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You can't have both. "Hardware security" means the manufacturer decides which OS can run and you can't override it.

Practically speaking, I can set up real hardware-enforced boot integrity on my Framework laptop today, both on Arch with sbctl and on NixOS with Lanzaboote or Limine.

There are still many unsolved problems in hardware security, so this is definitely not solved today. But I don’t see why it should be impossible. The EU could push the industry toward attestation models that respect user ownership instead of locking everything behind vendor-controlled software.

I think Meneth was basically correct but a bit imprecise: Boot integrity itself is only user respectful as long as the user can freely decide and change the integrity reference values, without consequences to the latter usefulness of their system. But attestation (based on boot integrity) as a principle directly contradicts "respect user ownership". This is not a question of technical feasibility, but of principle. Attestation is directed against users. The main purpose of attestation is to make sure that the local user can be forced to use a specific software (and not run other software at the same time that could influence this specific software) to access a certain remote service. Remote attestation means by definition "vendor lock", in that the vendor and their contractual partners lock and control the device's software. Therefore an attestation model that fully respects the user simply cannot exist.

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