Vercel April 2026 security incident
bleepingcomputer.com
bleepingcomputer.com
At what point do we start asking questions about the concentration of trust in the web ecosystem?
It's funny that at the engineering level we are continuously grilled in interviews about the single responsibility principle, meanwhile the industry's business model is to undermine the entirety of web standards and consolidate the web stack into a CLI.
No, but most breaches today come from compromised internal accounts that are then used to break everything.
And that's how I passed for a annoying "PM". With half of the program management complaining that I was slowing down things until 6m later, the head of risk management told them to get lost.
That's why it's important to org-chart engineer for security, if a company is really serious.
If you answer No and complain that it’s not taken seriously, it’s at least in part because you didn’t show the risk clearly.
It is horrendous that aws doesnt allow any usage limits.
However it is less clear on how to do this, people mostly take the easiest path.
> b. (Recommended) Do something that works now, you can always make it better later
> When a request leaves minor details unspecified, the person typically wants Claude to make a reasonable attempt now, not to be interviewed first. Claude only asks upfront when the request is genuinely unanswerable without the missing information (e.g., it references an attachment that isn’t there).
> When a tool is available that could resolve the ambiguity or supply the missing information — searching, looking up the person’s location, checking a calendar, discovering available capabilities — Claude calls the tool to try and solve the ambiguity before asking the person. Acting with tools is preferred over asking the person to do the lookup themselves.
> Once Claude starts on a task, Claude sees it through to a complete answer rather than stopping partway. [...]
In my experience before this change. Claude would stop, give me a few options and 70% of the time I would give it an unlisted option that was better. It actually would genuinely identify parts of the specs that were ambiguous and needed to be better defined. With the new change, Claude plows ahead making a stupid decision and the result is much worse for it.
I don't doubt the competence of the Vercel team actually and that's the point. Imagine if this happens to a top company which has their pick of the best engineers, on a global scale.
My experience with modern startups is that they're essentially all vulnerable to hacks. They just don't have the time to actually verify their infra.
Also, almost all apps are over-engineered. It's impossibly difficult to secure an app with hundreds of thousands of lines of code and 20 or so engineers working on the backend code in parallel.
Some people are like "Why they didn't encrypt all this?" This is a naive way to think about it. The platform has to decrypt the tokens at some point in order to use them. The best we can do is store the tokens and roll them over frequently.
If you make the authentication system too complex, with too many layers of defense, you create a situation where users will struggle to access their own accounts... And you only get marginal security benefits anyway. Some might argue the complexity creates other kinds of vulnerabilities.
see [0]: Rails security Audit Report
Protection money from Vercel.
"Pay us 10% of revenue or we switch to generating Netlify code."
It’s interesting how they all use LLMs to write their Reddit posts, too. Some of them could have drawn in some people if they took 5 minutes to type an announcement post in their own words, but they all have the same LLM style announcement post, too. I wonder if they’re conversing with the LLM and it told them to post it to Reddit for traction?
What do you see as the distinction between "translating" and "paraphrasing"? All translations are necessarily paraphrased.
Similarly, “j’ai un chat dans la gorge” probably translates best as “I’ve got a frog in my throat”, even though it’s a completely different animal, it’s an obvious mapping.
Those are fairly simple because they have neat English translations, but what about for example “C’est pas tes oignons”, which literally means “these aren’t your onions”, but is really a way of telling someone it’s none of their business. You could translate it as “it’s none of your business”, or “keep your nose out” or “stay in your lane” or lots and lots of other versions, with varying levels of paraphrasing, which depend on context you can’t necessarily read purely from the words themselves.
> Similarly, “j’ai un chat dans la gorge” probably translates best as “I’ve got a frog in my throat”, even though it’s a completely different animal, it’s an obvious mapping.
Those obvious mappings can sometimes be too seductive for the translator's good. One example is that people translating English-loanwords-in-a-foreign-language into English usually can't help but translate them as the original English word.
Another example is that, in China, there is a cultural concept of a 狐狸精, which you might translate as "fox spirit". (The "fox" part of the translation is straightforward, but 精 is a term for a supernatural phenomenon, and those are difficult to translate.) They can do all kinds of things, but one especially well-known behavior is that they may take the form of human women and seduce (actual) human men. This may or may not be harmful to the man.
Because of this concept, the word also has a sense in which it may be used to insult a (normal) woman, accusing her of using her sex appeal toward harmful ends.
Chinese people translating this into English almost always use the word "vixen", which is, to be fair, a word that may refer to a sexy human woman or to a female fox. But I really don't feel that they're equivalent, or even that they have much overlap. (Unlike the situation with English loanwords, I think native speakers of Chinese are much more likely to choose this translation than native speakers of English are.)
> what about for example “C’est pas tes oignons”, which literally means “these aren’t your onions”
The form closest in structure to that would probably be "none of your beeswax", which is just a minorly altered version of "none of your business". I assume the substitution of "beeswax" is humorous and based on phonetic similarity.
As you note, there are multiple dimensions relevant to translating this and several positions you could take along each. For this particular idea, I would say the two most important dimensions are playfulness and rudeness; it's a very common idea and the language is rich in options for both.
> translations often vary in terms of how faithful they are to the source vs how idiomatic they are in the target language. Take for example the French phrase “j’ai fait une nuit blanche”, which literally means “I did a white night”. Clearly that’s a bad translation. A more natural translation might be “I pulled an all-nighter”.
This isn't what I had in mind. Here are some idiomatic translations:
I pulled an all-nighter.
