from https://bitcoinfoundation.org/blog/?p=16 "new features are being added to the protocol to support alternative implementations– next major release of bitcoind/Bitcoin-Qt (version 0.8) should support for “bloom filters” to get just the transactions relevant to your wallet"
"...optimize transaction storage so validating transactions requires much less disk access and memory..."
Though, I see that this is a bit different. If I had 1000 bitcoins I wouldn't want to put it on any server but my own. But, then again, I'd be pretty rich and downloading a few gigs of data wouldn't be the end of the world. ;)
I will say that I recently wiped by HDD and re-installed everything incuding the bitcoin-qt client and it probably took me around 24 hours to download the entire blockchain, probably just shy of 210000 blocks. The first 50-70% of data took very little time at all, the last 50-30% took the lions share of the 24 hours.
If it's just the download time that's bothering you, try the electrum client: http://electrum.ecdsa.org/
It uses a remote blockchain so that you don't have to sync with the network. But you control the wallet (the private keys that let you spend the coins) so it doesn't suffer from the problems of the online hosted wallets where you are not in control of your coins.
If I were going to trust a third party to begin with, I'd just go with a hosted wallet like Coinbase. They seem more reputable to me than whoever's behind the Electrum project.
* Freedom and Privacy: The server does not store user accounts. You are not tied to a particular server, and the server does not need to know you.
* No scripts: Electrum does not download any script. A compromised server cannot send you arbitrary code and steal your bitcoins.
* No single point of failure: The server code is open source, anyone can run a server.
https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Thin_Client_Security#Server-Trust...
“All thin clients listed below currently connect to a single server, and are vulnerable to an attack similar to a double-spend. The attack can be run by that single server - the server can just lie to them that they received a Bitcoin transaction, and they, assuming the server does not lie, perform some service, transfer funds or send goods without actually receiving any Bitcoin in exchange.”
Scenario: Bob hacks the server (or colludes with the people operating it). He buys 100 BTC of goods from you, you see the funds in your Electrum client and ship the goods. Surprise! the transaction was fake. You're out 100 BTC.
I'd have more faith in this system if the Electrum website disclosed, very clearly, that this kind of attack is possible and also spelled out exactly who is running the server and why I should trust them. Instead, they appear to be trying to sweep the whole issue under the rug. I therefore see little reason to trust Electrum.
I think you are over-exaggerating the impact of this vulnerability given the safeguards available to mitigate the attack, such as running your own electrum server or cross checking transactions with a third party.
The project website doesn't advise taking these measures, nor disclose the possibility of this scenario. That's what bugs me the most here.
If their intended user is a knowledgeable Bitcoin hobbyist, who knows how the currency works inside and out, maybe it isn't a big deal, but just speaking personally as a Bitcoin newbie, the lack of disclosure/accountability suggested I stay away.
The project is still in its early stages of development, but is already very useful to bitcoin-tech savvy users. The ability to install it on my Android phone and other devices while running my own transaction server is a big plus for me currently.
But generally, I imagine most people would go with the online wallet approach if they're not comfortable with the drive space requirements.
I also believe that it is possible (theoretically, at least) to essentially just start somewhere further in the chain, in a way. Having said that, that would probably remove you from the option to mine at the same time. Maybe?
There's a lot of compression possible that the client hasn't bothered with yet. The community expects this to eventually be a solved problem.
What surprises me is that the original creators, who were obviously very intelligent, didn't anticipate this becoming a problem and create the system from the ground up to address it.
More to the point, however, is that this isn't really an issue of an authority, but rather an issue of trust. If I for whatever reason decided not to trust Bitcoin.org, someone else could take their place. For instance, I could get my recent state of the block-chain from a pal that I trust to do the actual task of verifying the full chain. I could even pay that person some fee periodically for providing that service. You could probably come up with a distributed, fraud resistant, method of providing recent block chain states where many sources would have to be simultaneously compromised for any attack.
2) You can always use one of a number of online wallets who will host the blockchain for you.