The US not going full in on drones reminds me of the British ridiculing submarines.
The Chinese are going to spam literally MILLIONS of drones all over the Pacific...
The Chinese are going to spam literally MILLIONS of drones all over the Pacific...
Relatedly, aircraft carriers are great for beating up on small powers, but they are vulnerable and would not be effective at reaching across the ocean and bombing China.
Plus, both nations have nukes, so the idea of either China or the US "winning" a war against the other side is easily cancelled out.
What you are left with, is a lot of posturing about superpower wars which is a waste of time. All sort of people thumping their chest, wargaming things out, as if any of this nonsense isn't immediately squashed with the nuclear trump card.
There will be no superpower wars.
There will, however, continue to be wars against smaller states, and the F35, aircraft carriers, etc, are really effective at those kinds of things. That is, effective at waging the wars that will actually happen. Nukes and the pacific ocean stop any war of consequence against China.
This drone has greater range than an F-35 and is cheaper to make:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_MQ-28_Ghost_Bat
https://www.boeing.com.au/products-services/defence-space-se...
Now, consider how many drones can be manufactured in garages using a shipping container full of components and 3d printer filament.
(Doing it that way means the drone designs improve continuously and with minimal manufacturing lag after tactics shift.)
And a few days ago they unveiled also unmanned interceptor drone launching drone ships, used to hit Russian Shaheed one-way-drones while still over water.
I wonder when drone carrier subs become a thing.
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1941/january/chap...
On British naval luminary compared submarine warfare to piracy, leading to the emergence a few years later of a tradition of Royal Navy submarine captains flying the Jolly Roger after completing successful missions.
The primary problem with killing carriers is, has been, and will be, finding the things.[1]
Drone strikes on oil refineries work because, with few exceptions, the refineries rarely move. You can literally program a drone to go x miles in a specific direction and then drop a bomb.
It's also considerably harder to hide things like drones in big empty spaces.
If loitering drones became a serious threat (as opposed to the, you know, literally super sonic missiles the navy has spent the last 40 years planning for) itms pretty easy to imagine anti-drone planes/ships/drones sweeping a large radius around your carriers.
[1] Satellites can definitely do things, but they're not magical and people can track where they're looking and just... sail in a different direction. Also if someone was actually using satellites to target american carriers with munitions the americans would probably just destroy the satellites.
I know nothing about this really, so forgive my ignorance.
Assuming a carrier is found and tracked by a satellite in the ocean, how could it possibly escape the satellite's detection before being targeted by a drone or some other type of munition? If the ship starts sailing in a different direction, the people (or AI) tracking via satellite would notice and adjust, right?
I don't know how many military satelites China has, but I would have assumed it would be sufficient to cover the pacific sufficiently to find an aircraft carrier. (the obvious caveat here being clouds, which are fairly common over the ocean)
https://www.csis.org/analysis/no-place-hide-look-chinas-geos...
Wait, what?
Like, this is a whole bunch of extremely unreliable numbers being stacked on top of each other to reach an unsupported conclusion, but how is a 50 square mile field of view supposed to find something in the middle of the pacific?
And the carrier isn't going to be in the middle of the pacific, its going to want to launch strikes, so its going to be within (say 500 miles) of Chinese military targets, which does narrow down the size of the haystack somewhat.
But yes, this is a significant challenge. On the modern battlefield it is usually significantly harder to find something than to kill something after you have found it.
Even something like a rain storm can lose visual track of a carrier group, or even just night time, at which point you've now got an increasingly large area to search again to find the carrier which can be anywhere inside a several hundred mile circle.
What?
> unless they're on the equator
What?
> because otherwise they have to be moving
What?
https://www.esa.int/Enabling_Support/Space_Transportation/Ty...
Now satellite constellations make it harder, since their numbers limit this strategy. But currently, none of the know systems utilize SAR like the LEO satellites, so they wouldn't function well in bad weather. They'd have to rely on optics which can be severely degraded.
China would be using their Yaogan-41 (geostationary) to try to track, which might work, in good weather, during daytime, IF the carrier group was south of Japan (it's equatorial). Carriers deliberately transit through weather, strike groups disperse broadly and use decoy behavior in wartime, and a geostationary optical satellite won't know which blip is the carrier and which is a support ship 50km away.
Every night, you lose the carrier group and have to find it again in the morning, if you can. Usually you can't, even with China's layered approach using optical, SAR, ELINT, and OTH radar.