I was up all night.
I didn't get any sleep.
I never got to bed.
I've been up since [something appropriate to the context].
[Something appropriate to the context] kept me up all night.
I wouldn't call any of the first four "more paraphrased" than the others. (The last two might be, if they included extra information.) If these were reports of the English speech of some other person, one of them (or less) would be a quote, and the others would be paraphrases. But as a report of French speech, they're all paraphrases. The first shares a little more grammatical structure with the French, which doesn't really mean much.
For a fairly similar example from my personal life, someone said to me 这是我第一次听说, and my spontaneous translation of it was "I've never heard that before", despite the fact that there is technically a perfectly valid English expression "this is the first I've heard of that".
What's closer to the grammatical structure of the Chinese? That's hard for me to say. You could analyze 我 as the subject of 听说, and I lean toward that analysis, but my instincts for Mandarin are weak. You might see 我 as being more strongly attached to 第一次, meaning something more like "my first time (to hear ...)" than "I hear (for the first time) ...".
But for whatever it's worth, a word by word literal gloss would be "this is me first time hear".
Between languages with less historical interaction than English and French, it's quite possible that a syntax-preserving translation of some sentence just doesn't exist.
Claude Code can produce exactly what I want, quickly.
The difference is that I don't really share my projects. People who share them probably haven't realized that code has become cheap, and no one really needs/wants to see them since they can just roll their own.
These libraries/frameworks are not insecure because of bad design and dependency bloat. No! It's because a mythical LLM is so powerful that it's impossible to defend against! There was nothing that could be done.
I really like it. Recommended.
The internet does that but it feels different with this
That's a funny way of saying "race to the bottom."
> The internet does that but it feels different with this
How does "the internet do that?" What force on the internet naturally brings about mediocrity? Or have we confused rapacious and monopolistic corporations with the internet at large?
Stack exchange. Google.
So I told something like, "don't use anything node at all", and it immediately rewrote it as a Python backend, and it volunteered that it was minimizing dependencies in how it did that.
[1] only vibe coding as an exercise for a throwaway artifact; I'm not endorsing vibe coding
Switch to vibe coding Rust backends and freeze your supply chain.
Super strong types. Immaculate error handling. Clear and easy to read code. Rock solid performance. Minimal dependencies.
Vibe code Rust for web work. You don't even need to know Rust. You'll osmose it over a few months using it. It's not hard at all. The "Rust is hard" memes are bullshit, and the "difficult to refactor" was (1) never true and (2) not even applicable with tools like Claude Code.
Edit: people hate this (-3), but it's where the alpha is. Don't blindly dismiss this. Serializing business logic to Rust is a smart move. The language is very clean, easy to read, handles errors in a first class fashion, and fast. If the code compiles, then 50% of your error classes are already dealt with.
Python, Typescript, and Go are less satisfactory on one or more of these dimensions. If you generate code, generate Rust.
But you're also correct in that Rust is actually possible to write in a more high level way, especially for web where you have very little shared state and the state that is shared can just be wrapped in Arc<> and put in the web frameworks context. It's actually dead easy to spin up web services in Rust, and they have a great set of ORM's if thats your vibe too. Rust is expressive enough to make schema-as-code work well.
On the dependencies, if you're concerned about the possibility of future supply chain attacks (because Rust doesn't have a history like Node) you can vendor your deps and bypass future problems. `cargo vendor` and you're done, Node has no such ergonomic path to vendoring, which imo is a better solution than anything else besides maybe Go (another great option for web services!). Saying "don't use deps" doesn't work for any other language other than something like Go (and you can run `go vendor` as well).
But yeah, in today's economy where compute and especially memory is becoming more constrained thanks to AI, I really like the peace of mind knowing my unoptimised high level Rust web services run with minimal memory and compute requirements, and further optimisation doesn't require a rewrite to a different language.
Idk mate, I used to be a big Rust hater but once I gave the language a serious try I find it more pleasant to write compared to both Typescript and Go. And it's very amiable to AI if that's your vibe(coding), since the static guarantees of the type system make it easier for AI to generate correct code, and the diagnostics messages allow it to reroute it's course during the session.
You don't have to live like this.
I've heard others had similar results with .NET/C#
I once made a golang multi-person pomodoro app by vibe coding with gemini 3.1 pro (when it had first launched first day) and I asked it to basically only have one outside dependency of gorrilla websockets and everything else from standard library and then I deployed it to hugging face spaces for free.
I definitely recommend golang as a language if you wish to vibe code. Some people recommend rust but Golang compiles fast, its cross compilation and portable and is really awesome with its standard library
(Anecdotally I also feel like there is some chances that the models are being diluted cuz like this thing then has become my benchmark test and others have performed somewhat worse or not the same as this to be honest and its only been a few days since I am now using hackernews less frequently and I am/was already seeing suspicions like these about claude and other models on the front page iirc. I don't know enough about claude opus 4.7 but I just read simon's comment on it, so it would be cool if someone can give me a gist of what is happening for the past few days.)
It is true that "more diversity in code" probably means less turnkey spray-and-pray compromises, sure. Probably.
It also means that the models themselves become targets. If your models start building the same generated code with the same vulnerability, how're you gonna patch that?
This situation is pretty funny to me. Some of my friends who arent technical tried vibe coding and showed me what they built and asked for feedback
I noticed they were using Supabase by default, pointed out that their database was completely open with no RLS
So I told them not to use Supabase in that way, and they asked the AI (various diff LLMs) to fix it. One example prompt I saw was: please remove Supabase because of the insecure data access and make a proper secure way.
