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I think those all have reasonable counterarguments:

(1) This sounds brittle. Are you really going to have a good mental model about what's secret when using ssh and reliably refrain from typing those things? Seems to kinda defeat the idea of securing the channel. Also, as a collection your activities might be more confidential to you than single inputs, or correlated with your other activities outside ssh, etc - it's hard to keep a mental model of this as well. Aka optimism is not a form of security.

(2) There isn't a reason to think this is a difficult attack that only a powerful adversary could mount. Seems like a college lab level thing to me. And very amenable to AI help as well. Also here optimism is not a form of security. It's a 25 year old attack[1] so there's a lot of existing research[2] around.

(3) Saving 100x bandwidth on single keystrokes on an internet dominated by video traffic just because it's 100x doesn't make sense. Also it's good to cultivate a mindset that steers away from trading off security in favour of trivial resource savings.

[1] https://www.usenix.org/conference/10th-usenix-security-sympo... (probably older stuff exists outside open literature)

[2] eg https://crzphil.github.io/posts/ssh-obfuscation-bypass/

Bandwidth is not the problem when you are using mobile connections (4G, weaker 5G). Videos work just fine, but ssh can be painful already without keystroke obfuscation. The problem is latency. Especially when roaming abroad it can 100s of ms.

Not sure whether the obfuscation is fully synchronous, i.e waiting for the server response before continuing. That would really kill it. Working with LTS distros I don't think I have seen it in practice yet. Need to try something modern on my next trip abroad.

> Not sure whether the obfuscation is fully synchronous, i.e waiting for the server response before continuing.

The people who designed SSH aren't idiots, and also, you can answer this question by simple observation: When you connect to a server with ~200ms ping, which is somewhat common in the scenarios you describe and which I've done many times, it does not take 20 seconds to show a keystroke.

There's no way to know in advance if some leaked cleartext will provide enough information to an attacker to be useful. Attackers profit from making creative use of information they didn't have before.

That said, plenty of people disable the most useful security features of SSH, like verifying host key signatures, with no ill-effects (as far as they know). For the majority of users, using Telnet and unencrypted HTTP would make no difference, as nobody's trying to hack them, and who really cares about privacy anyway?

Did you know SSH has long-standing performance limitations due to its design that need patches to eliminate? It was never intended to be a high-performance tool. If you want really high performance, use Telnet. If you want real security, use SSH with all strong security options enabled plus a server using ContainerSSH with the OAuth2 plugin (SSH's keys are static, which can be captured and reused, which is bad). If you don't care either way, use SSH with the defaults.

> I'm pretty much never typing secrets into an SSH tunnel; these days if there's a secret I need to transmit over SSH I'm going to be copying and pasting it, which will not reveal info from keyboard timing

One common secret that goes through a tty ssh connection is a sudo password. You are probably typing sudo command so without obfuscation the attacker can find out the sudo keystrokes, the command keystrokes and then the encrypted bytes of the password. They don't have the timing data to decode them as easily as the previous parts but if they record enough traffic they might be able to decrypt the password. But maybe they won't, because the ssh session key is probably different each time. Furthermore I don't know how many times they should capture your encrypted password to be able to decrypt it. Maybe it's unfeasible.

Anyway, in case of the sudo password, if the attacker gets it what would happen? The attacker is hopefully not able to get a shell into the server. If they do they have different ways to get root privileges.

By the way, I also copy and paste secrets from either the password manager or the clipboard, because nobody remembers long random strings. The only exceptions are the passwords of a few accounts.

sudo passwords are one of the things I'm copying and pasting from the password manager, because my shell account password is different on every system. But yes, if you type your sudo password without thinking about it, the timing attack might be feasible. (Though if you're laboriously copying a random password from a different screen, as I've had to do once or twice in situations where copy-and-paste was infeasible, the timing data will be useless as it's about 500 ms between keystrokes no matter what the previous keystroke is. Which is an interesting way to accidentally defeat this attack.)