People have been saying this for approximately the last 50 years. Maybe it's true today, but the odds are against it.
Iran pushed our carrier group far outside of striking range without midair refueling (very dangerous to do in an active war zone). This is because they can blow holes in the ships from the shore.
In the Vietnam War (“the resistance war against america to save the nation” as the vietnamese term it officially), American carriers were stationed 90mi off the coast at point yankee because there were not sufficient anti ship capability. This resulted in the horrific pounding of the country (Operation Linebacker I, II for example). Things have changed (for the better).
At minimum they travel with 6 or 7 ships and leave a wake a mile long and they only go tens of miles an hour, it isnt a speed boat.
Here is an Indian carrier (formerly Russian) on google maps and the US ones are large https://www.google.com/maps/place/14%C2%B044'30.3%22N+74%C2%...
I think people forget how many satellites are pointed at all parts of the planet. They are used for crop reporting and weather and all sorts of shit. It isnt the 1960s where only the super powers have them and they drop rolls of film.
Which is why you get things like this https://www.cnbc.com/2026/04/05/satellite-firm-planet-labs-t...
An aircraft carrier is not that fast, if you see it once you know roughly what radius of circle it is going to be in for a while (ignoring the fact that they are likely going somewhere for a reason its not their job is to say out of sight)
edit: aha that company literally lists it on their website https://www.planet.com/industries/maritime/
Beirut doesn't move around a lot. Carriers do. While there are a lot of satellites pointing at the earth at any one moment, this isn't some kind of Hollywood super screen showing a real time image of the entire pacific. You just see whatever small patch the satellite happens to be pointing at.
And again, ignoring the part where america would probably start shooting down satellites.
Do you seriously think China doesn't track US carrier movements?
How would they avoid having a Chinese satellite continuously track their movement? They have the capability to do that, there is nothing USA can do about it except shoot down all the Chinese satelites.
https://defencesecurityasia.com/en/china-three-satellites-tr...
I mean, you can try all you want, but there's limits to hiding a fleet of ships on the open sea. They are huge, emit immense heat signatures, and produce miles-long wakes while moving. As long as there are satellites overhead, they will be able to find them.
I suspect we might be talking past one another because we have different degrees of precision in mind: I'm not saying the Chinese could have a missile target lock on a carrier whenever they wanted, much less in wartime. Far from it. But I highly doubt you can reposition a carrier group without them catching wind of it within hours.
It's not impossible to track a carrier group via satellites, but it's not trivial either, you can't just, like, open up your windows gui and click on a satellite and click the button that says "follow this carrier" because like satellites orbit and fly around the earth and the ships can alter course when you don't have eyes on them and so on and so forth.
And yeah, as you point out, there's a big difference between having a satellite picture showing a probable carrier group at X and Y coordinates and being able to actually strike the thing.
Never mind that the Starlink radio arrays are, well, radio arrays that quite effectively cover the whole planet. If you think of each satellite as a radio telescope, its resolution is crap and probably cannot disambiguate a carrier group from anything else (at least according to disclosed specs). But it would be quite interesting to build a synthetic aperture array out of multiple satellites. This would rely on emissions from the ships themselves, but I bet it could be done and could locate ships quite nicely.
Carrier groups also don't emit radio when they aren't interested in being detected!
Despite the nuclear reactor, aircraft carriers won't stay in the fight long if their supply lines are disrupted. And also it's not likely that a carrier group could fend off a wave of 10,000-20,000 drones launched from a container ship that happens to be sailing near it.
At the end of the day, we rely more on nuclear weapons and MAD to deter these kinds of major hostilities between powerful countries. Talking about how conventional weapons match up is a bit of a red herring. The only thing that would change that would be very reliable nuclear missile/warhead interception systems - and I don't think any country even has a roadmap to such a thing.
To sink an aircraft carrier you really need like 10 direct hits with hypersonic missiles. Or a couple of hits with a torpedo. If you are lucky, maybe even a single torpedo hit. People underestimate how hard it is to sink a ship. You really have to attack it below the water line, from the bottom. A single torpedo is more effective than 100,000 drones when it comes to sinking big ships.
What drones could do, is damage the runway and radars and other equipment that would constitute a "mission kill" -- e.g. the carrier has to withdraw for a period to fix the damage to equipment on deck.
But now think a little bit -- the drones have limited range. They have to be launched from somewhere. So just launch missiles from that location. You get the same thing -- a mission kill. You don't need a million drones. And the missile will have much larger range than the drones, and will cause more damage.