Keep in mind, these ppl dont have a technical background and do not know what supabase or node or python is. They let the llm install docker, install node, etc and just hit approve on "Do you want to continue? bash(brew install ..)"
Whats interesting is that this happened multiple times with different AI models. Instead of fixing the problem the way a developer normally would like moving the database logic to the server or creating proper API endpoints it tried to recreate an emulation of Supabase, specifically PostgREST in a much worse and less secure way.
The result was an API endpoint that looked like: /api/query?q=SELECT * FROM table WHERE x
In one example GLM later bolted on a huge "security" regular expression that blocked , admin, updateadmin, ^delete* lol
Ahhhhhhhgh. If I ever make that cybersecurity house of horrors, that's going in it
This entire process is something anyone can test and reproduce; I was definitely steered towards both vercel and supabase by gemini. It isn't model specific.
That lack of diversity also makes patches more universal, and the surface area more limited.
I know what it's like being on the opposite side of this as I maintain an open source project which I started almost 15 years ago and has over 6k GitHub stars. It's been thoroughly tested and battle-tested over long periods of time at scale with a variety of projects; but even if I try to use exact sentences from the website documentation in my AI prompt (e.g. Claude), my project will not surface! I have to mention my project directly by name and then it starts praising it and its architecture saying that it meets all the specific requirements I had mentioned earlier. Then I ask the AI why it didn't mention my project before if it's such a good fit. Then it hints at number of mentions in its training data.
It's weird that clearly the LLM knows a LOT about my project and yet it never recommends it even when I design the question intentionally in such a way that it is the perfect fit.
I feel like some companies have been paying people to upvote/like certain answers in AI-responses with the intent that those upvotes/likes would lead to inclusion in the training set for the next cutting-edge model.
It's a hard problem to solve. I hope Anthropic finds a solution because they have a great product and it would be a shame for it to devolve into a free advertising tool for select few tech platforms. Their users (myself included) pay them good money and so they have no reason to pander to vested interests other than their own and that of their customers.
That's literally what "weight" means - not all dependencies have the same %-multiplier to getting mentioned. Some have a larger multiplier and some have a smaller (or none) multiplier. That multiplier is literally a weight.
> Indicators of compromise (IOCs)
> Our investigation has revealed that the incident originated from a third-party AI tool whose Google Workspace OAuth app was the subject of a broader compromise, potentially affecting hundreds of its users across many organizations.
> We are publishing the following IOC to support the wider community in the investigation and vetting of potential malicious activity in their environments. We recommend that Google Workspace Administrators and Google Account owners check for usage of this app immediately.
> OAuth App: 110671459871-30f1spbu0hptbs60cb4vsmv79i7bbvqj.apps.googleusercontent.com
https://vercel.com/kb/bulletin/vercel-april-2026-security-in...
This feels like a natural consequence of the direction web development has been going for the last decade, where it's normalised to wire up many third party solutions together rather than building from more stable foundations. So many moving parts, so many potential points of failure, and as this incident has shown, you are only as secure as your weakest link. Putting your business in the hands of a third party AI tool (which is surely vibe-coded) carries risks.
Is this the direction we want to continue in? Is it really necessary? How much more complex do things need to be before we course-correct?
We need a different hosting model.
And my own kernel. Can't trust some shit written by a Finnish dude 30 years ago.
And my own UEFI firmware. Definitely can't trust some shit written by my hardware vendor ever.
The AI maximalists would argue that the only way is through more AI. Vibe code the app, then ask an LLM to security review it, then vibe code the security fixes, then ask the LLM to review the fixes and app again, rinse and repeat in an endless loop. Same with regressions, performance, features, etc. stick the LLM in endless loops for every vertical you care about.
Pointing to failed experiments like the browser or compiler ones somehow don’t seem to deter AI maximalists. They would simply claim they needed better models/skills/harness/tools/etc. the goalpost is always one foot away.
You can write good and bad code with and without AI, on a managed service, self-hosted, or something in between.
And the comment I was replying to said something about not trusting something written in Akron, OH 2 years ago, which makes no sense and is barely an argument, and I was mostly pointing out how silly that comment sounds.
There is no “I wrote this code with some AI assistance” when you’re sending 2k line change PR after 8 minutes of me giving you permission on the repo. That’s the type of shit I’m dealing with and management is ecstatic at the pace and progress and the person just looks at you and say “anything in particular that’s wrong or needs changing? I’m just asking for a review and feedback”
Regarding the unix philosophy argument, comparing it to AI tools just doesn't make any sense. If you look at what the philosophy is, it's obvious that it doesn't just boil down to "use many small tools" or "use many dependencies", it's so different that it not even wrong [0].
In their Unix paper of 1974, Ritchie and Thompson quote the following design considerations:
- Make it easy to write, test, and run programs.
- Interactive use instead of batch processing.
- Economy and elegance of design due to size constraints ("salvation through suffering").
- Self-supporting system: all Unix software is maintained under Unix.
In what way does that correspond to "use dependencies" or "use AI tools"? This was then formalised later to
- Write programs that do one thing and do it well.
- Write programs to work together.
- Write programs to handle text streams, because that is a universal interface.
This has absolutely nothing in common with pulling in thousands of dependences or using hundreds of third party services.
