They are professional security researchers, they must know this is the way it is done in the ecosystem.
Kicking the can around leads nowhere.
They are professional security researchers, they must know this is the way it is done in the ecosystem.
Kicking the can around leads nowhere.
just as a note, its not as simple as firing off an email to linux-distros and calling it a day.
qualys, one of the big firms (10,000+ customers across 130 countries. i.e. "professional researchers"), has even taken a stance against emailing linux-distros because of the restrictions and policies involved:
> Although contacting the linux-distros list has been clearly beneficial
> (they have thoroughly reviewed and tested the patches, and were able to
> prepare their kernel updates beforehand), we have reached the conclusion
> that it has become increasingly difficult to coordinate the disclosure
> of kernel vulnerabilities with both groups (the Linux kernel security
> team and the linux-distros list), because they have very different
> policies. From now on, we will coordinate the disclosure of kernel
> vulnerabilities with the Linux kernel security team only. We also
> apologize in advance for this.There are (some, loose) norms of vulnerability disclosure, and this isn't one of them.
It’s certainly a thing some people do. But there is not a unified consensus on how to handle vulnerabilities. Different security researchers (or, in fact, the same researchers releasing different findings) can and do take many different courses of action.