A specific pattern of self-referencing data could be seen (or not) as low-level consciousness in the future, when we know what consciousness exactly is.
It might be that stockfish is already something future scientists would define as "conscious".
Altough it is diffucult for me to Imagine that specific example.
Common sense says "surely not"... But where is the exact point at which "surely not" becomes "well maybe..."?
I haven't been able to find a satisfying answer to that question, which forces me to assume (at least until a satisfying answer is found) that consciousness is a gradient and in fact does exist in little bits all over the place.
But then again this is just a external crude form of test that can lead to something like „light bulbs emit warmth, so fire must be a light bulb“
Because "a problem" could be as simple as conducting heat through a lattice of atoms and "not encountered before" could be from a specific temperature hotspot that was never seen before, etc.
It's really thorny to get to the bottom of things!
I recomend focusing on designing Tests before rigid definitions of states of tests. - it is much clearer that way what is asked from something to be conscious.
But again these are all just indirect tests because we cannot test the core of consciousness because we don't know the core of consciousness.
Or would one count any communication between animals as language? In that case almost any interaction would count.
As soon as try and draw a firm line between "X counts and Y doesn't", you find that you really can't. There are no obvious boundaries between a deeply complex and fully functioning FL human brain, and a pile of atoms bouncing around arbitrarily.
If we define consciousness this way, then a plain transformer is not conscious because it's not able to explain its outputs properly or make corrections to the pipeline (i.e. "cannot modify its own system prompt", if simplified). But an ensemble of LLMs "orchestrator/analyzer + reasoning subagents" can probably viewed as something approximating 'consciousness".
I think a chess engine can be proclaimed conscious if it has the properties listed above. However, my very simple and mechanistic definition of consciousness is debatable, especially since by many it's conflated with "soul".
That reasoning may not manifest as English that we can read, but that doesn't mean it isn't there.
As information bounces through the many layers of the model, I find it plausible that you could get reflection in there somewhere.
I also find it reasonable that consciousness may not even require reflection / introspection.
That's the main problem with consciousness. We really have no idea how it works, therefore it's really difficult to conclusively state that something lacks consciousness