Then there is the argument that "AI is just a higher level compiler". That is akin to me saying that "AI is just a higher level musical instrument" except it's not, because it functions completely differently to musical instruments and people operate them in a completely different way. The argument seems to be that since both of them produce music, in the same way both a compiler and LLM generate "code", they are equivalent. The overarching argument is that only outputs matter, except when they don't because the LLM produces flawed outputs, so really it's just that the outputs are equivalent in the abstract, if you ignore the concrete real-world reality. Using that same argument, Spotify is a musical instrument because it outputs music, and hey look, my guitar also outputs music!
Who is Apple?
There really isn't an option here, IMO.
1. Somebody does it
2. You do it
Much happier doing it myself tbh.
Imagine if cars were developed like websites, with your brakes depending on a live connection to a 3rd party plugin on a website. Insanity, right? But not for web businesses people depend on for privacy, security, finances, transportation, healthcare, etc.
When the company's brakes go out today, we all just shrug, watch the car crash, then pick up the pieces and continue like it's normal. I have yet to hear a single CEO issue an ultimatum that the OWASP Top 10 (just an example) will be prevented by X date. Because they don't really care. They'll only lose a few customers and everyone else will shrug and keep using them. If we vote with our dollars, we've voted to let it continue.
Instead of "programs that do one thing and do it well", "write programs which are designed to be used together" and "write programs to handle text streams", I might go with a foundational philosophy like "write programs that are do not trust the user or the admin" because in applications connected to the internet, both groups often make mistakes or are malicious. Also something like "write programs that are strict on which inputs they accept" because a lot of input is malicious.
It was also a different model on ownership and vetting of those focused tools. It might have been a model of having the single source tree of an old UNIX or BSD, where everything was managed as a coherent whole from grep to cc all the way to X11. Or it might have been the Linux distribution model of having dedicated packagers do the vetting to piecemeal packages into more of a bazaar, even going so far as to rip scripting language bundles into their component pieces as for Python and Perl.
But in both of those models you were put farther away from the third-party authors bringing software into the open-source (and proprietary) supply chains.
This led to a host of issues with getting new software to users and with a fractal explosion of different versions of software dependencies to potentially have to work around, which is one reason we saw the explosion of NPM and Cargo and the like. Especially once Docker made it easy to go straight from stitching an app together with NPM on your local dev seat to getting it deployed to prod.
But the issue isn't with focused tooling as much as it is with hewing more closely to the upstream who could potentially be subverted in a supply chain attack.
After all, it's not as if people never tried to do this with Linux distros (or even the Linux kernel itself -- see for instance https://linux.slashdot.org/story/03/11/06/058249/linux-kerne... ). But the inherent delay and indirection in that model helped make it less of a serious risk.
But even if you only use 1 NPM package instead of 100, if it's a big enough package you can assume it's going to be a large target for attacks.
GP said it's about taking the Unix philosophy to extremes, you say something different.
Anything taken to extremes is bad; the key word there is "extremes". There is nothing wrong with the Unix philosophy, as "do one thing and do it well" never meant "thousands of dependencies over which you have no control, pulled in without review or thought".
Better to report 100% known things quickly. People can figure it out with near zero effort, and it reduces one tiny bit of potential liability in the ops shitstorm they’re going through.
> A Vercel employee got compromised via the breach of an AI platform customer called http://Context.ai that he was using.
> Through a series of maneuvers that escalated from our colleague’s compromised Vercel Google Workspace account, the attacker got further access to Vercel environments.
> We do have a capability however to designate environment variables as “non-sensitive”. Unfortunately, the attacker got further access through their enumeration.
> We believe the attacking group to be highly sophisticated and, I strongly suspect, significantly accelerated by AI. They moved with surprising velocity and in-depth understanding of Vercel.
Still no email blast from Vercel alerting users, which is concerning.
On the one hand, I get that it's a Sunday, and the CEO can't just write a mass email without approval from legal or other comms teams.
But on the other hand... It's Sunday. Unless you're tuned-in to social media over the weekend, your main provider could be undergoing a meltdown while you are completely unaware. Many higher-up folks check company email over the weekend, but if they're traveling or relaxing, social media might be the furthest thing from their mind. It really bites that this is the only way to get critical information.
They can be brought in to do their job on a Sunday for an event of this relevance. They can always take next Friday off or something.
For most secrets they are under your control so, sure, go ahead and rotate them, allowing the old version to continue being used in parallel with the new version for 30 minutes or so.
For other secrets, rotation involves getting a new secret from some upstream provider and having some services (users of that secret) fail while the secret they have in cache expires.
For example, if your secret is a Stripe key; generating a new key should invalidate the old one (not too sure, I don't use Stripe), at which point the services with the cached secret will fail until the expiry.
If the attacker is moving with "surprising velocity," every hour of delay on an email blast is another hour the attacker has to use those potentially stolen secrets against downstream infrastructure. Using Twitter/X as a primary disclosure channel for a "sophisticated" breach is amateur hour. If legal is the bottleneck for a mass email during an active compromise, then your incident response plan is fundamentally broken.
This is not how things work. In a crisis like this there is a war room with all stakeholders present. Doesn’t matter if it’s Sunday or 3am or Christmas.
And for this company specifically, Guillermo is not one to defer to comms or legal.
Wouldn't the CEO be... you know... the chief executive?
Top leaders excel because they assemble a team around them they trust. You can't do everything yourself, you need to delegate. And having people in those positions also means you shouldn't be acting alone or those people will not stick around
Now I will agree that there are many executives like the ones you describe. But they are not top leaders.
And yeah, I would expect a CEO to have enough legal knowledge to handle such a situation (customer communication) on his own.
