This has always struck me as a matter of checkbox compliance rather than a commonly-exploited attack vector, though I'll grant that's partially because few people actually use such devices.
This has always struck me as a matter of checkbox compliance rather than a commonly-exploited attack vector, though I'll grant that's partially because few people actually use such devices.
This is pretty clearly a case of "oh there's an option here that says 'allow on rooted phones', do we want to allow that?" "No that sounds scary and risky! Of course not. We must not allow it."
The option is there, and nobody is going to try to sell not ticking it.
The big fraud vector is running emulators in datacenters or skipping running the app entirely and talking directly to endpoints. Requiring that an entity making a request is from a real phone and is from (approximately) your app adds friction and is effective at reducing fraud.
A significant amount of fraud comes from scammers convincing victims to installed malicious apps. They fake being a customer service provider.
Banks don't want their customer's to lose their money and they don't have the tools to protect them from themselves. For all the privacy reasons, app stores don't even banks enough tools to identify and block this fraud.
Drivers buy modified versions of our mobile app, because they think it will give them advantages over other drivers. These apps are side-loaded (not published in the app store).
I wasn't asking about sideloading apps though. I was asking about modified operating systems like LineageOS and GrapheneOS, or root via OS modifications like Magisk and KernelSU.