Just look at everything they've done to break yt-dlp over and over again. In fact their newest countermeasure is a frontpage story right beside this one: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=45898407
Just look at everything they've done to break yt-dlp over and over again. In fact their newest countermeasure is a frontpage story right beside this one: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=45898407
But having seen how things work at large companies including Google, I find it less likely for Google's Android team to be allocating resources or making major policy decisions by considering the YouTube team. :-) (Of course if Android happened to make a change that negatively affected YouTube revenue, things may get escalated and the change may get rolled back as in the infamous Chrome-vs-Ads case, but those situations are very rare.) Taking their explanation at face value (their anti-malware team couldn't keep up: bad actors can spin up new harmful apps instantly. It becomes an endless game of whack-a-mole. Verification changes the math by forcing them to use a real identity) seems justified in this case.
My point though was that whatever the ultimate stable equilibrium becomes, it will be one in which the set of apps that the average person can easily install is limited in some way — I think Google's proposed solution here (hobbyists can make apps having not many users, and “experienced users” can opt out of the security measures) is actually a “least bad” compromise, but still not a happy outcome for those who would like a world where anyone can write apps that anyone can install.
One way to achieve this is to only allow sideloading in "developer mode", which could only be activated from the setup / onboarding screen. That way, power users who know they'll want to sideload could still sideload. The rest could enjoy the benefits of an ecosystem where somebody more competent than their 80-year-old nontechnical self can worry about cybersecurity.
Another way to do this would be to enforce a 48-hour cooldown on enabling sideloading, perhaps waived if enabled within 48 hrs of device setup. This would be enough time for most people to literally "cool off" and realize they're being scammed, while not much of an obstacle for power users.
In other words, it's not any quality of Linux other than how niche it is.
Yea no. Now companies have to supply two phones, one for dev and one for calling. It is hard enough to get one...
80-year-old nontechnical self can easily operate machines and devices that are much more complex and easily more dangerous than a smartphone.
And yet we're here pretending that those same people will install apps without even thinking about it.
Careless people are careless, we know that, we don't make them safer by treating everyone else like toddlers with a gun in their hands.
Of course that's a side effect Google probably wouldn't be sad about.
Google is not rolling this out to protect against YouTube ReVanced but only in a small number of countries. That’s an illogical conclusion to draw from the facts.
Also, its not SIDE loading. Its installing an app.
I'm not on the side of locking people out, but this is a poor argument.
Debian already is sideloaded on the graciousness of Microsoft's UEFI bootloader keys. Without that key, you could not install anything else than MS Windows.
Hence you don't realize how good of an argument it is, because you even bamboozled yourself without realizing it.
It gets a worse argument if we want to discuss Qubes and other distributions that are actually focused on security, e.g. via firejail, hardened kernels or user namespaces to sandbox apps.
This is only true if you use Secure boot. It is already not needed and insecure so should be turned off. Then any OS can be installed.
> It is already not needed and insecure so should be turned off.
You know what's even less secure? Having it off.
Oh, you don't use <thing literally named ‘Secure [Verb]’>?? You must not care about being secure, huh???
Dear Microsoft: fuck off; I refuse to seek your permission-via-signing-key to run my own software on my own computer.
Also Secure boot is vulnerable to many types of exploits. Having it enabled can be a danger in its self as it can be used to infect the OS that relies on it.
No one is stopping you from installing your own keys, though?
I also dual-boot Windows and that's a whole additional can of worms; not sure it would even be possible to self-key that. Microsoft's documentation explicitly mentions OEMs and ODMs and not individual end users: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/manufactu...
Securing the boot chain protects against a whole range of attacks, so yes, it is objectively better from a security POV.
Malware developers know how to avoid this facade of an unlocked door.
Users do not.
That's the problem. It's not about development, it's about user experience. Most users are afraid to open any Terminal window, let alone aren't even capable of typing a command in there.
If you argue about good intent from Microsoft here, think again. It's been 12 years since Stuxnet, and the malware samples still work today. Ask yourself why, if the reason isn't utter incompetence on Microsoft's part. It was never about securing the boot process, otherwise this would've been fixed within a day back in 2013.
Pretty much all other bootkits also still work btw, it's not a singled out example. It's the norm of MS not giving a damn about it.
