It seems pretty cool, but I am wondering if there's any drawback on just using images that support curl? I can't think of any and to me it's kinda a must have, even on production images
So we start at compiling the codebase (Rust) against MUSL. That way we can run it with FROM scratch images.
If we need more tooling available at runtime, then we look at alpine, but still using MUSL.
If MUSL itself is proving problematic, or if some of the libraries we use need glibc then we can look at using some locked down image.
The cool part about FROM scratch images is that you'll never have to update your base image to address CVEs. Only your software and its (compiled) dependencies.
What's the benefit really, though? If you still need to be able to rapidly deploy a new image in response to a dependency CVE, what have you gained?
Add an ephemeral container to an already running pod, for example to add debugging utilities without restarting the pod.
https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/kubectl/generated/kubec...
And even that's only true if you assume kubernetes is the only place your container runs where you might want to also debug it.
For the rare cases where you find yourself needing to attach a debugger to your pods running in staging/prod, a debug container is absolutely the right tool to reach for.
How wasteful though? I have to admit, I envy the person whose codebase itself they have to support is so lean and space-conservative that the size of the gnu coreutils, curl, nano, etc., would show up as anything but a rounding error in the image size.
I see it like putting a thermometer in a turkey before I stick it in the oven. Sure, the thermometer adds thermal mass itself, making the turkey take a few seconds longer to cook, but the value of it being there is greater than the cost imposed.
But when Docker scans my image and notices that there is a CVE in one of those binaries, my image is currently out of compliance.
FROM scratch just reduces the surface.
The actual attack surface of your application? Or the attack surface of you and your team's attention from a busybody security org.
It's important not to confuse the two.
> to not have any dependencies outside of the code.
> ... FROM scratch images is that you'll never have to update your base image to address CVEs...
So a FROM scratch image, basically doesn't have things like a package manager to install things, and maybe also libraries that things like curl would depend on? Sorry for my ignorance, I've heard of FROM scratch but never tried them.
If you want to run as another user, you need to manually add an /etc/group & /etc/password (or generate them in a stage before that and copy them over).
If you need ca-certificates, you need to install ca-certificates in a stage before that and copy over /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt from that stage to your current one.
For what its worth, this container used `python:3.12.2-slim-bookworm` and I really would not expect that sort of an image to bundle `curl` -- even if it is intended for production.
In theory it has a couple of benefits. You don't have to re-deploy your image to patch CVE's in OS components if you don't have any OS components. And it provides some measure of defence-in-depth - one could certainly theory-craft a scenario where an attacker gains some limited control over your application and then uses some OS component to escalate.
These days if a security engineer is proposing my team adopt distro-less containers to receive these benefits, I would point out that we need to weigh them against the very real drawbacks of not having standard debugging tools available where and when we need them. And also to consider the relative impact of other defence-in-depth measures they could be pursuing instead - such as any sort of network policy to limit network traffic.
Add an ephemeral container to an already running pod, for example to add debugging utilities without restarting the pod.
https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/kubectl/generated/kubec...
Keeping in mind that containers are merely a bunch of namespaces, there's nothing stopping you from entering the same PID namespace with a different mount namespace in order to debug.
To summarize, in my experience there is immense value to having basic shell tools available in the environment where you need them with zero extra friction. Stripping those out provides a security benefit only in specific nebulous and niche scenarios.
I agree, however assuming you maintain a chroot for debugging this can be accomplished with a shell command that takes a single argument to target a running container by name.
Your linked comment suggests being limited to kubernates but nsenter and a chroot are entirely runtime agnostic.