number of services that try to aggressively push you towards passkeys, without you ever asking.

Every other time I open the Costco app (needed to walk in to the store, since I don't carry my card and they refuse to provide Apple Wallet integration) I get asked to switch to passkey, without a way of saying "don't ask me again".

If you're in any position to determine this in your company/software, please stop this pattern. Give users the option to say "stop asking me about passkeys".

The idea of passkeys is good (similar to key pairs you use with ssh if I understand correctly) but how and where they get stored is the problem. Especially if you use multiple computers / devices.

Something like a yubikey makes sense for this until you lose it and your fucked. From what I understand you cant clone a yubi key to keep a backup somewhere safe.

In the end the solution will be some sort of cloud based storage for these keys where the NSA can have easy access.

i don't understand passkey - there's a website forces me to use it. i have to remember some six digit number to unlock it. whereas before, i could just click to autofill my password.

Why not use SQRL instead?

I do not understand all of the drama surrounding passkeys. They work flawlessly for me on all my devices. Maybe that’s because I’m all-in on Apple devices, but I have yet to have a single problem with passkeys.

Passkeys do have drawbacks and tradeoffs, as has everything, but my god did I feel the energy of „lol I’m so bad at math” in that tweet and a lot of „lol smelly nerds” in replies.

I find it annoying that gmail has simply decided that my unlocked phone is more secure than my computer.

One of the dumbest auth workflows I experienced in recent times: My partner texts me, "Mom lost her phone somewhere in the zoo." I go to log into Google Find My Phone with her password. It sends a mandatory verification SMS... to the lost phone. (It was eventually found, no thanks to Alphabet.)

I would be much more comfortable with passkeys and 2FA if there was almost always the option to log in with just a password as long as an email gets sent to me (perhaps relevant that I have paid email, not Gmail) stating I logged in to site XYZ without 2FA. Not a "click button to confirm you want to log in" email, just a "hey this happened" email containing a Shaggy link, "It wasn't me." Bonus points if that site's account settings (e.g. 2FA) cannot be changed as long as I'm only logged in with a password[+].

The odds of me not having a device to receive the email at the same time someone guesses my password and causes rapid catastrophic damage[++]... I would need to be specifically targeted or unlucky beyond the normal expectations of unluckiness. (Much more likely: I'd occasionally discover which sites have bad security practices or that I need to be more resistant to social engineering or more careful in public spaces; guessing a long generated password in just a few attempts when the password is never shown on the screen would be impressive!)

I've lost count of the number of times I need to enter a password using a unknown machine, log into my Bitwarden server, copy/paste the necessary password, ... "okay now you'll see a popup on your Totally Breakable Losable Connectivity-Unreliable Android phone"

-----

[+]: account info can't be changed w/ only password... unless I provide some verification ranging from personally appearing at an office with ID for money-related accounts to verifying ownership from a backup email address for low-stakes accounts like bulletin boards.

[++]: short of guessing my Bitwarden master password, which is one of the carveouts for "always always 2FA" and "several alternative, secure backup login methods, at least one which does not require technology"

Passkeys? That shit that's not a password or a crypto key that I never use?

Have to agree. They are, indeed, very safe and effective, but no user that usually picks "fuckyouhacker" as a password, is gonna use them, given a choice.

1. Use Passkey from 1Password

2. Profit

Another point I haven't seen discussed here yet: It's nice that Google or Apple or 1Password or whoever else can sync your passkeys to all your devices, but what happens if they ban you? It can happen for sometimes ridiculous reasons, as demonstrated by Google. Does that mean you instantly lose access to all passkeys as well?

I don't know everything there is to know about passkeys or anything, but my reaction to most of these comments is "You're passing yourself off as someone who has relevant opinions about security, and you can't possibly imagine how these things work or how they're useful? Come the fuck on."

