Turnout in the past few elections was already extraordinarily high. Clearly this isn’t the answer. And neither is protesting, considering that 4 of the 5 largest demonstrations in US history happened in the past 10 years and achieved nothing.
Voting for the worse people makes things worse.
I’ve not quite reached that threshold, but I avoid moving to DC due to the lack of voting rights.
So if you're in a heavily red state but you're blue, then vote in the primaries for the more centered Republican. If you're in a heavily blue state but red, do the opposite. Either way this actually helps because more people are centered and we're getting wilder and wilder candidates because there's increased tribalism. They go to the extremes because they get more voters that way. They figured out that the mainstay voters will just end up voting left or right regardless, and that by catering to the extremes it actually pulls the mainstream voters too. (Both Reps and Dems are using this strategy)
Remember, you don't have to vote for the person you actually like.
And keep doing this until we get a sane voting system which can embed actual preference (any of the cardinal systems: i.e. Approval or STAR). This strategy still works with ordinal systems (i.e. Ranked Choice) because a weak spoiler is still really good at splitting the vote (happened in a pretty famous Alaska election).
I think of it this way: in a state where one party is clearly dominant, most offices will end up being held by members of that party. That means that the primaries for that party actually matter more than the general election.
RCV also tends to work against polarization, since it rewards candidates who are at least acceptable to a broad swath of the electorate.
It may not be the “answer” for all that ails the American political system, but it would help.
ETA: Unlike many other reforms it's also doable within the constraints of the current constitutional order and is hard for SCOTUS to torpedo (though I suppose I shouldn't underestimate SCOTUS).
And that's electoral votes. Counting actual people has the most voted candidate lose all the time.
Approval voting would be an improvement over the status quo but it makes it a lot harder for me to influence the choice between candidates I like less. If I do check my third choice I risk helping them beat my top two. If I don't check my third choice then I risk them losing to even worse options.
And people complain about it. If you were trying to make a change from some other status quo to that, it would be a significant impediment.
> Approval voting would be an improvement over the status quo but it makes it a lot harder for me to influence the choice between candidates I like less. If I do check my third choice I risk helping them beat my top two.
Approval voting is the range compressed version of score voting. Instead of scoring each candidate on a scale of 1 to 10, it's score each candidate on a scale of 0 or 1. Use score voting and you can give your favorite candidate a different score than your second favorite without giving them the same score as your least favorite.
Both of them are still better than RCV.
I'm not thrilled with score voting to begin with, and compressing it down doesn't change much.
> Use score voting and you can give your favorite candidate a different score than your second favorite without giving them the same score as your least favorite.
That doesn't solve my problem. Take exactly what I said before, but replace "check" with "give the maximum score to".
> Both of them are still better than RCV.
I don't see how.
Compressing it makes it slightly worse, but some people think it makes it easier to understand. I tend to think that's silly; people can understand "score each candidate on a scale of 1 to 10" perfectly well. But approval voting would still be a significant improvement over FPTP, and even over RCV.
> That doesn't solve my problem. Take exactly what I said before, but replace "check" with "give the maximum score to".
RCV doesn't solve that either, because it's subject to Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. It's actually even worse, because it makes you give a lower rank (rather than an equal one) to your most favored candidate to prevent an even worse candidate from winning.
Suppose your favorite candidate is the first choice of 20% of the population, your second favorite is 25% and the two candidates you hate are at 25% and 30% respectively. RCV makes you give your top pick to the second candidate so they can beat one of the two candidates you hate and ensure the runoff isn't between both of the candidates you hate.
Meanwhile with score voting your favorite candidate might have won, because they were the first choice of only 20% but the second choice of everyone else, and then end up with an average score of e.g. 6 when all the others are at 4 and 5.
RCV tends to do the opposite of that. If you have two opposite extremists and a moderate, the moderate can get knocked out in the initial round and then you get a coin flip between the two opposite extremes, even if the moderate would win one-on-one against either of the extremes. Or, in a district that skews to one side, give the district to the other side, because the minority party makes it to the runoff with 40% of the vote, the majority party splits between two candidates each at ~30%, but then if the majority party's extremist goes to the runoff instead of its moderate, they could lose the runoff to the minority party's moderate and give the district to the minority party.
Let's call those candidates A B X Y.
