Of course, only authorized users could see the data, but that was a different compliance line item.
Of course, only authorized users could see the data, but that was a different compliance line item.
Bank data is never E2EE because the bank needs to see it. If banks call it E2EE they are misusing the term. E2EE for financial transactions would look like e.g. ZCash.
That being said, the person you're replying to seems to be saying that "the server" is always an "intended" end, which is wrong.
Are we talking about 2 different things here?
This is what it takes to make a financial transaction E2EE. I'm not saying that banks could or should do this. I'm just saying that their systems do not qualify as E2EE unless they do. It's not ambiguous.
My understanding is that banks, at least in the US, need to have fairly extensive knowledge relating to all transfers of money, both for fraud handling and for non-fraud (money laundering, etc). A transaction they can't know anything about other than "transfer X money to some recipient you can't know anything about" just doesn't seem realistic with the regulations involved.
Plus, even "transfer X money to some recipient you can't know anything about" is a message that you're sending _to_ the bank, that they have to be able to decode and read. And, presumably, you'd encrypt that message and expect the bank to decrypt it.
Honestly, I don't understand what argument is that you're not sending a message TO the bank, and they need to be able to read it in order to act on it, and they need to decrypt it to read it. The bank is the target of the message, they are one of the "ends" in E2EE.
I feel like I need an "Explain this like I'm 5", because clearly you believe differently than me... and I don't understand _how_ it can be otherwise.
That's an argument that their payment service is not end-to-end encrypted, not an argument that you can simply redefine the ends and say that it is.
> Honestly, I don't understand what argument is that you're not sending a message TO the bank, and they need to be able to read it in order to act on it, and they need to decrypt it to read it. The bank is the target of the message, they are one of the "ends" in E2EE.
That's the part that I'm confused on.
You might just as well say that E2EE messaging is impossible because you are sending a message "to" Signal, and they need to read it in order to act on it.
I'm telling the bank "I want you to give $5 of my money to Bob". I'm not asking them to pass a message to Bob. The entire message is the instructions for the bank to give the $5 to Bob. The bank MUST be able to read that message in order to follow the directions. There's nothing to "leave encrypted" to treat the bank as a non-end of the E2EE.
You could presumably hide who Bob is by making it some kind of anonymous account thing... but that _still_ wouldn't leave any message encrypted. Because all of the information needs to have been decrypted for the bank to act on it.
For the Signal analogy to apply, there would need to be some message going to Bob. And there isn't... other than "We're giving you this $5 for OP", all of which is information in the original message that the bank needs to act on it.
That said, it might not be impossible to implement some enforcement of AML-like rules with zero-knowledge proofs. What's possible with advanced cryptography is not at all intuitive. But banks profit from their middleman position and surely wouldn't be interested in disintermediating themselves. Neither would crypto people be interested in adding AML. So I don't expect anyone to try. This fact still doesn't make existing middleman banks qualify as E2EE.
RFC 4949 (Internet Security Glossary, Version 2) from 2007: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4949
$ end-to-end encryption
(I) Continuous protection of data that flows between two points in
a network, effected by encrypting data when it leaves its source,
keeping it encrypted while it passes through any intermediate
computers (such as routers), and decrypting it only when it
arrives at the intended final destination. (See: wiretapping.
Compare: link encryption.)
Examples: A few are BLACKER, CANEWARE, IPLI, IPsec, PLI, SDNS,
SILS, SSH, SSL, TLS.
Tutorial: When two points are separated by multiple communication
links that are connected by one or more intermediate relays, end-
to-end encryption enables the source and destination systems to
protect their communications without depending on the intermediate
systems to provide the protection.
There's a bunch of older references as well. Since SSL/TLS wasn't really adopted by a lot of services until 2008+ usages of it are mainly in papers, old forum posts, etc. I saw it used and was discussing it back in the day on IRC with folks who were way more knowledgeable than me on this topic and had been in the trenches for a while :D