LaGuardia pilots raised safety alarms months before deadly runway crash
theguardian.com
Related: Two pilots dead after plane and ground vehicle collide at LaGuardia - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47486386 (667 comments)
theguardian.com
One last meta point. We live in the wealthiest country in the history of the world, and the highest air travel prices (some part is a function of longer distances I know). We should expect that we have ample coverage, if not over-coverage, at all times for one of our major metropolitan airports. Pay them.
The controller shortage has nothing to do with pay, controllers make a lot of money.
ATC should never work alone at any of the "Core 30" airports. https://www.aspm.faa.gov/aspmhelp/index/Core_30.html
Often Approach will take over the "tower" and operate in crippled mode (no clearances to cross active runways, you must go down to the end kind of thing).
Some airports are uncontrolled at various times and would revert to that. Some airlines would require the pilot execute a missed approach and deviate to a towered airport, others may allow them to land.
However despite the downvotes I still haven't seen evidence that they were running understaffed at that moment.
What I do know is that the developing emergency on the tarmac due to an apparently hazardous smell in another plane is likely the cause of the confusion that led to this incident. That's a trigger that could have been exacerbated by fatigue but we don't have any evidence of that yet.
I think the disagreement you see is based on the definition of what "understaffed" means. Having one ATC to do ground and air control simultaneously seems like an under-staffing situation to begin with, regardless of whether it's a common practice.
Do we have evidence that one controller did all ground and air? The only evidence I've seen was the NY Times said that, according to a source, two controllers were working and two more were in the building.
In situations like this there is as lot of disinformation. The best thing to do is not add to it - a pile of bad information is not improved by piling more on. The best thing is to patiently find reliable info and stick to it.
> The best thing is to patiently find reliable info and stick to it.
No disagreement here
Why do you (or why does anyone) think that? My point in the GP was, I have yet to see evidence that there was only one controller, and I have seen evidence that there were two.
What happens when they need the bathroom, or have some kind of medical problem? If it's really a common case for one controller to handle things, the system itself needs to be fundamentally rethought.
You can't think of any scenario having one controller makes sense?
I don't think people saying this stuff quite understand how busy LGA is even at night. I'd even go as far as to say that three minimum on duty with two in the tower at all times (for a ground/air split), would be the bare minimum for any hour or situation at LGA.
However, arrivals stay pretty heavy right up until 23:59 even on schedule and if you've got a lot of delayed flights (not exactly uncommon at LGA) - you may still have a lot of departures going out in the 23:00 hour.
I would not be surprised to learn that they're staffed to an appropriate level for what the schedule says is supposed to be operating at that time, but a very inadequate level for what actually winds up operating at that time on many days.
Initial analysis suggests they were running about 75% of full capacity in flight ops in the 15min prior to the accident. I doubt they were staffed to 75% of the daytime peak.
At one of the nation's busiest airports? Where there are two intersecting runways, both potentially with departing and arriving aircraft? Nope.
But, sure, a single-runway regional airport can probably get by with a single controller.
La Guardia appears to handle 400 flights a day, 22 an hour. I see 6 moving planes right now (https://www.flightradar24.com/airport/lga); hopefully they have more than one person on?
I don't want to blow your mind but if the airport closes there aren't going to be any controllers in the tower.
Likely, the problem was with truck 1 wishing to get to the emergency quickly. There was at least one queued landing hence the go-around demand after the crash.
It doesn't blow my mind, but at a major air hub like LGA I'm surprised there isn't a controller on site for callout?
Here it's being done at SFO or so it seems: https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?FileExtension=...
While searching I did find this other document where a GC (LC appears to be Local Control for local air traffic and GC is ground control) controller complains about combining due to short-staffing https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Document/docBLOB?ID=19837915&Fi...
Well, it'll be an interesting report from the NTSB at least.
What we are seeing here is the normalization of deviance.
Looking at the normal schedules - if all is on schedule there'd be no departures in the 23:00 hour but you'd still have the arrivals side running pretty heavily. However, once you factor in things not being on schedule, as they evidently were not on that night, you get:
----------
The 15min before the accident had 14 flight operations (per Juan Browne/blancolirio going through the ADSB playback). And that's in marginal weather and at night, which makes things more complicated.
That is 75% of the official maximum capacity of the airport - during the main part of the day where there's government-imposed caps on flights, it's capped at 74 operations per hour or about 18.5 per 15min.
As such, it seems apparent that you would need just as much staffing (or at least 75% as much) at that time to safely handle the traffic volume that was occurring that night as you did in the main part of the day.
Unless the normal staffing here was just 2 people, it seems clear that 1 is inadequate.
According to whom? Management, or controllers?
Certainly does not seem like controllers agree:
The concept most certainly exists.
Its previous head had a term that didn't expire until 2028 but he resigned after pressure from Elon Musk (who didn't like that he got fined), now a Trump-friendly head has been installed. What, realistically, would be the consequences if he lied? Likely none. Government officials lying on record is an every day occurrence these days.
I’m glad we’ve made our conclusions up front before the report has even come out.
That saves me a lot of reading!
It's scary that so many don't seem to know the difference. This is how misinformation starts and spreads.