Turning off UEFI secure boot on a PC to install another "unsecure distribution"
vs.
Unlocking fastboot bootloader on Android to install another "unsecure ROM"
... is not the exact same language, which isn"t really about security but about absolute control of the device.
The parallels are astounding, given that Microsoft's signing process of binaries also meanwhile depends on WHQL and the Microsoft Store. Unsigned binaries can't be installed unless you "disable security features".
My point is that it has absolutely nothing to do with actual security improvements.
Google could've invested that money instead into building an EDR and called it Android Defender or something. Everyone worried about security would've installed that Antivirus. And on top of it, all the fake Anti Viruses in the Google Play Store (that haven't been removed by Google btw) would have no scamming business model anymore either.
The parallels are astounding, given that Microsoft's signing process of binaries also meanwhile depends on WHQL and the Microsoft Store. Unsigned binaries can't be installed unless you "disable security features".
My point is that it has absolutely nothing to do with actual security improvements."
I agree. It is the same type of language.
You can only turn off Secure Boot because Microsoft allows it. In the same way Android has its CDD with rules all OEMs must follow (otherwise they won't get Google's apps), Windows has a set of hardware certification requirements (otherwise the OEM won't be able to get Windows pre-installed), and it's these certification requirements that say "it must be possible to disable Secure Boot". A future version of Windows could easily have in its hardware certification requirements "it must not be possible to disable Secure Boot", and all OEMs would be forced to follow it if they wanted Windows.
And that already happened. Some time ago, Microsoft mandated that it must not be possible to disable Secure Boot on ARM-based devices (while keeping the rule that it must be possible to disable it on x86-based devices). I think this rule was changed later, but for ARM-based Windows laptops of that era, it's AFAIK not possible to disable Secure Boot to install an alternate OS.
The linked post is full of fluff and low on detail. Google doesn't seem to have the details themselves; they're continuing with the rollout while still designing the flow that will let experienced users install apps like normal.
Naturally that got broken too, and even worse, broken when it's only supported by a minority of devices and content, because the more devices and content it's used for the easier it is to break and the larger the incentive to do it.
If you tried to require that for all content then it would have to be supported by all devices, including the bargain bin e-waste with derelict security, and what do you expect to happen then?
That’s why a lot of low end Android devices often have problems playing DRMed content on the Web: their keyboxes got cracked open and leaked wide enough for piracy that they got revoked and downgraded down to L3.
without opening it up physically there is no way to make it stop or get the raw stream before it's displayed
the real pain in the butt in my present is Patreon because I can't be arsed to write something separate for it. as-is, I subscribe to people on Patreon and then never bother watching any of the exclusive content because it's too much work. some solutions like Ghost (providing an API for donor content access) get part of the way to a solution, but they are not themselves a video host, and I've never seen anyone use it.
That's not real DRM then. The real DRM is sending the content such that it flows down the protected media path (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Protected_Media_Path) or equivalent. Userspace never sees decrypted plaintext content. The programmable part of the GPU never seen plaintext decrypted content. Applying some no-op blur filter would be pointless since anything doing the blur couldn't see the pixels. It's not something you can work around with clever CSS. To compromise it, you need to do an EoP into ordinarily non-programmable scanout of the GPU or find bad cryptography or a side channel that lets you get the private key that can decode the frames. Very hard.
Is this how YT works today? Not on every platform. Could it work this way? Definitely. The only thing stopping them is fear of breaking compatibility with a long tail of legacy devices.
If I'm going to live in a walled garden it's going to the fanciest
Because the hardware is so constrained an iphone lasts forever compared to a similar android. My two year old pixel is slow now, but I know people completely happy with a five year old iphone. Pause, I checked and the oldest iphone that receives updates is an iphone 11, which is the exact model I had before going back to android.
Of course I would be much happier if I didn't need to use Shizuku in the first place.
[0]: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=moe.shizuku.pr...
Not only users are not connected to WiFi all the time, but in many developing countries people often have no WiFi at home and rely on mobile data instead. It's a solution, but not a solution for everyone or a solution that works all the time.
I think number of people caring about alternative app stores, F-droid or whatever is very similar to the number of people willing to use adb if necessary, so rather small.