Can "LLMs are bad at counting" be generalized to "LLM are better in complex stuff but make more mistakes in simple"?
It then means you have 2 parties focussing on the big picture and no one focussing on the details.
Yesterday on a whim I tried asking a local model a question about kanji that look different in different fonts despite being the same character (to the point of strokes appearing in completely different directions), and the model hallucinated imgur links to images of the characters. If imgur could work with approximate references to data maybe that would have worked.
It applies to humans too. Calculus is “simple” but it takes something like sixteen years to train a human to do it, if all goes well. Meanwhile, most humans think that inverse kinematics is, like, the easiest thing in the world (it’s a super complicated task).
You’re only evaluating “harder” or “easier” based on the perspective of somebody who has a mammalian brain with millions of years of selective pressure to make it suitable for solving inverse kinematics problems.
The point here is that when we start constructing agents or tools with different architectures to ourselves, it makes sense to reevaluate notions of whether something is ‘hard’ or ‘easy’. LLMs are bad at counting not because counting is hard, but because their architecture makes it hard.
Also, I suspect you're comparing dissimilar things, because in one case you're looking at a brain doing both inverse kinematics and "calculus" (sense 1), and in the other you're looking at a computer doing both inverse kinematics and "calculus" (sense 2). The kind of calculus a CAS does is not the same kind that a human does. It's less versatile, for one.
>The point here is that when we start constructing agents or tools with different architectures to ourselves, it makes sense to reevaluate notions of whether something is ‘hard’ or ‘easy’.
Well, no, because when someone says that calculus is hard and moving their arms is easy, they're not talking about how hard it was to create each functionality, they're talking about how hard it is to employ each. We would need to ask a computer how hard it thinks the tasks it does are to do.
I don’t think the metric is at all reasonable, and the fact that it’s “objective” doesn’t make up for its other shortcomings. I don’t think we have a basis for agreement here—I think you’ve framed the argument in a way that supports a “calculus is hard” conclusion merely by defining “hard” in such a way that supports your conclusion from the start, but I think that approach is only useful as a way to win an argument, and we’ve failed to share ideas once you start using that tactic.
It seems to me you're the one who first did that by equivocating what is easier to do and what is easier to make a machine do.
>we’ve failed to share ideas once you start using that tactic
Well, I certainly don't agree with that.