But going by the strict notion of DSM-V criteria of providing a hindrance, we hit the somewhat problematic definition whereby a person can have autism at one point in their life (when it hinders them in a context), moves into another point or context in their life (where it does not) and therefore they do not or would not meet the criteria for having autism if they sought a diagnosis at that point in time, and then move back into another point or context in their life where it hinders them and so now they meet the criteria and presumably have autism again.

Now, needless to say, this is not how anyone actually thinks about psychiatric or psychological issues in practice, especially with conditions such as autism, and just highlights the relative absurdity of some of the diagnostic metrics, practices and definitions.

What we tend to do is tie the diagnosis of autism to the individual identity and assume that it is a consistent category and applicative diagnosis that stays with a person over time because it is biological. We know, of course, that this is despite not having any working biological test for it, and diagnosing it via environmental and behavioural contexts. And don't even get me started on tying in diagnosis of aspergers/autistic individuals with broadly differing abilities and performance metrics on a range of metrics under the one condition such that the non-verbals and low-functioning side of neurotypicals get lumped in with the high iq and hyper-verbal high-functioning aspergers as having the same related condition even though neurotypicals are closer to the non-verbals and low-iqs on the same metrics and scores.

The entire field and classification system, along with the popular way of thinking about the condition is, if i might editorialise, an absolute mess.