That’s literally it. Anything else is speculation and extrapolation.
But don’t let that stop you if you already know what caused the tragedy.
This is worthy of losing flagging privileges IMO.
The Secretary of Transportation said on record at the first press conference that reports this guy was working alone in the tower are INACCURATE. The actual number is the responsibility of the NTSB to disclose.
95% of this discussion is people blowing smoke out of their ass as per usual.
The evidence that he was overworked seems pretty damned obvious. He forgot about an entire airplane and put a fire truck in its path. The evidence of overwork is strewn all around LGA.
This is deranged. Seek help.
10? 30? One per aircraft?
How do you suppose all these people coordinate their activities?
Are you talking about a two strip airfield on a cattle station in the Northern Territory with once a month traffic, or something else?
Your "gotcha" class question isn't especially well formed.
So tell me, for an airport that only has two runways which intersect, at LGA's volume, what is the correct number of controllers that should be working that field?
This also assumes the FAA hasn't already done this math and the gaming-chair experts know more than the FAA (which they don't).
Again, you haven't sufficiently qualified your questions - it's not about the number of runways.
EDIT: I see you updated your response and added in a nod to traffic volume - that's a good start.
Other factors in this non linear multi factor equation are ... ?
So the minimum here would be 3 controllers given that nights setup. One for approach/ground, one for departure. Obviously you can argue more would be appropriate to segregate duties further, but it was a night shift headed into airport shutdown.
There seems to have been two working. The supervising controller double booked as a primary controller for departure at the time of incident. The fact the incident controller wasn’t immediately relieved of duty and had to spend 30 minutes shutting the airport down himself seems to match this explanation.
From what I’ve read on the matter for this tower not having a supervising controller was rather normalized - which is outside of SOP and something you need to report to management every time it happens. For this incident there was one - but sounds like one in name only. Once normalization of deviance happens, working in a way where two controllers that on paper should be sharing duties - but in practice are splitting them - seems exactly how I’d expect things to go.
But this is all speculation at this point of course. NTSB report will be interesting.
Either way - it has been clear for decades ATC needs both a massive surge in the staffing pipeline as well as a legitimate modernization program competently implemented. It’s certainly not a problem that started or remained in any single administration. Even if one or another had been worse, others sure as hell haven’t done much at all to fix the situation.
https://www.airlinepilotforums.com
You will see many are terrified ( in commercial pilot terms...) of flying into La Guardia or JFK...
Just a quick read/speculation based on the linked forum post...
Short of insane visibility conditions that prevented them from seeing the plane coming, the firetruck operator seems to be the liable party (beyond the airport for understaffing controllers—this seems to be exacerbated by government cuts but that's still no excuse for having a solo controller at that busy of an airport, especially at night).
The controller in question seems to have caught their mistake quickly and reversed the order instead asking the firetruck to stop (but for some reason, this wasn't heard).
Is it common now to have solo operators running control towers?
AC No: 150/5210-20A - "Subject: Ground Vehicle Operations to include Taxiing or Towing an Aircraft on Airports"
https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/...
“you must ensure that you look both ways down the runway to visually acquire aircraft landing or departing even if you have a clearance to cross.”
These trucks seem to have pretty good visibility from inside. Not sure if La Guardia model was the same: https://youtu.be/rfILwYo3sXc
Says at pag 9:
"While driving on an aerodrome : Clear left, ahead, above and right
Scan the full length of the runway and the approaches for possible landing aircraft before entering or crossing any runway, even if you have received a clearance."
They have mostly glass cabs for exactly that reason. Only thing that would block your view is a passenger in the right seat.
But if your truck has blind spots and vis is poor, you shouldn't be driving as fast if at all.
We can’t say that emergency vehicles should just stay in on dark and stormy nights.
..is what I was responding to.
>We can’t say that emergency vehicles should just stay in on dark and stormy nights.
This conclusion is flawed and doesn't apply to what I said.
If a truck can't see (conditions or not), then they shouldn't be on the same runway as takeoff/landing because...the consequences were severe despite the safeguards you mentioned, e.g. Not driving fast is relative and the "eyes" failed too initially.
Almost every airplane is bigger, blinder and slower than that truck. If it had been a plane cleared across the runway, this would have been so much worse.
Even if you want to exempt airplanes, it would require a complete rebuild of most major airports or using completely different emergency equipment. Every airport you have ever flown to commercially has ground vehicles crossing or operating on runways every day. It is simply not possible to operate a commercial airport without ground vehicles in aircraft movement areas, including runways.
The solution is not to spend billions on new trucks or access roads because of a single incident. It is to ensure that controllers, the people directly in charge of coordinating safe ground movement, have the mental bandwidth and tools to do their jobs. The fact that this was a truck and not an airplane is luck, making any discussions about truck cab visibility very much secondary. You have to go upstream of “trucks have blind spots” to truly prevent another of these incidents.
I never said this. This is very different to what I said.
This reveals you're having a different conversation.
All of my arguments apply to this statement as well as they do to my paraphrase of the statement.
What?
It doesn't work like that unless you're having a different conversation.