So the bottom line of all of this is no US aircraft carrier would venture near Chinese shores in the event of a war with china. That is probably because those shores would be lightning up with mushroom clouds anyway, as would ours. So what do you need the drones for?
Missiles are also an option, though carrier groups have some ability to defend themselves against them (less capability against hypersonic missiles, of course). The Chinese container ships are reported to have up to 60 vertical launch systems, which may be insufficient to overwhelm a carrier group and remove the carrier from service. It's reported that carrier groups can defend against "dozens to 100+" missiles.
That's why I'd imagine that it might be easier for a single container ship to disable a carrier group using 10,000+ drones instead of 60+ missiles. Especially as you wouldn't need fiber-optic cables, against ships a COTS AI targeting system would be sufficient (still robust against jamming, but allows for longer range than fiber-optics would).
Now I'm not saying defense against UUVs is impossible, but plenty of defenses against torpedoes don't work against them.
Note also that part of the approach of drone warfare is sheer quantity. Stopping 1 may be trivial, stopping 5 may be doable, but stopping 20 simultaneous ones might already be too hard to do consistently and repeatedly.
This is the thing everyone fails to understand about carrier warfare: anything you can use to attack the carrier can be outranged by the carrier because it can just employ the same weapons but from airplanes that fly closer to you.
You assert "plenty of defenses against torpedoes don't work against [UUV]". Based on what? What is this hypothetical property of a UUV that is superior to a torpedo?
A UUV with sufficient range and warhead is going to be big and heavy. Long-range torpedos weigh 2 tons each for a good reason. Calling something a "drone" or "UUV" does not imbue it with magic physics. It still has to cross some long span of water with enough speed and a large enough warhead and a guidance package capable of finding the target.
What kind of vessel are you going to use to bring these UUV within range of the target? 20 torpedos would be almost the entire magazine depth of an attack submarine. Surface combat ships carry even fewer.
You seem to be ignoring all evidence from how modern naval systems actually work when discussing your hypothetical UUVs.
You have a "this type" in your mind. I do not. Even then you're wrong. A drone can loiter and is thus not "literally the same type of thing" as a cruise missile or torpedo.
> What is this hypothetical property of a UUV that is superior to a torpedo? [...] It still has to cross some long span of water with enough speed and a large enough warhead and a guidance package capable of finding the target.
The huge advantage of drones (besides relatively low cost) is not how they cover the distance, but their flexibility in getting to the target, striking with high precision. An underwater drone can technically even circle the target before striking it at its weakest point (although this isn't going to work well if the target is at full speed).
> What kind of vessel are you going to use to bring these UUV within range of the target?
Bigger UUVs. Note that 'within range of the target' is also much higher for UUVs versus torpedoes, easily 160km for UUVs. Note that ambushes with these UUVs may also be an option, if they can loiter or just lie on the sea floor.
All of this reads like you are not familiar with modern military capabilities.
Longer ranger UUVs is equivalent to "even bigger torpedoes". Do you not understand the subject matter? There is a lot of evidence in this post that you do not. You are making up magical scenarios where your UUVs have properties that can't be replicated by any other real system that is literally supposed to execute the same mission.
At which point we more commonly call them drones or loitering munition. Even using a broad definition, 95% of what technically could fall under cruise missiles is of the traditional non-loitering kind. Same goes for torpedoes.
> Longer ranger UUVs is equivalent to "even bigger torpedoes".
The term UUV covers an enormously diverse set of devices, from fullblown autonomous nuclear subs to tiny industrial inspection drones.
Narrow-mindedly handwaving new technology into bins you're already familiar with and approaching them as such is exactly the type of cognitive failure that lies at the basis of the phrase "generals are always fighting the last war".
Since you are being willfully ignorant, haven't properly addressed the answers I gave you and are throwing out ad hominems I will not spend any more time on you.
Ukraine has had success against mostly unarmored and a few lightly armored Russian ships (and let's face it, these are small ships compared to carriers) in the black sea because the front lines are there and they can launch from a port, travel 5 miles, and hit one of these ships. That's a completely different situation.
Torpedoes cannot be launched from manned / unmanned surface vessels?
Wow.
Good job China isn't getting into water surface drone swarms.
Still, easy to see why close waters near Iran keep the US carrier groups away.
They're getting close enough to target the carriers without being sunk.. how exactly?
