> 1) This definition could actually be expanded (for example, with definitions from Mumford or Reuleaux). But still this definition cannot be applied directly to living organisms.
I'm not sure I understand this. Why not?
I'm not sure I understand this. Why not?
Traditionally, things that are alive were described with different words and assigned a different set of properties and characteristics. Machine can break, living things die. And we still have those two semantic frames separated: A living thing: can be harmed, it breathes, it nourishes, it reproduces, etc A machine: can break, can be fixed, can be repurposed, etc.
But because of a specific tradition in western philosophy, we started applying and analogy between 'inner mechanism (clever thing), that moves or provides a function, and seems to work in a causal way' and living things.
So when we say 'a living cell is a wonderful, complex machine', we are not actually saying it is a machine, we are operating through an analogy. That's how far we can go.