In a "might makes right" world, Europe clearly needs more might, and then it makes sense to improve relations with China; not a lot of options.
[0] - https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3316875/ch...
[1] - https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-russia-discuss-ukr...
[2] - https://fddi.fudan.edu.cn/_t2515/57/f8/c21257a743416/page.ht...
At the end of the day China cares more about Europe than Russia. Because that's where the real money is.
The EU signing an FTA with India on Jan 27th is also a negative sign for China-EU relations.
“Real money” aka resources are very obviously in Russia, not Europe.
As long as (eg.) France continues to support Dassault, Safran, and Thales - all of whom continue to support Indian [0][1] and Vietnamese [2][3] military modernization against Chinese aggression, CN-EU ties will never recover [4].
And that's just the tip of the iceberg depending on EU member state. Germany [5][6], Netherlands [6][7], and other individual EU states have similarly crossed Chinese redlines over the past year.
The DGSI is also actively prosecuting French nationals with ties to PLA adjacent institutions (public, private, and SoEs) for potential espionage risks [8]. Selon vos relations, vous pourriez également figurer sur cette liste, surtout après ce qui s'est passé en Nouvelle-Calédonie [9].
[0] - https://www.capital.fr/entreprises-marches/rafale-dassault-a...
[1] - https://www.lesechos.fr/industrie-services/air-defense/bombe...
[2] - https://www.intelligenceonline.fr/europe-russie/2023/06/27/a...
[3] - https://www.intelligenceonline.fr/asie-pacifique/2025/12/15/...
[4] - http://www.iis.whu.edu.cn/index.php?id=2986
[5] - https://taz.de/U-Boot-Deal-geplant/!6144706/
[6] - https://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article247750774/Ruestung-Tai...
[7] - https://www.nu.nl/economie/6372336/china-is-boos-op-nederlan...
[8] - https://www.intelligenceonline.fr/asie-pacifique/2026/01/14/...
[9] - https://www.intelligenceonline.fr/asie-pacifique/2025/02/26/...
China needs to keep close ties with Russia due to national security interests in Central Asia and North Korea. Additionally, Russia maintains its autonomy by retaining military and economic ties with India and military deployments and listening bases in Vietnam and North Korea, which adds pressure on China to have to collaborate with Russia.
> ...counterweight to the US...
Chinese foreign policy is almost entirely viewed through the lens of the US-China rivalry. Europeans underestimate this to their peril. And to China, an unaligned Europe is still not pro-China enough.
> Beijing did not want to see a Russian loss in Ukraine because it feared the United States would then shift its whole focus to Beijing
How does this statement make sense though? I don't see the A -> B. The US pretty clearly does not want to see a Russian loss either, and seems more fine with Ukraine losing.
It should depends on how much the US wants Europe?
If the US does not want more of Europe, and Russia wins, the US could let Russia take over Europe -> focus shifts to China.
If the US wants more of Europe, and Russia wins -> focus would be off China.
If the US does not want more of Europe, and Russia loses -> it's mostly whatever, but perhaps focus shifts to China.
If the US wants more of Europe, and Russia loses -> focus would be off China.
Perhaps I'm just really daft.
Despite Trump, the US (and rivals of China like South Korea and Japan) have continued to supply the Ukrainian armed forces and their allies like Poland and Romania.
A protracted Russia-Ukraine War with the balance of power in favor of Russia means the US, SK, and JP remain bogged supplying Ukraine and it's allies like Poland and Romania, instead of diverting stock to the Asian front.
Additionally, China and Russia are increasingly collaborating to respond against Japan should a conflict occur [0] and North Korea is already an active participant in the Russia-Ukraine War.
> It should depends on how much the US wants Europe?
The issue is both the US and China view the EU as a regional power that can be pushed around - not as an entity that can retain strategic autonomy.
This is the crux of the EU's current diplomatic malaise - neither the US nor China view the EU as an equal, but rather, as a junior partner.