Post WWII US has always struggled with asymmetric wars that can't be solved with military dominance and rarely addressed on deeper issues.
This current Iran conflict is reminiscent of the Taliban in Afghanistan, who survived 20 years in a frozen conflict with the US before taking back control of the country when the US withdrew.
The betting is strong on Iran still standing when Trump gets bored and carried off stage.
I mean, yeah, we're talking about the part of the war that is unrelated to the weapon systems involved.
I'm talking about asymmetric strategies that can be used by a less armed actor to stand off and occassionally clearly best a better resourced actor.
You know, wooden wing hand carved swarms Vs floating fortress cities with orbiting overwatch.
The Taliban, NVA, and likely Iran will be future examples of mice left still standing after the biggest cat on the planet failed to move them on or wipe them out.
Also, while you're completely right about the ruggedness of the ship itself, image recognition electronics are dirt cheap nowadays. You can buy COTS camera-IR modules from under $100 and train them on whatever you want. If I were opposing an enemy that had carriers while I had only drones, I'd target specific parts of the superstructure rather tha the hull.
lightning up with mushroom clouds anyway
I think you are wildly overestimating the appetite for using tactical nuclear weapons. Whoever deploys those first in an offensive capacity is going to gain instant pariah status. The US is torching a lot of its traditional alliances as is, deploying a nuclear weapon in anger would result in international criminal status and probable internal collapse soon after. nor do I see any likelihood of China using them against Taiwan since that would undermine the entire purpose of a military undertaking.
you are applying arbitrary constraints to a thing thats just "put an rc controller on it"
ukrainian drones are doing something like 700 miles to hit the oil ports in primorsk. its not the 2500 miles that a missile might do for hitting diego garcia, but nothing says you could get one to. after all, a b2 bomber can go on long flights. put controller on it, and control it via a satellite, and the b2 becomes a drone
Why not just put a nuke in their instead? Like, how is this supposed to work, china just has a totally not suspicious container ship sitting in every major port not moving or carrying cargo or letting anyone inspect it and nobody notices that its full of weapons???
> And also it's not likely that a carrier group could fend off a wave of 10,000-20,000 drones launched from a container ship that happens to be sailing near it.
If there's a state of war, you don't get to just sail your container ship next to a carrier, that's uh, not how that works.
Like, if this was a tom clancy novel maybe china could do some kind of super clever first strike where they attack a bunch of carriers at the start of a war with their super secret attack ships, but at that point why don't they just sneak their ninja assassins on to the carriers and take them over for the glory of china.
something like a spiderweb container isnt going to be visible just looking at the ship
you wouldnt think ukraine would be able to drive its semi trucks right up to russian nuclear bombers, but they did
Actually, exactly like that. It looks completely normal. Container ships are super massive, and generally containers are only searched after they're offloaded, before leaving the port. So they don't get searched if they remain on the vehicle.
> you don't get to just sail your container ship next to a carrier
A lot of drones have surprisingly long range.
And nobody is searching them during a state of war?
> A lot of drones have surprisingly long range.
I guarantee a missile launched from a f35 launched from a carrier has a much longer range.
Both the US and China have newer more advanced capabilities than a 50 year old system...
> [SOSUS] was the primary cuing system that antisubmarine forces used to localize and potentially destroy targets for over forty years, but secrecy largely kept that fact from the fleet. The lack of strong fleet support was a factor when budget cuts after the Cold War fell heavily on the surveillance program.
Driving cars down every street in every advanced country to take photos seems ridiculous, but Google did it (StreetView) and the US DoD has more money than Google...
The interesting thing about drones is the ability to attack from many directions at the same time, overwhelming the short-range defenses. IIRC no fewer than 5 naval drones attacked the Moskva missile carrier at once, and successfully sank it eventually. Naval drones are compact, barely visible, and, unlike torpedoes, highly maneuverable.
Aerial drones are also highly maneuverable. Large navy ships are pretty tough on the outside, able to withstand a blast of a moderate-size shell or bomb. But they have smaller, harder-to-reach vulnerable areas. This is the kind of target drones are apt to attack precisely.
Most anti-air weapons are pretty expensive to fire, because they were intended against high-value targets like planes or cruise missiles. They are insufficient and wasteful to fire against hundreds of small, inexpensive targets.
It's like having a shotgun and a sledgehammer, but fighting against a swarm of hornets. Despite a large advantage in damage-dealing capacity, you quickly become incapacitated.
