What makes you so sure that closed-source companies won't run those same AI scanners on their own code?
It's closed to the public, it's not closed to them!
What makes you so sure that closed-source companies won't run those same AI scanners on their own code?
It's closed to the public, it's not closed to them!
Having worked in quite a few agency/consultancy situations, it is far more productive to smash your head against a wall till bleeding, than to get a client to pay for security. The regular answer: "This is table stakes, we pay you for this." Combined with: "Why has velocity gone down, we don't pay you for that security or documentation crap."
There are unexploited security holes in enterprise software you can drive a boring machine through. There is a well paid "security" (aka employee surveillance) company using python2.7 (no, not patched) on each and every machine their software runs on. At some of the biggest companies in this world. They just don't care for updating this, because, why should they. There is no incentive. None.
Running AI scanners internally costs money, dev time, and management buy in to actually fix the mountain of tech debt the scanners uncover. As you said there is no incentive for that
But for bad actors the cost of pointing an LLM at an exposed endpoint or reverse engineered binary has dropped to near zero. The attackers tooling just got exponentially cheaper and faster, while the enterprise defenders budget remained at zero.
There should be a way to donate your unused tokens on every cycle to open source like rounding up at the chekout!
I've seen multiple proprietary places now including a routine AI scan of their code because it's so cheap and they may as well use-up unused tokens at the end of the week.
I mean, it's literally zero because they already paid for CC for every developer. You can't get cheaper than that.
Most software companies sadly don't hire a dedicated (software) security expert.
Yeah, but with closed source it's cheaper for the defender than for the attacker - the defender can scan their sources and their PRs as well as the compiled output. The attacker can only scan the compiled output, and they have to perform repeated scans.
How many companies take the time to use penetration testing tools, that have been available for many years, to verify their software (or pay a penetration testing company to do a more thorough job than they have the experience to do internally)?
Some, certainly. Many, possibly. Most, I would wager not.
1. shallow
2. hollow
3. flat
...
Not claiming that it's a slam dunk for open source, but the inverse does not seem correct either.
Why "minus D, E and F"? After all, once you have the harness set up, there's no additional work to add in new models, right?
I'm struggling to see how it is a level playing field:
1. Closed-source: defender runs llms to check the sources for vulns, runs llms on each PR, runs llm on deployment of the compiled output. Attacker runs llm only on compiled output.
2. Open-source: both attacker and defender runs llms on source, on PRs and on compiled output.