[1] "Everybody Loses: The Tumultuous Rise of American Sports Gambling" (2026) by Danny Funt
[1] "Everybody Loses: The Tumultuous Rise of American Sports Gambling" (2026) by Danny Funt
I think I enjoy the odds because it adds a sort of unspoken storyline to a fight, because those fighters themselves also know who's the underdog and it adds a bit of a psychological edge to the contest.
It's a lot like watching a chess game where the same stuff unfolds where you expect the favorite to push. Will the underdog look to survive, try to come and prove he's not to be taken lightly, and so on. Good times.
By the way, the UFC chews through athletes so fast (part of their somewhat exploitative business model), it's no wonder it's hard to keep up with the latest names.
Incidentally this is also what makes chess games relatively profitable. Moderate-info bettors will do things like flip on their chess engine, look at the eval, and then bet on that. But a computer might say a position is a dead-draw when a stronger player can tell you 'white has big practical winning chances'.
Even in the most optimistic case, betting market accuracy will be limited by the commission (if you have a better estimate than the market, but not sufficiently better that you'll make money on it, you don't bet), and I think even a not-terribly-smart model can get you there for chess games. We don't need betting markets for the prediction's sake.
And I think the reason for that is because a lot of these factors are unquantifiable, subjective, and non-fixed. For instance determining the winning chances for a human in a chess position is surprisingly complex. There's even a huge chunk of profit to be made for somebody that could create such a model outside of printing money in prediction markets - it'd be an invaluable tool for players to use during opening preparation since positions where winning chances don't correlate with computer eval are sort of the money-shot in human prep that's often motivated by a desire to avoid computer prep. And that factor is just 1 amongst many that can weigh in on an expert bettor's opinion.
For example, can someone place a bet on an event that X person will be shot? That question now touches on a whole range of laws regarding murder, life insurance, incitation to violence, free speech? That you just don't touch at all in sports betting.
But I made some research, and here's the main body that specifically targets 'regulation' regulations for prediction markets https://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/index.htm
I can see the argument that they are piggybacking off a body of regulations that wasn't designed for this. I'm not an attorney, so I don't know if that holds, but even if it does, it's undeniable that there are enough parallels between commodity futures and prediction markets and that's why it's being used to regulate so far.
If you argue for more or more specific regulation, it's probably going to be a fork, not regulation from scratch.
And as mentioned in other comments, there's existing laws around the subject of bets themselves that mean that there already exist loads of regulations around these subjects, in the end they are just contracts, which is one of the main branches of law and has a huge body of law and jurisprudence, so either it's inaccurate to say they are unregulated, or it regulation means something much more specific that I'm unaware of.
Did some research, and Kalshi (US based) is regulated by the CFTC, so they are already regulated by the same stuff that regulates securities, including price manipulation.
The subject of insider information is different because these are not public securities, there's no fiduciary responsibility. But it's not that there are no regulations, it's just that that specific regulation that we associate with the 2008 crisis just doesn't apply. But that doesn't mean there's no regulation, there's heaps, feel free to check out the CFTC website.
But ok, let’s follow your thought process. Couldn’t someone place a bet on a sporting event and then murder a key player? Wouldn’t all the same laws be triggered?
Laws against criminal activity aren’t regulations. Regulations are limitations and oversight requirements on business activities.
Probably not, no. I would be very surprised if the sports betting shops didn't have some sort of "force majeure" clauses.
I don’t see any force majeure clauses here https://polymarket.com/event/trump-out-as-president-before-2... but maybe they’re hidden in the fine print?
> Couldn’t someone place a bet on a sporting event and then murder a key player?
I don't follow, these are separate hypotheticals. For the record the answers would be:
1a) Can? Yes
1b) Legal? No, listing itself against public policy.
2a) Can? Yes
2b) Legal? No, murder is illegal
2c) Wager profits retained? No, slayer rule/No profit theory.
Re: 2c also applies to scenario 1, if you get caught you can’t retain the money.
So, to your point about which is more regulated - there is no difference in the amount of regulation between the two scenarios.
Not a lawyer, but jurisprudence (case law) is law, especially in Common Law jurisdictions like the US it has even more weight than actually codified law (unlike for example napoleonic Civil Law like in Argentina or France).
"Restatement (Second) of Contracts" (1989), Chapter 8, has a pretty extensive list of restatement and examples of case law of contract nullity by being against public policy.
Additionally, it's even a more basic rule that contracts are void ab initio if they are about breaking a law, I can see how it might be argued that a contract about a murder is not about breaking the law, but it's debatable and probably fact dependent.
There's also probably statutes or UCC that explicitly state such rules, but that's secondary.
>Easily skirted by making the bet not directly about death, e.g. https://polymarket.com/event/trump-out-as-president-before-2...
Worth noting that polymarket is not in US Jurisdiction, so no, it's not regulated. Kalshi is in US jurisdiction and is regulated by US laws.
There was a case that reached some appeal court about election bet in Kalshi, and Kalshi won, you may agree or disagree, but it is under regulation.
>Re: 2c also applies to scenario 1, if you get caught you can’t retain the money.
Not necessarily, because both parties would be at fault in scenario 1. In scenario 2, the law would not declare the contract void, but award the payment to the non murdering party. In case 1 the whole contract is void, and the court will probably not get involved in any action whether forcing award of monies, nor forcing a party to return money, letting "the loss lies where it falls", in pari delicto.
>So, to your point about which is more regulated - there is no difference in the amount of regulation between the two scenarios.
It was a very basic mathematical claim, prediction markets include sports bets, so therefore they touch more regulations. The regulations the prediction markets touch is huge, as it can be about anything really, it must follow the regulations of almost every branch of contract law.
So less regulation. Case 1 is the polymarket/kalshi case.
> It was a very basic mathematical claim, prediction markets include sports bets, so therefore they touch more regulations.
Uber is a taxi company and more. Uber is (or was) still less regulated than taxi industry.
You’re claiming it’s simple math, while grouping things that are categorically different into the same bucket.
But if Poly and Kalshi are gambling joints, then of course fixing gambling bets is no no, and that is what actually happens. They ban wins of market predictors who actually correctly predicted something but did it by fixing the game. A market prediction service wouldn't care about that, but gambling joint would.