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Comment by andrewmutz | Hacker News Reader

One man's offensive penetration tool is another mans defensive tool. In the recent HuggingFace/OpenAI incident the safety controls stood in the way of the defenders, not the attackers:

https://www.thestack.technology/hugging-face-hacked-turned-t...

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You're presenting further evidence of lack of effective control over these systems as... a mitigating factor...?

Why do you assume they're disagreeing with you?

> One man's offensive penetration tool is another mans defensive tool.

seems to suggest the author believes there's some intrinsic equilibrium

Which,

1) is definitely not proven and not guaranteed (open to proofs otherwise, not pithy sayings that have zero normative effect on reality)

2) is apparently "supported by" further evidence of lack of effective control, which does not feel like equilibrium whatsoever

Apparently, the attacker in the Hugging Face case was reported to be an internal OpenAI model trying to break into HF and steal the answers to cybersecurity benchmarks: https://openai.com/index/hugging-face-model-evaluation-secur... It really doesn't matter what restrictions are placed on public use of models if the attacking models are internal models at the AI labs themselves.

So if the AI labs are literally running rogue models breaking into other organizations' servers, then yes, I am OK with those organizations self-hosting Chinese models for defensive use.

What?

The issue is that models are not well-controlled and are increasingly powerful.

Offense/defense/Chinese/American/OAI/HuggingFace – none of it matters. What matters is introducing highly capable intelligences that we - quite demonstrably – do not have effective positive control over.

Oh, to be clear, I don't think that anything about this overall situation is even slightly OK.

Ah sorry I think the confusion was mine! I thought we were already talking on the top-level post about the OAI/HuggingFace article. But we are not!

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