I don't see the issue. I vote my actual ranking, A is eliminated. If this scenario isn't super weirdly convoluted, more of those votes shift to B than X, so X is eliminated next. Now it's B versus Y. If I vote for B instead, the same thing happens and we also get B versus Y.
And what happens here in score voting could be basically anything. Not enough specifics.
> If you have two opposite extremists and a moderate, the moderate can get knocked out in the initial round and then you get a coin flip between the two opposite extremes, even if the moderate would win one-on-one against either of the extremes.
Yeah that's a real issue, and I'd want to use condorcet methods to fix that.
> Or, in a district that skews to one side, give the district to the other side, because the minority party makes it to the runoff with 40% of the vote, the majority party splits between two candidates each at ~30%, but then if the majority party's extremist goes to the runoff instead of its moderate, they could lose the runoff to the minority party's moderate and give the district to the minority party.
Meanwhile with approval or score voting, a lot of people pretend not to like the other party's moderate because they're trying to get their side to win and it gets really messy. Is there a need to have multiple candidates per party? If there is, a two stage election that picks party first and then picks probably-the-moderate is probably better than anything.
It doesn't have to be that convoluted, all it takes is for the eliminated candidate to be a moderate so their votes go in two different directions. But you're right that I messed up that example; the percentages are wrong.
The problem case is when your second most favored candidate would otherwise be eliminated first and you need to prevent that by causing your most favored candidate to be eliminated instead, because the second best candidate has a better chance in the next round.
Suppose the candidates you dislike, X and Y, are the first choice of 40% and 25% of people respectively, and then A and B split the remainder evenly. X and Y are the two extremists -- on opposite sides of each other, with the moderates A and B in the middle. You favor A but A leans in the direction of X and B leans in the direction of Y.
If B is eliminated first then half of B's support goes A but half goes to Y, Y is still ahead of A and then A is eliminated next. If A -- your preferred candidate -- is eliminated first, half their support goes to B and the other half to X but Y gets nothing. Y then loses to B and the final round is X vs. B rather than X vs. Y. And the elimination of Y puts all their support behind B since X is the opposite extreme. But only if you rank B above A even though that's not what you'd have preferred.
> Yeah that's a real issue, and I'd want to use condorcet methods to fix that.
But now you're no longer using RCV/IRV. Score voting is a Condorcet method.
> Meanwhile with approval or score voting, a lot of people pretend not to like the other party's moderate because they're trying to get their side to win and it gets really messy.
Except that doesn't really help them because doing that also makes it more likely that their least favorite candidate wins, which is a significant incentive not to do it. The only reason to do that is if you're confident your favored candidate could only lose to your second choice, in which case it was really a two candidate race to begin with.
> Is there a need to have multiple candidates per party? If there is, a two stage election that picks party first and then picks probably-the-moderate is probably better than anything.
It doesn't matter if they're in the same party or not. If you're using a voting system that allows more than two parties to be viable then you'll have similar candidates running from similar parties. "Force the election to be one candidate from each of two major parties" is FPTP and it's terrible.
It's very unlikely that the two candidates I hate are on opposite extremes and both popular.
> Score voting is a Condorcet method.
That gains it a point but there are much better methods. Ones where I don't feel the need to balance risk versus reward for candidates I moderately dislike. Then the guarantee of the pairwise winner coming out on top is actually using accurate information on what everyone wants.
> Except that doesn't really help them because doing that also makes it more likely that their least favorite candidate wins, which is a significant incentive not to do it. The only reason to do that is if you're confident your favored candidate could only lose to your second choice, in which case it was really a two candidate race to begin with.
If I'm moderately confident then I'm likely to do it despite the risk.
> It doesn't matter if they're in the same party or not.
The whole framing of the problem was that one of the candidates in the minority party wins. If there are four unrelated candidates that problem goes away. The more popular moderate won, not a big deal.
It's easy to hate the candidate on the opposite extreme from the way you lean, so all this really requires is for the extremist on your side to be a corrupt populist who gets support by telling people the lies they want to hear or is paying off the right people to get favorable media coverage or valuable endorsements. Or is just more extreme than you can accept but you're in a district with some people who want that.
Notice also that neither of these candidates are the first choice of the majority. They just have enough support in a >2 candidate race to not be the first knocked out.
