Have I got that right?
No.
Let's take an example of 401ks.
Any company that has a 401k has to pass non-discrimination testing to ensure their plan doesn't favor highly compensated employees over non-highly compensated employees. This is done through Actual Deferral Percentage and Actual Contribution Percentage tests. Just doing these tests can be very costly.
If you don't want to do these tests, then you can follow a 'safe harbor' action where the company automatically contributes x% for everyone. If the plan executes the 'safe harbor' action, then they automatically pass the two tests above.
However, if they don't follow through that plan they may still not have violated the nondiscrimination policies if they end up passing those two tests.
So to bring it back to the circumstance here, because Cox was not following their own processes which would have afforded them safe harbor they do not get the benefit of being automatically protected from the action. Then the court goes to see if Cox was sufficiently involved in the violating actions in order to be liable, and the court found that Cox was not.
So going back to the line...: > It's sufficient to have a process that satisfies the letter of the law, but you can simply not follow through and enforce it.
Not at all. Because it was not enforced, Cox lost the safe harbor protections and had to defend themselves.
With DMCA claims, it's an adversarial accusation with inherent unreliability built into the collection mechanism, usually submitted by third parties. The process doesn't lend itself to the same kind of auditability and accountability as securities and investments.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MGM_Studios,_Inc._v._Grokster,....
But Grokster et al openly advertised that you could get all music "for free".
Where the gray area is would be something that arguably can ONLY be used for piracy (an example of what this would be is hard to imagine, but maybe a device that can ONLY duplicate encrypted blurays and cannot do it for non-encrypted ones - yes I know there are arguments even here via fair use/backup/personal copy) and/or something that is substantially advertised as for piracy - something that nobody would have a reason to buy unless they were pirating, perhaps - something where free/open source similar software exists but can't be used to pirate?
I know some file sharing sites do ip logging so if DMCA strikes happen, they can simply ban the ip too.
Is there anything tangetially important to these file sharing sites too after this decision by Supreme Court?
I can imagine that as long as they operate legal things as well and dont do things under the intention of just being used for piracy (from their sides but we all know the reality)
Then, they don't have to do anything other than just accepting the DMCA notice.
There are definitely server providers who are more privacy oriented while being affordable who only get involved not even with DMCA but rather some court ruling within their specific country which can be permissive.
So is it possible for now for a file sharing provider to say that we follow the DMCA but only if you can get it written from a local judge that we will remove these files for the purposes of Privacy for our end users?
For copyright law, Congress does not expressly allow secondary liability for third parties FOR COPYRIGHT unless the party induced the infringement or the provided service is tailored to that infringement. In this case, Cox was not cutting off copyright infringers BUT since their service could be used by same infringers for valid use, they didn't have to.
For arms producer, Congress has exempted them for liability and courts have ruled, yep, Congress gets to make the rules here.
Congress could overturn both rulings by changing the law.
This is what we want. Congress makes the rules, courts interpret but don't make new rules.
In that vein, merely selling a tool even if a predominant use or intention of that tool is infringement, the infringement must be actively induced or invited by the seller. This is also affirmed in detail in the USSC opinion: "The Court has repeatedly made clear—see Kalem Co. v. Harper Brothers, 222 U. S. 55, Sony, and Grokster—that mere knowledge that a service will be used to infringe is insufficient to establish the required intent to infringe."
This is the primary part of the opinion, the first 7 of 27 pages. I'm still reading the rest and will update when finished. (Concurring Opinion and Dissents I believe)
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The meat of the opinion has some interesting elements as well:
* "Internet service providers, such as Cox, have limited knowledge about how their Internet services are used and who uses them. They do know which IP address corresponds to which subscriber’s account, but they cannot distinguish one individual user from another...However, because online infringement is so widespread, pursuing each individual infringer does little to stem the tide.": mere IP logs are not enough to establish liability, perhaps. More importantly, it is opined that individual fishing expeditions dont actually serve the end of eliminating infringement. This does not absolve individual liability, but it becomes important later.
* "Holding Cox liable merely for failing to terminate Internet service to infringing accounts would expand secondary copyright liability beyond our precedents ... The Fourth Circuit’s holding thus went beyond the two forms of liability recognized in Grokster and Sony. It also conflicted with this Court’s repeated admonition that contributory liability cannot rest only on a provider’s knowledge of infringement and insufficient action to prevent it.": This points to another case where Circuit and District courts have been ignoring the instruction of higher courts, in this case, inventing new liabilities where none existed. This doesn't go so far as to repudiate entirely the idea of fishing expeditions having teeth, but it places a clear guardrail around expanding liability without laws establishing such.
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The Sotomayor concurrence on judgment states that the Justice does not believe the methods used by the majority opinion are correct, but still agrees with the judgement because of insufficient information presented by Sony. I think the analysis gone into in this section is flawed, but it is also not precedential since it is not the Order part of the opinion. I am also out of time to poke at that part for the moment. It does relate this case to the closest recent big case on secondary liability though, that of Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos, so its worth reading even if the justifying analysis I think does not fit.
The big difference I guess is whether you think negative jurisdiction (limiting what the government can do) vs positive jurisdiction (further enabling the government) is more important, but considering HN and the exhortations against divisive commentary, I'd rather not dive into the weeds arguing that part here.