How do you propose that a truck not driving “at all” manage to drive on the runway? Driving on the runway, (or anywhere) is a subset of driving “at all”. Logically I can conclude that since you think that the trucks should not be driving “at all” due to blind spots, that you also think that they should not be driving on runways because of blind spots.
My argument paraphrased you to highlight a specific situation that would arise as a result of what you argued and to point out the folly of just banning any vehicle with a blind spot from crossing the runway. By extension, that planes can’t cross the runway either (the difference between a fire truck and an airplane crossing the runway is that the plane is larger, with bigger blind spots, less maneuverable, fragile and filled with people).
The solution is not to ban vehicles with blind spots from crossing runways, but to provide tools and guidance for those vehicles to operate safely. You could, for example, provide them with a trained observer in an elevated place that can be responsible for saying whether it is ok to be on the runway. We could give the person coordinating movement in the elevated place tools like radar mapping the ground, or automated semaphore systems at runway crossings (I’m describing things that already exist). Using a system like that we could do things like operate in 0 visibility where the weather causes the blind spot to be anything past the windshield (which is something that happens at JFK for example).
The rest of the emergency vehicles were stopped because they hadn’t been authorized. Truck 1 started moving because he had received specific instructions to do exactly what he was doing.
I take it you’re not a pilot, controller or someone who has ever worked an aviation radio?
Edit: Confirmed truck 1 was the one involved in the collision. Previous text: It is unclear which truck specifically was involved in the crash. In photos, the truck has the number 35 on it, not sure if that would preclude it from being identified as "truck 1" verbally.
In any case, if they were cleared across the runway, and they were, it isn’t really on them. It doesn’t change the gist of the argument. The broader point is that it wasn’t that one truck was barreling around being reckless as implied by gp, it’s just that one truck made it out and the rest of the company had yet to start moving (whether because they saw the plane coming from their viewpoint farther back, or just hadn’t started moving yet, we will find out later). The entire company had stopped at the line, and when cleared across the lead truck was struck. Of course the rest were still stopped behind the line, there was a giant fire truck in their path moments before.
The instruction to stop is, to my pilots ear, irrelevant. Until an instruction is read back by the receiving party, it is worthless. It might not have been received, or received incorrectly. That’s the whole point of the readback, to ensure that the instruction was received correctly (notice how I missed the “and company”… a readback would have caught that). If there is not a readback, controllers are instructed to ask for one. On top of that, it was a panic instruction using non standard verbiage. If he was already past the line, the instruction to stop might have made it worse.
All people (pilots included) are responsible for only following ATC instructions if it is safe/possible to do so. You aren’t supposed to land on a runway with other traffic on it, even if cleared. You aren’t supposed to cross a runway if there is a plane taking off or landing, even if cleared. You aren’t supposed to clear a vehicle onto a runway at the same time you cleared a plane to land (this one’s an assumption, I’m not a trained controller).
You are making the assumption that the truck did not check the runway, but keep in mind that it is a 30ish ton vehicle, and the plane was moving at 150 mph at touchdown, 100 mph at the time of impact. There very well may not have been a plane visible when the truck started moving. The truck might not have received the non-standard clearance revocation, or received it and tried to get off the runway by accelerating across, or received it and begun slowing in the path of the plane.
The truck driver could have prevented this, but they certainly aren’t the primary cause.
At Class D airports it’s always been the norm. But KLGA is Class B.
The fire truck received the go ahead. They weigh 3x more than a normal firetruck. They're rushing to a different emergency. The plane is moving fast as hell. They can't just react instantaneously.
The ATC worker is clearly too stretched and such an incident was an inevitability. When they're shouting stop, they are no longer directly talking to the firetruck, which obscures the situation for everyone.
It is a terrible tragedy that will only be prevented with reform in staffing and safety procedures.
We aren’t in the aviation industry, and neither are we the NTSB.
Prosecutions and convictions do occur as a result of aviation incidents, pilots loose their jobs, pilots loose their licenses, ATC staff can be prohibited from ever working in the industry again.
We free to talk about all of those aspects here.
What government cuts? 2025 FAA air traffic budget was up around 7% from 2025
https://enotrans.org/article/senate-bill-oks-27-billion-faa-...
> The crash has raised fears that operations at US airports are under extreme stress. Airports have been dealing with a shortage of air traffic controllers, exacerbated by brutal federal government personnel cuts by Donald Trump’s administration at the start of his second presidency.
Not my opinion, just reading from there.
I'm just looking for: budget was X in <2026 and in 2026 it is Y, where X > Y
Also first time ATC told the truck to stop it wasn’t too clear who the message was addressed to. It’s a bit hard to hear “Truck1” there, not clear who he wants to stop. The second time, one can argue by the time “stop” command was heard it might have been better to gun the engine. As the truck sort of slowed down in the middle of the runway.
Just like in that collision, it is possible there is no one single person to blame (apparently helicopter pilot was not outside of the legal corridor, despite the speculations), but it was a compounding error issue.
How many planes land at LGA in the middle the night?
One controller overnight is completely reasonable.
So if said controller has a medical episode?
“If we remove regulation and safety controls, things will be safer because everyone will be more careful.”
Because the parties involved would be more careful if there were no ATC?