> Ones where I don't feel the need to balance risk versus reward for candidates I moderately dislike.
This is Arrow's Impossibility Theorem again. All of them do that, because in the rock-paper-scissors triangle where no candidate can beat both of the others, you then need something equivalent to a score to choose the winner. At which point degrading your second choice hurts them against both your first and third choice and whether or not you should do that is influenced by how likely you regard it that other voters will favor your first choice over your third but not your second.
It's also a dangerous game because the error bars on polls are huge and it's more often than not that the final results are very different than anybody's wild guess from the day before they started counting the votes.
> If I'm moderately confident then I'm likely to do it despite the risk.
Suppose your true ratings would be 10 for your most preferred candidate, 7 for the second best and 1 for the inhuman monster the opposing tribe somehow supports for no explicable reason. Polls say your first choice is expected to score ~5, your second choice ~6 and your vile enemy ~4, but all of these are plus or minus 2 points or more because polls are practically random number generators. What are you going to do?
You have the option to try to tank your second choice to give your first choice a better chance, but it's still a very real possibility that your first choice ends up at 4 and the hated enemy at 5.
> The whole framing of the problem was that one of the candidates in the minority party wins. If there are four unrelated candidates that problem goes away. The more popular moderate won, not a big deal.
It's still the same, and the minority party candidate isn't necessarily that much of a moderate, they're just not a far extremist.
Suppose it's California and a Republican, a Democrat and a member of the Green Party are in the race. The district is 40% Republican and under the old system correspondingly 60% Democrat, but in a system with more than two viable parties, it's 40% Republican, 29.9% Democrat and 30.1% Green.
If you hold that election with RCV and the Democrat gets knocked out first, the moderate Democrats (which, with the Green candidate in the race, was all of them) have to choose between a California Republican and a Green Party candidate who proudly wants to raise the gas tax to $8/gallon and pull out of NATO. More than a third of the moderate Democrats choose the Republican over that and under RCV that becomes a Republican seat.
The same race with score voting only does that if people vote the way you seem to think they would, which is exactly their incentive not to.
They do not. There are voting methods where I feel they work well enough that I don't worry about strategy, and I don't worry about what threshold to use for approval, I just rank choices honestly and then I'm done.
> Suppose your true ratings would be 10 for your most preferred candidate, 7 for the second best and 1 for the inhuman monster the opposing tribe somehow supports for no explicable reason. Polls say your first choice is expected to score ~5, your second choice ~6 and your vile enemy ~4, but all of these are plus or minus 2 points or more because polls are practically random number generators. What are you going to do?
In this situation the strategy play is that I rate both of the first two at 10. I'm not risking #3 by being strategic, I'm risking that I get #2 when I could have gotten #1.
For the situation where I might strategically lower the score, it's when there's a 10, there's a 7, there's a 4, and there's a 1. Do I give the 4 an honest rating that might help them win over the candidates I like, or do I give them a 1 and pray really hard that neither of the two guys I hate win? It's a tough choice.
> Suppose it's California and a Republican, a Democrat and a member of the Green Party are in the race.
This is a totally different situation. In the last version there were two moderates and one of them won. It was fine. In this version there's one middle candidate and they lose. But we already did this scenario earlier. I said "Yeah that's a real issue, and I'd want to use condorcet methods to fix that." So not just an instant runoff, but keeping the ranking system.
https://www.rangevoting.org/BayRegsFig
https://electionscience.org/research-hub/tactical-voting-bas...
utterly false.
no you don't. take a warren supporter who votes biden to stop trump. that person ranks:
biden 1st, warren 2nd, trump 3rd
they don't want warren to be a spoiler.
indeed, practically the only thing that matters in a voting method is the aggregate affect of what it achieves in light of other voters. YOUR vote will almost never make a difference. you could upgrade voting methods in exchange for giving up your right to vote, and you'd still be drastically better off.
When I said "I" I meant me. This one person. And I was talking about that specific scenario.
It wasn't a statement about "strategic voters" in other scenarios.
https://www.rangevoting.org/BayRegsFig
compressing it to approval voting doesn't hurt very much and makes the ballot extremely simple.
> I don't see how.
i just showed you how. better average voter satisfaction, better resistance to strategy, etc.
https://www.rangevoting.org/BayRegsFig
not to mention radically simpler:
https://web.archive.org/web/20190219005733/
https://sites.google.com/a/electology.org/www/approval-votin...