Passkeys are basically session cookies that are signed by a secure element in one of your devices at the time you log in. That's it. They cannot be phished because there is no password to steal. If I had to guess, the basic flow is something like this:

1. When the passkey is created, the device's secure element coughs up a public key or something to the server representing itself as a trusted device

2. When a user logs in, the server issues a challenge (basically a random number) to the device and says "sign this with a private key that corresponds to one of the trusted public keys I have"

3. The secure element signs the challenge and sends it back

4. The server goes through its list of trusted device public keys until it finds one that verifies the challenge response. If it finds one, it logs you in. If it doesn't, you don't log in

Step (1) is probably bootstrapped with a username/password and second factor like SMS 2FA, OTP, or email 2FA.

Even if this isn't exactly how they work, it's a plausible implementation. Nothing about this requires vendor lock-in. The various secure elements that can produce passkeys come from many different places, so I'm sure sufficiently motivated open source people could create a firmware TPM that is certified for use with passkeys or something if they cared enough.

> Passkeys were invented by security engineers with zero understanding of the consumer brain.

... of the human brain.

I hate passkeys so much. They're so confusingly implemented.

I don't know how to rationalize it: is passkey so good that even the banking apps start pushing it, or is it all a big conspiracy theory with a hidden agenda?

I just stick with TOTP.

> Imagine you’re a boomer and you just figured out how to store your passwords

i'm gonna stop you right there

Ah! Like Pgp

My tinfoil hat take is that there's significant interest to keep everything digital, always-online and connected to the major providers, so it can easily be snooped by five eyes using their omnipresent backdoors.

Passkey biometrics also allow you to confirm certain person is holding the device right in this very moment, and not receiving a TOTP via walkie-talkie. Especially important for kinetic sanctions.

If you check out their Terramare group of companies those guys are still using typewriters. Unless you're US/UK millionaire I recommend to stay as analog as possible with physical password book and TOTP/yubikey.

Same with the push for "post-quantum crypto" and elliptic curves. I feel my systems get significantly more attention when using 8k RSA than any of its modern replacements. While I love wireguard the transition to ED25519 felt way too smooth..

the fact that some nebulous "group of companies" still uses typewriters does not mean that all modern cryptography is flawed

Diversity is resilience; no need to standardize on curves or "post-quantum" IBM bullshit if other approaches still work perfectly fine.

And if the pros are using typewriters in 2026 it's not a signal for me to put even more eggs into the US-megacorp dominated basket who treat me like an NPC who can be droned at will.

An important skill to develop is determining whether somebody is bullshitting you. Because it would be impossible for any one human to perfectly understand all of these concepts, right? So when I read this person's blog post, I felt I could trust him, based on what I know about work he's done previously. I'm not saying you should trust me on this, or even blindly trust him, but look at his body of work, and the sources he cites, and make the call for yourself: https://words.filippo.io/crqc-timeline/

What the hell are you talking about? What pros use typewriters for what (to write code?)?

I get reluctance about being dependent from the US but your reason seems a bit off

At Caution we -exclusively- allow passkeys. The entire database is user ids and public keys. If it leaks, it would only be mildly annoying.

If you are confused about digital passkeys, you can use a physical yubikey or nitrokey and tap it when it blinks. You can treat them like a credit card or house keys.

Asking people to keep up with and remember passwords is and always has been the thing that was invented with zero understanding of the consumer brain.

> -exclusively- allow passkeys

Isn't that just a euphemism for "we mandate passkeys"? Saying 'exclusively allow' draws the reader's attention to the positive (allowing!) while de-emphasizing what's not permitted.

Regardless, I think it's a lot less of an issue for services exclusively oriented at people in tech instead of just everyone. Even then, there is a barrier to adoption besides just understanding it, which is relying on new software or owning a piece of hardware. It's a lot messier, while text remains universal and has no dependencies.

Instead of asking users to create another password, they just specify a username, tap, and they have an account. Good security and UX do not need to be at odds.

I think there are probably sinister motives behind some of the push to pass keys, but you'd think that if that were true, they would make it really quite easy to add one and to use.

That is not the case. The entire setup/enrollment/add a passkey to your account processing is DMV inspired.

