The fact that Intel and AMD both went with ECB leaves me with mild disbelief. I realize wrangling IVs in that scenario is difficult but that's hardly an excuse to release a product that they knew full well was fundamentally broken. The insecurity of ECB for this sort of task has been common knowledge for at least 2 decades.
You need a sequence number to solve this, but they have no place where to store it.
It's the same issue that XTS faces but that operates under the fairly modest assumption that an adversary won't have long term continuous block level access to the running system. Whereas in this case interdicting the bus is one of the primary attack vectors so failing to defend against that seems inexcusable.
Remember that everything in security (and computation) is a tradeoff. The MEE turned out to be a performance bottleneck, and support got dropped.
There are legitimate choices to be made here between threat models, and the resulting implications on the designs.
There's not much new under the sun when it comes to security/cryptography/whatever (tm), and I recommend approaching the choices designers make with an open mind.
I can see where it prevents inadvertent data leaks but the feature was billed as protecting against motivated adversaries. (Or at least so I thought.)