IRV is a strategic mess that maintains a two party system.
wonk.blog/duopoly
https://clayshentrup.medium.com/later-no-harm-72c44e145510
https://clayshentrup.medium.com/star-voting-is-simpler-than-...
That comes across as weirdly aggressive when you're referring to earlier in the same post. Like I'm dumb for not somehow seeing that before I finished my own post.
Also what's the definition of honesty for approval voting? Where am I supposed to draw the line?
The chart is pretty but I'm not trusting that chart without a lot more info.
> IRV is a strategic mess
I didn't say I want instant runoff in particular.
here's lots of detail. you can run the code for yourself. https://www.rangevoting.org/BayRegDum.html
here's a slightly different model from the late harvard stats phd, jameson quinn. https://electionscience.github.io/vse-sim/
don't "trust" anything. look at the data. you could also read the book "gaming the vote" by william poundstone.
As a non-US-American, it is hard to understand for me why this is so hard to explain: the amount of #1 votes is rather a measure for the number of "ultra-fans" that the candidate has.
I think it should be rather easy to find an example in US-American pop culture of some C-list celebrity who has a respectable base of very devoted ultra-fans, but is hated by basically everybody else.
This example should make the fallacy obvious to most people.
We've got MMP here in New Zealand, which is a fantastic improvement over what we had. However the list vote does give politicians some weird power.
Comment moderation is voting too.
In the US there are already people who complain that any election they lose must been “rigged”, including the current occupant of the White House. Choosing Approval Voting over RCV is not going to bring such people around; it’s rhetorical advantages are inconsequential.
The 2022 Alaska special election is a great example of RCV failing where approval voting wouldn't. And FairVote had the nerve to say it showed Alaskans understood and could use the system.
> Choosing Approval Voting over RCV is not going to bring such people around
It's a lot easier to claim the system is rigged when the voting system is much more complex in a way that most voters will not understand.
http://rangevoting.net/CoreSuppPocket https://wonk.blog/duopoly
approval voting actually DOES and it is better in every other way too.
In a nutshell, you have an issue where part of the information economy/market is captured. To the point that agenda can get set by theories or podcasts that have little truck with reality. Any checks or reviews of the claims, simply do not get surfaced within that ecosystem. This creates a more efficient system for political messaging.
You cannot have an effective democratic system when your consensus building mechanisms have been (intentionally) compromised and weakened.
And don't discount protests. It's crucially important to have big public and forceful displays of united opposition. The regime is unlikely to be toppled by protests, but they will weaken it.
That really matters.
In an authoritarian take-over institutions are the front-lines, not the masses. Think colleges, media, industry, courts, legal firms, local governments, etc. The dilemma those institutions will face is to follow rule-of-law or submit to authoritarian corruption. Authoritarians win when those institutions decide it's safer to submit than it is to follow the law. And when institutions (and the people within them) feel like they are twisting in the wind alone and nobody cares, they are more likely to buckle. Protest movements help reinforce the rule-of-law side of that calculation.
(The rise and fall of Orban is a great lesson on all of this)
Also see: https://essayx.substack.com/p/the-35-percent-rule-just-made-...
In a sense, this in itself is the issue. It's long-term _worse_ to vote for the "lesser of two serious evils". This extreme "long-term pain for short-term gain" attitude is what's gotten the US to where it is. If in 2016 of 2024 even 20% of the dems would've stayed home or voted third party, the DNC's continuous forcing of awful corpocrats with zero charisma would've become completely untenable and Trump would've been limited to one term. Yet instead they were rewarded for it, so you'll see Newsom get the candidacy and presidency in 2028 (if 2028 even happens at this point), and then in 2032 you'll get something like Hegseth or Thiel winning and it's all over.
There is an answer: relentlessly vote, but only for candidates who are actually slightly decent - including third-party - and otherwise stay at home. "Relentlessly" means "at every level", including locally from the very bottom, all the way up.
The whole idea of "third-party voting is a complete waste in the US" is incredibly dumb because a vote for someone who loses isn't a wasted vote. It shows the others that there's a voter there who can be convinced if catered to, if they select a better candidate. The powers that be have done a fantastic job of brainwashing the entire population of the myth that anyone who _doesn't_ go out and vote for either major candidate is a morally bankrupt person, because it directly benefits them.