But I also have to mentioned that I'm not in the US. Not every country has the litigation system of the US where you can basically destroy a company because you as the customer are too dumb to not spill hot coffee over yourself.
presuming you're referring to the hot coffee lawsuit, maybe read details of the story. McDonalds wasn't at all blameless, and the plaintiff had reasonable demands
Should the CEO also bang out some dev estimates for the roadmap because, hey, they should be competent enough to do something like that. Why not submit the accounts for the year? How hard can it be, just reading a few lines off their Sage or Quickbooks accounts?
What is the use of a CEO if not to have enough depth of knowledge about the different aspects of running a business?
Like what? Poor little CEO that doesn't understand anything about the world and how to run a company. Seems like helplessness is expected at every stage.
Bit of a difference between “having depth of knowledge in their business” and “can speak off-the-cuff with the necessary accuracy to remain in compliance with every contract and legal jurisdiction their organisation is engaged in, without consulting the numerous domain experts they employ for just this purpose,” isn’t there.
Also, such a situation that requires the CEO’s direct attention has already gone FAR beyond your standard incidents where you can throw out a pre written statement. Do you want your organisation just cuffing it from the top down? Are you Elon Musk in disguise?
If they are unprepared frankly they suck as CEO and should be thrown out. If only competency was a requirement for these jobs...
Take the lead, yes they should be able to as that's the job pretty much.
Act by themselves, sure they can make decisions in small cases. But on big things you hear everybody's input, weigh it, and only if needed, cast the deciding vote.
Blame it on AI ... trust me... it would have never happened if it wasn't for AI.
Reads like the script of a hacker scene in CSI. "Quick, their mainframe is adapting faster than I can hack it. They must have a backdoor using AI gifs. Bleep bleep".
Hmm? Who is the customer in this relationship? Is Vercel using a service provided by Context.ai which is hosted on Vercel?
Something happened, we won't say what, but it was severe enough to notify law enforcement. What floors me is the only actionable advice is to "review environment variables". What should a customer even do with that advice? Make sure the variable are still there? How would you know if any of them were exposed or leaked?
The advice should be to IMMEDIATELY rotate all passwords, access tokens, and any sensitive information shared with Vercel. And then begin to audit access logs, customer data, etc, for unusual activity.
The only reason to dramatically overpay for the hosting resources they provide is because you expect them to expertly manage security and stability.
I know there is a huge fog of uncertainly in the early stages of an incident, but it spooks me how intentionally vague they seem to be here about what happened and who has been impacted.
Oh and the owner likes to proudly remind people about his work on Google AMP, a product that has done major damage to the open web.
This is who they are: a bunch of incompetent engineers that play with pension funds + gulf money.
This and because it's so convenient to click some buttons and have your application running. I've stopped being lazy, though. Moved everything from Render to linode. I was paying render $50+/month. Now I'm paying $3-5.
I would never use one of those hosting providers again.
The point is, I used to just throw everything up on a PaaS. Heroku/Render, etc. and pay way more than I needed to, even if I had 0 users, lol.
I ran a LoB webapp for multiple companies on a similar setup. Turns out 1GB of RAM is insufficient to run even the most trivial Java webapps, like Jenkins, but is more than sufficient for even non-trivial things using Go + PostgreSQL.
Your stack may be slow, not the machine.
Does Vercel do the same?
But that is news to me. Interesting. Although for static sites, I always use Netlify or even GitHub pages.
From what I can figure out, Vercel charges "$0.60 per million invocations" [1], which would cost me $180 per day.
[0] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47611454 [1] https://vercel.com/docs/functions/usage-and-pricing#invocati...
I suspect I could do 3000+ rps with some tuning and a more modern CPU or hetzner VPS, but there's some fun cachet from running on an old Pi while there's still headroom.
The only possibility for that not being a reasonable starting point is if they think the malicious actors still have access and will just exfiltrate rotated secrets as well. Otherwise this is deflection in an attempt to salvage credibility.
> Environment variables marked as "sensitive" in Vercel are stored in a manner that prevents them from being read, and we currently do not have evidence that those values were accessed. However, if any of your environment variables contain secrets (API keys, tokens, database credentials, signing keys) that were not marked as sensitive, those values should be treated as potentially exposed and rotated as a priority.
https://vercel.com/kb/bulletin/vercel-april-2026-security-in... as of 4:22p ET
https://vercel.com/docs/environment-variables/sensitive-envi...
So they are harder to introspect and review once set.
It’s probably good practice to put non-secret-material in non-sensitive variables.
(Pure speculation, I’ve never used Vercel)
There are cases where I want env variables to be considered non-secure and fine to be read later, I have one in a current project that defines the email address used as the From address for automated emails for example.
In my opinion the lack of security should be opt-in rather than opt-out though. Meaning it should be considered secure by default with an option to make it readable.
But that's just a bare-minimum defense-in-depth. The fact that an attacker was able to access the insecure variables, and likely the names of secure variables, is still horrifying.
It’s not like I had a ton of trust in them before, but now they’ve lost almost all credibility.
While a different kind of incident (in hindsight), the other week Webflow had a serious operational incident.
Sites across the globe going down (no clue if all or just a part of them). They posted plenty of messages, I think for about 12 hours, but mostly with the same content/message: "working on fixing this with an upstream provider" (paraphrased). No meaningful info about what was the actual problem or impact.
