I have read about people giving an agent full access to their main system saying they have nothing of value. To me, that's a strange opinion to have with the distinction between what's private and what's secret.
I've also started creating new github deploy keys for each repo in use on a VM, so the blast area for any given agent disaster is "a couple/few github repos and whatever credentials were needed for the agent/model".
I wouldn't let a coworker, even one I know pretty well, log into my personal account on my machines...why would I let an agent that can be tricked into uploading all my credentials to an attackers web server?
The agents have sandboxes, but those are loose. Not enforced by anything outside of the agent harness itself.
This way, all members of the student union were able to install any software they wanted to on the student union computers without having to give out blanket root access to the members. Only a select few members had full root access.
There’s other ways to achieve the same too.
And you can do this exact same sort of thing for the user that your agent runs as too, without having to give it access to do everything that root can.
After you had been a member for a while and demonstrated that you mostly knew what you were doing, they’d give you full root access if you had some reason to want it that they agreed with.
And thanks to the dedicated suid program that exec’d into apt, wanting to install additional software was not a reason to be granted full root privileges since everyone could already install packages from the apt repositories this way without full root privileges.
Along with full root access came basically just a couple of simple rules, one of which was:
Do not abuse your root access to walk into other members home directories.
That rule was put in place after a previous member with root access had used the root privileges to copy the homework of another member into his own home directory without asking the other member for permission to see his work.
Aside from that one thing happening that one time, there hadn’t really been anyone doing anything malicious AFAIK. We were a rather small group of members in this student union, and it was a pretty chill and nice place. People came there to hang out, drink beer and tinker with electronics and computers.
There wasn’t much that root privileges could be abused for anyway. Regular members could already use all of the machines via graphical login at the desks, and remotely over ssh. Really the main two things anyone could have done maliciously would be to steal other people’s homework (like that one guy was kicked out for doing), or to steal credentials from others (no known cases of that happening there).
And if someone had started acting really maliciously, using the student union computers to attack the wider network, the university would have been on top of that real fast. The computer network of the student union was a subnet of the university network, and this university had a very competent crew of people watching over the university computer network as a whole.
A friend of mine once wondered how many computers were on the university computer network in total and did a port scan from one of the university computers (not from the student union computers). It did not take long from he started the port scan until university employees contacted him and gave him a stern talking to, and also told him the proper way find the answer to how many computers were on the university network.
You might want to check out Ant's open source srt [0], I use it to contain my local coding agents. It's strict by default and enforced at the OS layer.
[0] https://github.com/anthropic-experimental/sandbox-runtime
I do the same: my agents run in a hardened VM on a hardened Linux machines in a separated network in my basement. The magic of ssh makes this setup transparent for me on my desktop. But extremely hard for my agent to do nasty things.
You can do a brainstorming with web on a remote container prototyping based on that brainstorm on another container with no network access.
The one thing that is less trustworthy is using local agents for service management, you definitely want to have them scoped to dev/testing. I would never trust an agent to execute any command in production or sensitive data at all
And, we're not talking about hypothetical attacks here. Prompt injection attacks have happened. Supply chain attacks that agents fell for have happened.
https://venturebeat.com/security/six-exploits-broke-ai-codin...
I'm going to "security in depth" these gullible little thinky guys in my computer, but you do what makes you happy.
You can't see how the agent having no access to anything other than what it's working on is safer than the agent having access to my home directory with all of my credentials?
Look, you do whatever you want to do with your agents and your computer. I'm going to...contain them.
https://venturebeat.com/security/six-exploits-broke-ai-codin...
In that case, maybe you want VMs at hosting providers. There are companies building ephemeral VM and container orchestration layers for this kind of thing, I haven't played with them, though. It seems like a reasonable idea, though. One isolated environment per project or repo. Only the secrets needed for that one project and an agent that can't reach outside of it.
I've considered building something along those lines, and actually do run my security auditing benchmarks in containers automatically (that was originally to prevent the models from cheating, because you can disable network, but it has other pleasant side effects).
It's actually not that big of a lift these days to spin up containers on-demand and put just what's needed inside it (including the authentication info for the agent). I probably should automate it..right now I just have four permanent VMs setup for my various types of work: My day job, my open source projects, my benchmark and security work, and some side projects. Plus some temporary ones for experiments.
I've never used IDEs and never will, why are these things being constantly shoved down our throats?