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NASA describes some impressive work for runtime integrity, but the lack of mention of build-time security is surprising.

I would expect to see multi-party-signed deterministic builds etc. Anyone have any insight here?

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What would the threat profile be here to require that? Regardless, I'd be a little surprised if they didn't have anything like that; provenance is very important in aerospace, with hardware tracked to the point that NTSB investigators looking at a crash can tell what ingot a bolt was made from

In my experience government just uses RedHat which is -not- reproducible and -not- full source bootstrapped so a single person in the supply chain could maliciously or accidentally backdoor everything. Maybe the goal of the supply chain attacker is just embarrassing the Americans at best or cause a material loss of life at worst.

I would -hope- NASA does not trust their OS supply chains to a single person for high risk applications, but given even major companies I audit do this with billions of dollars on the line, it would not shock me if NASA has the same stance which worries me a bit.

They would need to be using something like heavily customized buildroot or stagex to produce deterministic OS images.

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