Its a lot easier to track email and phone numbers used across multiple sites than it is passkey used on multiple sites.

I don’t understand this point at all. I think the author has himself confused with the average consumer. For the first time in a decade or so you can buy a PHYSICAL key and use it to sign into websites. I can explain this to any grandma out there. Likewise, I’m an Apple user. Once you’re in Apple universe passkeys are extremely easy. Tap your thumb on the scanner, done. Now we can put on the tinfoil hat and say how this fosters vendor lock in yadda yadda but the last thing I would say is that it has terrible user ergonomics. LOL

> Once you’re in Apple universe

And there's your blocker. Being limited to only devices from a single vendor is horrible, and a firm no from a lot of people.

> Now we can put on the tinfoil hat and say how this fosters vendor lock

The fact that you call it a tinfoil hat type issue is just insane to me. Literally every person in my household has some apple devices and some other ones (android, windows, etc). And some of them have switched back and forth.

Plus, the "ergonomics" of logging into a website on a random device to check something are awful.

I literally presented you with the solution in the sentence before. Buy a usb c dongle key. You pay 20 euros to NEVER have to remember a single password ever again. Seems like an ok trade off to me. Likewise you can register multiple passkeys for multiple devices, so long as you do it in sequence (first Apple, then Android) etc. Really it takes very little getting used to. Ever tried to fill out a crap password form which wants 7 special characters but no dashes but uppercase but not uppercase Y and so forth.

How does that USB-C dongle work on my corporate computer that has USB blocked? How does it work with my iPhone or my iPad or my Kindle?

And how is it better than a password + password manager? Literally everything about what is described is worse than a password + manager.

> Being limited to only devices from a single vendor is horrible, and a firm no from a lot of people.

Maybe for a lot of tech people, I don't think the general public understands the risks enough to care.

Maybe it is easy to explain, but passkey promoters have clearly failed to do it. I don't think a single person I know in real life uses one.

> For the first time in a decade or so you can buy a PHYSICAL key and use it to sign into websites. I can explain this to any grandma out there.

What would you answer if grandma asked you what happens if she loses her physical key?

I recently logged into my CVS.com account after not touching it for years, and I couldn't find the password reset..... turns out they no longer use passwords at all; only Passkeys and tokens via email/SMS.

Aside from email accounts potentially being compromised or SMS interception, this is honestly the way all sites should be going now. But more seriously, there should be a way to use only Passkeys with a backup identification method in case you lose your Passkey.

The new threat? Browser password managers are insecure. Anyone can sit down at my machine if it's unlocked and Passkey their way into any of my accounts. What good is that? Why doesn't Chrome use my Google account password before allowing auto-fill/login? (Obviously I don't use Chrome's password manager, but it's a real concern for everyone else.)

I agree with your anti-password take, 100%. But all my passkeys have biometrics attached to them, mostly so that I know that they are being used, when they are being used. Silent release of authentication credentials is a scary security mode. A YubiKey with a press mechanism is enough, I just happened to buy the biometric version. Or use the biometric lock on iCloud Keychain passkeys.

I was trying to say, nobody should be using Passkeys via browsers because they all fail to secure them. You need a password manager of some sort. But this is also true of passwords. My ultimate point was, passwords are a burden because unless you use a password manager and unique passwords for every single account, then passwords are strictly a burden. The average user doesn't use a password manager outside of the junk in Chrome, so... they're really just creating a security disaster for themselves.

So, therefore: passwords shouldn't exist, and you should create sessions via email links/tokens. Then also offer Passkeys as a faster login.

Passkeys are a mitigation against users being bad at password hygiene and phishing being a real issue to users.

You can't phish a passkey, and you don't rely on the user providing you 'hunter2' on every site.

As for vendor lock in? No. The specs are open. You can run the code on a microcontroller, or, you can keep it in your arm with something like the Vivokey Apex. Note that the FIDO2 for the Apex is an open source Javacard applet.

The UX on the other hand is not great. If you have a password manager, your OS may prompt you which target to store the passkey with.