Only the next day did somebody write about what happened. Essentially a database running out of storage space. How that became a single point of failure, to at least plenty of customers: no clue. Sounds like bad architecture to me though. But what personally rubbed me the wrong way most of all, was the insistence on their "dashboard" having indicated anything wrong with their database deployment, as it allegedly had misrepresented the used/allocated storage. I don't who this upstream service provider of Webflow is, but I know plenty about server maintenance.
Either that upstream provider didn't provide a crucial metric (on-disk storage use) on their "dashboard", or Webflow was throwing this provider under the bus for what may have been their own ignorant/incompetent database server management. I guess it all depends to which extend this database was a managed service or something Webflow had more direct control over. Either way, with any clue about the provider or service missing from their post-mortem, customers can only guess as to who was to blame for the outage.
I have a feeling that we probably aren't the only customer they lost over this. Which in our case would probably not have happened, if they had communicated things in a different way. For context: I personally would never need nor recommend something like Webflow, but I do understand why it might be the right fit for people in a different position. That is, as long as it doesn't break down like it did. I still can't quite wrap my head around that apparent single point of failure for a company the size of Webflow though.
/anecdote
Google in particular has been staggeringly good, and don't sleep on IBM when they Actually Care.
The Oracle that published an announcement that said "we didn't get hacked" when the hackers had private customer info?
The Oracle that does not allow you to do any security testing on their software unless you use one of their approved vendors?
The Oracle that one of my customers uses where they have to turn off the HR portal for 2 weeks before annual performance evaluations because there is no way to prevent people from seeing things?
The only reason Oracle isn't having nightmarish security problems published every other week is because they threaten to sue anyone that does find an issue.
Oracle is a joke in every conceivable way and I despise them on a personal level.
1) Vercel rolled out sensitive secrets on February 1, 2024, why were not all existing env vars transitioned to sensitive type? Why was there any assumption that any secret added as env var before that date was still OK to be left as "non-sensitive".
2) How was actually the Google workspace account was compromised? If context.ai was the originating issue, what actually led to the takeover? Were there too many access privileges given to the Google Workspace token context.ai had, or was there actually a workstation takeover here?
3) And finally why the hack a compromised Google Workspace account lead to someone having access to bunch of customer projects? Were is the connection? I don't get this..
1. One or more Vercel employees - likely engineers - grant OAuth access to context.ai. They presumably did this for office-suite style features, but the OAuth request included a GCP grant for some reason, maybe laziness on context.ai's part or planned future features? Either way, Google's OAuth flow has little differentiation between "office suite" scopes and "cloud platform" scopes, so this may not have been particularly obvious to those at Vercel
2. context.ai's AWS account was compromised (unspecified how), and the Google OAuth tokens they had for customer accounts, including those for at least one Vercel employee, were taken
3. Those OAuth token(s) were used to authenticate to the GCP APIs as those Vercel employees, then allowing access to Vercel's DBs, and therefore access to customer data and secrets
Context.ai employee searches for Roblox exploits on web
-> Context.ai support access breached by malware
-> Vercel privileged employee account who uses Context.ai breached
-> Vercel customer secrets breached
Tl;dr - insufficient endpoint protection and activity detection at Context.ai (big surprise!) + insufficient privileged account isolation at VercelI’m no security engineer, but this is flatly unacceptable, right? This feels like Vercel is covering its own ass in favor of helping its customers understand the impact of this incident.
Clicking the Vercel logo at the top left of the page hard crashes my Chrome app. Like, immediate crash.
What an interesting bug.
I find it fun we're all reading a story how Vercel likely is compromised somehow, and managed to reproduce a crash on their webpage, so now we all give it a try. Surely could never backfire :)
No crash.
Now I don't want to click that "Finish update" button.
Chrome Version 147.0.7727.101 (Official Build) (64-bit). Windows 11 Pro.
Video: https://imgur.com/a/pq6P4si
I use uBlock Origin Lite. Maybe it blocks some crash causing script? edit: still no crash when I disabled UBO.
> Indicators of compromise (IOCs)
> Our investigation has revealed that the incident originated from a third-party AI tool whose Google Workspace OAuth app was the subject of a broader compromise, potentially affecting hundreds of its users across many organizations.
> We are publishing the following IOC to support the wider community in the investigation and vetting of potential malicious activity in their environments. We recommend that Google Workspace Administrators and Google Account owners check for usage of this app immediately.
> OAuth App: 110671459871-30f1spbu0hptbs60cb4vsmv79i7bbvqj.apps.googleusercontent.com
https://vercel.com/kb/bulletin/vercel-april-2026-security-in...
https://x.com/theo/status/2045862972342313374
> I have reason to believe this is credible.
https://x.com/theo/status/2045870216555499636
> Env vars marked as sensitive are safe. Ones NOT marked as sensitive should be rolled out of precaution
https://x.com/theo/status/2045871215705747965
> Everything I know about this hack suggests it could happen to any host
https://x.com/DiffeKey/status/2045813085408051670
> Vercel has reportedly been breached by ShinyHunters.
if it's not marked as sensitive (because it is not sensitive) there is no reason to roll them. if you must roll a insensitive env var it should've been sensitive in the first place, no?
I can imagine the reason why an env variable would be sensitive, but need to be re-read at some point. But overwhelmingly it makes sense for the default to be set, and never access again (i.e. Fly env values, GCP secret manager etc)
This was an interesting tidbit too. If true, this means that Vercel’s IT/Infosec maybe didn’t bother enabling the allowlist and request/review features for OAuth apps in their Google Workspace.
On top of that, they almost certainly didn’t enable the scope limits for unchecked OAuth apps (e.g limiting it to sign-on/basic profile scopes).
