There is no such thing in practice.
Anything with zero knowledge is never going to be considered robust enough by a government. Zero knowledge protocols really have no functional revocation mechanism.
Anything with zero knowledge is never going to be considered robust enough by a government. Zero knowledge protocols really have no functional revocation mechanism.
What was that about no government would consider zero knowledge to be robust enough?
So yeah, I'll gladly trust and cheer on the part working in the right direction.
https://github.com/eu-digital-identity-wallet/av-doc-technic...
It says that it wants to be zero knowledge, but it has no zero knowledge implementation and no plan of how it even possibly could be zero knowledge, and it never will precisely because that is incompatible with the revocation requirements set down by the EU.
> Zero knowledge protocols really have no functional revocation mechanism.
None would be needed, you (sadly) only age in one direction, so valid proof would never become invalid proof.
Somebody can give their proof of age to another person.
In any case, it's a moot point: the correct amount of required identification is zero.
And that is precisely why governments will never implement a privacy-preserving mechanism, which is exactly my point.
Compromised tokens would be trivially google-able within a day otherwise.