The reply to this will be "well it's too late for that now!". It's wrong because the alternative doesn't help you one bit. You're just wishing for a miracle, that in 4 years something happens, kicking the can down the road making things worse long term. And that's actually what's got you here.
It's a symptom of the terminal disease which has infected all layers of American society and has gotten it to where it's at: short-termism. Everyone just looks at the next quarter, the next election. China's ascendency is 1:1 tied to doing the exact opposite. Some smartypants will now point "but zero Covid", great you found a potential exception, now look at the other 90% of policy.
Every time I've explained this I've gotten instantly downvoted without a single reply making an argument against it, because it's too painful for people to admit that they've been part of the road to where the US is at. And again, short-termism: rather feel the short-term tiny dopamine hit by slamming that downvote button than thinking about it. Let's see if this happens again.
"In May 2016, MSNBC's Mika Brzezinski accused the DNC of bias against the Sanders campaign and called on Wasserman Schultz to step down. Wasserman Schultz was upset at the negative media coverage of her actions, and she emailed the political director of NBC News, Chuck Todd, that such coverage of her "must stop". Describing the coverage as the "LAST straw", she ordered the DNC's communications director to call MSNBC president Phil Griffin to demand an apology from Brzezinski."
[1] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2016_Democratic_National_Commi...
Sanders wasn't even a Democrat. He switched solely to run in the primary. It's neither scandalous nor surprising that the DNC would try to put up barriers between him and the nomination.
If the RNC had done it's job, Trump would never have been allowed into the primary in the first place.
Yes, that's exactly why they shouldn't exist.
The introduction of the partisan primary has been an unmitigated disaster for our politics, by massively empowering the most zealous fringes within parties
So for instance Sanders would almost certainly have beaten Trump in 2016 - the polls showed him ahead by double digit margins, whereas they had Clinton in for a very close election. Had the DNC listened to their own voters, the country would likely look very different today, and in a way far more favorable to DNC interests, at least if they even believe in their own platform.
But in normal years candidates are successful because of the amount of money they can raise. The more they can raise the more brainwashing ads they can buy. The non so secret cabal is the donor class.
Anyone can run? You must meet requirements on age and how long you have lived in the US. You must pay fees and provide signatures for each state. If doing it through a party you have to meet their rules.
Cost to get on most states ballots at a basic level is a million. You could do it for free if you dont want to appear on any ballots.
Yes, but with a caveat, if you had a strong preference between the top two actually-likely-to-win candidates (assuming the third party wasn't competitive), it's at least not voting the most in your interests for the outcome. Which is why we really need approval voting, so we can actually vote for the candidates we like, rather than needing to "strategically" hold our noses.
But I agree with the rest of it, if none of the candidates represent you, the third-party vote at least allows you to send a signal of "I vote, but you need to make me want to vote for you, and this is what I want".
Approval voting would not end strategic voting.[1]
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Approval_voting#Strategic_voti...
The strategy of this is no simpler than the strategy of a single vote system.
> Yes, but it specifically ends the "vote for a candidate you dislike instead of the one you do like" type.
> Your favorite is always included in your vote (assuming you like at least one candidate).
Ranking candidates would express preferences more than approval voting. But you advocated approval voting solely.
Yes, because RCV has issues: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Center_squeeze . Voting for your favorite candidate in RCV can help cause them to lose!
STAR is okay, but approval voting solves most of the issues with elections without being more complex.
Fully agreed, I vaguely implied this by talking about the "lesser of two evils" scenario but good to make it explicit.
> Which is why we really need approval voting,
Agreed here too, but it's not happening so people better wake up and realize that even without it, continuously voting for the "lesser of two evils" is the opposite of strategic.
Because it's dumb. People don't want to hear dumb ideas, or take the time to try and convince someone that would spend however long it took to type that, apparently multiple times, without realizing it. Throwing away votes will never be the reasonable thing to do. I know you don't want to hear that, because it's too painful for you to admit there's no simple answer.
Tried that in 2000, voting for Nader as a protest vote against Clinton/Gore third way neoliberalism. I did that in a state where the electoral votes for Dems were 100% safe. Still just got blamed for Bush and there was zero self-reflection on the part of the Democratic Party.
