In every of these threads there's a bunch of snarky comments, either acting like this class of attack is exclusive to npm, or that nothing has been done about it. I don't think that's fair.

There's plenty of comments mentioning delay lines, and the other good stuff pnpm (and others) have implemented in response to protect package consumers.

That bit that's getting less conversation is the tools on the package maintainer side:

- MFA for publishing: https://docs.npmjs.com/requiring-2fa-for-package-publishing-...

- trusted publishers, available for about a year: https://docs.npmjs.com/trusted-publishers

And as of recently, staged publishing, essentially combining the best of both those features: https://docs.npmjs.com/staged-publishing

Now you can: - Publish from CI, without static credentials

- AND require a maintainer to approve it using MFA before it actually goes live to the registry

If you want you can still use something like GitHub Actions Environments protection to require multiple approvals, or a time delay, on the CI side.

We need to encourage the community to adopt these publishing protections or this will continue to be an issue.