I feel for the team; security incidents suck. I know they are working hard, I hope they start to communicate more openly and transparently.
Next.js is the new PHP, but worse, since unlike PHP you don't really know what's server side and what's client side anymore. It's all just commingled and handled magically.
https://aws.amazon.com/security/security-bulletins/rss/aws-2...
Wasn't unheard of back in the day, that you leaked things via PHP templates, like serializing and adding the whole user object including private details in a Twig template or whatever, it just happened the other way around kind of. This was before "fat frontend, thin backend" was the prevalent architecture, many built their "frontends" from templates with just sprinkles of JavaScript back then.
But there are more people trying to secure this framework and the underlying tools than there would be on some obscure framework or something the average company built themselves.
Also "pay a real provider", what does that mean? Are you again implying that the average company should be responsible for _more_ of their own security in their hosting stack, not less?
Most companies have _zero_ security engineers.. Using a vertically-integrated hosting company like Vercel (or other similar companies, perhaps with different tech stacks - this opinion has nothing to do with Next or Node) is very likely their best and most secure option based on what they are able to invest in that area.
PHP was so simple and easy to understand that anyone with a text editor and some cheap shared hosting could pick it up, but also low level enough that almost nothing was magically done for you. The result was many inexperienced developers making really basic mistakes while implementing essential features that we now take for granted.
Frameworks like Next.js take the complete opposite approach, they are insanely complex but hide that complexity behind layers and layers of magic, actively discouraging developers from looking behind the curtain, and the result is that even experienced developers end up shooting themselves in the foot by using the magical incantations wrong.
What’s worse is vercel corrupted the react devs and convinced them that RSC was a good idea. It’s not like react was strictly in good hands at Facebook but at least the team there were good shepherds and trying to foster the ecosystem.
> Last month, we identified and stopped a security incident involving unauthorized access to our AWS environment.
> Today, based on information provided by Vercel and some additional internal investigation, we learned that, during the incident last month, the unauthorized actor also likely compromised OAuth tokens for some of our consumer users.
Meaning since 2015, you’ve got an 8.2% chance of having someone walk out with that box. Hopefully there’s nothing precious on it.
The chance of being burglarized is not the same as the chance that when you are hit, they decide to take your webserver. Think it through.
Thieves probably look for small stuff like jewelry, cash, laptops, not some big old server.
They regularly try to get me to join an enterprise plan but no service cutoff threats yet.
That said, I understand people are paying for basically not having to think about infrastructure, and agree that that's theoretically worth money, if they could do it well.
Everything runs fine locally until you try to deploy it, and bam you need 4g ram machine to run the thing.
So you host it on Vercel for free cause it's easy!
Then you want to check for more than 30 seconds of analytics, and it's pay time.
But the argument is if you’re using Vercel for production, you’re paying 5-10x what you’d pay for a VM, with 4gb.
So then what’s the rationale? You can’t be a hobbyist but also “it’s pay time” for production?
I’m still planning to move elsewhere though, the vendor lock-in is not worth it and I’d like to keep our infra in the EU.
That's for the free plan.
Limits are documented here:
https://developers.cloudflare.com/workers/platform/limits/#w...
Good work on workers though, maybe the next generation of sandstorm will be built on CloudFlare in a decade or so after all the bugs have been hammered out.
I've had so much trouble with Cloudflare, turns out you've to configure your deploy commands to use opennextjs-cloudflare. Vercel DX is much better for sure, and Cloudflare isn't even close. (I'm not even an engineer btw, so needed some time to figure out.)
Both have been changing as people realize it's rarely the right tool for the job, and as LLMs also become more intelligent and better at suggesting other, better options depending on what is asked for (especially Claude Opus).
nextjs is also powerful due to AI. But the value is a robust interactive front-end, easily iterated, with maybe SSR backing, nothing specific to nextjs (it's routing semantics + React).
So much complexity has gone into SSR. I hate 5MB client runtime just to read text as much as anyone, but not if the tradeoff is isomorphic env with magic file first-line incantations.
Recent Claude models do well with it, especially after adding the official skill.
I have only recently started using it, so would love to hear about anyone else's experience.
I guess they should have put some of that marketing money into hiring someone to manage the security of their systems. It's pretty telling that they had to hire an "incident response provider" just to figure out what happened and clean up after the hack. If you treat security like something you don't have to worry about until after you've been hacked you're probably going to get hacked.
Plenty to criticize them for, but that's totally standard and not something to ding them for. Probably something their cyber insurance has in their contract.
Forensics is its own set of skills, different from appsec and general blue team duties. You really want to make sure no backdoors got left in.
My impression is Next started becoming popular mostly as a reaction against create-react-app.
This is why most open source landing pages used nextjs, and if most FOSS landing pages use it, then most LLM’s have been trained on it, which means LLM’s are more familiar with that framework and choose it
There must be a term for this kind of LLM driven adoption flywheel…
Knowing how to operate a basic server is perceived as hard and dangerous by many, especially the generation that didn’t have a chance to play with Linux for fun when growing up
I am always feeling like I'm doing something wrong running bare metal based on modern advice, but it's low latency, simple, and reliable.
Probably because I've been using linux since Slackware in the 90s so it's second nature. And now with the CLI-based coding tools, I have a co-sysadmin to help me keep things tidy and secure. It's great and I highly recommend more people try it.
They have a free tier plan for non-commercial usage and a very very good UX for just deploying your website.
Many companies start using Vercel for the convenience and, as they grow, they continue paying for it because migrating to a cheaper provider is inconvenient.