I'm going to pretend to know exactly what would happen in that precise scenario but I'm confident most commercial pilots get enough training to be able to handle it.
You need to recognize when something is out of the ordinary and treat it as an emergency (perhaps not a literal pan-pan/mayday emergency) sooner rather than later, and do things that may end up to have been unnecessary (like executing a go-around because emergency vehicles were on the move).
One controller on two frequencies is another example - that works fine in normal situations, but during an emergency response, perhaps the channels should be mixed; giving the pilots in the air a chance to hear the incorrect clearance onto their runway.
After all, an active runway is really more of an "air" control thing than a ground one.
You are defeating your own argument :-) Its exactly because every accident is an example of multiple things going wrong at the same time...that you need...multiple layers of control and safety to catch it through each hole of the cheese.
Like...another controller?
Do you really think it's appropriate to have zero margin for handling unusually high ATC workloads? Because we just saw what happens when you have zero margin for handling unusually high ATC workloads: people start dying.
Ever?
I think the better question is how you get a system in which people are only responsible for any one facet to get the same performance out of people that a painter can get out of himself when he's setting up his own ladder that he personally has to climb on.
Mandatory scaffolding for roofing contractors would save some amount of deaths/injuries (and the related expenses) but add expenses to each job.
Some roofing firms refuse to operate without scaffolding; you pay for it or you find someone else.
A painter who does a bad job setting up a ladder is going to have a bad time, a lone ATC operator having a heart attack potentially puts multiple large aircraft full of people in danger...
Any system that requires perfect performance from any one human will fail.
How many fatal accidents are reasonable in your opinion?
In practice? It depends. Delays have a tendency to cascade in the air travel system and the Port Authority can curtail or cancel the curfew at their discretion. How frequently do exceptions to normal ops have to happen for it to be unreasonable to use "normal ops traffic" as a justification for scheduling a single controller? Ultimately, controllers have to control the traffic that they get, not the traffic that they want/expect to get, and a system that is overly optimized becomes brittle and unable to deal with exceptions to the norm.
If LGA was a small regional airport, sure one controller or maybe even no controls overnight could be appropriate. But LGA is not a small regional airport.
The way I think about it is this: substandard ATC staffing is just as bad as lacking jetways or damaged runways. When the airport can't land planes because of physical capacity constraints, flights get cancelled or delayed (literally happening today at LGA, flights are getting canceled because they're down one runway). The carriers need to eat the costs of forcing too much demand on ATCs.
The idea that waste must be reduced is killing society, and this mindset must be addressed first before any other safety-critical system can be made reliable again.
Running ATC (and limiting flights if necessary) seems like the job of the government to me.
Why put this on the carriers?
I am reminded of the Uberlingen disaster:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2002_%C3%9Cberlingen_mid-air_c...
https://admiralcloudberg.medium.com/cleared-to-collide-the-c...
Both precedents are applicable, because the Laguardia controller is also going to be savaged.
The mid-air collision occurred because the Russian air crew maneuvered contrary to their TCAS instruction (it commanded them to climb, the controller ordered them to descend). They were not trained that TCAS is the ultimate authority in this situation; it exists precisely because the controller has already failed in their separation duties, and if you have TCAS giving you a resolution advisory, your aircraft is no longer under ATC control and you must ignore any ATC instruction to the contrary. The other aircraft was correctly following its TCAS instruction (descending) because their crew was trained in this. Both planes descended and still hit each other.
In this case, KLGA has RWSLs (Runway Status Lights), including RELs (Runway Entrance Lights) on taxiways, that behave like traffic lights on roads. This too is completely automated and is the last-ditch resort for when a controller has already failed in their separation duties. This system processes transponder data of nearby aircraft and determines whether an aircraft is about to take off (is on the runway and accelerating) or land (is approaching the runway and descending). In either case the RELs go red automatically, and the controller cannot override this.
The driver of the ARFF probably [1] placed more emphasis on the controller's clearance to cross than the lights telling him to stay put, in exactly the same way that the Russian air crew placed more emphasis on the controller's instruction to descend than their TCAS instruction to climb, not realising that they were maneuvering contrary to the thing that exists specifically to prevent these accidents.
EDIT: I am not assigning blame to the controller here. They are human, and humans make mistakes. That's why these systems exist. Having one person handle an airport the size of KLGA is an accident waiting to happen.
[1] Obviously this is unknown at this point, and is something the NTSB will investigate. The system could have been down for maintenance for example.
Humans have a powerful need to affix blame and punish individuals. On the internet, you are forever the worst moment of your life.
We set air traffic controllers up to fail, and then when something goes wrong we torture them until they die, and then torture their memory after they die.
Pretty easy!
It doesn't serve us well to act like this administration is anything other than extremely aberrational.
Is it still an aberration the second time 'round?
Future historians are going to laugh at us- provided there will be any.
But scapegoating any single politician for the systemic problems of aviation is as unhelpful as scapegoating the controller for the crash at Laguardia.
Leaded gasoline? Illegal to use in the US - unless you're putting it into an old plane, where it's not likely legal to put unleaded in.
ATC? Done with old radar screens and physical cards.
