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Comment by mcny | Hacker News Reader

> But protecting specific directories is just whack-a-mole. The real fix is to properly sandbox code - an access whitelist rather than blacklist

I believe Wayland (don't quote me on this because I know exactly zero technical details) as opposed to x is a big step in this direction. Correct me if I am wrong but I believe this effort alone has been ongoing for a decade. A proper sandbox will take longer and risks being coopted by corporate drones trying to take away our right to use our computers as we see fit.

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Wayland is a significant improvement in one specific area (and it's not this one).

All programs in X were trusted and had access to the same drawing space. This meant that one program could see what another one was drawing. Effectively this meant that any compromised program could see your whole screen if you were using X.

Wayland has a different architecture where programs only have access to the resources to draw their own stuff, and then a separate compositor joins all the results together.

Wayland does nothing about the REST of the application permission model - ability to access files, send network requests etc. For that you need more sandboxing e.g. Flatpak, Containers, VMs

Maybe I am missing something but how and why would a display protocol have anything to do with file access model??

In Wayland you have these xdg-portals that broker access to the filesystem, microphone, webcam, etc. I am not knowledgeable about the security model though.

Portals are used to integrate applications to the host if they're being run inside a sandboxed environment.

They are hooks that latch on the common GUI application library calls for things such as "open file dialogs" such that exeptions to the sandbox are implicitly added as-you-go.

They cannot prevent for example direct filesystem access if the application has permission to open() stuff, like if they're not running in a sandbox, or if said sandbox have a "can see and modify entire filesystem" exception (very common on your average flatpak app, btw).

portals are used by wayland, but you can also use them without wayland.

E.g. under X you can use bubblewrap or firejail to restrict access to the web or whatever for some program, but still give that program access to for example an xdg portal that lets you "open url in web browser" (except the locked-down program can't for example see the result of downloading that web page)

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