Imagine a piece of software that is on some LTS, but it's not that popular. Bash is going to be used extensively, but what about a library used by one package? And the package is used by 10k people worldwide?
Well, many of those people have moved on to a newer version of a distro. So now you're left with 18 people in the world, using 10 year old LTS, so who finds the security vulnerabilities? The distro sure doesn't, distros typically just wait for CVEs.
And after a decade, the codebase is often diverged enough, that vulnerability researchers, looking at newer code, won't be helpful for older code. They're basically unique codebases at that point. Who's going through that unique codebase?
I'd say that a forked, LTS apache2 (just an example) on a 15 year old LTS is likely used by 17 people and someone's dog. So one might ask, would you use software which is a security concern, let's say a http server or what not, if only 18 people in the world looked at the codebase? Used it?
And are around to find CVEs?
This is a problem with any rarely used software. Fewer hands on, means less chance of finding vulnerabilities. 15 year old LTS means all software is rare.
And even though software is rare, if an adversary finds out it is so, they can then play to their heart's content, looking for a vulnerability.