The core problem this article surfaces is forensic: once the agent session ends, the evidence is whatever the vendor chose to log. Terminal scrollback is lossy, session logs are vendor-controlled, and "undo" only works if you catch it in time.

Certificate Transparency (RFC 6962) solved a structurally identical problem for TLS certificates after the DigiNotar incident. The insight: commit every action to an append-only Merkle tree where any third party can verify inclusion proofs — without trusting the log operator.

Applied to agents: - Inclusion proof: "this specific action was recorded at position N, and the log hasn't been rewritten" - Consistency proof: "between checkpoint A and B, the log only grew — nothing was removed or altered"

This gives you verification-based accountability, not trust-based logging. The difference matters: a signed receipt proves the signer said something happened. A Merkle inclusion proof proves it's part of a complete, append-only sequence — deletions are structurally detectable.

The AI agent ecosystem is having its DigiNotar moment weekly. We have the cryptographic tools to fix it. The question is whether we'll wait for a catastrophic incident to force adoption, like we did with CT.