> Perhaps I'm just really daft
I won't say daft, but the issue is Europeans view themselves as deserving of being on the same table as the Americans and Chinese. Neither the Americans or Chinese see it that way now.
In order for the EU to build strategic autonomy, some very painful steps need to be taken which simply aren't being taken (as Draghi pessimistically pointed out a couple months ago) [1].
Additionally, periphery regions of the EU have increasingly started operating independently of the rest of the EU - as with China's CSPs with Spain [2] and Hungary [3]; Israel+India's defense alliances with Greece [4] and Cyprus [5] against Turkiye; and Poland coming out against committing resources to defend Greenland [6] - so a unified EU response is steadily degrading as members decide to take defense matters into their own hands.
Basically, if a naval standoff between Greece and Turkiye was to arise in the next 6 months in the Aegean Sea, would the rest of the EU sanction Turkiye (and thus lose a major defense partner in Ukraine [7][8][9] and the Baltics [10]) or ignore Turkiye (and thus destroy the EU and NATO defense commitment).
[0] - https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-russia-discuss-ukr...
[1] - https://www.france24.com/en/tv-shows/business/20250916-mario...
[2] - http://en.cppcc.gov.cn/2025-11/13/c_1140641.htm
[3] - https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202405/10/content_WS663d3b83...
[4] - https://geetha.mil.gr/kyklos-synomilion-staff-talks-kai-ypog...
[5] - https://www.bankingnews.gr/amyna-diplomatia/articles/851003/...
[6] - https://www.reuters.com/world/poland-will-not-send-soldiers-...
[7] - https://ukrainesarmsmonitor.substack.com/p/ukraine-turkiye-s...
[8] - https://www.cats-network.eu/publication/ukraine-turkey-strat...
[9] - https://www.rnbo.gov.ua/en/Diialnist/3345.html
[10] - https://www.turkishminute.com/2026/01/13/nato-asks-turkey-to...
Military supplies have not slowed, that's true, the major difference since Biden is that European nations are now paying for it, but diplomacy and sanctions-wise, interest is waning for every month, it seems. Trump is even derailing the Davos summit. That was supposed to be primarily about Ukraine, but now it's about Greenland.
> A protracted Russia-Ukraine War with the balance of power in favor of Russia means the US, SK, and JP remain bogged supplying Ukraine and it's allies like Poland and Romania, instead of diverting stock to the Asian front.
I'll confess I didn't consider ROK and JP. That's a fair point. Poland and Romania are supply hubs, so I would've worded that "via Poland and Romania" and not made it seem like they are supplied for their own benefit.
> The issue is both the US and China view the EU as a regional power that can be pushed around - not as an entity that can retain strategic autonomy. > [...] neither the US nor China view the EU as an equal, but rather, as a junior partner.
There's no disagreement from me there, and I don't think I claimed that. Europe trying to improve relations with China would be with cap in hand.
> [...] the issue is Europeans view themselves as deserving of being on the same table as the Americans and Chinese. Neither the Americans or Chinese see it that way now.
Certainly many (not all) Europeans have been arrogant and babied with blinders on, and pretended not to have been glorified vassal states to the US via Pax Americana. I think that view is quickly changing. What irks me the most is that I still hear people talk about kicking out the US from NATO, not understanding that without the US, there is no NATO.
The Intel Chiefs meeting about Ukraine is still happening [0]
> so I would've worded that "via Poland and Romania" and not made it seem like they are supplied for their own benefit.
Poland [1][2][3] and Romania [4] are also choosing to buy Korean weaponry instead of European.
> Europe trying to improve relations with China would be with cap in hand
It's difficult because the EU can't go cap in hand to China as long as
1. Anti-China leaders like Babis (CZ) remain in power,
2. Deals with Chinese rivals such as the FTA with India (Jan 27th), French modernization of the Vietnamese Armed Forces, the GCAP project with Japan, and Eastern European defense procurement from SK and Japan continue,
3. the EU remains committed to the "rules-based order" (ie. the existing status quo including de facto sovereignty for Taiwan),
4. EU member states continue to have American boots on the ground in the Baltics, Romania, Poland, Germany, and Turkiye
5. The EU does not sign a comprehensive FTA with China
China will always view the EU as not aligned with China. Both China and the US have adopted a "either you are with us or against us" foreign policy.