Many folks here likely have some stack that looks like: Google Workspace, GitHub, Vercel/Railway/Render/etc. where env vars or secrets are hosted. These are all loosely coupled but transitively trusted.
So compromising any one of them becomes a threat vector. In other words, if System A trusts System B, and System B trusts System C, then System A trusts System C. This is also why OpenClaw is frightening from a security perspective.
Also, this is a good reminder to run audits. Run `npm audit` on a typical Next.js project and you’ll probably see DoS vulnerabilities, ReDoS issues, Prototype pollution, code injection paths, handlebars etc. I'm sure you'll find something unexpected if you don't have routine code hygiene checks.
> At this time, we do not have reason to believe that your Vercel credentials or personal data have been compromised.
Which is not very reassuring without actual information, since presumably they would have said the same thing on Saturday, if asked.
I see Vercel is hosted on AWS? Are they hosting every one on a single AWS account with no tenant isolating? Something this dumb could never happen on a real AWS account. Yes I know the internal controls that AWS has (former employee).
Anyone who is hosting a real business on Vercel should have known better.
I have used v0 to build a few admin sites. But I downloaded the artifacts, put in a Docker container and hosted everything in Lambda myself where I controlled the tenant isolation via separate AWS accounts, secrets in Secret Manager and tightly scoped IAM roles, etc.
It doesn’t make sense for a random employee who mistakenly uses a third party app to compromise all of its users it’s a poor security architecture.
It’s about as insecure as having one Apache Server serving multiple customer’s accounts. No one who is concerned about security should ever use Vercel.
You really have no clue what you’re talking about don’t you? Were you a sales guy at AWS or something?
Are you really defending Vercel as a hosting platform that anyone should take seriously?
Oh and I never download random npm packages to my computer. I build and run everything locally within Docker containers
It has absolutely nothing to do with “the modern state of web development”, it’s a piss poor security posture.
Again, I know how the big boys do this…
However, to say that serving multiple customers with Apache is "insecure" is inaccurate. There are ways to run virtual hosts under different user IDs, providing isolation using more traditional Unix techniques.
Absolutely no serious company would run their web software on a shared Apache server with other tenants.
How did that shared hosting work out for Vercel?
I've read about the Vercel incident. Given the timeline (22 months?!), it sounds like they had other issues well beyond shared hosting.
Has anyone made the move to self hosting on their own servers again?
Hey, I’m with you - I think social media needs to die specifically for this reason. I’m reminded of the term “snake oil” - it’s like the dawn of newspapers again.
So they use third-party for incident management? They are de-risking by spending more, which is a loose-loose for the customers.
7:57 AM Monday, April 20, 2026 Coordinated Universal Time (UTC)
I’m not exactly surprised, but it seems like the unserious, ill-informed and lazy are taking over. There is absolutely zero reason why a large, essential public service should be overspending and running on an unnecessary managed service like vercel… yet, here we are.
He also suggests in another post that Linear and GitHub could also be pwned?
Either way, hugops to all the SRE/DevOps out there, seems like it's going to be a busy Sunday for many.
> Here’s what I’ve managed to get from my sources:
>3. The method of compromise was likely used to hit multiple companies other than Vercel.
https://x.com/theo/status/2045870216555499636
To be fair journalists often do this too, eg. "[company] was breached, people within the company claim"
Theo has long been Vercel supporter and was sponsored by them several times. In this case it could be a combination of him being genuinely interested in Vercel (a rare thing) and hopes for future sponsorships
Theo's content boils down to the same boring formula. 1. Whatever buzzword headline is trending at the time 2. Immediate sponsored ad that is supposed to make you sympathize with Theo cause he "vets" his sponsors. 3. The man makes you listen to a "that totally happened" story that he somehow always involved himself personally. 4. Man serves you up an ad for his t3.chat and how it's the greatest thing in the world and how he should be paid more for his infinite wisdom. 5. A rag on Claude or OpenAI (whichever is leading at the time) 6. 5-10 minutes of paraphrasing an article without critical thought or analysis on the video topic.
I used to enjoy his content when he was still in his Ping era, but it's clear hes drunken the YT marketer kool-aid. I've moved on, his content gets recommend now and again, but I can't entertain his non-sense anymore.
I don't think he's a bad guy or that he's trying to be misleading. I suspect he wants his content to actually carry value, but he produces too much for that to be possible. Primarily he's a performer, not a technologist.
However, since the LLM Cambria explosion, he has become very clickbaity, and his content has become shallow. I don't watch his videos anymore.
When you're putting the bar that low, sure.
He's about as knowledgeable as the junior you hired last week, except that he speaks from a position of authority and gets retweeted by the entire JS slop sphere. He's LinkedIn slop for Gen Z.
> @ErdalToprak: "And use your own vps or k3s cluster there’s no reason in 2026 to delegate your infra to a middle man except if you’re at AWS level needs"
> @theo: "This is still a stupid take"
lol, okay. Thanks for the insight, Theo, whoever you are.
Linear has not been breached, customer data remains secure, and Linear is not hosted on Vercel.
AI agents have the benefit of working at scale, probably "better" used for mass targeting.
But I get your point.
Let that be the end of Microsoft. Was forced to use their shitty products for years, by corporate inertia and their free Teams and Azure licenses, first-dose-is-free, curse.
What's your agenda here?
Also LLMs will be used to attack only, no one will be smart to integrate it into CI flows, because everyone is that dumb. No security tools will pop up.