And I'm just an individual. What about when I send to an email list and it goes to 100 people? Should Google Groups pay a dollar to send out those 100 emails? What about MailChimp, do they have pay $200 when they send out a newsletter to 20,000 people?
I'm also concerned about how this money will be collected and how, from a technical perspective, all emails will be monitored. Every SMTP server will now have to be registered with the central oversight organization? VPNs and rogue email installations will be the enemy or blocked from communicating with anyone "on the grid"?
Or the post office for that matter. There's actually one single organization that all those stamped envelopes get sent through, it's not decentralized.
The point is that abusive email -- brain-dead bulk spam, and even annoying recruiter pitches and "real" business adverts -- are sent in far higher volume than even the all but the very largest of mailing lists. The standard figure bandied about for most of the past decade is that some high-90% of all email is spam. Let's say 97% (as Microsoft reports: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/7988579.stm).
Spammers are generating returns based on a small fraction of a percent response rate on an overwhelming volume of mail, which is close to free. Sender costs are estimated at $0.00001 (http://www.clickz.com/clickz/column/2138759/make-spammers-pa...). That's 1/1000th of a peny per mail, or a cent per mil (thousand mails).
I suspect that raising that cost by even just a few cents per mil would be sufficient to put the brakes on most spam. For personal email, that would literally be a few pennies a year for even a high-volume correspondent. Protocols for mailing lists and other legitimate noncommercial use would probably rely on offsetting costs to users.
In reality, proposals such as hash-cash, greymilter, targrubing, and the like extract computational work from an untrusted SMTP sender as a requirement for accepting mail. It's a pretty effective way to put the brakes on high-volume delivery. Computational power is a pretty reasonable proxy for coin of the realm.
And if that's not enough ... there's plenty that's going on now with DKIM and other header validation that would serve to identify a sender. Extend that such that you don't accept non-signed mail (except at a very, very, very slow rate) and that you can associate a designated signer with a verified escrow account, and you've got much of the nuts and bolts of putting a system into place. Not that I see this as entirely desirable, but we may have to go there.
In network terms, it's a SYN attack -- you're opening a port but not connecting to it, or dropping it.
A tax on uncompleted transactions might also help here. I'd say Soros's suggestion also has merits, though perhaps the incomplete transaction tax could be set somewhat higher.
Neither would have to be large to make HFT grossly unprofitable.
I agree. My understanding is that regulations in my own country (Canada) are being put in place to mitigate such problems. I just think it is important to maintain the distinction between high frequency trading and high frequency quoting. They should not be condemned as one entity.