Finding the things is not trivial. Finding them twice is even less trivial.
That's a hallucination, Moskva was by all accounts sunk by a couple of conventional anti-ship cruise missiles.
Yeah, except missiles are better at it and the navy has spent the last 30+ years innovating ways to defeat missile attacks. What exactly do you think is the difference between a "drone" and a missile here?
> Once the big valuable vessel is found, it can be reasonably tracked from orbit.
Satellites orbit. They move. They have a limited area they can see at any given time and that area is constantly shifting.
Something with the budget of the US Navy can do the math to figure out where the satellite can look and then move. If your sat is orbiting the earth every 4 hours, a carrier group could be 100+ miles away by the time it comes back around.
And, even if you manage to get a satellite picture that shows that at 8:32pm the carrier group was at lat 32/long 42; you can't exactly just open up your missiles and program that in and sink a carrier.
The only thing I can come up with is “war crimes”, but, as Iran pointed out, if you can afford an aircraft carrier, you have trillions of dollars of easily hit civilian targets, so you pretty much automatically lose if the other side retaliates in kind.
What makes you think they can't?
Ignoring some kind of dedicated anti-drone missile systems that they could equip (if you're just hitting drones you could probably carry like 500 tiny missiles or something, who knows), you can just go and destroy whatever platform is carrying the drones, since your carrier aircraft is pretty much going to outrange it by definition.
All that protection didn't stop the Swedish diesal-electric HSMS Gotland seamlessly torp'ing the Ronald Reagan in 2005.
France pulled a similar score 2015, Canada "got" a UK carrier in 2007, IIRC even Australia's taken out a US ship or two in various fun ways over the years.
But I do wonder what the starting conditions for those exercises were. The sub's underwater range is limited (although Swedish subs seem to be better than others) and the have to come up every once in a while, at which point they're vulnerable. There's plenty of places to hide near coasts, but I can imagine that on the open ocean, it might be a lot harder for a sub to get close enough.
I haven't studied the HSMS Gotland incident in any great detail, but just in general for wargames, ships are required to be in certain locations at certain times, stay inside sea lanes, use transponders, ignore certain other ships and in general not completely mess up the existing sea commerce traffic that is trying to go past the exercise area.
If your carrier group is literally 1000 miles away from any piece of land and you have full authorization to sink anything that looks even slightly suspicious, it probably becomes considerably more difficult to sneak up and torpedo a carrier.
But yes, carriers will get sunk, modern warfare is in large part attritional, but if you send out, dunno, $100m worth of subs and sink a $10b carrier, that's a great return on investment, but doesn't help you in the slightest if you're now out of submarines and the enemy sails two more carriers into range.
I'm geting fairly old now and I have no recollection of ever thinking such a thing ...
> but if you send out, dunno, $100m worth of subs and sink a $10b carrier,
Even better if you can send out $80m worth of torpedoes attached to cheap arse unmanned drone delivery units all embedded within a 10x magnitude swarm of cheap arse drone units that have no torpedoes.
High chance of penetration, good chance there'll be some left over to confound and confuse the next carriers.
Absolutely that keeps the high end gear standing well off from tight spaces.
If we're postulating magical "ai" attack drones loitering off the coast, what's stopping the americans from sending in their own fleet of equally magical ai attack drones to blow up all the defenders and then sail the carriers up?
Also, again, you'd have to know exactly where the carriers even are, right now $80m worth of torpedo drones would cover like .01% of china's coastal waters.
Numbers game, what's the maximum number of targets that can be covered in a window, the cost of dealing with non torpedo launch capable platforms is the same as the cost of taking out an actual torpedo carrying launcher - the overwhelming threshold is something that is tested in games, of course.
> If we're postulating magical "ai" attack drones loitering off the coast
I'm not, I'm looking at a reasonable near term extrapolation of what China already has and tested.
> what's stopping the americans from sending in their own fleet of equally magical ai attack drones to blow up all the defenders
The usual constraints of hunting and finding in vast area
> Also, again, you'd have to know exactly where the carriers even are
Well, approximately .. and that's what China provides to Iran via sat coverage.
> right now $80m worth of torpedo drones would cover like .01% of china's coastal waters.
I thought the carriers were off Iran and staged well back? I can't see them being as far back as China myself, but perhaps you have some curious reason for wanting to spread them out some place far far away from the conflict. I have no knowledge of that, obviously.
