Right; that makes a lot of sense. So currently the only implementation of pam is written in Yolo-C. If you want to build a safe, secure tool which depends on pam - like sudo - then you either need to trust pam (like sudo-rs does). Or you need some way to compile pam to safe code. Fil-C is a way to do that.
Just to name them - I can think of two other solutions to this problem:
1. Sandbox pam within a wasm container. This is probably less convenient than Fil-C (although it would allow that wasm container to be linked from yolo-c, rust, go, js, etc). For pam in particular, this would also be much less safe than Fil-C, since memory bugs in pam would still be possible, and might still result in privilege escalation. Wasm only sandboxes memory at the boundary. It wouldn't protect pam itself from its own bugs like Fil-C does.
2. Rewrite pam itself in a safer language, like C#, Go or Rust. Then sudo-rs doesn't need to link to yolo C code. I suspect someone will do this soon.
I think this also reaffirms the role I see for Fil-C: as a tool to make legacy C code (like pam) safe, at the cost of performance. For new code, I'd rather pick a fully GC language if I don't care about performance, or use rust if performance matters. Again, it would be nice if I could have the best of both worlds - use fil-c to wrap and sandbox pam, but write the rest of my program in rust or C# or Go or something else that is already safe without needing to pay fil-c's cost.
> But, unlike Rust, Fil-C does not attempt to ensure race-freedom for your own logic.
It depends what you're doing, but this can be a pretty big deal. I suppose this puts Fil-C in about the same safety and performance camp as Go, Java and C#. Ie, it has some protections that rust is missing - like there aren't any unsafe blocks. And its missing some protections rust has - like better thread safety. The unique selling point is it works with existing C code, like old C libraries that we don't want to rewrite. Thanks for your work on it!