Rethinking "Christian ethics" in terms of Aristotelian ethics

And if you can adequately frame radical Christian ethics this way, doesn't it suggest that the ethics themselves are not Christian but human, and aside from the particular cultural and mythopoeic trappings of radical christianity, not even really fundamentally different? If so, different from what, and to what value?

Let me use as an example the dilemma stated in the article, and the conclusion reached using the "radical Christian" metric:

This leads us to our second option: redefining which spectrum of vices and virtues we use. Let’s imagine the classic thought experiment against pacifism: Someone is attacking your grandmother; do you fight the attacker or do nothing? By the standard metric above, only a coward would not fight. The courageous man—the virtuous and ethical man—would clearly fight.

But I make decisions based on a different metric. On the one hand, I weigh my responsibility to the victim, and on the other hand I weigh my responsibility to the perpetrator. The virtuous person under this schema is the one who is able to treat both of them with perfect love; the vices are excessively favoring one side at the expense of the other. That is, the virtuous man intervenes but in a nonviolent way to stop the attack.

Surely the thesis can't be that only a 'radical Christian' would be able to adopt this point of view? The final paragraph says "radical Christians tend to adopt this perspective" but where is the evidence that non-radical Christians of a pacifist nature tend not to? The provided charts don't really cut it.