Symbian, a post-mortem
docs.google.com
docs.google.com
I developed 3 apps on J2ME at that time and investigated Symbian. The impression I got of Symbian of that time was that it was painful to develop against. J2ME was less painful but very, very limited. Think no animation support, just bitmaps, and I have to write my own game run loop, collision detection, etc.... This was most probably due to the limited hardware of the time but nonetheless, it was primitive.
In comparison, iOS and to a lesser extent Android are basically fully featured OSs with mostly full exposed functionality. iOS gives you core graphics, opengl es, core text, core animation, grand central dispatch, networking, etc... Android gives you views, animation, background tasks, activities, intents, etc...
The distribution model was also broken. If you wanted something distributed, you had to basically go with a carrier. There were attempts at an app store but there were not successful.
Contrast this with the App Store, Google Play, and iOS enterprise development program where you don't have to go begging to a carrier to get your app distributed.
To summarize, Symbian was coming from a previous era and had no chance. If you compare RIM's situation to Nokia's, I bet you will see a similar chart.
It's a natural approach when you have devices with different screen resolutions and sizes. Pixel-based layout works well when all devices have the same screen size, but break horribly when they don't. BTW, I'm curious on how the iPhone 5 runs iOS 4 apps.
True background multitasking on a phone in 2006 was really fun, though.
It was awesome! Great camera-recording, WiFi, 3.5mm audio plug, good looking, slim. Maybe not a competitor to the iPhone 3g but I felt it was on par with Android devices at the time, and available at only ~260€ without contract.
This feeling lasted for 5 minutes, then it crashed. And it crashed again. And again. 20-30 times that night as I tried different features, before I just gave up. I started to regret my purchase.
It got better over the following year with updates but it never fully stopped to crash. Often it would crash while playing music, which really sucks for a phone sold to me as THE music smartphone. By June 2010 I had switched to a HTC Desire (which I'm still happy with, now with a custom ROM).
It is interesting to read in this post-mortem that 'Testability' was really hard on Symbian, and that problems or bad choices on how e.g. email polling should work, that must have been caught by engineering, somehow slipped through the cracks into the hands of customers.
If testability had been easy and quality the highest prio at Nokia, then the 5630 could have been the phone I still use, and I would have recommended it to friends back then instead of saying 'Stay clear!'. I might even have considered buying another Nokia phone. Things could have been different.
inertia. plain and simple. not market inertia - although that plays a part - but internal inertia. and nokia had around a decade of inertia, some of it is technical debt that gets harder to pay off, some of it comes from big customers and partners you acquired. but underestimate the weight of that at your peril.
every business has stakeholders, internal and external. when you recognize a significant shift must be made, these stakeholders still have to be satisfied. you have teams of people - customers, partners, business units - invested in the way things are. to make changes to your core technology and violate the expectations of those stakeholders is insanely difficult to pull off. RIM is going through this, as well. one cannot simply "just adopt android (or windows mobile)" and be done with it. you have to see contracts and expectations (e.g. core applications and solutions) through with those stakeholders.
clayton christensen did a great job of elaborating on this in "the innovator's dilemma", everyone should study it. this is a ruthless market with fickle customers - developers, end users (witness the crash of motorolla in about one year!), everyone you need to win over - and an insanely fast cycle, much faster than your platform and hardware development cycle. today's darlings will be tomorrow's road kill, they always are in this business.
I was in total shock when they killed it. I think most people would be too if they just saw someone (in this case Nokia) commit suicide right in front of them.
"Wow, this file is really popular! Some tools might be unavailable until the crowd clears. [Try again] [Dismiss]"
This strikes me as a strange choice by the Google Docs team; rather than fixing the problem, they just tell you it exists. I mean, this is Google; don't they have lots of bandwidth and server capacity? Why can't they handle traffic spikes? Can anyone here shed some light on this?
Google Docs, like most of their applications, is built on a highly available, globally-distributed database. (There's evidence that it was using Megastore as of a couple years ago, and I wouldn't be surprised if it's now been migrated to Spanner.) That lets them scale to effectively infinite numbers of users, but it doesn't solve the problem of handling thousands of concurrent readers and writers all contending for the same individual rows in a multi-TB table, from multiple datacenters around the world.
The reasonable case for multi-person editing of a document is several people at the max editing the document concurrently.
Having thousands of people doing that is not a real-life scenario.
It's better to protect yourself from extremes like that by disabling editing functionality in that case than try to engineer a system that actually allows thousands of people editing a document concurrently (because it would be very expensive in engineering time and especially testing time).
There's literally no business case to be made for supporting thousands of concurrent edits - no one actually needs that functionality.
> The reasonable case for multi-person editing of a document is several people at the max editing the document concurrently.
On the other hand, I suppose it would be good UI design to not show that warning to everybody who only have read-only access to the document,
Quite a sad story, IMO, but unfortunately one they seem doomed to repeat with Elop "running" things. On the verge of what could have been the first GNU/Linux smartphone (N9) to take real market share, he killed both Moblin and Meego. It's amazing they still released the N9 and yet still switched to Windows.
Elop absolutely deserves a place next to ex-Sun's ex-CEO Schwartz as two of the worst CEO's tech or not in history.
tl;dr: Nokia is dying itself, slowly being killed by Elop. In two years or less, we'll probably get Nokia's postmortem, and it'll be a sad story for all.