Ground Control? Someone has to be standing in the tower with a pair of binoculars.
The US has an extremely safe aviation system, but the price for that safety has been technological stagnation. If I spend $70k on a small airplane, the best that'll get me is a 1975 Piper with a lawnmower engine and analog gauges. Replacing those with digital instruments will run ~$20k - the instruments themselves are only $7k, but the regulatory burden is quite pricey.
Reagan didn't do the US any favors when he treated ATC as disposable, but the truth is that the volume of flights has increased enormously and the job of ATC has gotten much harder while at the same time controller staffing has been screwed by budget fights in Congress and a couple years of one very misguided DEI policy.
The US needs to automate more of ATC. Human beings should be dedicated to emergencies, not issuing the exact same clearance 300 times a day.
You proceeded to list a bunch of things that have absolutely nothing to do with ATC being overworked and underpaid.
"Automating more of ATC" would change absolutely nothing about the fact they're overworked and underpaid, there would just be fewer controllers with the same workload because they lost all ability to collectively bargain with Reagan.
Name an industry that has automated, and the end result was they kept the same number of employees, but paid them more and reduced their hours. Oh, and it can't be a unionized industry. I'll wait patiently wait for that list.
I'm not providing that list because it's stupid. ATC is not a jobs program; it's a profession that exists to solve a problem. The goal is not to pay ATC more, the goal is to safely manage air traffic at a reasonable price.
There is a ton of low hanging fruit because ATC is done today via phone calls and analog radio despite digital radar and mandatory transponders. It would substantially reduce controller workload, because important yet brainless tasks like "don't issue a clearance to cross a runway with landing traffic" are trivial for a computer but require the same amount of synchronous focus for a human as managing an emergency landing.
Clearances to cross a runway are given by someone with a radio and a pair of binoculars right now, which is how this was possible. With another few controllers it would have been less likely.
With a few traffic lights and computers controlling them? This wouldn't be possible at all, because the controller could focus on the emergency and the rest of the traffic could just run as normal.
The number of flights in the US is enormous and still growing. ATC, as a job, really sucks because you have to spend years in school and then commit to a career where the government can just decide where you're going to live on a whim (no, a union would not fix this, because everywhere needs ATC but not everyone wants to live everywhere). You have criminal liability if you make a mistake and while you can make six figures, it's very hard to make as much as you would at a similarly stressful and intellectual job because anything in the private sector that's this critical just gets automated ASAP.
I have a pilot's license. I can tell you with certainty that even when ATC is staffed for conditions they still make mistakes fairly often. That's just the nature of the problem no matter how much you pay them or how many controllers you hire. When you're landing a 200mph jetliner every 60 seconds there is too much room for error in a human brain.
Deciding to change policies to effect the recommendation isn't their role. That's why you will so often see a safety investigatory body repeatedly recommend the same thing. The UK's RAIB (which is for Rail investigations) for example will often call out why a fatal accident they've investigated wouldn't have happened if the regulator had implemented some prior recommendation, either one they're slow walking or have rejected.
The investigators don't need to care about other factors. Are melons too expensive? Not their problem. Only unfriendly countries grow melons? Not their problem. They only need to care about recommending things that would prevent future harm which is their purpose.
And if it was the role of investigators to change policy, then there would be enormous pressure from industry to reach convenient conclusions, poisoning the investigation process.
1: https://admiralcloudberg.medium.com/cleared-to-collide-the-c...
The NTSB only makes recommendations.
The system is smart enough that if you get red bars to cross for an airplane departing once it passes your position the red clears because it knows the airplane is already past you. It is not dumb - it was deliberately designed to minimize false positives so everyone would trust it otherwise they might ignore it when it really counts. (AFAIK it very accurate in fact so the firetrucks weren't crossing because they distrusted the red lights).
This is just like all aviation incidents and indeed most incidents of any kind: the holes in the swiss cheese lined up.
The emergency aircraft couldn't find a free gate, creating a massive distraction for ATC, airport, et al. This is probably the primary domino that started the sequence. Had a gate been free this incident would not have happened. One big hole lined up.
Normally the aircraft would visually see the truck or the truck would visually see the airplane. But it was dark and rainy. Another hole lined up.
Everyone involved was rushing because noise abatement requires the airport to close at a certain hour. Thus everyone wanted to take-off or land before that shutdown. Another hole.
Normally the controller wouldn't issue the clearance to cross or their supervisor monitoring behind them would notice the error and override. But the controller and/or supervisor were distracted by the emergency. Another hole lined up.
The controller realized the error and issued a stop command but the fire truck proceeded anyway; they may or may not have heard the transmission. Another hole lined up.
Then someone else decided to jump on frequency during this busy time (we don't know who just yet) which may have prevented the controller's stop and/or go-around commands from being heard (another hole lined up).
The ARFF crew did not obey the REILs, accepting the clearance. Perhaps they thought the red lights were due to aircraft on short final and they still had time to cross? Perhaps it was some other misunderstanding of how that system works. Another hole lines up.
And the Air Canada jet was not paying attention to the chaos on frequency. There's a reason runway crossings are typically done on tower frequency: so aircraft can hear what is going on. But it was late at night and their brains probably didn't process what was happening. Or they were too close to touching down to have the bandwidth. Another hole lined up.
