> If a catalytic number of those had formed, they could have also even made real impact through shareholder initiatives and actions demanding changes by pressuring board members who rely on votes, etc.

For SpaceX, from Matt Levine [0]:

> SpaceX will have dual-class stock, with Class B shares getting 10 votes per share. Musk owns 93.6% of the Class B (and 12.3% of the low-vote Class A), for total voting power of 85.1%.[5] Tesla does not have dual-class stock, Musk is a minority owner, and he has worried aloud about the risk of losing control of Tesla’s robot army because he doesn’t have voting control of the company. Not a problem at SpaceX! Build all the robot armies you want!

> Because of Musk’s voting control, SpaceX is a “controlled company” under stock exchange rules, so it doesn’t have to have a majority of independent directors or an independent compensation committee. So the board of directors can be made up of Musk’s buddies, and they can pay him whatever they want.

> Even aside from controlling 85% of the voting stock, Musk gets to appoint a majority of the board of directors himself, without the Class A shareholders even voting.[6]

Does not sound like this is remotely true for SpaceX, then?

[0]: https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/newsletters/2026-05-21/spa... (the other footnotes are from the article itself)