Almost nobody has DNSSEC enabled.
Against DNSSEC: https://sockpuppet.org/blog/2015/01/15/against-dnssec/
Against DNSSEC: https://sockpuppet.org/blog/2015/01/15/against-dnssec/
The thing about trust anchors is that they are trust anchors and not a back door. DNSSEC goes well out of its way too, to not screw up things as far as possible if something is missing. OK, client implementations do that (I haven't gone into the RFCs in too much detail).
The architectural issues alluded to seem pretty handwavy too. I deployed a slack handful of PowerDNS boxes and adding DNSSEC is basically two CLI invocations per domain and passing on the DS records to upstream. The second invocation is to add an adjustment to deal with NXDOMAIN better (can't remember the exact thing at the moment)
If it doesn't work for you then fine - don't use it!
I find it useful and thanks to a decent implementation (so far) it is trivial to implement. However, I'm going to need to get my thinking cap on for some split-horizon domains.
Putting security on top of DNS is really, really hard because DNS was invented rather a long time ago when information wanted to be free and not fettered and I wore short trousers at school and in the distant future would run an IBM System /36!
When you confidently insist on "most sites" you appear to want to rudely trample on my experience of "it works for me and my 20 at the moment DNS domains and increasing as I migrate them over". I'm taking my time - I have quite a few more to do and each one needs adding to monitoring etc.
I don't run .de and I do feel for the lads n lasses that do that buggered up a KSK roll over or whatever it was that was screwed. I think that holding up a screw up is an extremely crass and facile argument against ... anything, let alone a rather esoteric engineering function.
I don't agree with your assertion about "Real security protocols fail closed." That sounds like striving for perfection and you know as well as I do that perfect is the enemy of good.
DNSSEC for better or worse is what we have and I don't think it is too bad. It does give some guarantees within certain parameters. Any decent engineer will look at the risks/rewards and decide on effectiveness and design their solutions to a requirement ... accordingly.
At the point where we're arguing about fail-open versus fail-closed, our premises are too far apart to get anywhere. We can part company here: I'm speaking, in part, for the people who believe that any viable security protocol must fail closed.
Plenty of security protocols have ultimately failed in the marketplace and been abandoned. DNSSEC is simply another one of them.
I am only describing my own experience and not pontificating on behalf of the world.
Even supports post quantum encryption :)
> What’s the alternative to DNSSEC? > Do nothing. The DNS does not urgently need to be secured.
> All effective security on the Internet assumes that DNS lookups are unsafe.
This is not true, our entire infrastructure of ACME certificate authorities like let's encrypt are fundamentally dependent on DNS: https://letsencrypt.org/how-it-works/#domain-validation
Then TLS verifies the domain with the private key the certificate authority issues...
How can you trust the s (secure) in https then??
Can anyone provide an example of "effective security on the Internet"?
I'm just looking for a way to cryptographically prove that my website is from me in a way that browsers will accept.
This means the whole chain from ICANN -> Verisign -> registrar -> dns -> IP -> my server.
2. DNS is the wrong level of networking abstraction to do this kind of policy enforcement at, because DNS isn't plumbed for warnings and error reporting; when DNSSEC fails, whole zones simply fall of the Internet (for people who validate) as if they weren't there at all. It's the worst possible failure mode.
3. The thing you say you want can't be had with DNSSEC. You don't get "the whole chain from ICANN to your server". Any of the parent zone operators above you can decide to defect, for your zone specifically, and (particularly for state-level adversaries) for particular targets resolving your zones, without you ever knowing about it.