I totally agree with you on that.
> The emergency aircraft couldn't find a free gate, creating a massive distraction for ATC, airport, et al.
Yes. And I want to add one more thing to this: the airplane with the "odour" issue was kinda ambivalent about the danger. They deemed it dangerous enough to declare an emergency, and request a gate then later ask for airstairs but not dangerous enough to pop the slides and just evacuate right there and then. I'm not saying this is wrong. Obviously they were evaluating the situation as new information was coming in. But it increased the workload of the ATC. They were trying to find a gate, and etc. If it was a clearer "mayday mayday mayday, aft cabin fire, we are evacuating" that might have been paradoxically less "work" for the ATC. Or at least more of a "practiced" scenario.
> Perhaps it was some other misunderstanding of how that system works.
Yeah. That's a big one. Total speculation but maybe they thought the airplane with the "odour" issue was keeping it red?
I guess they could have found a route that wouldn't conflict with landing aircraft, but I doubt that's a practical option most of the time.
I know that Heathrow have multiple fire stations and rendezvous points for emergency services so that fire service can attend even when one runaway is closed to crossing. This could be needed to allow continued operations following a crash. It allows them to accept emergency landings more easily whilst maintaining emergency service to another active runway.
A citation, please? The only video that I know of is [1].
[2] is my best mock up of the only video I have. I'm am not an expert, but my best read of that is that the RWSL is maybe? green to the taxiway¹ traffic, so, to me, the actual status of the RWSL at the time of the incident is "unknown"; that seems like something I should wait for the NTSB report, or at least someone with expert knowledge on. But your claims doesn't jive with the evidence I have, so that's what makes me ask for a citation.
[1]: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jRl7Vr87ym8&t=29
[2]: https://imgur.com/a/RVL28AV
¹but I think there are a number of problems with my own interpretation: I could be wrong about which lights are which; I am using the near-side lights, not the lights on the side the truck is entering from, and assuming them to be symmetrical (though what little I can see of the far side does seem to align with the near side); some of the lights I think are RWSLs & not RGLs look downright yellow, but that could be a property of the low quality of the video; there's the rather large problem of the plane on the runway that must then be explained.
Sorry for the late reply, and sorry for linking to reddit, but it was the first place I could find the right video. I saw this video linked at least a dozen times in the hours following the incident. I believe the clip you linked to is from the same video, but with the beginning cut off.
At approximately 1.5 seconds in my link, you can see one set of lights perpendicular to the runway turn off. I admit the the lighting/colors are not as crisp as I would like, but the lights that turn off are positionally consistent with the Runway Entrance Lights and the time at which they turn off (approximately 2 seconds before the plane enters the intersection) is also consistent with the operation of the Runway Entrance Lights system.
Furthermore, if the system was not operational it should have been NOTAMed as such, and I can find no such NOTAM so my default position is that the system was operational.
The truck involved in the collision did not have one. https://bsky.app/profile/flightradar24.com/post/3mht7m2f3rc2...
Empowering workers to make safety-critical meta-decisions does not seem to be a feature of actually-existing capitalism.
Well, what you are describing is a strike, and it is currently illegal for ATC to strike, so in theory one possible structural change would be to make it legal for the workers to do what you're describing.
https://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/sms https://www.faa.gov/media/94731
Source? Because that isn't true; they can quit like any other civilian government job.
> ...and the gov't put the screws to them.
That part is true though.
This guy was doing at least 3 people's jobs even before the first emergency occurred.
Then it was an inevitable cascade failure situation. It was never his fault.
Management failed here. If its stupid but it works, its not stupid, is the old saying, but the reality I've seen is its still stupid but you got lucky. -Maxim 43
The luck finally ran out.
And who was managing here? Do we dare point the finger at Congress and the POTUS for creating the conditions necessary for this to happen?
I hope the final report does point the finger. As far as politicians are concerned, accountability is for suckers.
"2384, it is oder like a smoke odor ...like from fire?" - Control
"No, it was a weird odor. I don't know exactly how to describe it. But yeah... we can't get a hold of anyone at the ops for a gate assignment." - United pilot
"Ground, United 2384 is declaring an emergency. The flight attendants in the back are feeling ill because of the odor. We will need to go into an available gate at this time." - United pilot
"... the fire trucks are over there. They're going to bring a stair truck just in case you guys do want to evacuate. Let me know if you do." - Control
"Copy, yeah, we prefer to wait on a gate, but I mean, again, we only got so much time here because there's still a bit of odor in the back of the airplane." - United pilot
"646, number two, clear to land 4." - Control
"Truck one and company, cross four Delta." - Control
"Truck one and company, crossing four at Delta." - Truck 1
"Stop, stop, stop, stop, Truck 1. Stop,stop, stop. Stop, Truck 1, Stop." - Control
"That was - that wasn't good to watch." - Frontier pilot
"Yeah, I know. I was here. I tried to reach out to [inaudible]. We were dealing with an emergency earlier... um, I messed up." - Control
"No, man, you did the best you could." -Frontier pilot
Currently over 41% of facilities are reliant on mandatory overtime, with controllers frequently working 60-hour weeks with only four days off per month.