> What irks me the most is that I still hear people talk about kicking out the US from NATO, not understanding that without the US, there is no NATO.
It's a conundrum.
I think the only way an American NATO commitment will remain is if all NATO countries publicly commit to providing a security umbrella in East Asia.
Similarly, the EU will always be viewed as a rival of China's as long as 1-5 are not resolved in China's favor.
The EU can potentially build it's own space in a multi-polar world, but it will require making some very politically unpopular decisions around rearmament at the expense of social services; aligning with other regional powers such as Israel, India, UAE, KSA, Vietnam, Japan, SK, Brazil, Argentina, etc despite domestic political backlash; and having to back down to the US or China depending on the issue.
[0] - https://www.intelligenceonline.com/europe-russia/2026/01/19/...
[1] - https://www.chosun.com/english/industry-en/2025/06/11/REUTAK...
[2] - https://www.chosun.com/english/industry-en/2024/08/19/GY7PG4...
[3] - https://www.chosun.com/english/national-en/2022/12/08/6DXIBF...
[4] - https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/southkorea/defense/20240710/kor...
Not true. US is not giving any material support. Only intel.
Yes, in some ways. Europe is a LOT less important than it used to be a few decades ago. A much smaller proportion of the world's economy, population, or military power.
It's hard to see any country wanting to get into conventional war with China, regardless of size of army and airforce - even the US is not going to do it unless actually attacked. At the end of the day if China seizes Taiwan (something Trump has made more likely by his seizing of Venezuala, now talking about Greenland, Cuba ..), then the US will just complain, create trade sanctions and/or tarrifs etc.
Except for France's ASMP-A nuclear warning shot (which is not a tactical option by the way), all other independent European nuclear options (French or British SSBNs) are not only strategic, but they imply wiping entire countries off the map. All options also depend on whether the French President or the British Prime Minister decides that this course of action is warranted.
If Trump indeed invades Greenland, shoving a French-made nuclear fireball in front of an American carrier battle group off the coast of Greenland would probably not be our first option. Besides the massive political cost of breaking the nuclear taboo, if kinetic actions are deemed necessary, deterrent also comes in conventional varieties.
Also, while the British nuclear deterrent might be operationally independent, it relies on American-supplied Trident missiles.
Also, our nuclear doctrine says that it's a nuclear warning shot, meaning that the next step on the ladder is French-delivered Armageddon by SSBNs. We're not supposed to keep lobbing them in case of a persistent problem.
China now leads the world on R&D and hard science, and is already making strides in chip design and chip making. How far off do you think a Chinese ASML is? Two decades at most? Or more like one?
And what would be the solution? I think we've all learned that protectionism doesn't work.
Automation Engineering, Materials Engineering, Biopharmaceuticals, Automotive Engineering (already mentioned), and Genomics.
China has made tremendous gains, but that should not undermine the fact that the fundamentals still exist within the EU, but Europeans on the Internet seem to vaccilate between chest-thumping Euro-nationalism (which is dead in the water and easily disprovable) or defeatism (which doesn't make sense and is also easily disprovable).
> How far off do you think a Chinese ASML is
1. ASML's EUV/DUV IP is owned and airgapped from the rest of ASML by the US DoE's JV with ASML called Cymer
2. Around 5-7 years, which is a loss from a Chinese NatSec standpoint and shows the Sullivan doctrine is still intact (keep China 1-2 generations behind the collective west in semiconductor fabrication capabilities).
> And what would be the solution? I think we've all learned that protectionism doesn't work.
The EU never actually tried protectionism or industrial policy. When most other countries and trade blocs were flouting the WTO, the EU kept trying to prop it up in order to negotiate with the US.