...
I would urge everyone to stop fixating on the Presidential vote as the only fight to win and everything being win/lose based on that outcome. If the Congressional Progressive Caucus in the House exceeds 50% of Democrats in the House, then we can start thinking about a world where e.g. AOC might be the speaker of the House rather than Nancy Pelosi.
> It's a symptom of the terminal disease which has infected all layers of American society and has gotten it to where it's at: short-termism. Everyone just looks at the next quarter, the next election.
Yeah, and the Office of the President is 4-8 years and is just more short-termism, along with individualism / cult of personality / CEO-leadership. If you want to make lasting change in the DNC, start by flipping more and more House seats to progressive from neoliberal.
I have zero faith in this system to execute anything other than purchased policy agendas, or empower any more than a tiny symbolic collection of people who oppose them… just enough to give the illusion of agency and stop any real organizing. I have no idea what could possibly break this pattern.
Arguing against that, probably comes from a cynical neoliberal perspective where the Democratic Party can't change because the argument assumes that the Democratic Party can't change.
And the alternative is definitely outright fascism and the suspension of Democracy. They've told us what they're planning on doing, just like we knew they wanted to get rid of Roe vs. Wade, we just accepted the lies about it being settled law and a political football.
If you're not willing to vote against that, then you're comfortably middle class and don't think you'll be one of the ones that are going to be hurt.
I've voted against Trump 3 times and threw money behind trying to get Sanders the nomination in 2020 instead of Biden, so when all the horrible stuff has been going down this term I don't have to tie myself in knots with rationalizations about my actions.
Ok I'll break it down for you.
> If in 2016 of 2024 even 20% of the dems would've stayed home or voted third party
Parties cater to their bases, and putting yourself out there as an unreliable voting bloc is exactly how you get your demands ignored.
> The whole idea of "third-party voting is a complete waste in the US" is incredibly dumb
It's not incredibly dumb, it's simple mathematical reality. This doesn't change unless the first past the post system changes. Why do you think the GOP backs the Green Party?
I wish more people understood this. Instead, there's this mistaken notion that you give away leverage by supplying votes. It's literally the opposite.
Your coalition will have more influence and leverage within a party by supplying votes, not withholding them.
NYC has a DSA mayor because people used that one weird trick.
The other important one is showing up in local elections.
Reality shows the exact opposite. Why do campaigns and candidates put an incredibly outsized effort into swing states? Those are the exact "unreliable voters". Yet they get the most attenton. In policies too, it's all about convincing those who otherwise might stay home or might swing. What you're saying doesn't reflect reality whatsoever.
> It's not incredibly dumb, it's simple mathematical reality.
This isn't an argument, or you struggled to read. It's not a wasted vote because of its secondary effects, as explained. Voting on someone who loses isn't a wasted vote.
You mean the 2024 election cycle where incumbents all around the globe were beaten because the economic situation was strongly anti-incumbent? Are you positing that the US election was somehow a unique outlier and solely down to Harris being the Democrat candidate? Even though a swing of 115k votes would have handed the presidency to Harris instead?
It sounds like you have a particular issue with the 2016 and 2024 elections and I'm wondering if there's something in common that might explain it...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democrat_Party_%28epithet%29?w...
Hillary Clinton won the popular vote. People didn't want Trump in 2016, they wanted her. But he won the electoral college,
He won the popular vote in 2024, but the tight margin in the electoral college suggests a democratically elected Democratic candidate (i.e. one selected by a primary, not one appointed by the sitting president) could have won instead. Other potential candidates were polling better than Harriss. I personally think Gretchen Whitmer could have successfully distanced herself from the Biden administration and defeated Trump.
There is never a sole factor. The problem by talking about 115k votes is, once again, not taking into account the strength of the opposition. The US losing in hockey to Canada by a tiny margin is not the same as losing to Spain by the same margin.
Ironically, in a sense you're only strengthening the point that an even moderately better candidate would've won.
> It sounds like you have a particular issue with the 2016 and 2024 elections and I'm wondering if there's something in common that might explain it...
What a vile implication. Selectively ignoring my mention of Newsom in the exact same bucket. I'm wondering if you're a state-backed operator, that might explain the trying to rile things up through FUD.
I mentioned 2016 and 2024 because they lost, and the candidates were indeed awful.