Counterpoint. It's Regen's fault. He's the guy who decided that a high priority of the government was making sure air traffic controllers had no power to fight back against being horrifically overworked (because unions are evil you see)
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/7311
originally passed as
https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?edition=2023&num=0&req=g...
So arguably if Reagan had not fired them he would be failing to uphold the laws of the United States.
Was in three different unions. Union didn't do squat for me. Mainly kept my wages down and gave the friends of the union rep the best shifts.
The bottom line is: don't break things that are difficult or impossible to fix.
1. outdated equipment
2. staffing levels
3. workload and fatigue
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1981_Professional_Air_Traffic_...
Union rules that say only a particular classification of employee is allowed to pick up a small package from a loading dock and move it twenty feet are also bad.
The blame can go to the top, for not managing correctly.
You can't just proclaim what incentives should be. We do have a mechanism for changing the incentives of management though: it's called unions.
You could spend a ton of time and money automating the process, and probably should especially in the future with the proliferation of drones.
But in the meantime there are simple solutions. Tunnels. No ground vehicles should be crossing runways when then could go under.
Also, ground vehicles typically need to be on the ground for a reason. Why seperate them?
I place no blame on the ATC as they were doing everything they could given the shit sandwich they were handed. I see this happening all over with staffs getting pared down to minimums, more (sometimes unpaid) over time, prices going up, and no raises.
Not many fatalities but nevertheless a spectacular collision. At a major hub airport in a major city. It’s hard to look away from, the cause is obvious, and all that without hundreds of deaths.
Imagine how good the next wake up call will be!
See also Preemptive Memorial Honors Future Victims Of Imminent Dam Disaster: https://theonion.com/preemptive-memorial-honors-future-victi...
In the future, you'll wear your cow collar, own nothing, and like it.
Being an air-traffic controller anywhere in the world is a very intense job at times, and needs a huge amount of proficiency that only a small number of people are capable of doing. Couple that with:
- the FAA expects you to move to where ATCs are needed, so many of the qualified applicants give up when they hear where the posting is. You can't force them to take the job!
- the technology is decades out of date and the Brand New Air Traffic Control System (it's seriously called that) won't roll out until 2028 at the earliest
- Obama's FAA disincentivised its traditional "feeder" colleges that do ATC courses to "promote diversity", net outcome was fewer applicants
- Regan broke the union in the 1980s
- DOGE indiscriminately decimated the FAA like it did most other government departments
It was much worse than that. Students who had already spent years studying to be air traffic controllers through the CTI program were subject to a sudden policy change that disqualified them from entering the profession unless they passed a “biographical questionnaire.”
85% of candidates failed this questionnaire, but the National Black Coalition of Federal Aviation Employees (the organization that pushed for this change to begin with) was feeding the “right” answers to its own members.
“Right” answers included things like having gotten bad grades in high school science class. You can take the test for yourself here and see how you score: https://kaisoapbox.com/projects/faa_biographical_assessment/
I can’t blame anyone for thinking this sounds too outrageous to be real, but all of it is public record at this point and the subject of an ongoing lawsuit: https://www.tracingwoodgrains.com/p/the-full-story-of-the-fa...
Unless I'm missing something, this couldn't have been designed by a human being with normal goals in mind. This feels like a test that was created to act as a locked door that you could only pass by knowing the exact password, the sequence of lies you had to produce. That anyone's career was at the mercy of THIS is deranged. What the hell is going on in the US?
Expecting a single person to consistently keep their mental picture clear and perfect for their entire career is asinine and irresponsible.
We need systems and tools to eliminate such errors and support people, not use them as a person to blame when things inevitably go wrong.
Not saying this is the right number of controllers to have, just sharing what I read in NYT.
Actually, you might be able to try this. Live ATC and radar is available.
The PATCO Strike of 1981 was a union-organized work stoppage by air traffic controllers (ATCs) in the United States. The Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) declared a strike on August 3, 1981, after years of tension between controllers and the federal government over long hours, chronic understaffing, outdated equipment, and rising workplace stress. Despite 13,000 ATCs striking, the strike ultimately failed, as the Reagan administration was able to replace the striking ATCs, resulting in PATCO's decertification.
The failure of the PATCO strike impacted the American labor movement, accelerating the decline in labor unions in the country, and initiating a much more aggressive anti-union policy by the federal government and private sector employers.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1981_Professional_Air_Traffic_...
> But he [Sean Duffy] denied rumors that the tower had only one controller on duty.
The workloads are too high. Nobody running life-critical operations should be working 60+ hour weeks and overnight shifts. We've known for decades how these practices increase errors. One effective answer is to dilute the workload by hiring more people. But this slows the race to lower costs, so it isn't done. We need to spend more on people.
Were they not operating correctly, or did the driver ignore them is one of the questions the investigation will answer.
The system is called Runway Status Lights. And in case there is a disagreement between the ATC clearance and the lights the drivers are supposed to not enter the runway.
> When activated, these red lights indicate that ... there is an aircraft on final approach within the activation area
This pdf talks more about how it is implemented: https://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/default/files/WEB_Final_RWSL.p...
