> real world compromises of major sites that don't use DNSSEC?
Without any other changes to this infrastructure DNSSEC by itself wouldn't have prevented this, but it could have been combined with something else like a CAA record.
And yet I see zero. Is it possible that given other mitigations (like multi-perspective validation) and given other attack vectors (like account takeover), this isn't actually a problem?
When you make arguments like this, or the weird SSH argument you're making across the thread, or the weird "this would be good for Wikileaks" thing you did elsewhere, you clarify how tenuous your argument is. Remember, you're in the position of arguing that 95%+ of large site operators are wrong about this, and have been for decades, and you're the one who's right. That can definitely happen! But it's an extraordinary claim and your evidence thus far is pretty terrible.