Amateur radio transmissions are public, unencrypted, and attributable. Callsigns are required, modes and frequencies are well known, and transmissions are trivially direction-findable. In a country like Iran, where RF spectrum is actively monitored and unauthorized communications are treated as a security issue, transmitting on amateur bands is effectively broadcasting your location and intent. Direction finding is routine, fast, and does not require exotic equipment. One transmission can be enough.

In the US and most other countries, amateur radio is tightly regulated. Encryption to obscure content is explicitly prohibited. Ignoring this can result in fines, seizure of equipment, and loss of license. Foreign operators encouraging or participating in such use are not insulated from consequences simply because the target country is authoritarian.

I did not claim to have a better solution. That's the point. When the threat model includes surveillance, attribution, and enforcement, there may be no safe civilian workaround. Suggesting amateur radio in this context is not “imperfect but helpful”, it reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of what amateur radio actually is and how it is regulated.

Amateur radio can't provide privacy, safety, or reliable information flow under an active crackdown. Pretending otherwise is irresponsible.

So they can do what with it? The people who can action it already have intensive satellite imagery of the area and domestic intelligence assets. The level of risk to reward for a citizen to do this is fairly low.