“RWSL is driven by fused multi-sensor surveillance system information. Using Airport Surface Detection Equipment-Model X (ASDE-X), external surveillance information is taken from three sources that provide position and other information for aircraft and vehicles on or near the airport surface. RWSL safety logic processes the surveillance information and commands the field lighting system to turn the runway status lights on and off in accordance with the motion of the detected traffic.”
> LGA Tower initiated a takeoff clearance for an aircraft waiting on 13 when we were only 300 feet high on final for 22. The voice accepting the takeoff clearance, most likely the First Officer, did not seem concerned, but the departing aircraft seemed to hesitate moving for a couple seconds. I believe this was because the Captain of that flight was likely the pilot flying, and was in a position to see how close we were to landing. I think he or she thought twice before starting their takeoff roll. Due to the thick smoky haze from the Canadian wildfires and a possible helicopter in the area, I judged it safer to continue the approach and land around 10 seconds after the departing aircraft crossed our path, instead of suddenly going around and trusting that the helicopter was not near the departure end of 22. The guidance in ATC’s 7110.65 does not seem to give guidance on exactly how close aircraft in this situation can get. Based on today’s and close calls I have seen over the years for Runway 27R/35 at PHL and 22L/29 at EWR, it seems to be a judgement call by the Local Controller. Another concern is that the portion of the runway status light system visible to aircraft departing 13 appears to have been disabled. In the past, this system provided an additional layer of safety to prevent runway incursions. Now, I never see it light up anymore when I am waiting in position on 13 while a plane lands on 22. The pace of operations is building in LGA. The controllers are pushing the line. On thunderstorm days, LGA is starting to feel like DCA did before the accident there. Please do something. At least turn the RWSL for 13 back on.
I think it's misleading to act like this was some kind of whistleblower.
I'm just tired of bullshit rhetoric. 33 is less than 37, that's "understaffed" not "very well staffed". Fuck Sean and our "leaders"... they speak with unauthority and spiritlessness.
When did this lunacy become an arguable position?
We have TCAS/ACAS in air, but no similar automatic safety guards near/on the field?
Imagine that you're landing at one of two parallel runways. There's a plane lining up on the other runway. You can't have proximity warnings like TCAS, because this is a safe situation even though you get close to the other plane. What if that plane is taxiing towards your runway? You can't predict its movements until it starts entering the runway because it may just stop at the hold short line, as it should. Extrapolate this simple scenario to anything that could ever happen at airports with a large variety of actors, and you'll start to see why everyone in the world is still relying on humans to do this.
Aeronautics, yes, but I was still surprised to see NASA and not the FAA here. But folllowing up here https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/overview/immunity.html
> The FAA determined that ASRP effectiveness would be greatly enhanced if NASA, rather than the FAA, accomplished the receipt, processing, and analysis of raw data. This would ensure the anonymity of the reporter and of all parties involved in a reported occurrence or incident and, consequently, increase the flow of information necessary for the effective evaluation of the safety and efficiency of the NAS.
Very neat. It's by design. Well done.
Looking at airport security, it's impossible not to ascribe waste, fraud and abuse if indeed there is a lack of ATC hires causing this. We can go without a greeter at the beginning of the security line, or a pre-screener of boarding passes halfway through the security line and have an extra ATC on duty. If you can't find the extra $ for that you're either blind or we need to charge each passenger $1 more.
The truth is, this sort of situational control shouldn't really be given to a human.
This is exactly the kind of thing a computer should be handling, in the same way we don't have a traffic guard at every intersection. Yes I understand airports are complex. So you have a computer and a human, and they work together.
how do you think it works today? some guy with binoculars?
The vehicle that crashed into the plane did not have one and thus no automated alert was triggered.
The US is just in an active state of collapse in many areas, including air travel.
Is it definitely safe to cross the runway in a vehicle moving a normal speed up to the moment before the lights turn red? Is it safe for a little bit afterward? Or is it unsafe even a little before the lights turn red?
I wonder if it'd even be reliable to see such a plane coming fast enough.
Now multiply that by the dozens of planes in your vicinity, and by the 100ish big US airports.
That isn't even beyond the top speed of a car, which non-trained humans are very well capable of tracking by sight - to talk of airport workers that are specifically trained to look for air traffic. It really is not that hard to tell that an aircraft is on short final if you are actually looking at it.
With four miles of visibility in light rain at night, the aircraft should have been perfectly visible (in a vacuum); what remains to be determined is why the ARFF crew did not see it. The answer to that could range from "they didn't look at all" to "the orientation of the runway relative to the surrounding neighbourhoods meant that the CRJ's lights got lost in the city lights".
> Nasa reports show repeated warnings of close calls before crash...
So was there an increase in repeated warnings before crash, or was there just the normal amount of warnings over a long period of time? If you go to that database they are referencing (using that web1.0 interface), there are a lot of reports, even ones marked 'critical'.
Yes we know. There was an other airplane who declared an emergency and was about to evacuate the passengers on the tarmac. The other plane in question had two aborted takeoffs, and then they smelled some “odour” in the aft of the plane which made some of the crew feel ill.