> As for vendor lock in? No. The specs are open. You can run the code on a microcontroller, or, you can keep it in your arm with something like the Vivokey Apex. Note that the FIDO2 for the Apex is an open source Javacard applet.

That is not true. Passkeys support device attestation, enabling websites to lock you out if you don't use their approved devices. Which is happening with all the big platforms right now.

Neither Apple nor Google do key attestation for their cloud-synced keys.

This

    > Which is happening with all the big platforms right now.

Does not seem to be happening. Am I missing something?

Consumer passkeys are just an extension of the OMB Policy Memorandum M-19-17, Enabling Mission Delivery through Improved Identity, Credential, and Access Management (dated May 21, 2019). It is ultimately part of anti terrorism efforts with regard to banking and fraud. Think of this as consumer computer version of the scene in the movie The Baader Meinhof Complex when the cops are discussing a proposal for electronic data processing. "According to a poll by the Allensbach Institute, one in four Germans under 30 sympathizes with the RAF. That's nearly 7 million people. That amounts to an enormous pool of sympathizers, which makes the search for perpetrators extremely difficult." It signals the end of publicly available general computing. This was always inevitable, the mob cannot be trusted with weapons of mass destruction. Computers = Guns

I will never understand how a small group of tech savvy people are heavily confused and against a simple and more secure system.

You want anecdotes? Ok. I’ve had elderly adult relatives who aren’t good with their devices tell me unprompted they’re using them and like them when I mentioned the word out loud to myself using my phone around them.

These are people who don’t know the difference between apps and the web. Who have 200 tabs open because they don’t know what tabs are so a new one just gets opened automatically all the time. Can’t tell some websites apart. Who change their passwords on every login to some sites because they can’t get sign in right.

Yeah if you want to write them down or refuse to save passwords outside text files or demand they live on a security key on your keychain you’ll have a hard time. You’re being 0.0000001% of the user population. You’re not representative.

They are a MASSIVE UX win. A MASSIVE security win.

I’ve logged into my work computer with a passkey on my personal phone, no issue. It’s fine. They’re backed up locally. It’s fine.

The biggest problem, which is getting better and somewhat a transition problem, is sites using terrible UX to trigger the workflow. Those that follow the suggestions or close to it are great.

I love passkeys. I just don’t get the confusion.

I've yet to meet a non tech person irl who uses them. I went through the laborious process years ago setting my parents up with 1Password. They find passkeys very confusing addition. I have yet to see the massive UX win. If that were true I don't think we'd be having this conversation. Good UX becomes the natural state of things and we don't even notice. I've had trouble myself setting up passkeys correctly with my 1Password. This never happens with traditional passwords and 1Password

The win for passkeys is login with faceID. That people actually use.

My usernames and passwords auto-fill with faceID already. Lots of forms even (somehow?) auto-submit after that, don't even have to press a button.

The forms don’t. The browser does. There’s a set of heuristics.

The problem with autofill is it doesn’t help if the person keeps screwing up their passwords, changing them, or ends up with 5 different passwords in the password manager for the same site.

All of which I’ve seen.

There’s far more than that.

My elderly mother accidentally created a passkey (in Chrome) for one of her accounts. Normally, I try to keep a copy of her accounts and passwords in case she forgets them so I can help her out. With the passkey, this is impossible.

She doesn't know how she created one, she doesn't know what it is, and I don't know how to explain to her that if her PC dies I won't be able to help her log back into her account. I'm not even sure how I'm going to migrate this thing to a new PC for her.

Any decent password manager can handle all of those. Apple does. I’d expect the same of Chrome, Edge, Firefox and 1Password but don’t personally use any of them.

Why not just set yourself up to be able to access her password vault? Why is copying magic strings a better solution? You could have done that to get password access without passkeys existing. So they change nothing.

If you are going to store passkeys in a password manager, the whole situation is no more secure than just using passwords.

Consider:

1. Password managers tie passwords to sites, so phishing-resistance is achieved. 2. Password managers allow long, complicated, individual password per web site, so compromise blast radius is 1.

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