I'm excited for this as it will allow desktops to get closer to the security of phones.
In my model my Linux pc is a lot more secure as there's no adversary having direct access and more control than me.
We shouldn't be happy with the state of security on Linux, while simultaneously enjoying its privacy benefits.
If a company has access to my data without my -completely voluntary- consent, that's a security breach.
As a 20 year old linux user, I do often use ChromeOS or ChromeOSflex. Just works. Beautiful UI. No more pain with webcam or wifi drivers - Yes, these have improved by still one has the pain of dropped packets (realtek wifi) etc. guaranteed 10 hour battery life.
With ChromeOS I just get 4 or 5 second - update - immutable OS. Fedora Silverblue is coming up but still not there.
But in practical terms there is a lot of trusting of someone/their-code going on. Unless you are reading/understanding it all.
I trust linux more than windows. But I've never read a line of it...
Not "the code is readable therefore trustable".
More "the code is readable, therefore I trust multiple someones, somewhere will read it or has read it and if they have a concern they will voice it".
Is it the greatest thing to trust? No, but like a lot of things in life, it's the best of the practical options.
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2024/apr/06/xz-uti...
That’s just one we know about it.
Microsoft/Apple have similarly secure set ups for their operating systems. Bitlocker by default (although there is a convenient backdoor for high-paying customers to protect against data loss and for law enforcement forensics) and Apple's Secure Enclave (only broken into by a certain five countries intelligence agencies and for older versions streaming pirates) should protect the average user pretty well.
Is there anything special about Android phones (especially budget ones) that makes them more secure? That's not what I've seen.
Meanwhile per-app isolation is a pain. You download a picture in a browser, crop it in a photo editor and attach it to an email. All three apps need access to the same picture. Your backup app needs access to everything. Your password manager is filling in fields in other apps.
You do want to be able to isolate something questionable, but the usual way to do this for sophisticated users is virtual machines or containers. Maybe that could use a coat of paint to make it easier for unsophisticated users to use it, but maybe unsophisticated users should just stick to the system package manager anyway.
On Android, each of those three apps would ask you for file system permissions on first launch. Your choices are "full access to user files", "limited access" (usually one directory and all its sub-directories), "full access, but only this time", and "no access".
Both the "save file as" and the "open file" dialog only show directories the app can access, and have a button at the top that reads something like "change storage scope" or "allow more access".
The system even has options where apps can request access to e.g. all photo/video/media directories - the photo editor would probably request only those to begin with.
Also, apps can pretty much never access each others config/keys/etc files - which they never should. If they need to communicate with each other, they're supposed to use interfaces like the Content Provider, Intents or Bound Services.
I think it's pretty well designed.
Which isn't completely useless, but in most cases the only thing you really want is "full access" or "I don't actually trust this thing" -- and most users aren't going to comprehend the difference between more fine-grained alternatives anyway -- and then you're basically looking at the distinction between normal trusted apps and something you run in a container.
> Also, apps can pretty much never access each others config/keys/etc files - which they never should.
And that's the problem, because the backup app is supposed to be able to back up everything, a malware scanner can't have potentially malicious apps hiding something from it, etc.