So how are you hunting and finding the carriers in the first place? You can't have it both ways.
> I thought the carriers were off Iran and staged well back? I can't see them being as far back as China myself, but perhaps you have some curious reason for wanting to spread them out some place far far away from the conflict. I have no knowledge of that, obviously.
We're talking about a hypothetical US carrier war against china. Is there something interesting to talk about with regards to iran trying to defend against carriers?
It's more or less simple VLS and CVW magazine math to figure out total carrier group saturation numbers. This also assuming prioritizing carrier survival... i.e. CVWs may not even be geometrically recoverable if carriers has to GTFO.
Napkin math hypothetical, if a stacked carrier group with 3DDGs quad packed antiair and CVWs where most tasking dedicated to shooting down drones... PRC needs to launch ~3000 enhanced shaheed136 tier moped munitions to fully deplete magazine and saturate. Considering PRC procurement likely getting them at fraction price of Iran (i.e. 10-20k, remember Iran has sanction tax), this probably actually cheaper than PRC hypersonic salvos. We're talking sub 100m swarms that effectively defeat carriers or at minimum draw billions in interceptors. VS 100m tier1 hypersonic ashm salvos that can do so in 1/20th time.
The TLDR is knowing where carriers are is theoretically a solved problem, and knowing where carriers are enables conemps/ops vs those who do not, i.e. if Iran can somehow launch 10000 drones, simply having shit C4ISR means they can't use same tactic.
No, prop drones don't "geometrically catchup". Shahed's extreme range achieved by flying really slow, the top speed (which they don't sustain constantly to conserve fuel) is about 185kph, for the maximum flight time of about 13 hours. US carriers officially can sustain 60kph indefinitely, and in practice they can go faster. That means on a straight line a Shahed can only gain 1600km in the absolute best scenario. In reality it's much less, because launching takes time and the average speed is slower.
The capabilities that you're describing are a fantasy.
>geometrically catchup
A carrier at 3000km and GTFO sprint opposite direction at max speed, i.e. 30knots / 60km, will have prop drones closing speed/gap at 120km per hour. AKA intercept time distance around ~24 hours at 4500km. Hence why I said ENHANCED shaheeds, i.e. swap propulsion with 30% more efficient heavy fuel engines, increase aspect ratio and improved shaheed basically makes carriers operating within 3000kms unable to reach ~4500km endurance no escape zone. This within the platforms SWAP potential, technically can also just swap payload for fuel but HFE and planform improvements simply more efficient.
3000km also VASTLY optimistic scenario for carriers and limits of prop planform/SWAP potential, it's functionally carrier at 0 sortie scrap metal range. Realistically carriers max effective standoff is ~2200km, at which point effective sorties down to 20% (rest tanking/support). So no, mathematically, carriers cannot fastandfurious straight line out of this, and definitely not surface fleet escorts. The capabilities I'm describing is pedestrian for PRC. Unless one thinks PRC cannot build a better shaheed than Iran who literally built them in caves with box of scraps.
The pacific ocean is over 60 million square miles. A full sized carrier group probably takes up like 100 square miles when it's fully spread out, but that's a very, very, small percentage of the available search space.
And beyond that, you need to actually see the carrier with something, a laser sensor, a direct radar hit, even the human eyeball; you can't just fire a bunch of missiles in the general direction you think the carrier is at and expect them to hit anything (for one thing there's a whole bunch of other ships that will distract the targeting sensors).
Like, I cannot stress this enough, even if you knew the exact location of a carrier at a given moment, down to like 4 decimals of lat/long, and you knew which direction it was sailing, if your missile launcher is 1000 miles away you can't just program it in and fire it off and expect it to fly 1000 miles and then hit the carrier. Even with some kind of amazing on board sensors, there's a dozen other ships just existing near by, the carrier itself is moving unpredictably, not to mention the actual decoying/spoofing systems specifically designed to interfere with targeting sensors.
And this is the problem, you now say "oh well just use a platform that's closer to the carrier so it can get accurate targeting data for a weapon to hit the specific carrier", which is technically possible... until the carrier destroys your targeting platform because why wouldn't it? Whatever distance you have to be within to "lock on" to the carrier will be, pretty much by definition, in range of the carrier to shoot back at.
Hell, as far as I know, they could put literal anti-satellite missiles on carrier aircraft and just fly straight up and shoot down targeting satellites. I don't know if that's something they're currently planning/practicing, but I don't know if any reason they couldn't.